Despite its highest rates of entrepreneurial intentions for women worldwide, the MENA region suffers from the largest gender gap in women establishing and owning businesses. This paper incorporates the gender of firm manager in a theoretical framework that explains the incidence, magnitude, and perception of corruption by the control rights and bargaining strength of firms. Using a unique panel data set on corruption in MENA containing quantitative information on bribe payments by firms, we find that a firm’s need to pay bribes is explained by the control maintained by public officials over this firm. Firms’ “ability to pay” and “refusal power” explain a large part of the variation in bribes’ magnitude, with female managers paying lower bribes. Female managers are more likely to be requested or expected to provide a gift/informal payment in the visits or inspections by tax officials. Prior exposure to corruption and more intense exposures, lower time opportunity cost of not engaging in corruption, not affording to pay informal payments, and doubting the rule of law are associated with a higher likelihood of perceiving corruption as a bigger obstacle to the firm’s operations. Female managers perceive corruption as a bigger obstacle to their firm operations.
Research Associates
Amira El-Shal
Acting Associate Director of Research, J-PAL MENA