

Agency in Transition: Evidence on Women's Empowerment in Jordan (2010–2025)

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Abstract

Using data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey waves of 2010, 2016, and 2025, this paper offers an assessment of women’s agency among women aged 15–59 across five core domains: household decision-making, mobility, financial autonomy, gender role attitudes, and rejection of intimate partner violence. The 2025 cross-sectional modules also enable direct comparisons between women and men on norms related to work, childcare, financial autonomy, leadership, and the justification of violence. Women’s participation in household decision-making expanded over time and reaches very high levels among married women by 2025, while improving but remaining lower among unmarried women. Rejection of intimate partner violence became nearly universal by 2025 across age, education, region, and nationality. In contrast, mobility and financial autonomy follow a U-shaped trajectory; declining in 2016 and only partially recovering by 2025, when just 36–41 percent of women report independent mobility to key destinations, and about half report access to household money. Ownership of longer-term assets remains limited, particularly among Syrian women. Egalitarian gender attitudes remain widespread but have softened over time, especially among younger, less educated women and those in the South. Support for women’s right to work and equal schooling remains high, but endorsement of women’s leadership and men’s participation in care has declined. Beliefs linking women’s work to financial independence have gained traction. In 2025, men are consistently less supportive of gender equality than women, especially in relation to women’s employment in male-dominated settings and men’s caregiving roles. Across domains, educational attainment is the most consistent predictor of higher agency. Overall, the findings reveal strong progress in rejecting violence and expanding women’s role in household decisions, yet gains in mobility and financial autonomy remain incomplete. To sustain and deepen women’s agency, targeted efforts are needed to expand independent control over savings and assets—particularly for Syrian women—address mobility barriers through safe transport and childcare, and engage not only husbands and young men but also policymakers, religious leaders, and media actors, to shift social norms around provision, care, and public participation in Jordan.

Keywords: Women’s empowerment; agency; decision-making; mobility; financial autonomy; gender norms; intimate partner violence; social norms; Jordan; Middle East and North Africa; JLMPS; gender equality

JEL Classifications: J16, O15, Z13

ملخص

باستخدام بيانات من موجات المسح التتبعي لسوق العمل في الأردن للأعوام 2010 و2016 و2025، تقدم هذه الورقة تقييماً لوكالة المرأة بين النساء اللاتي تتراوح أعمارهن بين 15-59 عامًا عبر خمسة مجالات أساسية: صنع القرار الأسري، والتنقل، والاستقلال المالي، ومواقف الأدوار النوعية، ورفض العنف الشريك. وتتيح الوحدات المقطعية لعام 2025 أيضًا إجراء مقارنات مباشرة بين النساء والرجال بشأن المعايير المتعلقة بالعمل ورعاية الأطفال والاستقلال المالي والقيادة وتبرير العنف. وتوسعت مشاركة المرأة في صنع القرار الأسري بمرور الوقت ووصلت إلى مستويات مرتفعة للغاية بين النساء المتزوجات بحلول عام 2025، في حين تحسنت ولكنها ظلت أقل بين النساء غير المتزوجات. أصبح رفض العنف الشريك عالميًا تقريبًا بحلول عام 2025 عبر العمر والتعليم والمنطقة والجنسية. في المقابل، يتبع التنقل والاستقلال المالي مسارًا على شكل حرف U؛ حيث انخفض في عام 2016 ولم يتعاف إلا جزئيًا بحلول عام 2025، عندما أبلغت 36-41 بالمائة فقط من النساء عن تنقل مستقل إلى الجهات الرئيسية، وأبلغ حوالي النصف عن إمكانية الوصول إلى أموال الأسرة. وتظل ملكية الأصول طويلة الأجل محدودة، وخاصة بين النساء السوريات. ولا تزال مواقف المساواة بين الجنسين منتشرة على نطاق واسع ولكنها تضاءلت مع مرور الوقت، وخاصة بين النساء الأصغر سنًا والأقل تعليمًا وأولئك الذين يعيشون في الجنوب. ولا يزال الدعم لحق المرأة في العمل والتعليم المتساوي مرتفعًا، ولكن تأييد القيادة النسائية ومشاركة الرجال في الرعاية قد انخفض. وقد اكتسبت المعتقدات التي تربط عمل المرأة بالاستقلال المالي زخمًا. في عام 2025، أصبح الرجال أقل دعمًا للمساواة بين الجنسين من النساء باستمرار، وخاصة فيما يتعلق بتوظيف النساء في البيئات التي يهيمن عليها الذكور وأدوار الرجال في تقديم الرعاية. وفي مختلف المجالات، يعد التحصيل التعليمي هو المؤشر الأكثر ثباتًا للفاعلية العليا. وبشكل عام، تكشف النتائج عن تقدم قوي في رفض العنف وتوسيع دور المرأة في القرارات الأسرية، إلا أن المكاسب في مجال التنقل والاستقلال المالي لا تزال غير مكتملة. ومن أجل دعم وتعميق قدرة المرأة على التصرف، هناك حاجة إلى بذل جهود مستهدفة لتوسيع السيطرة المستقلة على المدخرات والأصول — وخاصة بالنسبة للنساء السوريات — ومعالجة حواجز التنقل من خلال النقل الآمن ورعاية الأطفال، وإشراك ليس فقط الأزواج والشباب ولكن أيضا صناعات السياسات والزعماء الدينيين والجهات الفاعلة في وسائل الإعلام، لتحويل المعايير الاجتماعية حول توفير الرعاية والمشاركة العامة في الأردن.

1. Introduction

Jordan's headline indicators tell a paradox. Girls' schooling has expanded (UNESCO Institute for Statistics [UIS] 2025), and gender equality strategies have proliferated (Jordanian National Commission for Women [JNCW] 2020; UN Women 2022); yet women's participation in paid work remains among the lowest in the world, and progress has been stubbornly slow (IMF 2022; Youssef, Oraby and Farid Sammy 2023). The persistence of this gap may reflect not only constraints on human capital or labor demand but also limitations in women's agency. These include their mobility, control over resources, voice in household decisions, and capacity to challenge restrictive norms (IMF 2022).

Micro-level studies using Jordanian data show how gender norms shape women's freedom of movement and decision-making power and how migration can reinforce conservative expectations (Tuccio and Wahba 2018). Since 2010, Jordan has experienced major demographic and economic shifts, including the Syrian refugee crisis, fiscal pressures, and persistently high unemployment. At the same time, national strategies and donor-supported programs have continued to emphasize women's economic participation and gender equality (Asfoura and De Moura 2020; World Bank 2025). These developments provide an important backdrop for examining whether women's agency has changed over time.

Despite extensive attention to women's economic participation (DoS and ICF 2024; Krafft, Assaad and Abushehab 2026; UN Women 2022), there is limited evidence for Jordan that systematically follows key domains of agency, distinguishes reported capabilities from underlying attitudes, and identifies which groups are advancing and which remain constrained. Generating such evidence is essential for designing effective policies, targeting resources, and ensuring accountability.

This paper offers a portrait of women's agency in Jordan, drawing on three waves of the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey for 2010, 2016, and 2025. We assess five aspects of agency in women aged 15 to 59: decision making in the household, mobility freedom, financial independence, attitudes toward gender roles, and rejection of intimate partner violence.

This paper addresses these questions:

- 1) How have the relational (decision-making), spatial (mobility), financial (access/ownership), attitudinal (intrinsic agency), and normative (intimate partner violence [IPV] rejection) dimensions of women's agency evolved between 2010 and 2025?
- 2) How do these trajectories differ by age group, educational attainment, region (Middle, North, South), and nationality (Syrians versus Jordanians)?
- 3) In 2025, how do men's and women's attitudes differ on women's work and related norms (work rights, childcare, education, parenting, financial autonomy, leadership, and IPV justification)?

Answering these questions provides a nuanced picture of women's empowerment in Jordan and highlights groups and regions that require immediate policy focus. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and methods. Section 4 presents the findings. Section 5 concludes with policy implications, limitations, and directions for future research.

2. Background

Women's agency in Jordan has advanced unevenly. Legal reforms and rising female educational attainment have coincided with low labor-force participation and enduring norms around women's mobility and domestic roles that still limit their agency (World Bank 2018, 2023). Drawing on recent evidence, this section reviews five domains—mobility, financial autonomy, household decision-making, gender-role attitudes, and rejection of IPV—to motivate the analysis of women's agency using JLMPS data.

Household decision-making authority varies across domains and depends on whether decisions are measured as sole authority or joint participation. Earlier JPFHS evidence shows uneven involvement in household decisions, especially around major purchases (DoS and ICF 2019). In 2023, however, participation appears broader when joint decisions are included: 82 percent of currently married women participated in decisions about major household purchases, 94 percent in decisions about their own health care, and 92 percent in decisions about visits to family or relatives (DoS and ICF 2024). Still, joint participation should not be read as equal authority, since IMAGES Jordan shows that many men continue to believe men should have the final say in household decisions (Burniat, Cano and Asfoura 2022). This suggests that reported joint decision-making can mask unequal influence when veto power or budget control rests with husbands (Felicio and Gauri 2018; UNICEF 2025).

Mobility, or freedom of movement, is crucial for accessing schooling, healthcare, employment, and civic participation. In Jordan, women's mobility is shaped by both social norms and transport constraints, including safety concerns, affordability, service quality, and access to reliable public transport (Morad, Ardila Gómez et al. 2022; Kurshitashvili, Dajani et al. 2020). Earlier JPFHS waves documented health-access barriers linked to women's mobility and autonomy (DoS and ICF 2019). The 2023 JPFHS shows that such barriers remain especially high among women with no education: 27 percent reported needing permission to seek treatment as a serious problem, 40 percent reported not wanting to go alone, and 48 percent reported distance or transport-related barriers to reaching care (DoS and ICF 2024). Recent policy and program efforts, including gender-sensitive public transport reforms, codes of conduct, reporting mechanisms, and safety initiatives, have sought to reduce these constraints, but mobility remains a central barrier to women's agency in Jordan (Kurshitashvili, Dajani et al. 2020; Economic and Social Council of Jordan and UN Women 2022).

Financial agency concerns earning income and directing spending. Despite gains in schooling, women's labor-force participation remains low at 15 percent, limiting their earnings and bargaining power (Krafft, Assaad and Abushehab 2026). Women with secondary and post-secondary education are more likely to control their own earnings and household expenditures, yet remittances, microcredit, and digital payments often expand access to funds without ensuring autonomous control, which still depends on marital power and norms (Felicio and Gauri 2018). The National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2023–2028 likewise highlights persistent gender gaps in account ownership, credit, and use of formal financial services, especially among low-income women (Central Bank of Jordan 2023).

Evidence from Jordan shows that higher education is linked to more egalitarian views on gender roles and decision making, especially among younger cohorts and residents of large cities (Haerpfer, Inglehart et al. 2022; UN Women 2022). Men are generally less supportive of gender equality than women, particularly among less educated and older groups (Alhameedyeen 2025). Pro-equality attitudes are often associated with greater exposure to schooling, social media, and advocacy campaigns such as SADAQA, a Jordanian initiative that promotes work and family-friendly policies (OECD/ILO/CAWTAR 2020). Yet an attitude–behavior gap persists, as supportive views do not always translate into more mobility, employment, or financial control in the face of care burdens and prevailing norms (Felicio and Gauri 2018; Burniat, Cano and Asfoura 2022).

Legal and normative environments shape women’s ability to reject IPV. The 2017 repeal of Penal Code Article 308, which had allowed rapists to avoid prosecution or suspend sentences by marrying their victims, is widely regarded as a key step against impunity for sexual violence (UN Women 2017). After the reform, marriage to the victim no longer halts criminal proceedings, and offenders can be prosecuted regardless of marital status. Surveys show increasing rejection of wife beating, especially among educated and urban women, but stigma and reputation concerns around reporting remain strong, especially in poorer areas (DoS and ICF 2019; UNFPA 2024). Recent evidence from Jordan indicates that many survivors still do not seek help, citing fear of retaliation, honor-related pressure, lack of confidentiality, and financial dependence as major barriers to accessing services (Gender-Based Violence Sub-Working Group 2024; UNFPA 2024).

Three patterns emerge: education is linked to increased mobility, financial inclusion, household engagement, egalitarian gender views, and lower tolerance of IPV; place affects access, with urban and better-served areas offering more freedom; and legal and service changes can improve agency but are limited by norms. These results support using JLMPS data to track women’s agency in Jordan.

3. Data and methodology

The analysis draws on the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) waves for 2010, 2016, and 2025 (OAMDI 2018a, 2018b, 2026). The three nationally representative waves are used jointly to trace changes in women’s agency over time. The 2025 cross-section is also used to analyze additional questions on gender differences in attitudes, which were fielded only in that wave. All estimates use the individual survey weights provided with the JLMPS.

3.1. Analytical sample

The core analytical sample consists of women aged 15 to 59 in 2010, 2016, and 2025. For each agency dimension, the results start with an overview figure at the item level, followed by disaggregation by ten-year age groups, region, education, and nationality. The age groups are 15-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59. Regions are categorized as North, Middle, and South. Education levels are divided into three categories: Illiterate or Read/Write, Basic, and Secondary or higher, with the last group combining secondary, post-secondary, university, and postgraduate education. For 2025, the figures also present separate estimates for Jordanians and Syrians.

3.2. Construction of agency measures

For each agency dimension, indices are constructed by averaging binary items coded as one when the empowering condition holds and zero otherwise. In the figures, these indices are shown as percentages. Household decision-making is measured using harmonized variables that indicate whether a woman reports involvement in decisions about large household purchases, daily needs, visits to relatives, food, health care, and children's schooling and clothing. Each decision item is coded as one if the woman reports having a say in the decision, either alone or jointly, and zero otherwise. For each woman, the decision-making index is calculated as the simple average of these items and interpreted as the percentage of decision domains in which she reports involvement. Separate indices are calculated for unmarried and married women in each wave.

Comparisons over time should be interpreted with caution because the 2025 survey did not field all decision domains included in earlier waves and also used revised response options for some items. As a result, changes between 2016 and 2025 may reflect both changes in women's reported decision-making involvement and differences in measurement. The time trends are therefore presented descriptively, with attention to possible changes in question wording and response categories.

Mobility is measured using four indicators that record whether a woman can go to a market, visit a health facility, take a child to a doctor, and visit nearby family or friends. Each item is coded as one if she reports that she can go alone or after informing someone, and zero for all other arrangements, including needing permission, needing to be accompanied, or not being able to go. Results are shown as the percentage of women who can go alone or after informing someone for each destination, as well as averages across destinations.

Financial autonomy is proxied by two binary measures, reported separately rather than averaged. The first indicates whether a woman has access to household money, and the second indicates whether she owns valuables. Each variable is coded as one if the answer is yes and zero otherwise. Results are reported as the percentage of women with access to money and the percentage who own valuables.

Intrinsic agency, interpreted as gender role attitudes, is measured using ten Likert-scale statements on women's employment, men's roles in care and housework, women's leadership, and equal schooling for girls and boys. Negatively worded items are reverse-coded so that higher values always correspond to more egalitarian views. Each item is coded as one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the egalitarian statement and zero otherwise. The intrinsic agency index is the percentage of intrinsic items for which the respondent agrees or strongly agrees across the ten items. Item-specific percentages are also presented.

Rejection of intimate partner violence is measured using scenarios that ask whether a husband is ever justified in hitting or beating his wife. Each scenario is coded as one if hitting is not justified and zero if it is considered justified, and the IPV rejection index is the percentage of scenarios rejected. In 2025 a reduced set of scenarios was fielded, so the index in that wave reflects a slightly narrower range of situations. For each agency dimension, item-level percentages are presented by wave, and indices are contrasted by age group, education, region, and, for 2025, by nationality for Jordanians and Syrians.

3.3. Additional questions for men and women in 2025

The 2025 wave includes several attitude questions asked of both men and women, allowing direct gender comparisons. Respondents evaluated how women's employment in the public sector, the private sector, and self-employment affects marriage prospects. Women also reported how supportive a husband is expected to be of their work and whether they expect to continue working after marriage. A five-item set assesses acceptance of mothers of young children working under different childcare arrangements, and a short battery of items captures general approval or disapproval of married women's employment. Respondents who oppose women's work cite mainly concerns about domestic care, childcare availability, exposure to harassment, moral beliefs, or views on men's role as provider. Broader perspectives on gender and employment are assessed through questions on spousal support, girls' education, motherhood, marital harmony, women's financial independence, and women's leadership, along with IPV questions also being asked of men. These questions offer a clear baseline for 2025 to monitor gender gaps in attitudes toward women's employment and the acceptance of IPV.

4. Results


4.1. Involvement in decision-making

Figure 1 shows the share of women involved in specific household decisions, separately for unmarried and married women in the 2010, 2016, and 2025 JLMPS waves. Because response options and the availability of some decision items differ across waves, the patterns should be interpreted descriptively rather than as fully comparable time trends.

The figure first shows a clear marital-status divide. Married women report substantially higher involvement than unmarried women across nearly all adult household decisions. By 2025, married women's involvement reaches 85 percent for major household items, 88 percent for daily needs, 88 percent for visits to family or friends, and about 90 percent or higher for daily food, going to the doctor, and buying personal clothes. Among unmarried women, involvement is lower, but it rises notably in routine household decisions. Between 2010 and 2025, involvement in major household items increases from 19 to 54 percent, daily needs from 17 to 53 percent, visits to family or friends from 39 to 56 percent, and daily food from 21 to 58 percent.

The largest gains are therefore concentrated among unmarried women, while married women begin from much higher levels and show smaller changes over time. Health-related decision-making is already comparatively high among unmarried women in 2010 and remains around 62 percent by 2025, while involvement in buying personal clothes starts very high, declines in 2016, and partially recovers by 2025. Child-related items should be read cautiously because they are not observed consistently across waves.


Figure 1. Percentage involved in household decisions, by marital status, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Household decision-making involvement by age group and marital status is shown in Figure 2. Among unmarried women, participation increases with age each year. In 2010, about a quarter of those aged 15–19 and a third of those aged 20–29 reported involvement, compared with just over half of women in their thirties and around three quarters of those aged 40–59. By 2025, involvement has increased at all ages, but the gradient remains: fewer than half of unmarried teenagers are involved, around two-thirds of women in their thirties are, and nearly 90 percent of those aged 50–59. Married women show a much flatter age profile: their participation was already high in 2010 (around 70–85 percent) and rises to about 88–93 percent in most age groups by 2025. Overall, decision-making is concentrated among older women, especially married women, while younger unmarried women show the largest gains over time.


Figure 2. Decision-making involvement index, percentage of decision domains with involvement, by marital status and age group, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Figure 3 shows decision-making involvement by education level and marital status. Among unmarried women, involvement remains much lower than among married women across all education groups, but the education pattern is not strictly linear. In 2025, involvement is highest among unmarried women with secondary or higher education, at 62 percent, followed by illiterate/read-write women at 57 percent and women with basic education at 55 percent. Among married women, involvement is high across all education groups, ranging from 86 to 91 percent in 2025, with only small differences by schooling. Over time, involvement increases in most groups, especially among unmarried women, while married women remain at consistently high levels.

Figure 3. Decision-making involvement index, percentage of decision domains with involvement, by marital status and education level, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025




Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010–2025

Figure 4 compares women's decision-making involvement across regions for unmarried and married women. Among unmarried women, involvement is lowest in the South and highest in the North and Middle. In 2010, fewer than 40 percent reported involvement in any region, but the North and Middle already sit slightly above the South. By 2025, regional gaps widen: around 60 percent of unmarried women in the North and Middle are involved in decisions, compared with only about 54 percent in the South.

Among married women, involvement is high in all regions, with the North and Middle generally ahead of the South. Levels exceed 80 percent everywhere, but by 2025, married women in the South lag behind those in the North and Middle by more than 10 percentage points. Over time, participation rises for unmarried women in all regions, while for married women it increases modestly between 2010 and 2016 and then stabilizes or slightly declines in the South, indicating that regional disparities in married women's involvement have become more pronounced.


Figure 4. Decision-making involvement index, percentage of decision domains with involvement, by marital status and region, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Nationality differences in women's decision-making involvement in 2025 are modest but visible, as shown in Figure 5. Syrian women report higher involvement than Jordanian women in both marital-status groups: about 65 percent versus 59 percent among unmarried women, and 93 percent versus 89 percent among married women. This pattern should be interpreted cautiously. (Krafft, Assaad and Pastoor 2024), using the 2016 JLMPS, note that Syrian adult women often had slightly higher decision-making involvement, but that this may be driven by the more frequent absence of adult men in Syrian households. Higher reported involvement among Syrian women in 2025 may therefore reflect greater household responsibility under displacement, rather than greater autonomy alone.

Figure 5. Decision-making involvement index, percentage of decision domains with involvement, by marital status and nationality, women aged 15–59, 2025




Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2025

4.2. Freedom of movement

Across all four destinations, women's mobility autonomy remains below half, even after the 2025 rebound shown in Figure 6. In 2025, the share able to go alone or after informing someone is highest for visiting family or friends at 41 percent, followed by going to the market at 39 percent, visiting a health center at 38 percent, and taking a child to the doctor at 36 percent.

The time trend is similar across destinations: mobility declines between 2010 and 2016, then rises sharply by 2025. For example, market mobility fell from 25 percent in 2010 to 15 percent in 2016 before increasing to 39 percent in 2025. Overall, mobility autonomy improves substantially by 2025, but fewer than half of women report being able to move alone or after informing someone, indicating that mobility remains an important constraint on agency.

Figure 6. Percentage with free movement, by destination, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025


Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010–2025

Notes: Free movement is being able to go alone or after informing

Women's mobility autonomy is strongly age-graded, with older women reporting greater freedom of movement than younger women across all four destinations. Figure 7 shows that, in 2025, autonomy remains lowest among women ages 15–19, ranging from 19 percent for taking a child to the doctor to 25 percent for visiting family or friends. By contrast, women ages 50–59 report the highest levels of mobility, with 51 percent able to go to the market, 50 percent to a health center, 45 percent to take a child to the doctor, and 56 percent to visit family or friends, either alone or after informing someone.

Over time, mobility follows a common pattern across destinations and age groups: it generally declines between 2010 and 2016, then rises sharply by 2025. The rebound is especially visible among women ages 20–49. For example, among women ages 40–49, mobility reaches 49 percent for the market, 48 percent for the health center, 48 percent for taking a child to the doctor, and 51 percent for visiting family or friends in 2025. Overall, mobility autonomy improves substantially by 2025, but younger women continue to face the strongest restrictions.

Figure 7. Percentage with free movement, by destination and age group, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025




Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Notes: Free movement is being able to go alone or after informing

Figure 8 examines women’s freedom of movement by education level, using the same measure of being able to go alone or simply inform someone before going. In 2025, mobility is clearly stratified by education across all four destinations. Among women with secondary or higher education, about 41 percent can go to a market, 40 percent to a health center, 37 percent can take a child to the doctor, and 44 percent can visit family or friends. Women with only basic education report very similar levels of autonomy, with roughly 39–41 percent able to go to markets and health centers, 38 percent able to take a child to the doctor, and about 43 percent able to visit family or friends. By contrast, women who are illiterate or can only read and write have the lowest autonomy, with only about 30–33 percent reporting freedom of movement across these destinations. These patterns indicate that more educated women enjoy greater freedom of movement, but even at the top of the educational distribution, fewer than half report independent mobility to key destinations.

Figure 8. Percentage with free movement, by destination and education level, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025




Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Notes: Free movement is being able to go alone or after informing

Regional differences in mobility autonomy remain clear. In 2025, women in the North have the highest mobility to all four destinations, those in the South are in the middle, and women in the Middle region report the lowest levels. All regions follow a similar trajectory over time: moderate mobility in 2010, a dip in 2016, and sharp gains by 2025. Yet those improvements have not closed regional inequalities.


Figure 9. Percentage with free movement, by destination and region, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Notes: Free movement is being able to go alone or after informing

Nationality differences in mobility autonomy are modest in 2025, as shown in Figure 10. Syrian women report somewhat higher mobility than Jordanian women for going to the market (47 versus 39 percent) and visiting a health center (42 versus 38 percent). For taking a child to the doctor and visiting family or friends, the differences are negligible. About 36 percent of both Jordanian and Syrian women can take a child to the doctor, and about 42 percent can visit family or friends alone or after informing someone. Overall, nationality gaps in mobility are modest and vary little across destinations.

Figure 10. Percentage with free movement, by destination and nationality, women aged 15–59, 2025


Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2025

Notes: Free movement is being able to go alone or after informing

4.3. Financial autonomy

Access to household money is consistently more common than ownership of valuables, indicating that day-to-day access to cash is more widespread than control over longer-term assets. As shown in Figure 11, about half of women report access to household money by 2025, while ownership of valuables remains much lower, at roughly its 2010 level. Over time, both indicators follow a U-shaped pattern: access to money declines from about one-third of women in 2010 to around one-fifth in 2016, before rising to roughly half by 2025. Ownership of valuables follows a similar but lower-level pattern, falling from about 14 percent in 2010 to around 5 percent in 2016, then recovering to about 14 percent by 2025. Overall, financial autonomy improves by 2025 mainly through stronger access to money, while ownership of longer-term assets remains limited.


Figure 11. Percentage with access to household money and ownership of valuables, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Figure 12 highlights clear age gradients in financial autonomy. In every wave, access to household money rises with age. Younger girls are the least likely to report access, while women in their forties and fifties are the most autonomous. By 2025, fewer than one in five women ages 15 to 19 report access to money, compared with roughly two-thirds among women ages 40 to 59. Ownership of valuables shows a similar pattern, with older women much more likely than younger women to hold assets in their own name. Over time, autonomy improves across all age groups from 2010 to 2025, but gains are especially marked among younger and middle-aged women, narrowing, although not eliminating, the gap between adolescents and older women.


Figure 12. Percentage with access to household money and ownership of valuables, by age group, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Financial autonomy varies by education level, particularly in access to household money, as illustrated in Figure 13. In 2025, about 46 percent of women with no schooling/read-write or basic education report access to money, compared with 53 percent of women with secondary or higher education. Ownership of valuables is much lower across all education groups. Women with secondary or higher education have the highest ownership in each wave, while ownership remains modest among women with no schooling/read-write or basic education. Over time, access to money drops in 2016 and then rises sharply by 2025 across all education groups. Ownership follows a less consistent pattern. Overall, education differences are clearer for access to money than for ownership of valuables.


Figure 13. Percentage with access to household money and ownership of valuables, by education level, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Regional gaps in financial autonomy are modest but still visible. In 2025, access to household money is highest in the North, at about 52 percent, followed by the Middle at 49 percent and the South at 43 percent. As shown in Figure 14, ownership of valuables is low across all regions, ranging from about 13-14 percent in the South and North to 15 percent in the Middle. Over time, both indicators show the same broad pattern across regions: a decline in 2016 followed by recovery by 2025. Access to money falls especially sharply in the Middle in 2016, reaching about 17 percent, compared with roughly 23 to 25 percent in the North and South. By 2025, access has recovered strongly in all regions, although women in the South continue to report slightly lower financial autonomy than women elsewhere.


Figure 14. Percentage with access to household money and ownership of valuables, by region, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

In 2025, Jordanian and Syrian women report nearly identical access to household money, at 49 percent, as shown in Figure 15. The main disparity lies in ownership of valuables. About 15 percent of Jordanian women own valuable assets, compared with only 4 percent of Syrian women. Financial autonomy, therefore, appears more unequal in longer-term asset ownership than in immediate access to cash.


Figure 15. Percentage with access to household money and ownership of valuables, by nationality, women aged 15–59, 2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2025

Routine spending autonomy is relatively common in 2025, but not universal, as shown in Figure 16. For market purchases, 43 percent of women always have permission to buy from the market, while 31 percent usually, 22 percent sometimes, and 5 percent do not. Control over earned income is slightly higher: 49 percent can always use their earnings to buy clothes, compared with 30 percent usually, 17 percent sometimes, and 4 percent who cannot. Overall, women report greater autonomy over earned income than over market purchases.

Figure 16. Women’s ability to make market purchases and use earned income without asking permission (percentages), women aged 15–59, 2025




Source: Authors’ calculations based on JLMPS 2025
 Note: Only available in 2025

4.4 Gender Role Attitudes

Women’s gender-role attitudes vary by statement, as shown in Figure 17. Support is highest for women’s right to work, husbands’ involvement in childcare and household chores, girls’ schooling for future jobs, and women’s work as a source of financial autonomy. Support is lower for women’s leadership and for statements linking women’s employment with motherhood and marital harmony. Over time, however, the direction of change differs across items. Support for women’s right to work declines from 91 percent in 2010 to 77 percent in 2025, and support for husbands’ involvement in childcare and housework also weakens. Rejection of the ideas that working women cannot be good mothers and that women’s work harms marriage also falls by 2025. By contrast, agreement that girls should study to prepare for jobs rises from 52 to 74 percent, and agreement that women need paid work for financial autonomy increases from 56 to 72 percent. Overall, women’s work appears increasingly accepted as economically necessary, while broader egalitarian attitudes around care, family roles, leadership, and labor-market equality soften by 2025.


Figure 17. Percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing with gender-role attitude statements, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Gender-equal norms decline across all age groups between 2010 and 2025, as shown in Figure 18. Age differences are modest in each wave, but by 2025 younger women show slightly lower support than older women. The index falls from 74 to 63 percent among women ages 15–19 and from 73 to 64 percent among women ages 20–29, compared with a smaller decline from 72 to 67 percent among women ages 50–59. Overall, the weakening of gender-equal norms is broad-based, with a somewhat sharper decline among younger women.


Figure 18. Gender-role attitudes index, percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing with egalitarian statements, by age group, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010–2025

Education differences in gender-equal norms widen over time, as shown in Figure 19. In 2010, support was similar across groups, ranging from 71 percent among illiterate/read-write women to 74 percent among women with secondary or higher education. By 2025, the gap was clearer: support fell to 56 percent among illiterate/read-write women, compared with 64 percent among women with basic education and 68 percent among women with secondary or higher education. Overall, support declines in all education groups, but the drop is sharpest among women with the least schooling.


Figure 19. Gender-role attitudes index, percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing with egalitarian statements, by education level, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

The regional pattern shifts from broad similarity in 2010 to clearer divergence by 2025, as shown in Figure 20. In 2010, support for gender-equal norms was close across regions, with the South slightly higher at 75 percent, followed by the North and Middle at about 73 and 72 percent. By 2016, support increased in the North and South, with the North reaching the highest level at 78 percent and the South close behind at 76 percent, while the Middle declined to 66 percent. By 2025, the North remained relatively high at 72 percent, but support fell more sharply in the Middle to 62 percent and in the South to 59 percent. Overall, regional differences widen over time, with the South showing the largest reversal from one of the highest-support regions to the lowest by 2025.


Figure 20. Gender-role attitudes index, percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing with egalitarian statements, by region, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Nationality differences in gender-equal norms are minimal in 2025, as shown in Figure 21. Jordanian and Syrian women report identical support levels, at 64 percent. Compared with nationality, differences are more apparent by education and region, while age differences remain modest.


Figure 21. Gender-role attitudes index, percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing with egalitarian statements, by nationality, women aged 15–59, 2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2025

As shown in Figure 22, women express stronger support than men for egalitarian views on work, care, and leadership in 2025. Women are more likely to agree that girls should study for jobs (74 versus 63 percent for men), husbands should help with children (76 versus 66 percent for men) and chores (72 versus 60 percent for men), women should be allowed to work (77 versus 67 percent for men), and women should lead (65 versus 50 percent for men). Women also more often agree that work is needed for financial autonomy (73 versus 61 percent for men). Agreement with restrictive statements is much lower: 17 percent of women and 18 percent of men agree that work interferes with marriage, while 17 percent of women and 19 percent of men agree that working women are not good mothers. Overall, women report more egalitarian attitudes than men, while explicitly negative views of women’s employment remain a minority position.

Figure 22. Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with statements on women’s roles and work, by sex, women and men aged 15–59, 2025




Source: Authors’ calculations based on JLMPS 2025

4.5. Rejection of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)

Women’s rejection of IPV varies by scenario, as shown in Figure 23. Rejection is highest for burning food and lower for arguing with a husband, talking to men, wasting money, or refusing sex. Over time, rejection increases in nearly all scenarios. The biggest gains are for neglecting a child and arguing with a husband, rising from 65 percent and 41 percent in 2010 to about 99 percent in 2025. Rejection also grows between 2010 and 2016 for talking to men, wasting money, and refusing sex, although rejection of IPV in response to talking to men remains lower. Overall, the figure shows a broad shift toward rejecting IPV, with slower progress where norms around women’s interactions with men are more restrictive.


Figure 23. Percentage rejecting intimate partner violence, by scenario, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors’ calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Rejection of IPV becomes increasingly universal across age groups over time. In 2010, age differences are modest: women in their twenties and thirties are slightly less likely to reject all IPV scenarios, while teenagers and women in their fifties report somewhat higher rejection, with most groups clustered around two-thirds. By 2016, rejection rises sharply across the full age distribution, reaching about nine in ten women in every age group, and the age gradient largely disappears. By 2025, rejection is nearly universal across all ages, with only very small differences between groups. Overall, the change reflects a broad strengthening of norms against IPV across generations, rather than a shift concentrated among one age group, as shown in Figure 24.


Figure 24. IPV-rejection index, percentage of scenarios rejected, by age group, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Figure 25 shows that educational differences in IPV rejection were visible in 2010 but largely disappeared by 2025. Women with secondary or higher education were initially more likely to reject IPV than women with little or no schooling. By 2025, however, rejection is almost universal across all education groups. The figure, therefore, suggests that changing norms around IPV were broad-based, not limited to more educated women.


Figure 25. IPV-rejection index, percentage of scenarios rejected, by education level, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025


Regional differences in IPV rejection were largest in 2010, with the South at about 44 percent, compared with 58 percent in the North and 68 percent in the Middle. Over time, rejection increased in all regions, reaching around 89 percent in the Middle and South and 96 percent in the North by 2016. By 2025, rejection was nearly universal, about 99 percent in the Middle and North and 97 percent in the South. The regional gap was substantial in 2010 but minimal by 2025, showing that rejection of IPV became widespread across all regions.

Figure 26. IPV-rejection index, percentage of scenarios rejected, by region, women aged 15–59, 2010–2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2010-2025

Complete rejection of IPV is nearly universal among both Jordanian and Syrian women in 2025, as shown in Figure 27. About 99 percent of Jordanian women and nearly 100 percent of Syrian women reject all IPV scenarios, showing that strong opposition to IPV is shared across both groups.


Figure 27. IPV-rejection index, percentage of scenarios rejected, by nationality, women aged 15–59, 2025

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2025

Rejection of IPV is very high among both women and men in 2025, as shown in Figure 28. Across most scenarios, sex differences are small, generally ranging from 0 to 3 percentage points. For burning food, neglecting children, arguing with the husband, going out without telling him, and disobeying him, more than 94 percent of both women and men reject violence.

The gap is somewhat larger when the wife insults her husband, where rejection is 94 percent among women and 89 percent among men. Rejection is lowest for both sexes when the wife cheats with another man, at 74 percent among women and 67 percent among men. Overall, women are slightly more likely than men to reject violence, but the main pattern is broad rejection of IPV across nearly all scenarios.

Figure 28. Percentage rejecting intimate partner violence, by scenario and sex, women and men aged 15–59, 2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2025


Because the JLMPS waves are analyzed as repeated cross-sections, changes in sample composition could potentially influence observed time trends. This is particularly relevant for nationality composition, given the inclusion of both Jordanian and non-Jordanian women across waves. To assess whether the main time trends are driven by compositional change, all time-trend figures were re-estimated using a Jordanian-only sample. The Jordanian-only results closely mirror the full-sample estimates: the direction of change remains the same across decision-making, mobility, financial autonomy, gender-role attitudes, and IPV rejection, and the magnitudes differ only modestly. This suggests that the main time trends are not primarily driven by changes in nationality composition. The full weighted sample is retained in main figures for national representativeness; Jordanian-only estimates serve as a sensitivity check.

4.6. Gender differences in norms around women’s paid work in 2025

Perceptions of women’s employment differ across three sectors: public employment, private employment, and self-employment. Across all three, women are more likely than men to say that women’s work strengthens marriage prospects, as shown in Figure 29. Public-sector work is viewed most favorably: 54 percent of women and 47 percent of men say it strengthens marriage prospects. The share is slightly lower for private-sector work, at 50 percent among women and 42 percent among men, and lowest for self-employment, at 40 percent among women and 33 percent among men.

Very few respondents see women’s work as preventing marriage, with this view ranging from about 2 to 6 percent across sectors and sex. Instead, many respondents describe women’s employment as having no influence, especially self-employment. Overall, women’s work is more often viewed as neutral or beneficial than harmful, but public-sector employment carries the strongest perceived marriage advantage, while self-employment is the least likely to be seen as strengthening marriage prospects.

Figure 29. Percentage distribution of perceived effects of women’s employment on marriage prospects, by sector and sex, women and men aged 15–59, 2025




Source: Authors’ calculations based on JLMPS 2025

Figure 30 contrasts norms around women’s employment for married and unmarried women in 2025. Among married women, only about two in five describe their husbands as supportive (29 percent) or strongly supportive (9 percent) of their working for pay, while 33 percent report that their husbands are not supportive, and the remainder say they have no clear opinion. This shows that explicit encouragement from husbands is far from universal, even among currently working-age wives.

Among unmarried women, expectations about future employment are similarly cautious. Roughly one third (32 percent) expect to work for pay after marriage, 22 percent expect not to work at all, and 46 percent say that whether they work “depends,” for example, on their husband’s views or household circumstances. Together, the two panels suggest that both current and anticipated employment are shaped by uncertainty and possible resistance from husbands, rather than by a strong shared expectation that women will work.

Figure 30. Percentage distribution of husbands’ support for wives’ paid work among married women and expected work after marriage among unmarried women, women aged 15–59, 2025.




Source: Authors’ calculations based on JLMPS 2025

Support for mothers’ employment varies substantially depending on the type of childcare arrangement. As illustrated in Figure 31, the highest acceptance occurs when care is provided by an adult family member, with 78 percent of women and 74 percent of men endorsing it or strongly endorsing it. Formal care options, particularly childcare centers, also garner relatively high support—67 percent from women and 60 percent from men—followed by early-childhood education programs, rated at 59 and 54 percent respectively. Support diminishes when care involves younger relatives or non-kin: roughly half agree when a family member under 18 provides care, and it is lowest for trusted neighbors

or friends. Overall, gender differences are modest; the primary distinction lies between adult kin or formal care, which are more accepted, and younger or informal non-kin care, which remains more contested.


Figure 31. Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing that mothers can work under different childcare arrangements, by sex, women and men aged 15–59, 2025



Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2025

Attitudes toward women’s paid work vary strongly by work context, as shown in Figure 32. Support is highest for women working outside the home, with 72 percent of women and 60 percent of men agreeing or strongly agreeing. Agreement is lower for women working in environments with mostly men, at 45 percent among women and 33 percent among men. Support is more limited for married women returning from work after 5 PM, with 35 percent of women and 26 percent of men agreeing. Agreement with the negative statement that women’s work harms their reputation is low, at 10 percent among both women and men. Overall, Figure 32 shows that women are more supportive than men across the positively worded items, while both women and men show limited agreement with the view that paid work harms women’s reputation.


Figure 32. Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with statements about women’s paid work, by context and sex, women and men aged 15–59, 2025



Source: Authors’ calculations based on JLMPS 2025

Opposition to women’s employment outside the home in 2025 is mainly rooted in care and breadwinner norms, as shown in Figure 33. Women most often cite childcare strain and the belief that men should provide, both at about 38 percent, followed by disruption to cooking and cleaning at 15 percent. Men report a similar pattern: 35 percent cite childcare, 34 percent cite men’s provider role, and 16 percent cite cooking and cleaning. Safety and morality concerns are less common, with harassment risk mentioned by 7 percent of women and 9 percent of men, and concerns about women misbehaving cited by 3 percent of women and 7 percent of men. Overall, opposition is driven less by safety or morality concerns than by expectations around women’s unpaid care work and men’s breadwinner role.

Figure 33. Percentage distribution of main reasons for opposing women’s employment, by sex, women and men aged 15–59 who oppose women’s work outside the home, 2025



Source: Authors’ calculations based on JLMPS 2025

5. Conclusion

This paper has traced changes in women’s agency in Jordan across three waves of the JLMPS, focusing on decision-making, freedom of movement, financial autonomy, gender-role attitudes, rejection of intimate partner violence, and norms around women’s paid work. Taken together, the findings point to substantial progress in some domains of agency alongside persistent, and in some cases widening, constraints in others.

Women’s say in household decisions has become more widespread, especially among unmarried women, and remains high among married women across waves. Financial autonomy has also strengthened after a clear setback in 2016, with more women reporting access to money by 2025 than in 2010. At the same time, freedom of movement continues to lag behind other dimensions, and even in 2025, fewer than half of women report being able to move independently to key destinations, especially younger and less educated women.

The analysis highlights systematic heterogeneities that qualify this progress. Age, education, and region shape women’s agency across all three waves. Older and more educated women are consistently more involved in decision making, more mobile, and more likely to control financial resources than younger and less educated women, although these gaps narrow over time. Regional differences are modest but present across several outcomes. By 2025, women in the North often report somewhat higher mobility, and more egalitarian gender norms than women in the Middle and South. However, no region leads in every indicator. The South starts from relatively high levels of egalitarian attitudes

in 2010, and the Middle region has slightly higher ownership of valuables in 2025, while regional gaps in IPV rejection nearly disappear by the final wave. Nationality gaps are small for many outcomes, yet Syrian women remain disadvantaged in longer-term asset ownership, underlining that refugees' economic security does not match their day-to-day access to cash. Gender comparisons show that women hold more supportive views than men of women's work, men's participation in care, and women's leadership, while men are somewhat more likely to see paid work as potentially undermining marriage or motherhood.

There is also evidence of attitudinal softening that complicates the picture of progress. Rejection of intimate partner violence becomes almost universal by 2025 across age, education, region, and nationality, which marks a major normative shift. In contrast, support for broad gender equality and for men sharing domestic and care work has weakened over time, especially among younger and less educated women. Both women and men frame opposition to women's employment mainly in terms of domestic and provider norms rather than safety or morality. These patterns are consistent with a context in which the expansion of women's schooling and employment has not fully displaced traditional expectations around female care and male breadwinning, and may even sit alongside their renewed emphasis.

From a policy perspective, the findings point to three priorities. First, because mobility remains the weakest domain, especially for younger and less educated women, safe and affordable transport and the placement of jobs, services, and training opportunities closer to where women live remain central (Felicio and Gauri 2018; OECD/ILO/CAWTAR 2020). Second, persistent gaps in asset ownership, particularly among Syrian women, call for financial inclusion policies that strengthen women's independent savings, asset ownership, and protection from asset appropriation within households (Central Bank of Jordan 2023). Third, childcare should be treated as one part of a broader package, not a stand-alone solution. Care responsibilities remain a barrier to women's work, but the findings also point to mobility restrictions, limited spousal support, and provider norms. Policies should therefore combine affordable and socially accepted care options with safe mobility, flexible work arrangements, and efforts to normalize women's economic participation (Burniat, Cano and Asfoura 2022; JNCW 2020; Economic and Social Council of Jordan and UN Women 2022).

The near-universal rejection of IPV provides a strong normative basis for enforcing existing protections and integrating violence screening and referral into health, social protection, and refugee services. At the same time, persistent gaps in egalitarian attitudes by age, education, region, and gender suggest the need to engage husbands and young men, especially in the South and among less educated groups, around nonviolent masculinities, women's autonomy, and more equitable household relations (JNCW 2020; Ait Ali Slimane et al. 2019; Burga et al. 2021).

The study has several limitations. Although the JLMPS provides valuable evidence, the agency indicators are necessarily partial. Mobility is measured only through reported freedom to go to four destinations, and financial autonomy is captured through yes/no measures of access to money, asset ownership, and spending permission. These items do not capture frequency, intensity, quality of access, or women's own preferences. The constructed indices also rely on a limited set of survey items and simple aggregation rules, so they should be interpreted as descriptive summaries of selected agency domains rather than complete measures of empowerment.

Comparability over time is another limitation. Some items, response categories, and scenarios differ across waves, especially in 2025, which means that changes over time should be interpreted cautiously. The observed declines and recoveries, such as the 2016 dip in mobility and financial autonomy, are genuine changes in the measured indicators, but the analysis cannot identify what caused them. Similarly, differences by age, education, region, or nationality should be read as descriptive associations rather than causal effects of these characteristics. The sample is also limited to women aged 15–59, which restricts conclusions about adolescents and older women. Because this chapter focuses on agency indicators, it does not fully address informal employment, unpaid domestic and care work, or job quality. These related dimensions are addressed in other working papers using the JLMPS 2025, including Boustati and Hesham’s (2026) work on unpaid caregiving and female employment, and Asaad and Khraise’s (2026) work on employment structure and job quality, among others. Finally, as with all self-reported survey data, responses may be affected by social desirability bias or interviewer effects, particularly for sensitive questions on gender norms, mobility, and intimate partner violence.

Future research can build on these descriptive patterns in several ways. First, the sharp dip and partial recovery in mobility and financial autonomy between 2010 and 2025 call for longitudinal and quasi-experimental studies that link changes in agency to specific economic and policy shocks. Second, near-universal IPV rejection alongside softer egalitarian attitudes among younger, less educated, and southern women calls for mixed-methods research on how work and care norms are understood and how they shape women’s work, agency, and family responsibilities. Third, the small nationality gaps in decision-making and access to cash but large gaps in asset ownership for Syrian women point to the value of following refugee and host households over time to understand how displacement shapes different dimensions of agency. Comparative analyses with other LMPS settings, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan, could situate Jordan’s trajectory in a broader regional context. Finally, linking the agency indices developed here to subsequent outcomes in employment, fertility, and mental health would clarify which dimensions of agency matter most for women’s well-being and which policy levers are likely to sustain and deepen the gains observed.

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