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Abstract

We examine how a modest unconditional cash transfer policy affects child labor, schooling and health during periods of high inflation by studying Turkey's Family Support Program, launched in 2022. Using a regression discontinuity design based on the program's per capita income eligibility threshold, we analyze the program's short-term effects within six months of implementation. Despite the program's relatively modest transfer amounts—approximately one-third of the monthly minimum wage—we find significant reductions in children's participation in family businesses and agricultural work. Investigating the heterogeneous effects, we find that the program reduces non-market work for boys and domestic work for girls. Notably, these labor reductions occurred without corresponding increases in school enrollment or time spent on educational activities, with the exception of a suggestive rise in boys' school hours. We also find improvements in children's emotional well-being and daily protein consumption primarily for boys, and a reduction in unhealthy dietary habits among girls. Our findings suggest that even a modest transfer policy can enhance child welfare through multiple channels.

Keywords: cash transfers, education, child labor, regression discontinuity design, program evaluation, Turkey
JEL Classifications: I21, I28, I38, J21

ملخص

نقوم بدراسة كيفية تأثير سياسة التحويلات النقدية المتواضعة غير المشروطة على عمالة الأطفال والتعليم والصحة خلال فترات التضخم المرتفع من خلال دراسة برنامج دعم الأسرة التركي، الذي تم إطلاقه في عام 2022. وباستخدام تصميم عدم الاستمرارية الانحداري المبني على عتبة أهلية دخل الفرد للبرنامج، قمنا بتحليل التأثيرات قصيرة المدى للبرنامج في غضون ستة أشهر من التنفيذ. وعلى الرغم من مبالغ التحويلات المتواضعة نسبيا للبرنامج —حوالي ثلث الحد الأدنى للأجور الشهري—، فإننا نجد انخفاضات كبيرة في مشاركة الأطفال في الشركات العائلية والعمل الزراعي. وعند دراسة التأثيرات غير المتجانسة، نجد أن البرنامج يقلل من العمل غير السوقي بالنسبة للأولاد والعمل المنزلي بالنسبة للفتيات. والجدير بالذكر أن هذه التخفيضات في العمالة حدثت دون زيادات مقابلة في معدلات الالتحاق بالمدارس أو الوقت المستغرق في الأنشطة التعليمية، باستثناء زيادة موحية في ساعات الدراسة للبنين'. ونجد أيضًا تحسنا في الصحة العاطفية للأطفال واستهلاك البروتين اليومي للأولاد في المقام الأول، وانخفاضا في العادات الغذائية غير الصحية بين الفتيات. تشير النتائج التي توصلنا إليها إلى أنه حتى سياسة النقل المتواضعة يمكن أن تعزز رعاية الطفل من خلال قنوات متعددة.

1. Introduction

There are 160 million children in child labor worldwide (ILO, 2024). These children are usually deprived of their education, live in poverty, and work to generate income to support their families (Dar et al., 2002). Engaging in child labor creates long-term losses as children who work are more likely to drop out of and or not attend school regularly (Beegle et al., 2009).

Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) are a promising tool for reducing child labor in developing countries. These programs may reduce the need for children to work by alleviating immediate financial constraints. They are also used to support families during the economic crisis. For example, during the 2008 global recession, some existing programs extended their coverage or increased their benefits (Fiszbein et al., 2011). However, UCT's effectiveness during high inflation periods, especially with modest transfer amounts, is not well understood. This paper examines how households adjust child labor allocation and investments in response to modest cash transfers during high inflation, providing new insights into family decision-making under economic stress.

Turkey launched the Family Support Program (FSP) during a period of surging inflation, which peaked at 85.5% in October 2022. The cash transfers began in June 2022, and the program reached 3 million households. Considering that the average household size in Turkey was 3.17 people in 2022 (TurkStat, 2022), the program is estimated to have reached over 9 million individuals within that year. FSP has become one of Turkey's largest social assistance programs targeted at Turkish nationals.[1]

FSP offers monthly payments for one year to low-income families. The FSP payments to households are very modest and they range between 850-1900 Turkish Lira (TL) per month.[2] A family with five or more children and a monthly income of less than 450 TL per person would

[1] A separate program Emergency Social Safety Net is another unconditional cash transfer program that targets refugees who live in Turkey.

[2] The transfers depend on the monthly per capita household income and range as follows:1250 TL payment for an income of 450 TL or lower, 1100 TL payment for an income between 450 TL and 911 TL, 950 TL payment for an income between 911 TL and 1372 TL, and 850 TL payment for an income between 1372 TL and 1833 TL. The child support component ranges between 350-650 TL depending on the number of children.

receive 1900 TL per month, slightly higher than one-third of the monthly minimum wage in 2022. The program paid a total of 13 billion TL in 2022 (representing approximately 0.087% of the total GDP for that year), within six months after its launch.

To assess the program's causal effects, we implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) exploiting the program's income eligibility threshold, set at one-third of the after-tax minimum wage. We use microdata from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), collected by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) between October and December 2022. According to the survey, 12.3% of households reported receiving family support within the previous year. [3]

Importantly, the income threshold also determines eligibility for in-kind support, including food aid provided before religious holidays and subsidies for heating (coal or natural gas). As such, our analysis captures the combined effects of both cash and in-kind assistance, and our findings suggest policy implications for complementing in-kind transfers with UCTs.

Despite FSP's relatively small payments, we find significant reductions in child labor within just six months of implementation. These effects are driven primarily by declines in family-based and agricultural work**.** However, we also observe a slight increase in children's engagement in paid work, though this effect is minimal in magnitude and only significant in broader bandwidths. Similarly, while the policy reduces the likelihood of children cooking, its impact on other domestic tasks, such as cleaning, caregiving, and shopping, remains insignificant.

Interestingly, we find no significant effect on time spent in school or studying, suggesting that the transfers primarily influenced labor allocation rather than school attendance or time allocated to educational activities. However, we find evidence on increased consumption of protein-rich foods, decreased consumption of soda drinks, and suggestive evidence of improvements in children's

[3] Although the survey does not distinguish between unconditional cash transfers and other types of family support, it predominantly captures the FSP due to its higher statistical likelihood compared to other forms of assistance within the family support category. FSP reached 3 million households in 2022. In contrast, other transfers covered a smaller number of individuals: For example, widow payment was given to 89 thousand women, military family support to 65 thousand households, 47 thousand children who lost a parent received cash support, 816 thousand mothers received newborn cash support, and 28 thousand received multiple birth support.

emotional well-being, pointing to broader welfare gains. These results underscore that even modest UCTs and in-kind transfers can enhance child welfare through multiple channels, beyond labor force participation and schooling.

The heterogeneity analysis reveals that the program is beneficial for reducing boys' employment outside the house in agriculture or family work. Girls, on the other hand, are likely to reduce their engagement in domestic tasks, namely cleaning or cooking. While the work hours of boys decline, there is suggestive evidence that they spend more time in school. For girls, we do not find any significant improvements in time allocated to school or studying as the time spent on domestic tasks declines.

Our findings contribute to the growing literature on UCTs, particularly regarding short-term impacts under macroeconomic stress. Our study builds on previous research by examining a one-year UCT program's short-term effects on children's labor, schooling, and well-being. Prior studies have shown that UCTs can increase schooling (Baird et al., 2011) or have heterogeneous effects depending on the context (Baird et al., 2014; Handa et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2020; Sessou et al., 2024). While some programs reduce child labor (Edmonds, 2006; Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Tagliati, 2022), others—such as those in Malawi and Zambia—have increased it by encouraging household investments in family businesses (Covarrubias et al., 2012; de Hoop et al., 2020). Our findings align more closely with Sessou et al. (2024), who report declining agricultural and family work following UCTs in Mali. However, in their case, the impact on schooling was more substantial with lower baseline enrollment rates.

Finally, our study highlights the importance of economic and social context in shaping the effects of UCTs. Previously, Hiziroglu Aygun et al. (2024) showed that the UCT of a similar amount offered to refugee households had a substantial impact on reducing child labor and increasing school enrollment of refugee children.[4] In the case of refugee children, the cash was accompanied by policies encouraging school integration, such as language training, pre-educational programs, and backup courses. Another difference is the prevalence of child labor among the refugee and

[4] An average refugee household's ESSN cash transfer paid 105 USD per month, and a native household's FSP transfer paid around 102 USD in 2022 if the family had 5 children and a monthly income of 450TL per capita.

native families, as child labor was more common among the refugee children who live in more crowded and poorer families. Building on this, our study documents that similar effects do not hold for low-income native households, which helps us understand the broader implications of cash assistance programs in alleviating child labor and improving educational outcomes in economically vulnerable populations.

2. Background: Family Support Program

Turkey's Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS) provides various forms of family support to low-income families under specific conditions. These include one-time transfers to families with a newborn child, ongoing transfers for families with multiples up to age two, and assistance for women who lost a husband or children who lost a parent. Additionally, cash assistance is available for families of those in military service, veterans, and martyrs. To qualify for these transfers, applicants must meet one of the specified categories and demonstrate economic need for social assistance.

The coverage of the family support programs was extended in 2022 with the introduction of the unconditional cash transfer program, Turkey Family Support Program (FSP), which offers regular monthly payments to low-income families for one year. The cash transfer program is based on income eligibility, set as the per capita income is less than one-third of the after-tax minimum wage.

The FSP is the first need-based, unconditional cash transfer program in Turkey that is available to a wide range of Turkish nationals without eligibility requirements tied to events such as the loss of a family member or the birth of a child. The program was designed to be inclusive and reach families who did not fit into the other categories supported by the social assistance system. Unlike most other programs in Turkey, such as universal health insurance, FSP does not exclude households with a member in formal employment (i.e., registered with the social security system).[5] Turkish citizens above the age of 18 can apply for the FSP transfers. Applications for the FSP can be submitted through the e-Government Gateway (e-Devlet Kapısı) or directly to the relevant

[5] The only exclusion criteria for FSP are having a civil servant, a muhtar (the elected neighborhood heads), or a notary in the household.

Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASF) located at the applicant's registered residential address. A SASF office is available in every province and district, and every office operates independently. SASFs are not part of the administrative structure of the MoFSS. However, three ministries, including the MoFSS, carry out their oversight. When an eligible household applies for the FSP benefits, the benefits begin if the Board of Trustees of the SASF approves the application. Benefits last 12 months and may pause or stop if the SASF determines a change in the household's address or eligibility status.

Other social assistance programs are organized in different categories within the MoFSS operations. Some programs also use the same income eligibility rule as the FSP. Among those, multiple-birth transfers are given on the condition of giving birth to multiples. Elderly and disability transfers are provided if the family lacks social security and an old-age (above 65) or disabled member exists. Government-subsidized health insurance is also conditional on lacking social security. Education materials and food, shelter, and transportation support for the children who live outside the bussed-schooling system are provided for the children who attend school. The food and shelter program provides food before the religious holidays (which can be extended throughout the year if needed) or helps with heating based on the income eligibility threshold. In that sense, the income eligibility rule is not unique to the UCTs we study. Hence, we test how the likelihood of receiving family support and other benefits in the last 12 months is affected by the eligibility rule based on the household's income per capita. Table 1 shows that FSP and food and heating recipiency are significantly more likely for households with a per capita income below one-third of the minimum wage. Therefore, we define treatment as beneficiary status for both UCT and in-kind transfers, and interpret our results as the joint effect of receiving these programs.

3. Dataset: Turkey Child Survey

We use the micro dataset Turkey Child Survey (TCS), obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). The survey was carried out in collaboration with TurkStat, the MFSP's General Directorate of Child Services, and UNICEF Turkey. The fieldwork for the TCS was conducted by the TurkStat across Turkey between October 10 and December 16, 2022. The study sample includes 9,010 households with at least one child aged 0-17. The study sample size was designed to be representative of Turkey.

Information about children aged 0-17 living in the sampled households was collected. Mothers or primary caregivers provided information about the household and various topics for children younger than thirteen. The topics include education, living conditions, early childhood development, health, disabilities, school quality of life, parental involvement, breastfeeding and nutrition, social and cultural participation, child labor, and child discipline.

The survey collected child labor and schooling information only for children aged five and above. We limit our sample to children below the age of thirteen due to the data collection design of the survey. Mothers were surveyed about children in this age range, ensuring consistent information for these observations. For older children (ages thirteen and above), the survey directly interviewed the children themselves, introducing potential biases as observations were dropped if the child was absent at the time of the survey. Therefore, we use the 5–12 age range as the most reliable sample for our analysis.

The survey respondent reports the household income. We calculate the per capita household income by using the number of residents related to the household head as recorded in the household member information questionnaire. In our analysis, we use several outcome variables, including dummies for family work, agricultural work, and domestic work of children. We also analyze children's time spent working, school, and studying, as well as daily food consumption and children's health and well-being.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our analysis. They refer to the children living in households with a 900 TL bandwidth on both sides of the cutoff. The descriptive statistics provide an overview of children's participation in non-market work, domestic work, time allocation, food consumption, and health outcomes. School enrollment is high in the age group we study, with 96% of the children. Paid employment is rare in this age group, as only 0.3% of the children engage in market work. Participation in any non-market work is 10%, with 3% of children working for their families, and 9% engaged in agricultural activities. Domestic work is more common, with 9% of children invoveld in cooking, 34% in shopping, 15% in cleaning, and 42% engaged in at least one type of domestic task.

On average, children spend 0.35 weekly hours on market work and 0.93 weekly hours on domestic work. They dedicate 5.67 hours per day to school, 3.93 hours per week to studying on weekdays, and 1.88 hours per week on weekends.

Regarding daily food consumption, 54% of children consume fruits, 32% consume vegetables, 11% consume proteins, and 10% consume pulses, while higher proportions report consuming grains (65%) and dairy products (59%). However, consumption of less healthy items such as soda drinks (16%), sweets (36%), and unhealthy snacks (23%) is also notable. Regarding health outcomes, 28% of children reported experiencing a health problem in the last two weeks, and 7.4% had an untreated health issue. Approximately 32.6% of children were reported as seeming depressed or unhappy as often as once a week or every day, and 35.5% of children in the sample were reported as seeming anxious or worried.

The descriptive statistics in Table 2 further provide insights into children's beneficiary status on social transfers. Among the children in our sample, 17.9% benefit from the FSP and food and shelter together, while only 1.9% receive Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) for attending school. The share of children benefiting from educational material support stands at 4.8%. Disability and old-age benefits are accessed by 4% of the children's households, and 6.7% benefit from health-related transfers. Other forms of support are less common, with only 2.1% reporting access to different social benefits.

We also summarize the descriptive statistics of the control variables we use in our regressions in Table 2. Most household heads have a middle school education (52.4%) and are employed (75%), with a smaller proportion being unemployed (4.2%) or not in the labor force (14.7%). Only 0.6% of the households have multiples, and 10.8% have a child below age one. Nearly half of the children in our sample are female (49.5%), and very few have experienced the loss of a parent (0.6% for mothers, 2.9% for fathers). The age distribution of the children in our sample is balanced, ranging between age 5 (12.5%) and age 12 (11.1%).

4. Methodology: Regression Discontinuity Design Approach

We exploit the income eligibility cutoff in RDD to identify the effect of receiving cash transfers. The eligibility criterion for households receiving FSP cash benefits and food and shelter transfers is a per capita household income of less than one-third of the after-tax minimum wage. Hence, we expect a jump in program beneficiary status and child wellbeing outcomes at this cutoff value. We estimate these reduced-form effects of the income eligibility criterion with the sharp RDD specification,

$$y_{i,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_j + I(T_j = 0){x_j}^2 + I(T_i = 1){x_j}^2 + X_{i,j}\Gamma + u_{i,j}, \quad (1)$$

where $y_{i,j}$ denotes the outcome variable for child i in household j. The treatment variable, T, takes the value of one when the household per capita income is less than one-third of the minimum wage and zero otherwise. We control for the quadratic trend in per-capita household income on the cutoff's left- and right-hand sides by the interaction of the indicator function $I(.)$ and ${x_j}^2$ where x_j is the per capita household income in household j. We also show the robustness of our results when we use a linear function of the running variable in Appendix B. X The set of control variables, u for the error term, and β_1 gives the reduced-form effect of the income eligibility criterion on the outcome variable.

The control variables, X, include dummy variables for children's age, a dummy variable indicating female children, as well as dummy variables indicating if the mother and father of the children died. We control for the household composition by including a dummy variable if there are multiples below age 2, or an infant (less than age 1) within the household. Finally, we include dummies for the household head's education categories (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, and cannot work because of old age or disability). We cluster the standard errors at the per-capita income level in all regression analyses and use survey weights.

Some households with a per capita household income above the eligibility ratio receive other forms of family support by meeting other criteria, and not all households on the left-hand side of

the cutoff receive cash transfers. Therefore, we use a fuzzy RDD to measure the effect of being a beneficiary by using 2SLS estimation, as follows:

$$D_{i,j} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 T_j + I(T_j = 0){x_i}^2 + I(T_j = 1){x_i}^2 + X_{i,j}\Delta + u_{i,j}, \quad (2)$$

$$y_{i,j} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \widehat{D}_{i,j} + I(T_j = 0){x_i}^2 + I(T_j = 1){x_j}^2 + X_i, \mathrm{j}\Theta + v_{i,j}. \quad (3)$$

Equation (2) illustrates the first stage, where the dummy variable for the status of receiving cash transfers ($D_{i,j}$) is regressed on the same set of variables as in equation (1). The second stage, given in equation (3), has the same structure as equation (1)—except that the predicted treatment status from equation (2), $\widehat{D}_{i,j}$, replaces the assignment to the treatment (T).

In our analysis, we use parametric bandwidths for RDD. Based on statistical considerations, we restrict the bandwidth for per capita income to four alternative values between 750 TL and 900 TL. Specifically, bandwidths narrower than 750 TL yield insufficient observations and a statistically insignificant first stage, and 900 TL represents the maximum bandwidth where pre-determined characteristics remain statistically non-significant, thus preserving our RDD assumptions. As a result, we concentrate on bandwidths of 750, 800, 850, and 900 TL on both sides of the cutoff point.

4.3. Plausibility of the RDD Assumption

A potential threat to our identification strategy is manipulating the household income per capita variable to be eligible for the program. Our dataset was collected within six months of the program introduction, and a change in the household composition in this short period is very unlikely, primarily through fertility response. Furthermore, manipulating household income is very difficult as the Ministry uses a three-step eligibility check for the program. First, during pre-screening, they control the requirements about applicants' citizenship, residential status, and the existence of a civil servant in the household. Second, eligible applicants undergo an evaluation by SASF, where the household's socioeconomic profile and income level are assessed. The income level is determined using a household approach, which involves calculating the per capita income within a household based on total household income and the number of members. This calculation

incorporates data on the income, assets, and expenditures of all individuals in the household and follows the method used in the General Health Insurance Income Test. The necessary information is gathered through queries of institutional databases via the Integrated Social Assistance Information System or through household visits conducted by SASF and declarations provided by the households themselves. Finally, the per capita income within the household is calculated by the SASF Board of Trustees. The household qualifies for assistance if it is less than one-third of the monthly net minimum wage; otherwise, the application is rejected.

In addition to the institutional setup that makes it very difficult to manipulate the program eligibility, we present evidence supporting the plausibility of the identifying assumption—specifically, the smoothness of outcome variables in the running variable around the cutoff. This reinforces the validity of the RDD estimation strategy.

First, Appendix Figure A1 demonstrates the continuity of the score density around the cutoff. Due to the nature of the running variable, we observe mass points at the cutoff (one-third of the minimum wage) and one-fourth and half of the minimum wage. However, the mass at one-third of the minimum wage threshold is not notably more pronounced than at other high-frequency points, which would have been expected if households had manipulated their income per capita. Additionally, the null hypothesis of no difference in density between the treatment and control groups at the cutoff is rejected at only the 10 percent level.

Second, we present evidence for the absence of policy effect on the pre-treatment covariates. The test results in Appendix Table A1 reveal that the households on the left- and right-hand side of the cutoff are comparable in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, mainly the household head's education and employment status. Among the covariates we test, we find a statistically significant jump at 10-percent level only one the household head's education category. When we look at the household composition covariates, we observe a jump in the number of children aged 5–12 in the household at the 5-percent level. This result is not surprising given the definition of our running variable- household income per capita. When the households are similar in socioeconomic aspects, and their income variation is limited within the 900TL per-capita income bandwidth around the cutoff, the eligible households have more children. As a result, this could lead to an

underestimation of the policy's impact on children, as the transfers are more likely to be received by larger households.

Lastly, we find no evidence of a policy impact when using alternative cutoffs on either side of the actual threshold. Appendix Table A2 presents the results of reduced-form regressions conducted at these alternative cutoffs. In this analysis, we examine the beneficiary status of FSP and food transfers, along with our main outcome variables—children's employment in paid and unpaid work and their time use. While we observe statistically significant effects in only four of the regressions (at the 5 percent level), these effects do not follow a systematic pattern. Therefore, we conclude that the observed discontinuity at one-third of the minimum wage cutoff is driven by the policy rather than an inherent feature of the data or the running variable, household income per capita.

5. Results

5.1. Main Results: Children's Work and Time-Use Outcomes

Figure 1 shows a nonparametric local regression of transfer recipiency status. The fitted lines on either side of the 1833.45 cutoff show a drop in probability at the threshold, consistent with program eligibility rules. Although the point estimate for cash transfer recipiency shows a small jump at the income threshold, the confidence intervals on the treated side (left-hand side of the threshold) do not overlap with the mean outcome of the untreated side (right-hand side of the threshold), suggesting a meaningful treatment effect.

Table 1 shows our RDD reduced-form results for the beneficiary status of the FSP and in-kind transfers within the last 12 months. There is a 22-23 percentage point increase in the likelihood of receiving FSP and food and heating support with program eligibility. As Table 1 reveals, the eligibility rule is not statistically significantly related to receipt of any other transfers within the last 12 months.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the proportion of children engaged in different types of work, comparing those on either side of the eligibility threshold for the cash transfer program, concentrating on outside and domestic work, respectively. In Figure 2, a drop in the fraction of children in family work is observed. However, no obvious drop at the cutoff is seen in the other

outcome variables. Panel A in Table 3 presents the RDD results for the children's paid and unpaid work outcomes. The impact of the policy on paid work participation is positive, with very small and statistically insignificant coefficients. On the other hand, there is a substantial decrease in unpaid work participation with the policy. As the table reveals, children's likelihood of working in their family's business falls by 8 percentage points in our narrowest bandwidth. There is also evidence for the fall in agricultural work participation, with a 10.4 percentage point decrease in our narrowest bandwidth. Overall, children's likelihood of engaging in any kind of non-market work decreases by 14 percentage points.

In contrast, there is a slight increase in the likelihood of children's engagement in paid work, only observed in the broader bandwidths. The impact of the policy on school enrollment is positive, with very small and statistically insignificant coefficients.

The 2SLS estimates in Table 4 show the impact of cash and in-kind transfers on children's paid and unpaid work, as well as their engagement in domestic work. The table shows that the UCT benefits, along with the food transfers, significantly reduce the ratio of children who work for their families, who undertake agricultural work or engage in any non-market work.

In Figure 3, there is a drop in the proportion of children who care for older people and children. The regression results in Panel B of Table 5 suggest a drop in the domestic work participation of children, but they are not statistically significant. The policy reduces children's likelihood of cooking for domestic work by 12.4 percentage points, but effects on other domestic tasks, such as cleaning, care, and shopping, are insignificant. The 2SLS results in Table 6 also show that the transfers do not affect children's time use, except for a suggestive increase in time spent in school, which is only estimated for the larger bandwidths and has marginal statistical significance.

Figure 4 illustrates the time spent on paid and unpaid employment and school work for children. Even though there is a drop in domestic work hours, these are not statistically significant, as presented by the effect of the policy on children's time use in Table 6. While weekly hours spent on work and domestic work decrease, the changes are statistically insignificant. There is a positive but insignificant effect on school hours (daily) and study hours (weekend). These findings suggest

that the policy reduces children's involvement in non-market family work and domestic tasks like cooking, but does not significantly impact time allocated to formal education or studying.

5.2.Other Results: Children's Daily Food Consumption, Health and Well-being

The policy we study in this paper provides modest cash transfers to low-income families. We analyze its immediate effect as the dataset was collected six months after the program began. The eligibility rule is similar for the food and shelter transfers and impacts food and shelter transfer recipiency significantly. We find that the policy does not affect children's paid work participation but decreases unpaid work participation, especially when working in the family business.

In this section, we analyze other variables to understand whether the policy affected children's food consumption, health, and well-being.

Figure 5 shows the proportion of children who consume various food items daily. There is a drop in daily consumption of grains and unhealthy food items such as soda drinks, snacks, and sweets at the threshold. Table 7 examines the effect of per capita income eligibility on food consumption around the cutoff. For daily food intake, the policy significantly increases meat-based protein consumption by 16 percentage points in the narrowest bandwidth, while there is evidence for a decrease in soda consumption. The policy effects on other food categories like fruit, pulses, grain, sweets, and unhealthy snacks are statistically insignificant. The 2SLS regression results in Table 8 also reveal that the transfers significantly increase meat-based protein consumption and decrease unhealthy soda drinking and food intake.

Finally, Figure 6 shows the children's health problems and treatment status in the last two weeks. Table 9 explores the impact of per capita family income eligibility on children's health and well-being. For child health outcomes, the policy has no significant effect on general or untreated health problems, but is associated with a reduction in children who seem depressed or unhappy. There is evidence suggesting that the transfers improve children's emotional well-being according to the 2SLS results in Table 10.

5.3.Heterogeneous Results for Girls and Boys

This section provides evidence on the heterogeneity of the impact of the benefits in the beneficiary households by the gender of the child. Table 11 shows the heterogeneity in children's work and school enrolment. We observe a decline in boys' likelihood of working in a family business and picking up agricultural employment, whereas for girls, engagement in agricultural work decreases, but the statistical significance is limited to broader bandwidths.

Girls' engagement in domestic work, mainly cooking and cleaning, decreases as Table 12 shows. We show that the transfers reduce boys' time use in working outside the home and increase their time in school. Girls appear to shift away from domestic work, but the effects lack statistical power. Overall, our results indicate gendered effects of the cash and in-kind benefits in reducing children's domestic and outside work.

Furthermore, we show the daily food intake for boys and girls in Table 14. The benefits appear to reduce unhealthy food consumption more for girls, while boys benefit more from increased protein and dairy intake, the former being consistently statistically significant. The divergence in nutritional outcomes between boys and girls may reflect differences in intra-household food allocation

Finally, Table 15 presents health outcomes for girls and boys. The transfers do not show a statistically significant impact on the health or psychological well-being of girls. For boys, it significantly reduces indicators of emotional distress, with some evidence of reducing anxiety. Effects are strongest and statistically robust at narrower bandwidths.

6. Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that even a modest cash transfer policy can work as a complement to in-kind transfers in generating meaningful improvements in child welfare during periods of economic hardship. Our analysis of Turkey's FSP reveals that within six months, the program reduced young children's participation in non-market work, particularly in family businesses and agricultural activities. This finding is especially noteworthy given the program's relatively small transfer amounts and short duration, which constrain the scale of intervention needed to affect household labor decisions.

The program's impact extends beyond labor outcomes, with suggestive evidence of improved emotional well-being among recipient children and increased protein consumption. These benefits suggest that even limited cash support given in addition to food and shelter programs can help families better protect their children's welfare during economic difficulties. The increase in protein intake, potentially linked to the program's connection with food and shelter support, indicates significant complementarities between different forms of social assistance.

However, our findings also highlight essential limitations of standalone transfer programs. Despite reduced labor participation, the absence of significant changes in time spent on schoolwork suggests that financial constraints may not be the only barrier to educational engagement. This aligns with broader evidence from the cash transfer literature indicating that program impacts often depend on integrating multiple interventions (Dammert et al., 2018). With its high baseline school enrollment rates among young children, the Turkish context further underscores the need to look beyond access when considering educational outcomes.

Our results have several important implications for policy design. First, they suggest that even modest support can generate meaningful benefits for child welfare. Second, the quick emergence of positive effects (within six months) indicates that cash transfers can serve as practical emergency response tools. Third, the simultaneous improvement in nutritional intake and emotional well-being, alongside reduced child labor, suggests that even modest transfers can trigger multiple positive changes in household behavior.

Our findings reveal meaningful heterogeneity in the effects of the FSP and in-kind transfers across gender. Among boys, the program significantly reduces working outside the home, while also showing suggestive improvements in school participation, protein and dairy consumption, and emotional well-being. For girls, the evidence points to reduced consumption of unhealthy foods and lower domestic labor engagement, but with limited impacts on mental health, education, or nutritional intake of healthy items like fruits and vegetables. These gendered patterns suggest that FSP influences intra-household dynamics and child outcomes in complex ways, potentially reflecting differences in parental investment, time use expectations, or baseline vulnerabilities.

One caveat of our study is our inability to explain the underlying mechanism, mainly because we lack data on household assets or detailed information about the household head's main economic activity. More comprehensive data collection on household economic activities and assets would help illuminate the mechanisms through which cash transfers influence family decisions about child labor. Additionally, future research should examine whether these short-term benefits persist after the program ends and explore potential threshold effects in transfer size.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Receiving Social Transfers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)			
	900	850	800	750
FSP & Food				
Policy Effect	0.216***	0.219***	0.220***	0.231***
	[0.036]	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.039]
CCT				
Policy Effect	0.015	0.016	0.02	0.008
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.014]
Education Material				
Policy Effect	0.001	0.001	0.005	-0.007
	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.033]	[0.029]
Disability and Old-Age Benefits				
Policy Effect	0.025	0.025	0.006	0.010
	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.035]	[0.038]
Health Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.046*	-0.041	-0.053*	-0.041
	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.030]	[0.029]
Other Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.009	-0.008	-0.006	-0.010
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.039]	[0.039]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for the child's age, the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force or not working because of old age or disability), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1 in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the per-capita income level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

A)Child Labor	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**F) Social Transfers**	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
Enrolled in School	0.963	0.189	0	1	Food and Cash Transf	0.179	0.384	0	1
Works for the Family	0.029	0.169	0	1	CCT	0.019	0.138	0	1
Works in Agriculture	0.088	0.283	0	1	Education Material	0.048	0.215	0	1
Any Non-market Work	0.097	0.296	0	1	Disability and Old-Ag	0.040	0.196	0	1
					Health Benefit	0.067	0.250	0	1
B)Domestic Work					Other Benefit	0.021	0.143	0	1
Cooking	0.089	0.285	0	1	**G)Control Variables**				
Cleaning	0.151	0.358	0	1	**Household Head Education**				
Child and Elderly Care	0.085	0.279	0	1	Missing	0.067	0.249	0	1
Shopping	0.339	0.473	0	1	Middle School	0.524	0.499	0	1
Any Domestic Work	0.422	0.494	0	1	Secondary	0.283	0.451	0	1
C)Time Spent In Work, School or Studying					Higher	0.126	0.332	0	1
Work Hours (Weekly)	0.351	1.690	0.00	40	**Household Head Employment**				
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)	0.931	2.969	0	66	Employed	0.751	0.432	0	1
School Hours (Daily)	5.677	2.388	0	15	Unemployed	0.042	0.200	0	1
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)	3.933	5.727	0	80	Not in LF	0.147	0.354	0	1
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)	1.883	2.716	0	16	Old/Disabled	0.061	0.239	0	1
D)Daily Food Consumption					**Household Composition**				
Fruits	0.545	0.498	0	1	Any Multiples	0.006	0.076	0	1
Vegetables	0.320	0.466	0	1	Any Child Under 1	0.108	0.310	0	1
Proteins	0.111	0.314	0	1	**Child Characteristics**				
Pulses	0.103	0.303	0	1	Female	0.487	0.500	0	1
Grain	0.651	0.477	0	1	Mother Died	0.006	0.077	0	1
Dairy Products	0.586	0.493	0	1	Father Died	0.029	0.167	0	1
Soda Drink	0.157	0.363	0	1	**Child Age**				
Sweets	0.360	0.480	0	1	Age 5	0.125	0.330	0	1
Unhealthy Snacks	0.230	0.421	0	1	Age 6	0.129	0.335	0	1
E)Child's Health & Social Wellbeing					Age 7	0.135	0.342	0	1
Health Problem (last 2 weeks)	0.280	0.449	0	1	Age 8	0.129	0.336	0	1
Health Problem Untreated (last 2 wee	0.074	0.261	0	1	Age 9	0.126	0.332	0	1
Seems Depressed/Unhappy	0.326	0.469	0	1	Age 10	0.133	0.340	0	1
Seems Anxious/Worried	0.355	0.478	0	1	Age 11	0.112	0.315	0	1
					Age 12	0.111	0.315	0	1

Notes: The data come from TurkStat's 2022 Turkey Child Survey. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within 900TL bandwidth on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. Number of observations is 4006 except seeming depressed (N=3992), seeming anxious (N=3989) which has some missing values replied as "Unknown" to the survey question.

Table 3: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Child Labor, Domestic Work

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)					**Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)**				
A)Child Labor & Schooling	900	850	800	750	**B) Domestic Work**	900	850	800	750
Enrolled in School					Cooking				
Policy Effect	0.012	0.012	0.014	0.022	Policy Effect	-0.109***	-0.116***	-0.112**	-0.124***
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.023]		[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.044]	[0.041]
Works for the Family					Cleaning				
Policy Effect	-0.064**	-0.060**	-0.079***	-0.081***	Policy Effect	-0.071	-0.073	-0.073	-0.059
	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.027]	[0.027]		[0.055]	[0.056]	[0.062]	[0.058]
Works in Agriculture					Child and Elderly Care				
Policy Effect	-0.120***	-0.112***	-0.111**	-0.104**	Policy Effect	-0.040	-0.036	-0.038	-0.040
	[0.039]	[0.039]	[0.045]	[0.046]		[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.049]	[0.049]
Any Non-market Work					Shopping				
Policy Effect	-0.145***	-0.136***	-0.143***	-0.140***	Policy Effect	-0.024	-0.034	-0.027	0.030
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.040]	[0.043]		[0.055]	[0.057]	[0.063]	[0.047]
					Any Domestic Work				
					Policy Effect	-0.059	-0.069	-0.066	-0.032
						[0.048]	[0.050]	[0.055]	[0.042]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628	Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for the child's age, the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force or not working because of old age or disability), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1 in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the per-capita income level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Table 4: The Effect of Transfers on Child Labor, Domestic Work

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)					**Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)**			
	900	850	800	750		900	850	800	750
A) Child Labor & Schooling					**B) Domestic Work**				
Enrolled in School					Cooking				
Transfer	0.057	0.056	0.064	0.093	Transfer	-0.506**	-0.528**	-0.509**	-0.539**
	[0.099]	[0.099]	[0.104]	[0.106]		[0.228]	[0.229]	[0.248]	[0.238]
Works for the Family					Cleaning				
Transfer	-0.295**	-0.276**	-0.358**	-0.352**	Transfer	-0.330	-0.336	-0.331	-0.254
	[0.138]	[0.133]	[0.160]	[0.152]		[0.284]	[0.286]	[0.311]	[0.274]
Works in Agriculture					Child and Elderly Care				
Transfer	-0.557***	-0.513***	-0.504**	-0.451**	Transfer	-0.187	-0.166	-0.172	-0.175
	[0.185]	[0.179]	[0.208]	[0.196]		[0.211]	[0.207]	[0.226]	[0.213]
Any Non-market Work					Shopping				
Transfer	-0.672***	-0.620***	-0.649***	-0.606***	Transfer	-0.112	-0.153	-0.123	0.130
	[0.189]	[0.176]	[0.218]	[0.207]		[0.261]	[0.269]	[0.294]	[0.198]
					Any Domestic Work				
					Transfer	-0.274	-0.315	-0.300	-0.140
						[0.244]	[0.252]	[0.277]	[0.193]
F statistics	35.23	36.55	30.29	34.42	F statistics	35.23	36.55	30.29	34.42
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628	Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include the child's age, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Table 5: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Time Use

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)				
Work Hours (Weekly)	900	850	800	750
Policy Effect	-0.352	-0.312	-0.276	-0.294
	[0.241]	[0.239]	[0.250]	[0.267]
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	-0.491	-0.519	-0.527	-0.414
	[0.340]	[0.346]	[0.420]	[0.428]
School Hours (Daily)				
Policy Effect	0.335	0.335	0.236	0.198
	[0.203]	[0.204]	[0.220]	[0.221]
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	-0.129	-0.123	-0.153	-0.120
	[0.922]	[0.936]	[1.010]	[1.046]
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	0.078	0.097	0.359	0.419
	[0.418]	[0.430]	[0.384]	[0.367]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for the child's age, the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force or not working because of old age or disability), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1 in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the per-capita income level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 6: The Effect of Transfers on Children's Time Use

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)				
	900	850	800	750
Work Hours (Weekly)	-1.629	-1.428	-1.257	-1.276
Transfer	[1.213]	[1.169]	[1.211]	[1.210]
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)	-2.272	-2.375	-2.400	-1.793
Transfer	[1.776]	[1.792]	[2.137]	[1.982]
School Hours (Daily)	1.553*	1.530*	1.073	0.859
Transfer	[0.934]	[0.925]	[0.968]	[0.927]
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)	-0.595	-0.564	-0.698	-0.519
Transfer	[4.281]	[4.285]	[4.605]	[4.529]
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)	0.362	0.443	1.633	1.817
Transfer	[1.910]	[1.934]	[1.716]	[1.550]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include the child's age, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 7: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Food Consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)				
	900	850	800	750
Fruit				
Policy Effect	-0.122	-0.098	0.011	0.017
	[0.097]	[0.093]	[0.077]	[0.080]
Vegetables				
Policy Effect	-0.089	-0.079	-0.096	-0.083
	[0.063]	[0.061]	[0.063]	[0.064]
Protein				
Policy Effect	0.098**	0.101**	0.154***	0.157***
	[0.045]	[0.044]	[0.041]	[0.044]
Pulses				
Policy Effect	0.057	0.058	0.093	0.084
	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.065]	[0.067]
Grain				
Policy Effect	0.014	0.014	0.035	0.006
	[0.061]	[0.062]	[0.072]	[0.073]
Dairy				
Policy Effect	-0.048	-0.041	-0.014	-0.006
	[0.068]	[0.068]	[0.076]	[0.080]
Soda				
Policy Effect	-0.174***	-0.160***	-0.157***	-0.144**
	[0.052]	[0.051]	[0.056]	[0.055]
Sweets				
Policy Effect	-0.044	-0.047	-0.042	-0.018
	[0.061]	[0.062]	[0.074]	[0.074]
Unhealthy Snacks				
Policy Effect	-0.113	-0.093	-0.112	-0.087
	[0.073]	[0.073]	[0.072]	[0.076]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for the child's age, the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force or not working because of old age or disability), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1 in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the per-capita income level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 8: The Effect of Transfers on Children's Food Consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)			
	900	850	800	750
Fruit				
Transfer	-0.565	-0.446	0.052	0.073
	[0.488]	[0.449]	[0.346]	[0.344]
Vegetables				
Transfer	-0.412	-0.363	-0.438	-0.359
	[0.317]	[0.298]	[0.320]	[0.300]
Protein				
Transfer	0.455**	0.462**	0.700***	0.681***
	[0.207]	[0.201]	[0.214]	[0.213]
Pulses				
Transfer	0.263	0.265	0.425	0.365
	[0.306]	[0.302]	[0.287]	[0.281]
Grain				
Transfer	0.066	0.065	0.158	0.025
	[0.283]	[0.285]	[0.336]	[0.315]
Dairy				
Transfer	-0.222	-0.187	-0.065	-0.028
	[0.331]	[0.323]	[0.349]	[0.345]
Soda				
Transfer	-0.805**	-0.733**	-0.714**	-0.623**
	[0.321]	[0.302]	[0.327]	[0.295]
Sweets				
Transfer	-0.202	-0.213	-0.191	-0.080
	[0.273]	[0.272]	[0.324]	[0.313]
Unhealthy Snacks				
Transfer	-0.524*	-0.423	-0.509*	-0.377
	[0.315]	[0.310]	[0.304]	[0.303]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include the child's age, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 9: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Health and Emotional Well-being

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)			
Health Problem				
Policy Effect	-0.034	-0.042	-0.039	-0.056
	[0.057]	[0.056]	[0.061]	[0.064]
Untreated Health Problem				
Policy Effect	0.046	0.047	0.047	0.056
	[0.044]	[0.046]	[0.054]	[0.053]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628
Seems Depressed/Unhappy				
Policy Effect	-0.155**	-0.142**	-0.128*	-0.143*
	[0.073]	[0.071]	[0.075]	[0.076]
Observations	3,992	3,968	3,676	3,614
Seems Anxious/Worried				
Policy Effect	-0.106	-0.111	-0.125	-0.142
	[0.121]	[0.123]	[0.139]	[0.149]
Observations	3,989	3,965	3,673	3,612

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for the child's age, the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force or not working because of old age or disability), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1 in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the per-capita income level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 10: The Effect of Transfers on Children's Health and Emotional Well-being

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)			
Health Problem				
Transfer	-0.159	-0.193	-0.178	-0.244
	[0.260]	[0.250]	[0.275]	[0.274]
Untreated Health Problem				
Transfer	0.212	0.216	0.213	0.242
	[0.215]	[0.220]	[0.255]	[0.241]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628
Seems Depressed/Unhappy	-0.721*	-0.650*	-0.586	-0.620
Transfer	[0.408]	[0.386]	[0.395]	[0.383]
F statistics	35.05	36.40	30.21	34.25
Observations	3,992	3,968	3,676	3,614
Seems Anxious/Worried				
Transfer	-0.497	-0.510	-0.575	-0.620
	[0.598]	[0.599]	[0.676]	[0.690]
F statistics	34.66	35.97	29.69	33.59
Observations	3,989	3,965	3,673	3,612

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include the child's age, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 11: Heterogeneous Effect of Transfers on Child Labor-Girls vs Boys

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)					**Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)**			
A) GIRLS	900	850	800	750	**B) BOYS**	900	850	800	750
Enrolled in School					Enrolled in School				
Transfer	-0.048	-0.037	-0.035	0.014	Transfer	0.150	0.131	0.154	0.136
	[0.088]	[0.090]	[0.095]	[0.093]		[0.189]	[0.180]	[0.203]	[0.188]
Works for the Family					Works for the Family				
Transfer	-0.015	-0.009	-0.091	-0.119	Transfer	-0.753*	-0.716*	-0.793*	-0.716*
	[0.088]	[0.091]	[0.086]	[0.076]		[0.415]	[0.400]	[0.434]	[0.389]
Works in Agriculture					Works in Agriculture				
Transfer	-0.235**	-0.216*	-0.130	-0.087	Transfer	-1.109**	-1.034**	-1.132**	-1.026**
	[0.114]	[0.115]	[0.118]	[0.116]		[0.476]	[0.450]	[0.526]	[0.465]
Any Non-market Work					Any Non-market Work				
Transfer	-0.178	-0.154	-0.121	-0.114	Transfer	-1.522***	-1.431***	-1.550**	-1.401**
	[0.119]	[0.121]	[0.123]	[0.118]		[0.588]	[0.552]	[0.660]	[0.571]
F statistics	36.42	36.32	26.10	29.27	F statistics	14.35	14.90	12.43	13.85
Observations	1,952	1,943	1,802	1,766	Observations	2,054	2,039	1,888	1,862

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include the child's age, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 12: Heterogeneous Effect of Transfers on Children's Domestic Work- Girls vs Boys

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)					**Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)**			
A) GIRLS	900	850	800	750	**B) BOYS**	900	850	800	750
Cooking					Cooking				
Transfer	-0.492**	-0.522**	-0.535**	-0.626***	Transfer	-0.553	-0.531	-0.488	-0.391
	[0.211]	[0.212]	[0.255]	[0.223]		[0.446]	[0.434]	[0.448]	[0.410]
Cleaning					Cleaning				
Transfer	-0.511**	-0.528**	-0.608**	-0.540**	Transfer	-0.018	0.024	0.035	0.110
	[0.226]	[0.233]	[0.273]	[0.258]		[0.468]	[0.459]	[0.481]	[0.445]
Child and Elderly Care					Child and Elderly Care				
Transfer	-0.223	-0.169	-0.272	-0.257	Transfer	-0.232	-0.267	-0.158	-0.218
	[0.260]	[0.256]	[0.297]	[0.289]		[0.223]	[0.216]	[0.221]	[0.193]
Shopping					Shopping				
Transfer	-0.028	0.000	-0.097	0.183	Transfer	-0.416	-0.539	-0.183	-0.028
	[0.290]	[0.291]	[0.319]	[0.207]		[0.397]	[0.404]	[0.325]	[0.272]
Any Domestic Work					Any Domestic Work				
Transfer	-0.292	-0.228	-0.399	-0.267	Transfer	-0.371	-0.562	-0.177	-0.018
	[0.270]	[0.258]	[0.287]	[0.231]		[0.391]	[0.413]	[0.335]	[0.266]
F statistics	36.42	36.32	26.10	29.27	F statistics	14.35	14.90	12.43	13.85
Observations	1,952	1,943	1,802	1,766	Observations	2,054	2,039	1,888	1,862

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for the child's age, the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force or not working because of old age or disability), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1 in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the per-capita income level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 13: Heterogeneous Effect of Transfers on Children's Time Use- Girls vs Boys

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)					**Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)**				
A) GIRLS	900	850	800	750	**B) BOYS**	900	850	800	750
Work Hours (Weekly)					Work Hours (Weekly)				
Transfer	0.645	0.742	1.006	0.852	Policy Effect	-5.465*	-5.156*	-4.826	-4.377
	[0.725]	[0.728]	[0.684]	[0.683]		[2.955]	[2.847]	[2.972]	[2.679]
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)					Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)				
Transfer	-3.601	-3.855	-3.831	-3.178	Policy Effect	-0.917	-0.664	-1.520	-1.076
	[2.297]	[2.389]	[2.778]	[2.475]		[2.255]	[2.242]	[2.291]	[2.240]
School Hours (Daily)					School Hours (Daily)				
Transfer	0.821	1.095	0.675	0.200	Policy Effect	2.757*	2.090	1.683	1.963
	[0.999]	[0.978]	[1.066]	[1.053]		[1.641]	[1.308]	[1.312]	[1.280]
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)					Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)				
Transfer	-2.209	-2.548	-4.927	-5.795	Policy Effect	0.538	1.498	5.153	6.495
	[5.018]	[5.098]	[5.771]	[5.702]		[5.646]	[5.553]	[5.920]	[6.029]
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)					Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	0.497	0.442	1.159	1.460	Policy Effect	-1.465	-0.956	1.262	1.465
	[2.014]	[2.051]	[2.162]	[2.070]		[2.595]	[2.546]	[2.215]	[2.120]
F statistics	36.42	36.32	26.10	29.27	F statistics	14.35	14.90	12.43	13.85
Observations	1,952	1,943	1,802	1,766	Observations	2,054	2,039	1,888	1,862

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for the child's age, the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force or not working because of old age or disability), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1 in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the per-capita income level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 14: Heterogeneous Effect of Transfers on Children's Food Consumption-Girls vs Boys

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)					**Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)**			
A) GIRLS	900	850	800	750	**B) BOYS**	900	850	800	750
Fruit					Fruit				
Transfer	-1.001*	-0.875	-0.628	-0.672	Transfer	0.152	0.279	1.051	1.089*
	[0.584]	[0.562]	[0.588]	[0.595]		[0.723]	[0.681]	[0.658]	[0.637]
Vegetables					Vegetables				
Transfer	-1.083***	-1.033***	-1.170***	-1.018***	Transfer	0.968*	0.992*	0.890	0.707
	[0.301]	[0.292]	[0.361]	[0.301]		[0.529]	[0.522]	[0.543]	[0.491]
Protein					Protein				
Transfer	0.238	0.270	0.502**	0.469**	Transfer	0.731**	0.701**	0.863**	0.860**
	[0.217]	[0.220]	[0.220]	[0.224]		[0.358]	[0.325]	[0.375]	[0.363]
Pulses					Pulses				
Transfer	0.163	0.186	0.294	0.252	Transfer	0.440	0.382	0.488	0.411
	[0.378]	[0.381]	[0.392]	[0.401]		[0.347]	[0.324]	[0.333]	[0.305]
Grain					Grain				
Transfer	-0.165	-0.116	0.007	-0.026	Transfer	0.534	0.395	0.384	0.090
	[0.406]	[0.410]	[0.398]	[0.402]		[0.723]	[0.682]	[0.732]	[0.659]
Dairy					Dairy				
Transfer	-0.640	-0.586	-0.554	-0.528	Transfer	0.614	0.594	0.805*	0.782*
	[0.455]	[0.451]	[0.509]	[0.504]		[0.410]	[0.396]	[0.445]	[0.416]
Soda					Soda				
Transfer	-0.600**	-0.574**	-0.574**	-0.559**	Transfer	-0.909	-0.802	-0.737	-0.540
	[0.251]	[0.247]	[0.285]	[0.276]		[0.598]	[0.566]	[0.586]	[0.510]
Sweets					Sweets				
Transfer	-0.182	-0.165	-0.219	-0.098	Transfer	-0.238	-0.333	-0.227	-0.166
	[0.251]	[0.254]	[0.306]	[0.244]		[0.718]	[0.679]	[0.745]	[0.736]
Unhealthy Snacks					Unhealthy Snacks				
Transfer	-0.347*	-0.280	-0.514***	-0.435***	Transfer	-0.804	-0.691	-0.439	-0.270
	[0.194]	[0.184]	[0.180]	[0.162]		[0.591]	[0.595]	[0.600]	[0.621]
Observations	1,952	1,943	1,802	1,766	Observation	2,054	2,039	1,888	1,862

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include the child's age, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 15: Heterogeneous Effect of Transfers on Children's Health and Emotional Well-being-Girls vs Boys

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A) GIRLS	Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)				B) BOYS	Per Capita Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL			
Health Problem					Health Problem				
Transfer	0.102	0.068	-0.045	-0.137	Transfer	-0.766	-0.791	-0.497	-0.480
	[0.220]	[0.222]	[0.262]	[0.269]		[0.670]	[0.669]	[0.695]	[0.669]
Untreated Health Problem					Untreated Health Problem				
Transfer	0.264	0.271	0.230	0.215	Transfer	0.115	0.110	0.139	0.222
	[0.252]	[0.259]	[0.303]	[0.306]		[0.354]	[0.361]	[0.416]	[0.380]
F statistics	36.42	36.32	26.10	29.27	F statistics	14.35	14.90	12.43	13.85
Observations	1,952	1,943	1,802	1,766	Observations	2,054	2,039	1,888	1,862
Seems Depressed/Unhappy					Seems Depressed/Unhappy				
Transfer	-0.557	-0.489	-0.445	-0.330	Transfer	-0.936*	-0.881*	-0.787*	-1.002**
	[0.437]	[0.424]	[0.447]	[0.403]		[0.480]	[0.465]	[0.464]	[0.458]
F statistics	36.71	36.67	26.32	29.52	F statistics	14.16	14.70	12.23	13.62
Observations	1,942	1,933	1,792	1,756	Observations	2,050	2,035	1,884	1,858
Seems Anxious/Worried					Seems Anxious/Worried				
Transfer	-0.198	-0.232	-0.302	-0.295	Transfer	-0.979	-0.932	-0.975	-1.026*
	[0.652]	[0.663]	[0.764]	[0.778]		[0.600]	[0.573]	[0.616]	[0.623]
F statistics	36.27	36.20	25.88	29.03	F statistics	13.66	14.18	11.74	12.97
Observations	1,941	1,932	1,791	1,755	Observations	2,048	2,033	1,882	1,857

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include the child's age, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher), the child's gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Figure 1: Discontinuity in FSP recipiency



Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows FSP and food and shelter recipiency within 750 TL on both sides of the cutoff.

Figure 2: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Child Labor Outcomes and School Enrollment



Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children younger than 13.

Figure 3: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Domestic Work Outcomes



Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children younger than 13.

Figure 4: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Weekly Work and Study Hours



Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children younger than 13.

Figure 5: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Daily Food Consumption Outcomes



Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children 5-12 years old.

Figure 6: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Child Health Outcomes



Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children ages 5-12.

Appendix Tables and Figures

Figure A1



Notes: Manipulation test using the local polynomial density estimators proposed in Cattaneo et al. (2018). Stata command rddensity. A local quadratic approximation with kernel epanechnikov weights is used to construct the density estimators, while a cubic approximation is used for the bias-corrected density estimator. The density estimation method is restricted-assuming equal distribution function and higher-order derivatives. Robust bias-corrected statistic with asymptotic plugin standard errors and uniform confidence interval at 95% level (2000 of simulations). T= 1.7227, p-value = 0.0849

Table A1: Policy Effect on the Pretreatment Covariates

Household Head Education	**RD Effect**	**p-value**
Missing	-0.015	0.881
Middle School	0.189	0.339
Secondary	-0.338*	0.065
Higher	0.164	0.284
Household Head Employment		
Employed	0.132	0.451
Unemployed	0.055	0.227
Not in LF	-0.117	0.325
Old/Disabled	-0.070	0.627
Household Composition		
Nbr Under 5	0.248	0.228
Nbr Between 5 and 12	0.848**	0.016
Nbr Between 13 and 17	0.186	0.364
Nbr of Adults	-0.031	0.947
Any Multiples	0.016	0.756
Any Child Under 1	-0.077	0.557
Child Characteristics		
Female	-0.019	0.906
Mother Died	0.017	0.444
Father Died	0.012	0.849

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within 900 TL on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The sample size is 4007. The dependent variable is given on the first column. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table A2: Continuity Analysis with Alternative Cutoffs

	Sample: Left-Hand Side of Actual Cutoff			**Sample: Left-Hand Side of Actual Cu**		
	Location of the Alternative Cutoff relative to the Actual Cutoff in TL					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A) Program Beneficiary	-800	-600	-400	400	600	800
FSP	-0.116	0.006	-0.075*	-0.132	0.035	0.000
	[0.228]	[0.063]	[0.042]	[0.318]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Food and Shelter	-0.041	-0.021	0.034	0.059	-0.005	0.015
	[0.151]	[0.039]	[0.037]	[0.167]	[0.012]	[0.013]
Paid Employment	0.009	0.009	-0.008	0.025	-0.003	0.004
	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.023]	[0.005]	[0.004]
Works for the Family	0.092	-0.016	0.011	-0.105	-0.020	-0.012
	[0.098]	[0.025]	[0.022]	[0.341]	[0.015]	[0.036]
Works in Agriculture	0.204	0.025	-0.003	0.270	-0.066*	0.057
	[0.169]	[0.036]	[0.028]	[0.433]	[0.035]	[0.041]
Sells Produce	0.032	-0.010	0.010	0.039	-0.006	-0.008
	[0.029]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.042]	[0.006]	[0.018]
Any Non-market Work	0.299*	0.028	0.005	0.363	-0.078**	0.053
	[0.176]	[0.039]	[0.032]	[0.458]	[0.038]	[0.048]
Enrolled in School	-0.134	-0.004	0.003	0.269	0.017	-0.026
	[0.098]	[0.023]	[0.016]	[0.208]	[0.014]	[0.017]
B) Domestic Work						
Cooking	-0.132	-0.037	0.021	-0.036	0.032	0.015
	[0.147]	[0.034]	[0.020]	[0.497]	[0.039]	[0.054]
Cleaning	0.122	-0.028	0.021	-0.470	0.005	-0.013
	[0.189]	[0.045]	[0.032]	[0.614]	[0.048]	[0.070]
Child and Elderly Care	0.216*	0.041	0.006	0.293	-0.027	0.040
	[0.130]	[0.039]	[0.027]	[0.426]	[0.032]	[0.040]
Shopping	0.098	0.059	-0.021	-0.881	0.020	-0.017
	[0.262]	[0.063]	[0.044]	[0.716]	[0.074]	[0.101]
Any Domestic Work	0.081	-0.024	0.013	-0.679	0.009	0.008
	[0.262]	[0.062]	[0.045]	[0.694]	[0.073]	[0.100]
C) Time Spent In Work, School or Studying						
Work Hours (Weekly)	1.548*	0.278	-0.057	1.506	-0.515**	0.388
	[0.839]	[0.238]	[0.163]	[2.871]	[0.218]	[0.239]
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)	1.693	0.289	-0.294	-3.480	0.152	-0.644
	[1.488]	[0.263]	[0.262]	[4.378]	[0.334]	[0.536]
School Hours (Daily)	-1.102	0.085	0.078	2.429	-0.112	-0.071
	[0.788]	[0.188]	[0.136]	[1.861]	[0.174]	[0.327]
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)	3.144	1.716**	0.078	8.399	-0.062	1.280
	[2.981]	[0.810]	[0.576]	[8.791]	[0.917]	[1.354]
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)	0.507	0.504	-0.075	-0.077	-0.143	1.058**
	[1.480]	[0.446]	[0.257]	[3.789]	[0.490]	[0.519]
	2,908	2,908	2,908	1,098	1,098	1,098

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within 900 TL bandwidth on the left and right side of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status based on alternative cutoffs given on columns 1-3 and 4-6 on the dependent variables given in panels A,B, and C. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table B1: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Receiving Social Transfers-Quadratic Function of the Running Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)			
	900	850	800	750
FSP				
Policy Effect	0.163***	0.165***	0.181***	0.189***
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.045]	[0.047]
CCT				
Policy Effect	0.016	0.017	0.019	0.009
	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.021]
Education Material				
Policy Effect	0.005	0.003	0.006	-0.005
	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.033]	[0.033]
Food and Shelter				
Policy Effect	0.113***	0.114***	0.101***	0.102***
	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.029]
Disability and Old-Age Benefits				
Policy Effect	0.024	0.024	0.008	0.012
	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.032]	[0.033]
Health Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.037	-0.032	-0.047	-0.039
	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.046]	[0.048]
Other Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002	-0.006
	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.024]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table B2: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Child Labor, Domestic Work-Quadratic Function of the Running Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)					**Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)**			
A) Child Labor	900	850	800	750	**B) Domestic Work**	900	850	800	750
Paid Employment					Cooking				
Policy Effect	0.007	0.008	0.011	0.011	Policy Effect	-0.100*	-0.107**	-0.099*	-0.112*
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.010]		[0.053]	[0.052]	[0.059]	[0.059]
Works for the Family					Cleaning				
Policy Effect	-0.070*	-0.067*	-0.083**	-0.084**	Policy Effect	-0.058	-0.060	-0.057	-0.043
	[0.036]	[0.037]	[0.039]	[0.040]		[0.065]	[0.065]	[0.073]	[0.076]
Works in Agriculture					Child and Elderly Care				
Policy Effect	-0.104**	-0.096*	-0.093	-0.089	Policy Effect	-0.070	-0.067	-0.072	-0.069
	[0.052]	[0.053]	[0.059]	[0.061]		[0.048]	[0.049]	[0.055]	[0.055]
Any Non-market Work					Shopping				
Policy Effect	-0.135**	-0.125**	-0.130**	-0.130**	Policy Effect	-0.009	-0.018	-0.023	0.030
	[0.057]	[0.058]	[0.064]	[0.066]		[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.087]	[0.089]
					Any Domestic Work				
					Policy Effect	-0.045	-0.053	-0.06	-0.029
						[0.081]	[0.081]	[0.087]	[0.091]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628	Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 and 5-8 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table B3: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Time Use -Quadratic Function of the Running Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the Cutoff (TL)			
Time Spent In Work, School or Studying	900	850	800	750
Work Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	-0.354	-0.315	-0.282	-0.296
	[0.316]	[0.320]	[0.366]	[0.378]
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	-0.534	-0.567	-0.613	-0.483
	[0.469]	[0.470]	[0.527]	[0.542]
School Hours (Daily)				
Policy Effect	0.302	0.299	0.200	0.159
	[0.208]	[0.206]	[0.222]	[0.228]
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	0.063	0.069	0.047	0.059
	[1.069]	[1.078]	[1.147]	[1.171]
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)				
Policy Effect	0.063	0.082	0.365	0.421
	[0.436]	[0.440]	[0.494]	[0.507]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table C1: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Outcomes -Excluding the Food and Shelter Beneficiaries from the Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the					**Per Capita Family Income on Both Sides of the**			
A) Program Beneficiary	900	850	800	750	**E) Daily Food Consumption**	900	850	800	750
FSP	0.146*	0.149*	0.185**	0.203**	Fruit	-0.111	-0.06	0.164	0.163
	[0.075]	[0.076]	[0.085]	[0.088]		[0.184]	[0.185]	[0.197]	[0.202]
B) Child Labor & Schooling					Vegetables	-0.155	-0.136	-0.191	-0.154
Paid Employment	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.015		[0.175]	[0.178]	[0.192]	[0.198]
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.017]	Protein	0.240*	0.246*	0.331**	0.339**
Works for the Family	-0.123*	-0.117*	-0.153**	-0.156**		[0.129]	[0.131]	[0.146]	[0.153]
	[0.069]	[0.070]	[0.073]	[0.074]	Pulses	0.115	0.116	0.163	0.152
Works in Agriculture	-0.178*	-0.16	-0.144	-0.135		[0.132]	[0.134]	[0.149]	[0.154]
	[0.103]	[0.105]	[0.115]	[0.120]	Grain	0.003	0.001	0.011	-0.051
Sells Produce	0.040**	0.042**	0.030**	0.032**		[0.172]	[0.173]	[0.189]	[0.195]
	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.016]	Dairy	-0.138	-0.126	-0.069	-0.051
Any Non-market Work	-0.228**	-0.207*	-0.213*	-0.212*		[0.178]	[0.180]	[0.195]	[0.202]
	[0.111]	[0.113]	[0.124]	[0.129]	Soda	-0.290**	-0.260*	-0.259*	-0.239
Enrolled in School	0.048	0.048	0.047	0.060		[0.131]	[0.133]	[0.146]	[0.152]
	[0.044]	[0.045]	[0.050]	[0.050]	Sweets	0.052	0.046	0.061	0.095
C) Domestic Work						[0.183]	[0.184]	[0.201]	[0.206]
Cooking	-0.192*	-0.201*	-0.192*	-0.222*	Unhealthy Snacks	-0.141	-0.096	-0.134	-0.091
	[0.106]	[0.106]	[0.117]	[0.117]		[0.160]	[0.162]	[0.176]	[0.182]
Cleaning	-0.105	-0.109	-0.111	-0.078	Observations	3,757	3,735	3,482	3,421
	[0.129]	[0.131]	[0.144]	[0.150]	**F) Child's Health and Wellbeing**				
Child and Elderly Care	-0.145	-0.137	-0.147	-0.135	Health Problem	0.003	-0.011	0.001	-0.061
	[0.097]	[0.098]	[0.109]	[0.110]		[0.156]	[0.157]	[0.171]	[0.178]
Shopping	-0.057	-0.077	-0.07	0.037	Untreated Health Problem	0.104	0.108	0.095	0.106
	[0.159]	[0.161]	[0.173]	[0.179]		[0.108]	[0.110]	[0.118]	[0.124]
Any Domestic Work	-0.145	-0.163	-0.169	-0.104	Observations	3,757	3,735	3,482	3,421
	[0.161]	[0.163]	[0.175]	[0.182]	Seems Depressed/Unhappy	-0.306*	-0.272*	-0.247	-0.273
D) Time Spent In Work, School or Studying						[0.159]	[0.161]	[0.179]	[0.184]
Work Hours (Weekly)	-0.498	-0.410	-0.324	-0.354	Observations	3,743	3,721	3,468	3,407
	[0.613]	[0.625]	[0.711]	[0.741]	Seems Anxious/Worried	-0.233	-0.237	-0.258	-0.296
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)	-0.791	-0.853	-0.942	-0.666	Policy Effect	[0.162]	[0.165]	[0.181]	[0.186]
	[0.914]	[0.917]	[1.028]	[1.062]	Observations	3,740	3,718	3,465	3,405
School Hours (Daily)	0.652	0.644	0.327	0.244					
	[0.431]	[0.427]	[0.450]	[0.464]					
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)	0.521	0.528	0.408	0.423					
	[2.067]	[2.087]	[2.208]	[2.258]					
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)	0.329	0.375	0.874	0.992					
	[0.886]	[0.896]	[0.986]	[1.015]					
Observations	3,757	3,735	3,482	3,421					

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022.The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 and 5-8 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. the sample excludes households who received food and shelter benefits within the last 12 months. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the dependent variables given in panels A and B. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

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