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GVCs and Entrepreneurial Activity: The Role of Institutions and Labor Provisions

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GVCs and Entrepreneurial Activity: The Role of Institutions and Labor Provisions¹

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Abstract

This paper examines the nexus between participation in global value chains (GVCs) and entrepreneurial activity, with particular attention to the moderating role of institutional quality and labor provisions enforced in trade agreements. Using panel data that combine the EORA multi-region input–output tables with World Bank entrepreneurship indicators, the analysis distinguishes between forward and backward GVC participation measures to capture the different channels through which international production linkages influence entrepreneurial dynamics. Preliminary results show that although both forward and backward GVC integration increase entrepreneurial density, backward linkage, measured by foreign value added exported, is more relevant than forward linkages. Furthermore, institutional quality exerts a direct, robust effect on entrepreneurship density and negatively moderates the GVC-driven entrepreneurial activity, signaling a substitution effect. On the other hand, labor provisions exert a direct negative effect on entrepreneurial activity and do not moderate the GVC-driven entrepreneurial dynamics. The findings reveal heterogeneous effects across different income and regional groups.

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1- Introduction

Over the previous decades, the rapid expansion of global value chains (GVCs) amid the “unbundling” of the production process has vivid effects on economic development. While the nexus between GVCs and innovation measures attracts scholars’ interest, the former’s association with entrepreneurial activity remains understudied. New trade theory highlights different effects of trade interlinkages on firms’ entry and exit dynamics. On the one hand, competition and learning through GVCs motivate new entrants with an innovation edge, leading to higher entrepreneurial density. On the other hand, the selection effect of trade not only limits market access but can also drive firm exit, leading to less entrepreneurial density. These trade dynamics raise new questions, particularly for regions with institutional challenges like the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Furthermore, the increasing number of trade agreements with enforced labor provisions raises the question of the relevance of these provisions to the labor market conditions and, consequently, to entrepreneurial activity. This paper explores the triple influence of GVCs (forward versus backward measures), institutional quality, and labor provisions on entrepreneurial activity across different income and regional groups.

The literature on entrepreneurship highlights different definitions and approaches to exploring the concept. Out of the vast, fragmented definitions, we follow the Schumpeterian definition linking entrepreneurship to innovation by exploring opportunities. Opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, as defined by Acs and Audretsch (1990) and Wennekers et al. (2002), is more prevalent in areas where technology, innovation, and institutional support are strong. On the other hand, necessity entrepreneurship prevails where economic opportunities are limited, and self-employment is a last resort (Cunningham and Lischeron, 1991). On theoretical grounds, economic theory identifies opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship as influenced by contextual factors such as economic growth, market structure, as well as the regulatory landscape in which entrepreneurs operate (Ratten 2023).

Accordingly, GVC-driven competition and learning raise novel questions on how different types of interlinkages influence entrepreneurial dynamics, through the endogenous opening and closing of businesses. Employing the “self-employment” economist’s definition of entrepreneurship, GVCs’ participation can have a dual impact on the density of entrepreneurial activity. On the one hand, GVCs induce technology and innovation (Eissa and Zaki, 2023), facilitating new entry due to decreased cost and economies of scale. However, GVC-driven pressures can also induce consolidation and exit among less efficient and vulnerable firms. First, vulnerable firms may not be able to face the foreign competition induced by more GVC integration. Second, international trade comes with compliance costs that small firms cannot endure. Hence, the shifting landscape of GVCs has contributed both to the rise in dynamic new entries and, in some contexts, business closures in less competitive businesses.

Focusing on the forward measure of GVCs, more participation enhances entrepreneurship through market access, supplier relationships, and accompanying innovation (Szalavetz, 2020). In this respect, the drive to enhanced entrepreneurship is both opportunity- and necessity-driven (Su et al., 2024). Strong domestic GVC linkages provide greater productivity and support the opening of innovative new firms (Beverelli et al., 2017). From another angle, GVC forward measures can

have a negative association with entrepreneurial activity if domestic firms are narrowly specializing in low-value-added activities (Fischer et al., 2024). This effect is particularly relevant to developing regions like the MENA, and requires strict policies to incentivise absorptive capacities. Although forward interlinkages create opportunities for business expansion, specialization, and integration into high-value stages of global production, they may also prompt exit where competitive pressures cannot be met.

Moving to the backward GVC measures, importing foreign value added for domestic processing introduces technology, knowledge, and high-quality inputs to local markets, often stimulating entrepreneurial entry through the learning effects and productivity enhancements (Eissa and Zaki, 2023). Because of the demand effect, foreign value added absorbed enhances self-employment (Thompson and Zang, 2023). An enhanced level of innovation underscores the role of backward linkages in facilitating entrepreneurship activity. Technological change and innovation opportunities foster entrepreneurship by lowering entry barriers, enabling new products/processes, and raising productivity. Empirical evidence links higher rates of new business formation to investment in R&D, digital infrastructure, and knowledge spillovers, particularly in advanced and knowledge-intensive sectors (Rojas et al., 2024).

Although both measures conceptually lead to entrepreneurial activity, studies on Turkish firms evidence the positive impact of the backward measure solely. Again, the forward measures make firms stuck in low-value-added, unproductive activities (Kılıçaslan, 2019). Because of the contrasting evidence, it is important to study the effect of a combined measure of GVCs to unveil the net effect of both measures. Panel data analyses reveal that while both forward and backward GVC participation generally support dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystems, the net effect depends on sector, market structure, and absorptive capacities (Wang et al., 2022).

Besides GVC integration, entrepreneurial activity is shaped by a broad constellation of determinants, reflecting contextual macroeconomic and institutional factors. The literature confirms that entrepreneurship is multidimensional and driven by the interplay of micro (individual and firm-level) and macro (institutional, policy, and market) determinants (Roman et al., 2018; Sendra-Pons et al., 2022).

Key determinants of entrepreneurial activity include the level of development, institutional quality, and labor market conditions. Mai et al. (2025) empirically analyze the effect of macroeconomic variables on entrepreneurship across 70 economies spanning the years 2003 and 2019. They find that economic resources strongly and positively affect entrepreneurship activity. In that sense, a higher level of development, foreign investments, and trade openness correspond to higher entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, transaction costs and poor institutional quality translate to lower entrepreneurial density.

Empirical research shows that labor market determinants, creativity, and self-efficacy are robust predictors of entrepreneurial intentions and entry (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). While strong labor provisions and investment in human capital enhance competitiveness, they are negatively associated with necessity-driven entrepreneurship and longevity of entrepreneurial ventures. Indeed, higher labor market participation signals job creation and limits the necessity of self-

employment. In the same line, unemployment benefits available for longer periods lead to longer periods of unemployment, which pushes starting businesses out of necessity rather than opportunity. In this case, entrepreneurship is weaker, with fewer resources, and short-lived (Camarero et al., 2024).

Nowadays, over 80% of preferential agreements incorporate labor provisions to the end of strengthen labor market conditions and human capital. such clauses. Multiple provisions address working conditions, minimum wage standards, and rights, affecting entrepreneurial activity by shaping regulatory environments and supply chain governance. While labor provisions can protect workers, support social upgrading, and create incentives for responsible enterprise, they also raise compliance costs for firms, potentially discouraging entry or accelerating exit for businesses unable to meet new benchmarks. Yet, the literature suggests that when implemented alongside supportive development policies, labor standards can foster stable business environments, reduce informal sector risks, and encourage sustainable business creation in GVC-linked sectors (Barbu, 2018). According to Conregado et al. (2024), the effect of strict labor laws and provisions on entrepreneurship is conditional on regulatory compliance. In that sense, the quality of institutions determines the effect of labor laws on entrepreneurship activity.

Grounding on the reviewed literature, the effect of GVCs integration on the dynamism of entrepreneurship density is underexplored. This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it differentiates between the effects of different GVC measures on entrepreneurial activity. Second, it explores the role of institutions and labor provisions in moderating the GVC effect on entrepreneurial activity. This paper is particularly relevant to developing countries with prevalent labor market challenges, high informality, and poor institutional quality. The findings highlight the positive association between the different GVC measures with a higher magnitude of backward participation in entrepreneurial activity. In addition, labor provisions have a direct negative effect, and regulatory quality is positively associated with entrepreneurial activity. The findings contribute to nuanced policy recommendations that promote trade integration and strengthen labor conditions to foster a more inclusive entrepreneurial climate.

2- Stylized facts

This section presents data patterns in entrepreneurial activity, GVCs, and labor provisions across 181 countries spanning the years 2006 and 2018. Starting with the global average entrepreneurial total density rate. Figure 1 shows a generally upward and stable pattern of the number of registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 of the population. Over time, the fluctuations are moderate around an average of approximately 70, before rising sharply in 2018. In 2008, the line slightly decreased, reflecting the financial crisis's effect on firm density. On average, the increasing pattern reflects an expansion in entrepreneurial reflecting higher access to markets.

As for the GVC trend, Figure 2 shows the average of three measures: backward participation, measured by foreign value added exported (FVA), forward participation, measured by domestic value added exported (DVA), and the addition of both (GVC). As presented, all three measures


show a moderate and consistent increase between 2006 and 2018. Yet, the global forward participation (DVA) is higher than the global backward participation (FVA). As shown in the figure, the movements of the three measures are gradual and almost parallel, suggesting that both forward and backward GVC linkages expand worldwide over this period.

Over the last decades, GVCs have become a dominant pattern of economic integration (Casella et al., 2019). The decrease in both communication and trade costs enabled firms to unbundle the production process across different countries (Cigna et al., 2022). Although this unbundling offers new opportunities for firms to connect with global markets, the GVCs’ implications for entrepreneurial activity remain underexplored. Exploring this nexus is particularly relevant for emerging economies, where entrepreneurship is a key engine of job creation and economic transformation.

To explore the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and GVCs, both Figures display a combined view of the global trends of GVC participation and entrepreneurial density over time. The figures signal a parallel pattern where both variables show moderate fluctuations from 2006 until the early 2010s, ending the period with an upward movement. The global alignment suggests that deeper integration into global value chains has synchronized with an increase in entrepreneurial activity at the aggregate level. Yet, econometric modelling is necessary to scrutinize and guarantee this association.


Focusing on income groups’ heterogeneity, Figure 3 shows expected disparities. Similar to innovation measures, entrepreneurship density is clustered in high-income economies with a striking gap compared with preceding income groups. By definition, innovation is spatially concentrated in advanced economies. This fact motivates the role of international interlinkages in knowledge spillover to disadvantaged economies (Tajoli and Felice, 2018; Eissa and Zaki, 2023).

Figure 1: Total Density Entrepreneurship Rate, World Averages, 2006 - 2018




Source: Own construction based on the World Bank Entrepreneurial Activity

Figure 2: GVC Measures, World Averages, 2006 - 2018



Source: Own construction based on the EORA dataset

Figure 3: Total Entrepreneurial Density Rate over income groups on average




Source: Own construction based on the World Bank Entrepreneurial Activity

As Figure 4 shows, high-income countries are not only advantaged with high entrepreneurship density due to higher absorptive capacities, but also a strong quality of institutions is clustered in high-income economies. Indeed, poor institutions, corruption, and administrative barriers discourage entry and can accelerate exit, especially in developing and transition economies. Consequently, the cross-regional gap in entrepreneurship density and institutional quality is significant. The question is whether multilateralism and enhanced trade interlinkages play a role in narrowing this innovation and institutional gap.


To address the increasing number of trade agreements with labor provisions, Figure 5, presents a consistently increasing trend of labor-related provisions in trade agreements between 2006 and 2018. The figure displays that labor provisions increase steadily from around 308 in 2006 to 841 in 2018. This rapid rise reflects a major institutional shift in creating international trade regulations, where labor standards, worker protections, and social articles have become increasingly embedded in trade agreements. Labor provisions, such as commitments to core labor standards, decent work conditions, or enforcement mechanisms, influence the incentives and barriers to entrepreneurship. Yet, as presented in the previous sector, the direction of the effect varies according to the driving force on entrepreneurship. Necessity entrepreneurship is associated with weak labor conditions, and enforced provisions can have a declining effect on entrepreneurial density in this case.

Figure 4: Quality of institutions over income groups on average



Source: Own construction based on the World Development indicators

Figure 5: Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements, 2006 - 2018



Source: Own construction based on the WTO dataset

In summary, the data representations show several consistent empirical conclusions. First, entrepreneurial density has remained in general stable but highly uneven across income groups. At the regional front, the concentration is clustered in Latin America, North America, and Europe, which exhibit higher rates than MENA, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, GVC participation (forward, backward, and total) and labor-related provisions increase over time. Third, trends of GVC integration are parallel to entrepreneurial density. Fourth, institutional quality is highly uneven across income groups.

To guarantee the association and understand the mechanism of the GVCs' effect on entrepreneurial activity, econometric modelling is necessary. The interplay of GVC participation, labor provisions, and entrepreneurial activity raises the question of whether deeper integration into global value chains and the labor provisions in trade agreements influence entrepreneurial dynamism, and whether the effect differs across different income groups and regions.

3- Methodology and data

To econometrically estimate the effect of GVCs on entrepreneurial density, the role of labor provisions and institutional quality, we employ and merge four datasets. First, the World Bank Entrepreneurship dataset includes data on total registered firms spanning the years 2006 and 2018. Second, the EORA database includes forward, backward, and total GVC measures. Third, the World Trade Organization trade agreements datasets include the number of labor provisions across signed trade agreements. Fourth, the World Development Indicators dataset is employed for the institutional quality and the control variables.

The baseline model is estimated as follows:

$$Y_{it} = a_0 + a_1GVC_{it} + a_2Provisions_{it} + a_3Reg_{it} + a_4Z_{it} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{jt}$$

where, Y_{it} is the entrepreneurial density measured by the number of registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 of the population in logarithms. GVC_{it} is alternating domestic value added exported, foreign value added exported, and total GVC. As the literature suggests, the backward linkages to GVCs enhance absorptive capacities and positively affect entrepreneurial density. As for the forward linkages, the effect is conditional. As explained above, developing countries stuck in low-value-added activities may struggle to realize the GVC-driven innovation effect. $Provisions_{it}$ is the number of labor provisions enforced in trade agreements. If entrepreneurship is necessity-driven, enhanced labor conditions are expected to exert a negative association. Reg_{it} is Regulatory Quality Index is expected to foster entrepreneurial density. Z_{it} is a vector of control variables including country size measured by the population in logarithms, level of development measured by real GDP per capita in logarithms, and labor market conditions measured by the female employment to population ratio. This variable is important to single out the labor provisions effect while controlling for the domestic conditions of labor markets. and trade openness measured by the aggregate exports and imports share of GDP in logarithms. Adding the trade variable is important to differentiate between final goods trade and the variable of interest. δ_i and δ_t are country and year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.

After estimating the baseline effect of GVC participation on entrepreneurial density, we extend the model in three ways. First, we address the heritability of the effect across different income groups. As the literature suggests, the GVC knowledge spillover effect is higher at lower absorptive capacities (Eissa and Zaki, 2023). Second, we explore the moderating effect of labor provisions in trade agreements by interacting the number of provisions in trade agreements signed by the country at a given year with the different GVC measures. Third, we explore the moderating effect of the quality of institutions by interacting it with the GVC measures. Third, we address the heterogeneity across income levels and regions.

In the revised version of the paper, we will account for GVCs' endogeneity by using a two-stage least squares instrumental variables approach. In particular, the GVCs can be affected by the vibrant business environment pronounced in high entrepreneurial density. Accordingly, the causal effect is unguaranteed. In this robustness check, we employ the absolute difference between the quality of the institutions of the country and that of the main trading partner. The rationale behind this instrument pertains to the fact that the institutional gap enhances GVCs but is unrelated to the entrepreneurial environment in the country. In addition, we will explore the different effects on firms' new entry, closing firms to evidence the selection effect of trade integration. The combined dataset includes 180 countries spanning the years 2006 – 2018. Table 1 presents the variables' definitions and sources.

Table 1: Variables' definitions and sources

| Variable Name | Definition | Source |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| Entrepreneurial Density | Total number of registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 working-age people (ages 15–64) | World Bank Entrepreneurial Dataset |
| FVA (Foreign Value Added embodied in exports) | Backward GVC measure | EORA dataset |
| DVX (Domestic Value Added in foreign countries' exports) | Forward GVC measure | EORA dataset |
| GVC | FVA + DVX | EORA dataset |
| Trade (% of GDP) | Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP | World Development Indicators |
| Population, total | The number of all residents | World Development Indicators |
| Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) | Proportion of the working age population that is employed. | World Development Indicators |
| GDP per capita | In Purchasing Power Parity | World Development Indicators |
| Individuals using the Internet (% of population) | Share of individuals who have used the Internet in the last 3 months. | World Development Indicators |
| Mean Years of Schooling (MYS) | The average number of years of education for adults aged 25 and older. | World Development Indicators |
| Regulatory Quality | The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. | World Development Indicators |

Source: Own elaboration

4- Empirical Results

This section analyzes the effect of different GVC measures on entrepreneurial activity while considering income group heterogeneity and the moderating role of labor provisions and institutional quality.

Table 2 presents the baseline results showing a positive effect of all GVC measures on the total density of entrepreneurial activity. Yet, the effect is more pronounced in foreign value-added exports. In particular, a 1% increase in backward GVC linkages corresponds to a 0.32% increase in entrepreneurial density. Although the total GVC measure is significant, its magnitude is less than the backward GVC measure. Our results match the literature that backward GVCs transmit foreign knowledge and substitute for domestic innovation inputs (Zeng et al., 2025; Eissa and Zaki 2025; Eissa and Zaki 2023).

As for the control variables, institutions, level of development, country size, and trade openness exert a positive and significant effect on entrepreneurial density. Aligning with the literature, trade openness incentivises entrepreneurial activity (Rahman et al., 2023). Yet, after a certain threshold, the effect flips to negative due to excessive competition (Salange et al., 2024). On the other hand, higher participation in the labor market is negatively associated with entrepreneurial density. Indeed, entrepreneurial activity is an alternative to absorbing the labor force in rigid labor market conditions. Likewise, since labor provisions in trade agreements correspond to better labor market conditions, they are negatively associated with the decision to open one's own business. This finding aligns with the literature, which evidences a positive association between strong labor unions and self-employment. In particular, weaker labor conditions raise the probability of self-employment of blue-collar workers by 53% (Kim et al., 2025).

Because the effect can vary in accordance with the income group, Table 3 presents the results while interacting the GVC measures with income groups. As presented, in reference to high-income countries, the net effect of forward GVCs is positive across the three preceding income levels. Yet, the magnitude is highest for low-income countries. Although low-income economies have the lowest average of entrepreneurial density, the GVC-driven self-employment is highest compared to higher-income levels. As for the backward measure, the significance is robust only for low-income countries. The particular relevance of GVCs to knowledge spillovers to low-income countries aligns with the literature, which evidences that the lower the absorptive capacity, the higher the GVC knowledge spillovers index (Eissa and Zaki, 2023).

Integrating labor provisions into trade agreements, when studying the nexus between GVC participation and firm dynamics, is necessary for drawing policy-relevant evidence that aims to enhance entrepreneurial entry and survival. In North-South trade agreements, labor provisions can incentivize partner countries to prioritize firms with existing compliance capabilities -larger firms- that are more integrated in GVC. In African economies, GVC firms -likely benefiting from labor provisions- employ more skilled workers (Shepherd, 2013).

As evidenced, labor provisions in trade agreements and self-employment move in an opposite direction. Yet, it is important to analyze whether the former moderates the positive effect of GVCs. Table 5 presents the result of interacting GVC measures with labor provisions. As shown, the direct effect of the provisions remains positive with an insignificant moderating effect. Again, the backward linkages to GVCs show the highest magnitude and significance. Unlike the positive interaction between women empowerment provisions and backward GVCs on female entrepreneurship in the literature (Gawal et al., 2025), the labor provisions' moderating effect on overall entrepreneurship is insignificant.

Table 2: Baseline GVC effect on entrepreneurial density

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | DVA | FVA | GVC |
| GVC | .111* | .323*** | .225*** |
| | (.066) | (.057) | (.078) |
| Ln (Labor provisions) | -.271*** | -.268*** | -.271*** |
| | (.035) | (.035) | (.035) |
| Regulatory quality | .37*** | .346*** | .36*** |
| | (.049) | (.048) | (.049) |
| Ln (GDP per capita) | .77*** | .679*** | .723*** |
| | (.108) | (.103) | (.108) |
| Ln (Population) | .713*** | .662*** | .69*** |
| | (.154) | (.149) | (.152) |
| Employment to population | -.014*** | -.012*** | -.013*** |
| | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) |
| Ln (Trade openness) | .368*** | .339*** | .371*** |
| | (.064) | (.064) | (.064) |
| Constant | -18.838*** | -19.929*** | -19.732*** |
| | (2.927) | (2.889) | (2.938) |
| Observations | 1031 | 1031 | 1031 |
| Within R ² | .637 | .649 | .639 |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Table 3 Income Group Heterogeneity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | DVA | FVA | GVC |
| GVC | -.209** | .208** | .046 |
| | (.084) | (.082) | (.094) |
| Upper middle*GVC | .307*** | .035 | .173** |
| | (.076) | (.072) | (.078) |
| Lower middle*GVC | .284*** | -.052 | .122 |
| | (.094) | (.08) | (.091) |
| Low*GVC | 2.038*** | 1.761*** | 2.453*** |
| | (.07) | (.08) | (.09) |
| Ln (Labor provisions) | -.185*** | -.213*** | -.203*** |
| | (.034) | (.031) | (.032) |
| Regulatory quality | .281*** | .226*** | .249*** |
| | (.045) | (.043) | (.044) |
| Ln (GDP per capita) | .573*** | .539*** | .528*** |
| | (.101) | (.092) | (.098) |
| Ln (Population) | .339** | .197 | .258* |
| | (.142) | (.133) | (.137) |
| Employment to population | -.01*** | -.014*** | -.013*** |
| | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) |
| Ln (Trade openness) | .274*** | .153*** | .212*** |
| | (.06) | (.058) | (.059) |
| Constant | -9.146*** | -9.466*** | -9.921*** |
| | (2.729) | (2.625) | (2.678) |
| Observations | 1031 | 1031 | 1031 |
| Within R ² | .705 | .733 | .721 |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors are in parentheses
 *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Although the regulatory quality is consistently positively associated with entrepreneurial activity, it is important to explore its moderating effect. As the literature suggests, poor regulatory quality reduces both entrepreneurial quantity and quality (Audretsch et al., 2023). Yet, the question of its moderating effect on GVCs is not yet explored. In Table 5, we present the results of interacting GVCs with regulatory quality. As presented, the positive direct effect does not have a higher magnitude, but the moderating effect is negative, with a net positive effect on entrepreneurial activity. Our results suggest substitutability between foreign knowledge and the competition effect, incentivising entrepreneurship activity and regulatory quality. These results are optimistic for developing countries with a sticky low quality of institutions. Opening the doors of GVCs can compensate for their poor regulatory quality when it comes to new businesses and self-employment.

Table 4 GVCs' interaction with labor provisions

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | DVA | FVA | GVC |
| GVC | .125* (.067) | .325*** (.057) | .233*** (.078) |
| Ln (Labor provisions) | -.184** (.09) | -.212** (.085) | -.192** (.089) |
| GVC*Labor prov | -.005 (.005) | -.004 (.005) | -.005 (.005) |
| Regulatory quality | .365*** (.049) | .343*** (.048) | .356*** (.049) |
| Ln (GDP per capita) | .753*** (.109) | .67*** (.104) | .71*** (.109) |
| Ln (Population) | .713*** (.154) | .661*** (.149) | .69*** (.152) |
| Employment to population | -.014*** (.003) | -.012*** (.003) | -.013*** (.003) |
| Ln (Trade openness) | .37*** (.064) | .341*** (.064) | .373*** (.064) |
| Constant | -18.884*** (2.927) | -19.869*** (2.891) | -19.733*** (2.938) |
| Observations | 1031 | 1031 | 1031 |
| Within R ² | .638 | .649 | .64 |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors are in parentheses
 *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Table 5: Institutions interaction with GVC

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | FVA | DVX | GVC |
| GVC | .169** (.066) | .332*** (.056) | .262*** (.077) |
| Reg quality | 1.071*** (.157) | .933*** (.148) | .987*** (.154) |
| GVC*Reg quality | -.047*** (.01) | -.042*** (.01) | -.043*** (.01) |
| Ln(Labor provisions) | -.238*** (.036) | -.241*** (.035) | -.242*** (.036) |
| Ln(GDP per capita) | .734*** (.107) | .666*** (.102) | .7*** (.107) |
| Ln (Population) | .8*** (.153) | .752*** (.149) | .78*** (.152) |
| Employment to population | -.013*** (.003) | -.011*** (.003) | -.012*** (.003) |
| Ln (Trade) | .376*** (.064) | .341*** (.063) | .377*** (.063) |
| Constant | -20.774*** (2.923) | -21.368*** (2.883) | -21.49*** (2.939) |
| Observations | 1031 | 1031 | 1031 |
| Within R ² | .646 | .655 | .647 |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Robust standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

So far, the results evidence a positive association between GVC participation, particularly the backward measure, and entrepreneurial activity. Because of the incentivizing competition with GVC participation, firms innovate and enter the market with the edge of carving a unique product and service. New trade theory suggests an upscale in the number of firms with enhanced trade integration. Yet, the selection effect in our work is still blurred. In the coming version of this work, we will analyze the GVC effect on new versus closing firms separately. On average, the total density of entrepreneurial activity increases with higher backward linkages to GVCs, but focusing on the closing effect of firms is enlightening and echoes necessary policy recommendations to contain the adverse social effects of GVC integration. In addition, we will explore the non-linearity of the effect by integrating a squared term of GVC measures. Again, because the causal effect is unguaranteed, we will use instrumental variables techniques to control for endogeneity. As the literature suggests, digitalization can foster both entrepreneurial activity due to decreased costs and GVC integration due to the facilitating communication (Szalavetz, 2020).

5. Conclusion

New trade theories endorse a dual effect on firm performance. On the one hand, the global integration induces firm performance through the scale effect (Krugman, 1992). On the other hand, vulnerable firms may not be able to sustain their market positions after market integration and will be forced to exit the market (Melitz, 2003). In parallel to the conceptual framework of the selection effect elucidated model, empirical studies show the contracting effect of international trade on vulnerable and smaller firms (Christen et al., 2025).

This dynamism may lead to new business creation and growth, especially in export-oriented sectors. Indeed, a strong domestic value chain foundation is associated with higher rates of business survival and sectoral upgrading. In addition, resilient GVC serves as a buffer against external shocks and fosters a business climate conducive to entrepreneurship. Yet, unapt labor market conditions -like prevalent informality- pose persistent challenges. In this paper, we study the direct effect of GVC measures (forward versus backward) on firms' entry and exit dynamics. In addition, we explore the moderating role of institutions and labor provisions in trade agreements across different income and regional groups.

The preliminary results show an association between forward and backward GVC measures on entrepreneurial density, with a higher effect of the latter. Since entrepreneurial activity is an innovation measure, the findings align with the literature, evidencing the effect of knowledge spillovers of backward GVC integration. In addition, the effect is more pronounced at lower income groups with middling absorptive capacities. Higher entrepreneurial activity that is necessity-driven is associated with a negative association with labor market conditions. As our results suggest, there is a negative direct association between labor market variables (employment to population and labor provisions in trade agreements). Yet, labor provisions do not interact with GVC measures. On the other hand, regulatory quality is positively associated with entrepreneurial activity, with a negative interaction with GVC. The dampening effect suggests a substitution effect between foreign interlinkages and institutional quality. In other words, complaints accompanied by GVCs can compensate for the poor institutional quality in developing countries in incentivising entrepreneurship.

In the next version of this work, the empirical strategy will account for endogeneity, differentiate between the rate of new and closing firms, and explore the effect of the extensive margin of labor provisions. From a policy standpoint, the paper highlights the importance of trade and institutional policies, central drivers of entrepreneurial activity and firm dynamism.

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Appendix

Appendix 1 Descriptive statistics

| Variable | No. of observations | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|--------------------------|---------------------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Ln(Total Density) | 1338 | 3.038 | 1.678 | -2.33 | 7.786 |
| Ln (DVA) | 1807 | 14.718 | 4.559 | 0 | 21.353 |
| Ln (FVA) | 1807 | 13.442 | 4.405 | 0 | 20.59 |
| Ln (GVC) | 1807 | 14.355 | 4.526 | 0 | 21.11 |
| Ln (Labor provisions) | 2353 | .899 | .942 | 0 | 3.091 |
| Regulatory quality | 2327 | .043 | .947 | -2.548 | 2.252 |
| Ln (GDP per capita) | 2262 | 9.455 | 1.16 | 6.755 | 11.889 |
| Ln (Population) | 2301 | 15.613 | 2.148 | 9.216 | 21.062 |
| Employment to population | 2132 | 46.822 | 15.038 | 7.847 | 83.566 |
| Ln (Trade) | 1997 | 4.391 | .493 | 3.103 | 6.095 |

Appendix 2 Regional heterogeneity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | FVA | DVX | GVC |
| GVC | -.116 (.088) | .179* (.103) | .001 (.113) |
| ECA*GVC | .157* (.09) | .089 (.1) | .172* (.104) |
| LAC*GVC | .215 (.15) | .073 (.148) | .182 (.164) |
| MENA*GVC | .035 (.13) | -.08 (.131) | -.08 (.141) |
| South Asia*GVC | -.077 (.131) | -.096 (.131) | -.017 (.141) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa*GVC | .784*** (.108) | .353*** (.105) | .574*** (.116) |
| lnLabor | -.244*** (.035) | -.266*** (.035) | -.261*** (.035) |
| RegulatoryQuality | .309*** (.048) | .304*** (.049) | .314*** (.049) |
| ln_GDPperCapita | .857*** (.109) | .7*** (.106) | .768*** (.11) |
| ln_population | .699*** (.17) | .683*** (.169) | .776*** (.171) |
| Employmenttopop~o | -.016*** (.003) | -.011*** (.003) | -.013*** (.003) |
| ln_trade | .316*** (.064) | .334*** (.064) | .351*** (.064) |
| _cons | -18.563*** (3.162) | -19.517*** (3.212) | -20.461*** (3.211) |
| Observations | 1031 | 1031 | 1031 |
| Within R ² | .663 | .658 | .654 |

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$