

The Social Contract and Collective Action:

Grievances, Cleavages,
and Protests in Tunisia
and Lebanon

**Markus Loewe
and Holger Albrecht**

**The Social Contract and Collective Action:
Grievances, Cleavages, and Protests in Tunisia and Lebanon**

Markus Loewe (IDOS, Bonn) and

Holger Albrecht (University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa)

Abstract

The article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to take to the streets for contentious collective action. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon that we commissioned in late 2020 and unpacks popular preferences about the social contract and states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries, but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

Key words: Social Contract, Protests, Contentious Politics, Public Opinion, Middle East and North Africa, Grievances

People develop grievances when their expectations in the state's social contract obligations are not met. How do these grievances turn into political action? An emerging body of literature perceives the social contract as a contractual arrangement between states and their citizens where both sides have rights and obligations toward each other (Loewe, Zintl and Houdret, 2021; Bishara, Jurkovich and Berman, 2023). In this research program, increased attention has been paid on grievances that citizens develop where states do not make good on their promises to provide material provisions, physical protection, and avenues of political participation (Berman, Bishara and Jurkovich, 2023).

The Middle East and North Africa have emerged as an empirical playing field to study social contract grievances and people's reactions to them: citizens in this region have routinely taken to the streets to demand that states hold their side of the bargain (El-Haddad, 2020). Protest politics has taken on different shapes and forms, ranging from small street rallies to revolutionary mass uprisings (Del Panta, 2020; Beissinger, Jamal and Mazur, 2015; Han, 2023). Hence, we know quite well how social contract grievances emerge and, at the same time, how protest action shapes state-society relations in these countries. However, we know surprisingly little about the question when grievances make people participate in street protests (De Juan and Wegner, 2019). Hence, to deploy Hirschman's terminology (1972), we want to know if and how grievances lead to voice rather than loyalty or exit.

This article addresses this gap and investigates the link between social contract grievances and protest behavior in Tunisia and Lebanon—two countries that have been particularly prone to contentious collective action over the past decade. We investigate our question on the individual level, drawing on self-reported responses about the protest activities, grievances, and sentiment of citizens on their states' social contract obligations. To this aim, we conducted original, nationally representative surveys in both countries, the results of which provide us with leverage to test general expectations about the link between grievances and protest behavior.

To advance our argument and develop testable hypotheses, we adopt two broad perspectives on the possible driving forces of contentious collective action. For one, extant scholarship emphasizes differences in society to explain variations in protest participation. Cleavages within society—the argument goes—identify specific strata that would be more or less prone to contentious collective action (McAdam, 1986; Kandil, 2012; Hylmö and Wennerhag, 2015). These cleavages may include ethnicity, political and epistemological preferences, social class differences, and possibly more. We zoom in on socio-economic differences—empirically operationalized with income, education, and other indicators—to distinguish between socially privileged vs. underprivileged parts of society and test whether this cleavage is a meaningful predictor of protest behavior: are privileged or underprivileged people more or less likely to turn social contract grievances into voice? This can be because privileged groups are better able to organize and know about protests (Pellicer et al. 2022) or because they can bear the costs and risks that participation in protest bring about (Campante and Chor, 2012). Our argument expands a discussion, which has largely focused on European welfare states, to countries with different class structures and fundamental political crises questioning the core mechanisms of the social contract.

In turn, we consider the possibility that differences between social groups do not matter as much for the link between grievances and protest behavior. We therefore investigate whether such grievances override extant social cleavages: is there a direct link between specific social contract grievances—on the spectrum of provisions, protection, and participation—and protest action, regardless of people’s belonging to specific socio-economic strata? And do people develop priorities in the state’s social contract obligations salient enough to inspire their participation in collective action?

Our empirical findings reveal noteworthy commonalities and differences between self-reported citizen behavior in Tunisia and Lebanon. For one, we find that, across the board, socially

privileged people in the MENA region are more likely to engage in protest activities than underprivileged people. This is in line with findings from research on protest behavior in Western welfare states, where that the middle classes in society tend to emerge as the driving force for protest action. Yet, while socially advantaged people are more likely to resort to street politics, grievances across the board show variation between respondents in Tunisia and Lebanon, supporting accounts pointing at the difference of political and social crises in our two countries: while crises in political regime change (Tunisia) prompt people to prioritize specific areas of the social contract, namely service provisions over political participation, crises of state failure (Lebanon) appear to lead people to the streets over their grievances with all core elements of the social contract.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. We first explain our puzzle, embed our theoretical argument in the literatures on the social contract and contentious collective action, and develop testable hypotheses for our empirical inquiry. In the subsequent part, we introduce our research design, justify our cases selection, and provide some empirical context on politics in Lebanon and Tunisia. We then present and discuss descriptive findings from our surveys and the results of probit estimations for a systematic test of our hypotheses. The article concludes with a brief discussion of our findings' theoretical and empirical implications.

Theorizing the Social Contract, Grievances and Collective Action

There has been an emerging social science literature on the social contract in different countries. Scholars have conceptualized the social contract as a mutual agreement between those in government and the people on rights and obligations toward each other (Loewe, Zintl and Houdret, 2021; El-Haddad, 2020; Heydemann, 2020). Going beyond a simplistic perception of these relations to largely consist of social service provision, this broader conceptualization allows for the social contract to be seen as an arena of reciprocal state-society relations where

both the state and people have something to give and take in turn. While governments expect their citizens to accept government rule, law-abiding behavior, tax payments, and military service in the face of existential threats, citizens develop expectations in three constituent areas: *protection* relates to guarantees of collective and individual security against internal and external threats. *Provision* refers to basic services, such as access to resources, infrastructure, social services and benefits, and economic opportunities. And *participation* denotes citizens' expectations to be heard in political decision-making processes through elections or other means (Loewe, Zintl and Houdret, 2021).

Scholars in this emerging research program have been predominantly interested in people's expectations toward these 'Three Ps' of the social contract along with grievances emanating from governments' failures to provide them. They found how people develop grievances where their expectations are not met, how social and political crises impact on people's preferences toward social contract provisions, and how people develop hierarchies of needs where states deliver selectively on the social contract's 'Three Ps' (e.g., among other works, Ardovini and O'Driscoll, 2023; Bishara, Jurkovich and Berman, 2023; Loewe and Albrecht, 2023; Castañeda, Doyle and Schwartz, 2019; Cassani, 2017; Slater, 2010; Timmons, 2005; Loewe and Zintl, 2021).

We therefore know quite well how social contract grievances emerge. We know, however, comparatively little about if, and how, such social contract grievances turn into political action as we are reminded that 'grievances are just too widespread to explain comparatively rare instances of political mobilization' (De Juan and Wegner, 2019: 34). Ultimately, the difference between preferences and action is important because publicly sharing grievances is cheap, while political action in street politics is costly for the individual involved (Olson, 1965; Kuran, 1995).

Among few and scattered works, Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2018) argued that social contract grievances have bolstered support for extremist parties, while Huang and Zuo (2023) unpacked how grievances with economic inequality led to declining regime support in China. Other scholars found how community resistance toward vaccinations served to renegotiate the social contract in Nigeria (Grossman, Phillips and Rosenzweig, 2017; Albrecht and Loewe (2024) explored whether unmet social contract obligations amid the COVID-19 pandemic would prompt people to seek help from the state or their social networks; and Klandermans and van Stekelenburg (2016) analyzed grievances emanating from austerity measures as drivers of street protests in the Netherlands.

We take inspiration from these accounts and aim to unpack how social contract grievances lead to people's participation in contentious politics and street protests. Our main question reads as follows: what are the driving forces for social contract grievances to turn into political action? Findings from such an inquiry contribute to knowledge in three related research areas. First, they further substantiate what we know about the dynamics of contentious politics in crisis-ridden societies. Second, they provide leverage for the body of works mentioned above, inquiring into people's expectations in, and grievances with, the social contract. Third, our case selection allows us to unpack variation about the type of crisis that provides the context for linking social contract grievances with voice, distinguishing between state failure, as in Lebanon, and regime crisis, as in Lebanon.

We begin our theoretical discussion of political action by considering the possibility of two different types of driving forces in protest politics: *cleavage* vs. *grievance* as the better predictor for participation in collective action. What we call 'cleavage-driven' collective action originates from general divisions in society regardless of specific preferences emanating from social contracts and crises that render the provision of goods through social contracts difficult. The core underlying premise here is that some strata in society are generally prone to advocate for

their preferences and grievances in street politics more so than others. What we call ‘grievance-driven’ collective action, in turn, would come from the specific preferences that people develop *across* society, and grievances they hold with the state’s failure to deliver on its social contract obligations. Our underlying premise here is that grievances themselves explain the likelihood of protest action across different societal strata and identities. Finally, apart from the salience of grievances more generally, we believe that some individual grievances might be stronger than others, hence prompting collective action.

Cleavage-Driven Collective Action

We begin with protest action that would be more likely among specific strata in society than others. We will consider this possibility by distinguishing broadly between the haves and the have nots in society, namely those that are socially and economically privileged vs. those that are underprivileged—evidenced empirically with people’s access to income, employment, and education.

Scholars of contentious activism have long debated which strata in society are prone to taking to the streets in demand of their preferences more so than others. The debate clusters around two rivaling arguments: some scholars have brought forward a need-based argument holding that underprivileged people in society are more likely to engage in collective action. In turn, other scholars would emphasize opportunity costs for collective action to argue that privileged strata in society are more likely to take to the streets. We situate our study in this debate, which has empirically largely focused on liberal democracies in the OECD world, to see which one of these perspectives holds greater traction in explaining protest behavior in a different political context: non-Western, crisis-ridden countries in the Middle East and North Africa where people have developed significant grievances with their states’ side of the social contract bargain.

Need-based assumptions about how social contract grievances turn into political action are perhaps most intuitive in that they surmise, very broadly, that people with less material and nonmaterial resources are most affected by the failure of their governments to provide economic resources and physical protection. Underprivileged people in society, the argument goes, would be more vulnerable to individual social and economic decline in the case of unmet state obligations toward the social contract because they have less material and educational resources to weather such social and economic crises. In consequence, they would be more likely to engage in contentious collective action. This would hold, among others, for people with low income, less education, insecure job situations, as well as for females in countries with large gender gaps.

Scholars have found, for instance, that perceptions of inequality in the delivery of basic social services have led to a ‘rebellion of the poor’ in South Africa (Alexander, 2010; De Juan and Wegner, 2019). In different empirical contexts, scholars have shown how the unemployed and economically marginalized members of the work force have overcome collective action problems and mobilized for protest politics outside of established organizations, such as labor unions, political parties, and civil society organizations (Han, 2023; Jöst, 2020). Even females can be more active in demonstrations if they suffer more as the uprisings in Iran in 2022 have shown (Sajadi, 2023). Inspired by these accounts, we are able to submit a first testable Hypothesis on the driving forces of cleavage-driven contentious politics:

Hypothesis 1a: Socially disadvantaged people are more likely to engage in protests as a consequence of social contract grievances.

In contrast to arguments emphasizing economic necessity and perceptions of inequality, other scholars have highlighted the role of the urban middle classes as drivers of protest activities, providing empirical evidence from episodes as diverse as European protest movements (Hylmö and Wennerhag, 2015) and the Arab Spring (Beissinger, Jamal and Mazur, 2015; Kandil, 2012).

Arguments clustering around the notion of social availability and capacity play a key role in this research program (McAdam, 1986). Higher levels of education, for instance, are found to be robustly associated with increased protest activities (e.g., Anduiza, Cristancho and Sabucedo, 2014; Campante and Chor, 2014).

Three mechanisms are thought to link education in particular with contentious politics. First, education invests individuals with the skills and capacities to organize for contentious collective action (Anderson, 2021; Hillygus, 2005); second, reminiscent of relative deprivation arguments (Davies, 1962), higher education fuels expectations at upward social mobility that turn into grievances where states fail to deliver on social contract obligations (Pellicer et al., 2022). The third argument in this line invokes moral economy arguments: based on their higher education, society's middle classes are more likely to develop moral preferences and social norms about the state's obligation to deliver on social contract obligations. Kurtuluş Gemici, for instance, found that educated urban middle classes—namely shopkeepers and artisans—have engaged in social protests amid the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey (Gemici, 2013).

In addition, participation in protests is often associated with costs in terms of time, money, and risks (Olson, 1965). One could argue that people with limited income, assets, education, and job security are more reluctant to bear these costs and risks. They are more vulnerable and therefore less willing to accept additional risk, as empirical studies show (Bhalla et al., 2019; Barrientos and Malerba, 2020). In the same way, females might be less willing than males to participate in protests—at least if these are confrontational—because females tend to be more vulnerable in physical, social, and economic terms (Dodson, 2015). Hence, our second testable Hypothesis reads as follows:

Hypothesis 1b: Socially advantaged people are more likely to engage in protests as a consequence of social contract grievances.

Grievance-Driven Collective Action

In addition to our first pair of rivalling hypotheses, we consider two hypotheses that we develop inductively from our understanding of grievances emanating from people's unmet expectations in the social contract. We consider the possibility that the driving forces for protest action are endogenous to people's grievances; that is, social contract grievances themselves entail greater readiness of people to taking to the streets (Loewe, Zintl and Houdret, 2021). In this view, grievances would be more salient than social differences. We thus submit a first, broad Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: The extent of general social contract grievances increases the likelihood of protests.

To expand on this perspective, we remain interested to detect possible variation in the effect of people's more concrete grievances about state delivery of the 'Three Ps' mentioned above in social contracts: provision, protection, or participation. Could it be possible that people prioritize among those three elements of the social contract and develop grievances informed by these priorities, leading to greater protest activity? Drawing on Maslow's famous hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943; Davies, 1991), scholars have, for instance, explored the conditions under which people prioritized 'existential needs'—such as food, shelter, and safety from threats of violence—over 'epistemic needs,' that is, preferences in lifestyle and politics (Federico and Malka, 2018: 4). Much of this body of scholarship has been interested in what these priorities mean for the development of political preferences, ideological dispositions, and voting behavior (e.g., among many other works, Jost et al. 2007; Sindermann and Montag 2021). Loewe and Albrecht (2023) have most directly explored variance in the degree to which people develop priorities regarding what they see as the state's obligations from the social contract. They found that there is a hierarchy in expectations, along which people do indeed prioritize states' social contract obligations in the provision of material resources over

opportunities for political participation. Drawing on these findings, we propose a third Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: There is a hierarchy of needs in social contract grievances. Protest participation becomes more likely if social contract grievances emerge about the provision of material goods over political participation.

Case Selection and Research Design

We begin our inquiry with an explanation of our case selection and research design. In the following, we first justify why we selected two countries for our empirical studies and then discuss some empirical context factors before introducing our survey data on which our analysis is based.

Case Selection

We selected two countries for our empirical inquiry: Tunisia and Lebanon. This is for four reasons. First, we set out to explore two countries rather than a single case to show similarities in pursuit of greater external validity of our findings. Selecting two countries allows us to control for specific, country-level context factors that may characterize single-case studies.

Second, we needed to select countries undergoing fundamental political crises as the presence of grievances with the state's response to people's social contract expectations is a necessary condition for our inquiry. As we remain interested in how such grievances turn to action, we introduce variation on the individual level by looking at those respondents in our survey that have voiced grievances, while others did not. Our case selection also allows us to test variation regarding the type of crisis present in a country: regime vs. state crisis. As we will show below,

Lebanon represents countries undergoing state failure, while Tunisia has experienced a political crisis amid its transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

Third, and relatedly, both countries have witnessed the empirical phenomenon we set out to explore in our outcome variable: street protests. Since the Arab Spring, both Lebanon and Tunisia have developed a culture of protest that has led people to the streets to voice their demands on a regular basis. Protests took on various shapes and forms, ranging from popular mass uprisings—as in the 2010/2011 events in Tunisia or the 2019 uprising in Lebanon—to more mundane, smaller protest episodes. Yet again, our empirical inquiry will introduce variation on the individual level, comparing people who participated protests with others who did not.

Fourth, our case selection was mindful of feasibility concerns. In many countries experiencing the types of political crises that we are interested in, people enjoy limited personal freedoms for two activities of imminent importance for our study: protest activities and sharing their opinions openly in interview situations. Many authoritarian governments around the globe restrict their citizens' activities in the guise of contentious politics, including publicly sharing opinions in opposition to those in power and engaging in collective action and street protests. Individuals' risk to participate increases significantly in more repressive authoritarian regimes (Sika, 2024; Mirić and Pechenkin, 2023). In turn, scholars showed that authoritarian governance also restricts people's readiness to share their true opinions in survey research, with respondents' sensitivity bias informed mainly by social desirability concerns and uncertainty whether their opinions would remain anonymous (Truex and Tavana, 2019).

We therefore selected countries with comparatively open state-society relations and liberties granted to their citizens, at least at the time our research was conducted. At the time of our research, Freedom House's 2020 *Freedom in the World* report ranked Tunisia among 'free' countries at an aggregate score of political rights and civil liberties of 70/100; Lebanon was

‘partly free’ (44/100). We were confident few restrictions were imposed on Lebanese and Tunisians to share their opinions on categories meaningful for our study.¹

Empirical Context

Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring in that its popular mass uprising against long-time dictator Ben Ali in December 2010 and January 2011 has triggered a whole series of similar events in the MENA region, including in Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya (Del Panta, 2020; Allinson, 2015; Beissinger, Jamal and Mazur, 2015). Tunisia has also been identified as the only Arab Spring success story of democratization in that its uprising resulted in an inclusive transition process (Maboudi, 2020), albeit one that came under threat more recently. Yet, rather than ushering in an orderly democratic transition, the country’s ‘Jasmine Revolution’ marked the beginning of a decade of contentious politics where the country’s shaky transition process was characterized by routine episodes of street protests and political campaigns. People have taken to the streets to protest the nature of the country’s post-2011 political trajectory as much as other partisan political issues (Ketchley and Barrie, 2019; Berman, 2019). The country’s protracted economic crisis has contributed to people’s readiness to voice their demands in the streets, including amid labor protests (Han, 2023), unemployment

¹ Our own research experience with surveys and qualitative interviews in Lebanon and Tunisia is backed up by some observation in our data: respondents in our own survey were very critical of the political and religious leadership in their respective countries. For example, 64 per cent of Lebanese and 41 per cent of Tunisians stated that they had no confidence at all in their respective governments. 64 per cent of Lebanese and 70 per cent of Tunisians said they had no confidence in their parliament. 36 per cent and 30 per cent respectively had no trust in religious organizations.

mobilization (Weipert-Fenner, 2018; Bishara, 2021), and other socio-economic demands (Grewal, 2019; Jöst and Vathauer, 2020; Berman, Bishara and Jurkovich, 2023).

Popular discontent with the post-2011 transition period has culminated in strong anti-political establishment sentiment and ultimately the election of a political outsider, Kais Saied, to the presidency in 2019 (Ridge, 2022; Albrecht et al., 2023). Saied conducted a self-coup on 25 July 2021 to monopolize power and effectively ending Tunisia's democratic period. Since we conducted our survey in 2020—that is, prior to the 2021 coup—we are not concerned the country's autocratization has biased results from our interview research. Though we believe it is possible that Tunisians, after these watershed events, would share different preferences than at the time we conducted our empirical analysis.

In 2011, Lebanon did not experience a revolutionary mass uprising of similar magnitude as Tunisia. Yet, the Lebanese post-2011 political trajectory was characterized by multiple protest movements against the country's political establishment and its sectarian, consociational power arrangements (Fakhoury, 2014; Geha, 2019). Sectarianism has continued to shape Lebanese politics as much as its protest movement, for instance amid the 2019 'October Revolution' in Tripoli and Beirut, or protracted urban youth protests (Karam and Majed, 2022; Osman, 2022; Harb, 2018). Sectarianism has been so pervasive that it undermined the role of the state as the main provider of social services (Cammett, 2014).

Apart from contentious activism about the polity, Lebanese have taken to the streets amid rampant corruption and economic decline as well. 2015 saw substantial protests erupt in the capital city in response to the Lebanese government's failure to sustain trash collection (Paler, Marshall and Atallah, 2018); the country looks back at a history of union-driven labor protests that has most recently culminated in large-scale strike activities (Baumann, 2016); and citizens have pointed, yet again, at government corruption and neglect upon the explosion of a stockpile of ammonium nitrate in 2020. Taken together, Lebanon did not experience the type of political

crisis associated with failed regime change—as in Tunisia—but rather a fundamental crisis of state failure (Mouawad and Bauman, 2017).

Data and Descriptive Findings

For our empirical analysis, we used original survey data. Using individual-level data remains a somewhat unconventional approach in studies of contentious collective action (see, for instance, Anduiza, Cristancho and Sabucedo, 2014; Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, 2016; Doherty and Schraeder, 2018). Most studies in this research tradition draw on event-level data, investigating the ecology of protest events by using variance in socio-economic data across time and space. In our survey data, we use self-reported protest activities of interview respondents, which allows for a more fine-grained investigation of individual-level factors important for our expectations, namely income, education, gender, work contracts, and individual grievances with states' social contract obligations.

To this aim, we conducted nationally representative surveys in both Lebanon and Tunisia in October-December 2020. Unlike with rapid-response, face-to-face surveys conducted during protest events (e.g. Alexander, 2010; Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, 2016), this allows us to explore variation between protestors and people that did not engage in contentious politics. Our questionnaire was administered as nationally representative telephone polls by a survey firm, *One-to-One for Research and Polling*, which is based in Tunis and operates across most countries in the MENA region, including Tunisia and Lebanon.²

² The company has ample experience with the conduct of surveys. It has administered opinion polls for the Afrobarometer and Arab Barometer surveys across the MENA region, including in Tunisia and Lebanon.

Interviewees were selected to sample the composition of the entire population in terms of key characteristic such as gender, living place, and religion (see Table A10 in the Appendix). Identified households who refused to respond were replaced by others with the same characteristics. Conducting telephone interviews was the interview method of choice owing to the COVID-19 pandemic at the time that prevented the administration of in-person surveys.

Our sample consisted of adult respondents in the two countries. For matters of comparison over time, we took several questions from Arab Barometer Wave V surveys conducted face-to-face in 2018. The answers on most questions are very similar in the two surveys for both Lebanon and Tunisia, which means that the conduct of interviews by phone has no serious impact on the composition of our sample or the responses of interviewees. Major differences in the responses on some questions are most likely due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Interestingly, the non-response rate diverged least between the two polls, and it was very low for almost all questions, including the sensitive ones. The questionnaire was constructed in modern-standard Arabic and administered to a total of 2,506 respondents by enumerators speaking local dialects in the respective countries (Tunisia: $n = 1003$; Lebanon: $n = 1503$). The sample size in Lebanon was larger to account for respondents representing refugee communities, including Palestinians ($n = 220$) and Syrians ($n = 228$).

Our survey instrument was designed to include a single question operationalizing our dependent variable along with a battery of questions operationalizing our independent and control variables. The question on the dependent variable was broad enough to include various protest events and motivations; it reads as follows: ‘Have you ever participated in street rallies or campaigns?’ The entire survey consisted of forty-three questions, nineteen of which were designed to directly gauge people’s perceptions on social and economic indicators.³

³ See the survey questionnaire in the appendix.

Table 1 presents descriptive findings on the social correlates of protest participation in Lebanon and Tunisia. Supporting our expectations, we find evidence for a culture of protest in both countries, with 21.6% Tunisians and 28.3% native Lebanese reporting to have participated in contentious activities.⁴ We are also not surprised to see that refugee communities—who remain more vulnerable owing to their, often uncertain, immigrant status (Onoma, 2013)—have been less inclined to voice their demands in public (see more on this issue in the next section). Second, there appears to be some evidence already in support of our Hypothesis 1b: both our income and education measures reveal that socially advantaged people show greater propensity to engage in street protests than disadvantaged people. Third, we detect similar protest patterns across our two countries, in particular for these two categories meaningful for our analysis. Self-reported total household income and education increase the likelihood for protest activities in Lebanon and Tunisia, which makes us more confident our findings can claim external validity more so than single-case studies. And finally, there appear to be noteworthy differences between the two countries, namely as to gender, marital status, and employment status.

⁴ A high response rate across both countries as well as substantial numbers of people reporting to have participated in protest action add evidence to our expectation that social desirability concerns do not bias the results of our surveys.

Table 1: Share of respondents who declared having participated in protests

	Lebanon: only native Lebanese	Lebanon: people from Palestinian or Syrian origin	Tunisia
All	28.3%	14.1%	21.6%
Females	25.4%	15.3%	18.9%
Males	31.3%	13.4%	24.4%
Top income quartile*	36.6%	25.9%	37.1%
2nd income quartile*	29.4%	18.6%	28.3%
3rd income quartile*	20.2%	12.8%	19.0%
Bottom income quartile*	22.0%	8.3%	12.3%
Tertiary education	35.2%	22.9%	34.5%
Secondary education	24.7%	10.7%	21.2%
Less than secondary education	13.4%	10.2%	8.9%
With working contract	37.4%	16.2%	25.9%
Unmarried	35.6%	23.4%	22.2%
Married	25.9%	12.1%	22.1%
Divorced, separated or widowed	26.1%	16.7%	14.3%

* Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members.

Empirical Findings and Discussion

In the following section, we explore our survey data more systematically to test the three hypotheses established above. For our first hypothesis on cleavage-driven collective action, we find a strong pattern that conforms to our intuition drawn from the descriptive data above: socially advantaged people are more likely to engage in protest action, while socially disadvantaged people are less likely to do so. Results for our two grievance-driven hypotheses are mixed. While Hypothesis 2 does not find any support in our data, our Hypothesis 3 on assumed hierarchy of provision needs as compared to protection and participation need finds evidence in Tunisia, but not in Lebanon.

For our empirical inquiry, we measure probit regression models using the above-mentioned questions for our dependent and independent variables along with a battery of control variables from our survey. These variables capture differences along gender, age, self-perception of affluence, religion, dominant values, and primary group of orientation (see Appendix). We report the main results from these models on the following pages, while the complete models—along with the survey questionnaire—can be accessed in the supporting appendix.⁵ The tables in the Appendix also show probit regressions that control for autocorrelation between our categories of interest for the independent variables, namely *education* and *total household income*.

Cleavage-Driven Collective Action

Our Hypothesis 1 presented rivaling assumptions as to whether socially privileged or underprivileged people are more likely to engage in protests as a consequence of social contract grievances. Findings in Table 2 below show that privileged people are clearly overrepresented among protesters in both Lebanon and Tunisia, while underprivileged people are underrepresented. Thus, they support our Hypothesis 1b, while contradicting Hypothesis 1a. In both countries, people from the *top income* quartile and those with a degree from *tertiary education* are significantly overrepresented (at least at the 95% confidence level) among the protesters (see Table 2 and Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix).

In turn, the share of protesters is significantly below average (at least at the 95% confidence level) for underprivileged people, operationalized as 1) people from the *bottom income* quartile, 2) people with less than *secondary education*, and 3) people who consider their *living conditions* to be bad in comparison with others. Even for *females*, we find a negative correlation with

⁵ The Appendix will be made available upon publication on this website: [URL]

participation in protests for both countries (Table 2 and Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix). These results are confirmed by other probit models that introduce additional control variables (see Tables A7-A9 in the Appendix).⁶

⁶ Table 2 contains two models for each country. This is to avoid introducing the *education* and *income* variables in the same model. As Table A4 in the appendix shows, these variables are autocorrelated. Hence, using them in the same model would create endogeneity problems. We have therefore also run probit estimates with various combinations of income and education variables and a respective interaction term, which shows not only that income and education are highly correlated with each other but also that each one of them alone has a significant impact on protest participation, our dependent variable of interest (see Table A4 in the appendix).

Table 2: Impact of social and economic status on protest participation				
	Participated in protests			
	Lebanon		Tunisia	
Top income quartile of sample	0.303*** (0.0871)		0.422*** (0.132)	
Bottom income quartile of sample	-0.259** (0.102)		-0.390*** (0.118)	
Living conditions perceived better than those of others		-0.174** (0.0870)		-0.258** (0.106)
Tertiary education		0.318*** (0.0971)		0.461*** (0.105)
Less than secondary education		-0.254** (0.115)		-0.551*** (0.126)
Has working contract	0.249*** (0.0886)		0.0570 (0.114)	
Female		-0.123* (0.0743)		-0.337*** (0.0955)
Palestinian origin		-0.0801 (0.106)		
Syrian origin		-0.782*** (0.146)		
Constant	-0.799*** (0.0505)	-0.718*** (0.0960)	-0.772*** (0.0599)	-0.725*** (0.0864)
Observations	1,503	1,503	1,003	1,503
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members. The results of numerous additional regression models are in the Appendix, Tables A1 and A2. They include also employment status (occupation), religion and age as independent variables, which all do not appear to have significant impact on protest participation.				

People who suffered from serious decline in wellbeing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic do not show up significant in our data. They do not share with underprivileged people a similarly negative correlation with protest behaviour, nor do they show up positively, which can be interpreted as a first indicator for our Hypothesis 2 about the relationship between immediate grievances and protest behaviour (see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix).

Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between participation in protests and *working contracts*, which is another observable implication in support of Hypothesis 1b: people with a working contract are less economically vulnerable, hence more privileged, than people in more

informal employment situations (Han, 2023).⁷ For occupation, in turn, we did not find significant influence.

Pointing in the same direction, people in underprivileged employment situations appear to be particularly cautious in expressing their grievances in public. In both countries, the share of *craftspeople*, workers in *manufacturing*, and *seasonal* and *day labourers* is significantly below the nation-wide averages. The same is true for *housewives*, a not so surprising observation as they are generally, across the MENA region, less present in the public sphere. In Lebanon, the share of *unemployed* people participating in protests is also significantly lower than the respective share of all citizens. In Tunisia, however, we do not find significant results for this variable (Table A1 in the Appendix).

Likewise, we find country-level differences among other variables, none of which call into question our broad observation regarding our category of interest, socially advantaged vs. disadvantaged people. *Unmarried* people, for instance, participate significantly more often in protests than the rest of the population in Lebanon. This is not the case for Tunisia. Yet, some models display a significant positive relation for both countries between *youth* (below age 30) and participation in protests (Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix)

⁷ Table 2 displays this correlation only for Lebanon, not for Tunisia. This is due to endogeneity effects: the variables *income* and *working contract* are interrelated. Once we control for this interrelation, we find a positive correlation between participation in protests and working contracts for Lebanon as well: Table A3 in the appendix shows the result of a probit estimate with an interaction term, which separates the direct effects of income and working contracts on protest participation and finds a positive correlation even for Tunisia (however only at the 90% confidence level).

Finally, there are some findings for categories of citizenship and identity. Lebanon hosts significant numbers of *Palestinian* and *Syrian* refugees. Yet, according to our models, only Syrians behave differently from the native Lebanese: the share of people from Syrian origin participating in protests is much lower than the respective share among native Lebanese, while there is no significant difference in this respect between people with Palestinian and Lebanese roots (see Table 2). This difference is probably due to the fact that Palestinians have constituted a refugee community in Lebanon for several generations, while most Syrian refugees have come after the beginning of the civil war in their home country in 2012 and remain more vulnerable outsiders in Lebanese society (Kikano, Fauveaud and Lizarralde, 2021). Syrians thus have likely not adapted to life in Lebanon in socioeconomic, behavioural, and attitudinal terms as much as Palestinians have over the past decades.

According to Table A1 in the Appendix, *Christians* in Lebanon are also more inclined to participate in protests than their Muslim fellow citizens.⁸ However, this finding is also due to endogeneity because on average Christians achieve a higher level of education in Lebanon. Once we control for education, the effect of religion on protest behaviour disappears.⁹

Taken together, we emphasize, yet again, a strong finding that shows consistent support across a whole range of empirical measures: socially advantaged people in our two countries are more likely to participate in protests than ordinary Lebanese and Tunisians, while socially

⁸ In Tunisia, the number of Christians and member of other religious minorities is too small to control for differences. At the same time, we found no significant differences between Shi'i and Sunni people in Lebanon in terms of their protest behaviour.

⁹ Table A4 in the appendix displays a probit estimate with tertiary education, Christianity, and an interaction term between the two as the only independent variables. In this model, the positive effect for religion disappears.

disadvantaged people are significantly less likely to do so. These findings are noteworthy for two interrelated reasons. For one, they support theories in social movement studies emphasizing social availability arguments and the role of the middle classes in society as drivers of protest action. In turn, they call into doubt theories emphasizing desperation, where people most in need would take to the streets more so than others. For another, the remarkable consistency of our findings is noteworthy for students of Middle East politics and those interested in different types of protest action. As we were interested in protest activities more broadly, self-reported protest activity would include individual participation in very different forms of contentious politics, ranging from small events to revolutionary mass uprisings, and from economically induced protest to political rallies. As our findings show a consistent picture across different countries, including different types of protests, we can safely assume street protest participation across our countries is a phenomenon of social privilege, rather than desperation.

Grievance-Driven Collective Action

In the previous section, we already hinted at the observation that people who suffered most from the COVID-19 pandemic and its political and social ramifications are less likely to engage in protest action than the national average. This is a counterintuitive observation. Should we not expect people suffering most from this health crisis to blame the authorities and develop grievances that would prompt them to take to the streets? And yet, as we will show below, tests of this intuitive assumption—the direct link between self-reported grievances and protest behaviour—reveal mixed findings. For one, we cannot report evidence in support of our Hypothesis 2 that raised the expectation that general, unspecific social contract grievances increase the likelihood of protest participation. Some findings show that people who are dissatisfied in general terms participate more often in protests than others. However, the significance of this correlation disappears when we control for endogeneity.

A first look at Lebanon reveals a significant correlation between some expressions of general dissatisfaction and people's participation in protests. In particular, people seem to be more likely to protest if they 1) believe that the country is going in the wrong direction, 2) do not consider the performance of the government as good, or 3) believe that there is no reason to be loyal with the government (all significant at the 99% confidence level, see Table A6 in the Appendix).¹⁰ The significance for the last sentiment, however, disappears if we control for status variables such as income and education (Table A7 in the Appendix). Likewise, the significance of the effect of people's belief that the country is going in the wrong direction evaporates once we introduce an interaction term with tertiary education (Table A9 in the Appendix). Lebanese with tertiary education are both more pessimistic about the development of their country and more likely to pull to the streets. Only the perception of some people that the overall performance of the government is not good retains its significance (Table A9 in the online Appendix).

In Tunisia, in turn, only the belief that there is no reason to be loyal with the government is significantly correlated with people's inclination to protest (at the 95% confidence level) (Table A6 in the Appendix). Here, the significance of the effect disappears when we introduce an interaction term with high income (Table A9 in the Appendix).

Taken together, in our test of Hypothesis 2 we do not find robust support for our assumption that general, unspecific grievances are a major driving force for people to engage in contentious collective action. While intuitive to assume, positive results show up—for Lebanese more so than Tunisians—in baseline models where significance disappears once we control for variables that we used to operationalize our Hypothesis 1. Our broader, preliminary finding thus far is

¹⁰ People's perception that the economic situation in the country is bad or very bad has no significant correlation with their likelihood to protest (see Table A6 in the appendix).

that our assumptions about cleavage-driven collective action, namely perceiving protest action as a phenomenon of privilege, fares better to explain such protest activities than grievance-driven collective action.

Moving on to a systematic test of our final Hypothesis 3 and the impact of more specific grievances on protest behaviour, we remain interested to see if there is a hierarchy of needs in social contract grievances that prompt people to take to the streets if they prioritize existential needs (food, shelter, safety) over epistemic needs (lifestyle, political preferences). To this aim, we present, in Table 3 below as well as in Tables A7 and A8 (Appendix) the results of probit estimations, while models in Table A9 in the Appendix introduce interaction terms for each of the combinations of the dissatisfaction with a single policy and high/low income or education.

In this regard, we detect more substantial country-level differences in our empirical findings. In fact, there appears to be a hierarchy of needs in social contract grievances in Tunisia but not in Lebanon. In Tunisia, protestors are particularly concerned with grievances emanating from their existential needs—in particular relating to service provision. In turn, protests in Lebanon seem to be driven by grievances regarding opportunities for political participation and protection against individual threats as much as by grievances about social service provision. Our broader findings regarding Hypothesis 3 are thus mixed: Tunisia lends support to the idea that, first, there is a hierarchy of needs regarding state obligations toward the social contract and, second, these preferences drive protest behaviour. Lebanon, however, has seen its citizens develop more universal grievances as drivers of contentious activism.

People who are dissatisfied with the allocation of social service provision are significantly overrepresented among protesters in both Lebanon and Tunisia. This observation in Table 3 below provides some initial evidence in support of our Hypothesis 3. In Lebanon, however, people who are dissatisfied with opportunities of political participation and protection against internal threats are also more likely to demonstrate than the rest of the population, which calls

into question our assumed preference for material goods over epistemic interests. The share of people who reported to have participated in protests is significantly above average among those who are dissatisfied with social *welfare* and *health* policies but also among those who are dissatisfied with *internal security*, *elections*, and political *participation* in general. The significance of the correlation is even higher than shown in Table 3 when each of the named grievances is analysed separately (Table A7 in the Appendix). Table 3 displays also significance for the correlation between dissatisfaction with *education* policies and participation in protests but the significance disappears when the interrelation with people's self-reported *total household income* and *education* level is taken into consideration (see Table A9 in the Appendix). Dissatisfaction with the government's efforts to create *employment*, reduce *inequality*, limit *inflation* or *defend* the country against external threats seems not to drive Lebanese people to the streets. Table 3 shows that there are no significant effects.

Table 3: Why people take to the streets in Lebanon and Tunisia

	Lebanon				Tunisia			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Top income quartile of sample	0.205** (0.0886)	0.204** (0.0882)	0.185** (0.0885)	0.204** (0.0884)	0.267** (0.136)	0.278** (0.135)	0.258* (0.136)	0.278** (0.136)
Tertiary education	0.425*** (0.0794)	0.411*** (0.0789)	0.402*** (0.0789)	0.416*** (0.0788)	0.614*** (0.103)	0.612*** (0.103)	0.596*** (0.104)	0.607*** (0.103)
Has working contract	0.142 (0.0917)	0.153* (0.0915)	0.134 (0.0915)	0.130 (0.0919)	-0.047 (0.118)	-0.042 (0.118)	-0.033 (0.118)	-0.044 (0.118)
Female	-0.108 (0.0757)	-0.0955 (0.0752)	-0.092 (0.0753)	-0.111 (0.0757)	-0.303*** (0.0953)	-0.312*** (0.0953)	-0.310*** (0.0957)	-0.302*** (0.0964)
Syrian origin	-0.754*** (0.146)	-0.746*** (0.146)	-0.765*** (0.146)	-0.736*** (0.146)				
Dissatisfied with education policy	0.071* (0.0390)				0.089 (0.0545)			
Dissatisfied with health policy		0.086** (0.0394)				0.091* (0.0522)		
Dissatisfied with social welfare policy			0.126*** (0.0420)				0.115** (0.0535)	
Dissatisfied with employment policy			0.098 (0.0799)				0.160** (0.0721)	
Dissatisfied with inequality reduction				0.057 (0.0646)				0.166** (0.0802)
Dissatisfied with inflation reduction				-0.006 (0.0672)				0.128* (0.0766)
Dissatisfied with national defence	0.029 (0.0409)				0.025 (0.0497)			
Dissatisfied with internal security				0.137*** (0.0395)				0.020 (0.0494)
Dissatisfied with political participation	0.118*** (0.0455)				0.038 (0.0511)			
Dissatisfied with elections		0.079* (0.0426)				-0.009 (0.0484)		
Constant	-0.933*** (0.0769)	-0.941*** (0.0761)	-1.012*** (0.0989)	-0.941*** (0.0947)	-0.939*** (0.0790)	-0.928*** (0.0739)	-1.049*** (0.0888)	-1.107*** (0.109)
Observations	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members. The results of additional regressions are in the Appendix, Tables A7 and A8. These include age, the values of interviewees, and their primary groups of orientation as independent variables. Their impact, though, has not been found significant in most cases and ambiguous in others. In particular, the indicators for the intensity of religious beliefs of interviewees appear insignificant. Likewise, we found no difference in the protest behaviour between Sunni and Shi'i Lebanese.								

In Tunisia, in turn, participation in protests is only correlated with dissatisfaction with the government's provision of social welfare, health, jobs, price stability and inequality reduction

(Table 3 above and Table A8 in the appendix). Most of these correlations are statistically significant even if we control for endogeneity. Only the significance of the effect of dissatisfaction with health policies disappears in combination with low education (Table A9 in the appendix).

The share of street protestors with concerns about protection (against internal or external threats) or political participation (in general or specifically through elections) has not been significantly higher than the respective share among the rest of the population. In addition, dissatisfaction with education, also a key component of social service provision, does not significantly increase the likelihood to protest in Tunisia (Tables 3, and A8 and A9 in the appendix).

Conclusions and Implications

When asking about the social forces driving protest action in Lebanon and Tunisia, we find that privileged people are more likely to take to the streets while underprivileged people are less likely to do so. The factors that prevent unprivileged people from taking part in demonstrations are therefore stronger than the factors that drive them onto the streets. Conversely, the factors that encourage privileged people to demonstrate are stronger than the factors that render them satisfied with their living conditions. We cannot fully determine the entire universe of factors involved in each case, but our results suggest that a good income, high education, job security, and gender—being male—help identify the quintessential protestor across our two countries. Our counter-hypothesis that people mainly protest when they live under adverse conditions, i.e. low income, low education, insecure employment, and being a woman, does not find any evidence. In fact, these people are less likely to pursue their preferences in street politics.

Once we explore individual grievances as possible drivers of protest action, we find for Lebanon and Tunisia that this happens above all when people are dissatisfied with certain

services provided by the state. In Tunisia, this holds for people who are dissatisfied with specific aspects of *provision*, namely social welfare, health, jobs, price stability and inequality reduction. In Lebanon, people are also more likely to protest if they are dissatisfied with certain aspects of provision, namely social welfare and health policies, but also if they are dissatisfied with political *participation* or *protection* against internal threats. These trends exist across different strata in society and remind us of differences in conflict dynamics and state-society relations from one country to the next. One general finding from the empirical observations is that some causes of dissatisfaction appear to impact people at a higher degree than others, at least when it comes to the decision to voice such dissatisfaction in the streets. At the same time, people are not more likely to protest even if they confess to be dissatisfied with other government deliverables such as e.g. housing policies or protection against external threats.

From a broader perspective, these findings contribute to understanding differences in the *type* of political crisis for social contract relations between the state and its citizens. Citizens in countries undergoing regime crisis—as in Tunisia—might be selective on turning grievances to collective action. In this view, regime crisis would catalyse protests about existential needs, but not epistemic preferences, while the crisis of state failure in Lebanon would prompt people to question the state more fundamentally, including in all elements of the social contract—provision, protection, and participation.

Exploring the interplay of grievances and protest action is all but trivial. It tells more about people's preferences regarding deliveries by the state than more conventional opinion polls about their preferences could do. The fact that underprivileged people are less likely to take to the streets reminds us that protest participation comes with significant costs that privileged people can more easily pay. Witnessing people in Lebanon and Tunisia to more likely protest upon their dissatisfaction with social welfare and health policies—but not with other government deliverables—helps us understand that failure in the delivery of social welfare and

health services brings about particular hard for people. Studying the interplay of grievances and protest action hence serves to emphasize areas of need—a perspective useful for social scientists and development policy makers alike. At the same time, we can conclude that protests are only an imperfect indicator for the grievances of people.

Social differences and privileges constitute important factors to determine whether people take to the streets. For researchers, these results imply that they should not interpret demonstrations as an expression of dissatisfaction in broad sections of the population; they may only express the discontent of the better-off, but not the suffering of the socially disadvantaged. Those in power also should not exclusively gauge the mood in society based on when and why demonstrations take place as those may only reflect the interests and grievances of individual groups. If underprivileged groups are to be taken into account in the renegotiation of social contracts, alternative channels for the expression of preferences and grievances must be created. The international donor community, in turn, can support national governments in that regard. They can help them to build up more inclusive forms of exchange and negotiations between the government and all groups of the population. In labour market policies, for example, a social dialogue might include the government, employers' associations, and trade unions but also representatives of the unemployed, self-employed, and informal sector employees.

References

- Albrecht H and Loewe M (2024) States or Social Networks? Popular Attitudes amid Health Crises in the Middle East and North Africa. *International Political Science Review* 45(2): 224-242.
- Albrecht H et al. (2023) Popular Support for Military Intervention and Anti-establishment Alternatives in Tunisia: Appraising Outsider Eclecticism. *Mediterranean Politics* 28(3): 492-516.

- Alexander P (2010) Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests—A Preliminary Analysis. *Review of African Political Economy* 37(123): 25-40.
- Allinson J (2015) Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. *Democratization* 22(2): 294-314.
- Anderson A (2021) "Networked Revolutions?" ICTs and Protest Mobilization in Nondemocratic Regimes. *Political Research Quarterly* 74(4): 1037-1051.
- Anduiza E, Cristancho C and Sabucedo J (2014) Mobilization through Online Social Networks: The Political Protest of the *Indignados* in Spain. *Information, Communication & Society* 17(6): 750-764.
- Ardevini L and O'Driscoll D (2023) The Failure of the Social Contract in Iraq: Iraqi Perspectives. *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 17(4): 415-433.
- Barrientos A and Daniele M (2020) Social Assistance and Inclusive Growth. *International Social Security Review* 73(3): 33–53.
- Baumann H (2016) Social Protest and the Political Economy of Sectarianism in Lebanon. *Global Discourse* 6(4): 634-649.
- Beissinger M, Jamal A and Mazur K (2015) Explaining Divergent Revolutionary Coalitions: Regime Strategies and the Structuring of Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions. *Comparative Politics* 48(1): 1-20.
- Berman C (2019) When Revolutionary Coalitions Break Down: Polarization, Protest, and the Tunisian Political Crisis of August 2013 *Middle East Law and Governance* 11(2): 136-179.
- Berman C, Bishara D and Jurkovich M (2023) When Citizens Look Backwards: Retrospective Understandings of Grievance in Post-Revolutionary Societies. *Acta Politica*, online first.

- Bhalla G, Kangasniemi M and Winder-Rossi N (2021) Effects of Social Protection on Economic Development. In Schüring E and Loewe M (eds.), *Handbook on Social Protection Systems*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 621–635.
- Bishara D (2021) Precarious Collective Action: Unemployment Graduates Associations in the Middle East and North Africa. *Comparative Politics* 53(3): 453-476.
- Bishara D, Jurkovich M and Berman C (2023) Citizens' Understanding of the Social Contract: Lessons from Tunisia. *World Development* 168: 106163.
- Cammett M (2014) *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Campante FR and Davin C (2014) 'The People Want the Fall of the Regime:' Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy. *Journal of Comparative Economics* 42(3): 495-517.
- Cassani A (2017) Social Services to Claim Legitimacy: Comparing Autocracies' Performance. *Contemporary Politics* 23(3): 348-368.
- Castañeda N, Doyle D and Schwartz C (2019) Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion. *Comparative Political Studies* 53(7): 1175-1219.
- Davies J (1962) Toward a Theory of Revolution. *American Sociological Review* 27(1): 5-19.
- Davies JD (1991) Maslow and Theory of Political Development: Getting to Fundamentals. *Political Psychology* 12(3): 389-420.
- De Juan A and Wegner E (2019) Social Inequality, State-centered Grievances, and Protest: Evidence from South Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(1): 31-58.
- Del Panta G (2020) Cross-Class and Cross-Ideological Convergences over Time: Insights from the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutionary Uprisings. *Government and Opposition* 55(4): 634-652.
- Dodson K (2015) Gendered Activism: A Cross-National View on Gender Differences in Protest Activity. *Social Currents* 2(4): 377-392.

- El-Haddad A (2020) Redefining the Social Contract in the Wake of the Arab Spring: The Experiences of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. *World Development* 127: 104774.
- Federico C and Malka A (2018) The Contingent, Contextual Nature of the Relationship between Needs for Security and Certainty and Political Preferences: Evidence and Implications. *Advances in Political Psychology* 39(1): 3-48.
- Geha C (2019) Co-optation, Counter-Narratives, and Repression: Protesting Lebanon's Sectarian Power-Sharing Regime. *Middle East Journal* 73(1): 9-28.
- Gemici K (2013) Moral Economy Redux: Social Protest in Turkey after the 2001 Economic Crisis. *Mobilization* 18(2): 143-160.
- Grewal S (2019) Military Defection during Localized Protests: The Case of Tataouine. *International Studies Quarterly* 63(2): 259-269.
- Grossman S, Phillips J and Rosenzweig L (2017) Opportunistic Accountability: State-Society Bargaining over Shared Interests. *Comparative Political Studies* 51(8): 979-1011.
- Halikiopoulou D and Vasilopoulou S (2018) Breaching the Social Contract: Crises of Democratic Representation and Patterns of Extreme-Right Party Support. *Government and Opposition* 53(1): 26-50.
- Han S (2023) Mobilizing within and Beyond the Labor Union: A Case of Precarious Workers' Collective Actions in North Africa. *ILR Review* 76(4): 674-696.
- Harb M (2018) New Forms of Youth Activism in Contested Cities: The Case of Beirut. *The International Spectator* 53(2): 74-93.
- Heydemann S (2020) Rethinking Social Contracts in the MENA Region: Economic Governance, Contingent Citizenship, and State-Society Relations after the Arab Uprisings. *World Development* 135: 105019.
- Hillygus S (2005) The Missing Link: Exploring the Relationship between Higher Education and Political Engagement. *Political Behavior* 27: 25-47.

- Hirschman, AO (1972) *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Huang X and Zuo C (2023) Bread or Roses: How Economic Inequality Affects Regime Support in China? *Political Studies* 71(3): 869-892.
- Hylmö A and Wennerhag M (2015) Does Class Matter in Anti-Austerity Protests? Social Class, Attitudes toward Inequality, and Political Trust in European Demonstrations in a Time of Economic Crisis. In Guigni M and Grasso M (eds), *Austerity and Protest: Popular Contention in Times of Economic Crisis*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 83-107.
- Jost J, et al. (2007) Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated with Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 33: 989-1007.
- Jöst P (2020) Mobilization without Organization: Grievances and Group Solidarity of the Unemployed in Tunisia. *Mobilization* 25(2): 265-283.
- Jöst P and Vathauer JP (2020) Socioeconomic Contention in Post-2011 Egypt and Tunisia: A Comparison. In Weipert-Fenner I and Wolff J (eds), *Socioeconomic Protests in MENA and Latin America: Egypt and Tunisia in Interregional Comparison*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 71-103.
- Kandil H (2012) Why Did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square? *Mediterranean Politics* 17(2): 197-215.
- Karam J and Majed R (eds) (2022) *The Lebanon Uprising of 2019: Voices from the Revolution*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Ketchley N and Barrie C (2019) Fridays of Revolution: Focal Days and Mass Protest in Egypt and Tunisia. *Political Research Quarterly* 73(2): 308-324.
- Kikano F, Fauveaud G and Lizarralde G (2021) Policies of Exclusion: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 34(1): 422-452.

- Klandermans B and van Stekelenburg J (2016) Taking Austerity to the Streets: Fighting Austerity Measures or Austerity States. *Mobilization* 22(4): 431-448.
- Kuran T (1995) *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Loewe M and Albrecht H (2023) The Social Contract in Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia: What Do the People Want? *Journal of International Development* 35(5): 838-855.
- Loewe M and Zintl T (2021) State Fragility, Social Contracts and the Role of Social Protection: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. *Social Sciences* 10(447): 1-23.
- Loewe M, Zintl T and Houdret A (2021) The Social Contract as a Tool of Analysis: Introduction to the Special Issue on “Framing the Evolution of New Social Contracts in Middle Eastern and North African Countries.” *World Development* 145: 1-16.
- Maboudi T (2020) Reconstituting Tunisia Participation, Deliberation, and the Content of Constitution. *Political Research Quarterly* 73(4): 774-789.
- Maslow A (1943) A Theory of Human Motivation. *Psychological Review* 50(4): 370-396.
- McAdam D (1986) Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer. *American Journal of Sociology* 92(1): 64-90.
- Mirić S and Pechenkina A (2023) Elite Selection in Single-Party Autocracies: Minimizing Protests and Counterproductive State Violence to Maintain Social Stability. *Political Research Quarterly* 76(2): 607-621.
- Mouawad J and Bauman H (2017) In Search of the Lebanese State. *Arab Studies Journal* 25(1): 60-65.
- Olson M (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Onoma AK (2013) *Anti-Refugee Violence and African Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Osman KF (2022) Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Tripoli Protests in Lebanon. *Protest* 2(1): 29-54.
- Paler L, Marshall L and Atallah S (2018) The Social Costs of Public Political Participation: Evidence from a Petition Experiment in Lebanon. *Journal of Politics* 80(4): 1405-1410.
- Pellicer M, et al. (2022) Grievances or Skills? The Effect of Education on Youth Political Participation in Egypt and Tunisia. *International Political Science Review* 43(2): 191-208.
- Ridge H (2022) Dismantling New Democracies: The Case of Tunisia. *Democratization* 29(8): 1539-1556.
- Sajadi H (2023) Iranian Women's Movement: Political Opportunities and New Forces. *Journal of International Women's Studies* 25(2): 1-13.
- Sika N (2024) Mobilization, Repression and Policy Concessions in Authoritarian Regimes: The Cases of Egypt and Jordan. *Political Studies* 72(2): 741-758.
- Slater D (2010) *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sindermann C and Montag C (2021) Individual Differences in Need Satisfaction and Intentions to Vote for Specific Political Parties—Results from Germany. *Current Psychology* 42: 9496-9508.
- Timmons J (2005) The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services. *World Politics* 57(4): 530-567.
- Truex R and Tavana D (2019) Implicit Attitudes toward an Authoritarian Regime. *Journal of Politics* 81(3): 1014-1027.
- Weipert-Fenner I (2018) Unemployed Mobilisation in Times of Democratisation: The Union of Unemployed Graduates in Post-Ben-Ali Tunisia. *Journal of North African Studies* 25(1): 53-75.

Online Appendix

Table A1: Who pulls to the streets in Lebanon?								
	Participated in protests							
	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Top income quartile of sample	0.313*** (0.0883)			0.236*** (0.0913)		0.292*** (0.0918)	0.269*** (0.0916)	0.221** (0.0901)
Bottom income quartile of sample	-0.216** (0.104)			-0.131 (0.107)		-0.194* (0.105)	-0.231** (0.104)	-0.180* (0.105)
Living conditions perceived worse/ same/ better than those of others			-0.224** (0.0875)		-0.164* (0.0881)	-0.184** (0.0892)	-0.195** (0.0892)	
Income decreased due to Covid-19		-0.129* (0.0768)		-0.127 (0.0773)	-0.120 (0.0773)	-0.111 (0.0764)		
Tertiary education		0.317*** (0.0970)			0.292*** (0.0992)			0.264*** (0.0986)
Less than secondary education		-0.275** (0.115)			-0.270** (0.115)			-0.271** (0.113)
Female	0.00439 (0.0748)							
Unmarried	0.371*** (0.0807)				0.211** (0.0868)	0.238** (0.0998)	0.252*** (0.0968)	0.243*** (0.0838)
Married	0 (-)							
Divorced or separated	0.00341 (0.247)							
Widowed	-0.281 (0.200)							
Widowed, divorced or separated				-0.0891 (0.0927)				
Older than 60 years		0.0668 (0.0933)						
Younger than 30 years		0.238** (0.0930)		0.175 (0.116)		0.234** (0.106)	0.149 (0.106)	
Number of adults in household			0.00424 (0.0195)					
Number of children in household			-0.0539** (0.0235)		-0.0323 (0.0237)	-0.0322 (0.0237)		
Christian	0.237*** (0.0804)			0.148* (0.0825)	0.151* (0.0834)	0.215*** (0.0818)	0.237*** (0.0805)	0.158* (0.0818)
Syrian origin		-0.757*** (0.147)		-0.778*** (0.149)				
Palestinian origin		-0.0439 (0.107)						
Lebanese origin		0 (-)						
Has working contract	0.211** (0.0901)					0.226** (0.0905)		
Employee			0 (-)	0.0842 (0.107)	0.0433 (0.0988)			
Employer			-0.165 (0.142)					
Shop owner			-0.507 (0.319)					
Farm owner			-0.0599 (0.769)					
Professional			0.154 (0.155)					
Craftsperson			-0.735** (0.288)	-0.480* (0.290)	-0.527* (0.287)		-0.501* (0.280)	-0.483* (0.281)

Table A1 continued								
Army or police member			0.187 (0.748)					
Worker in manufacturing			-0.442** (0.176)		-0.181 (0.184)			
Worker in agriculture			-0.201 (0.380)					
Seasonal or day labourer			-0.929*** (0.358)		-0.398 (0.332)			
Housewife			-0.552*** (0.112)		-0.406*** (0.106)		-0.296*** (0.101)	-0.273*** (0.0930) -0.211** (0.0942)
Unemployed			-0.467*** (0.136)		-0.407*** (0.135)		-0.411*** (0.126)	
Retired			-0.0236 (0.150)					
Student			0.253 (0.156)		0.149 (0.179)			
Constant	-0.968*** (0.0735)	-0.724*** (0.106)	-0.479*** (0.104)	-0.472*** (0.124)	-0.716*** (0.122)	-0.916*** (0.0893)	-0.889*** (0.0699)	-0.873*** (0.0983)
Observations	1,503	1,503	1,486	1,503	1,489	1,489	1,503	1,503
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1								
All variables are binary (1/0) except (i) <i>number of adults in household</i> (metric variable), (ii) <i>number of children in household</i> (metric variable) and (iii) <i>living conditions perceived worse/same/better than those of others</i> (categorical with three categories: 1/0/-1).								
Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members.								
Source: authors based on survey IDOS survey conducted in autumn 2019								

Table A2: Who pulls to the streets in Tunisia?								
	Participated in protests							
	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Top income quartile of sample	0.390*** (0.133)			0.382*** (0.134)		0.407*** (0.133)		0.260* (0.136)
Bottom income quartile of sample	-0.395*** (0.119)			-0.372*** (0.123)		-0.413*** (0.118)		-0.181 (0.125)
Living conditions perceived worse/ same/ better than those of others			-0.339*** (0.108)					
Income decreased due to Covid-19		0.0276 (0.0931)		0.0216 (0.0925)				
Tertiary education		0.437*** (0.104)			0.469*** (0.108)		0.482*** (0.106)	0.379*** (0.107)
Less than secondary education		-0.580*** (0.126)			-0.588*** (0.127)		-0.589*** (0.127)	-0.523*** (0.129)
Female	-0.166* (0.0932)				-0.316*** (0.113)	-0.170* (0.0949)	-0.319*** (0.0987)	
Unmarried	0.00948 (0.102)							
Married	0 (-)							
Divorced or seprated	-0.252 (0.355)							
Widowed	-0.331 (0.330)							
Widowed, divorced or seprated				-0.0295 (0.125)				

Table A2 continued

Older than 60 years	0.0668 (0.0933)							
Younger than 30 years	0.238** (0.0930)		0.175 (0.116)		0.234** (0.106)		0.149 (0.106)	
Number of adults in household	0.00424 (0.0195)							
Number of children in household	-0.0539** (0.0235)		-0.0323 (0.0237)		-0.0322 (0.0237)			
Has working contract	0.0663 (0.115)							
Employee	0 (-)		0.142 (0.132)					
Employer	-0.139 (0.208)							
Unpaid family member	-0.391 (0.643)							
Farm owner	-1.047* (0.544)		-0.873 (0.535)		-0.605 (0.525)			
Professional	-0.276 (0.212)							
Craftsperson	-0.559** (0.274)		-0.308 (0.267)					
Army or police member	-0.00112 (0.747)							
Worker in manufacturing	-0.866*** (0.321)		-0.668** (0.320)		-0.535* (0.319)		-0.612* (0.317)	
Worker in agriculture	-0.104 (0.220)							
Seasonal or day labourer	-0.457** (0.193)		-0.202 (0.183)					
Housewife	-0.620*** (0.157)		-0.370** (0.148)		-0.0371 (0.158)			
Unemployed	-0.159 (0.163)							
Retired	-0.407** (0.171)		-0.248 (0.164)					
Student	-0.429** (0.188)		-0.179 (0.200)					
Constant	-0.680*** (0.0783)		-0.722*** (0.0993)		-0.467*** (0.125)		-0.581*** (0.147)	
	-0.581*** (0.0855)		-0.627*** (0.0739)		-0.596*** (0.0844)		-0.717*** (0.0817)	
Observations	1,003		1,003		975		1,003	
	1,003		1,003		1,003		1,003	

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All variables are binary (1/0) except (i) *number of adults in household* (metric variable), (ii) *number of children in household* (metric variable) and (iii) *living conditions perceived worse/same/better than those of others* (categorical with three categories: 1/0/-1).

Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members.

Source: authors based on survey IDOS survey conducted in autumn 2019

Table A3: Interrelation between income and working contract		
	Participated in protests	
	Lebanon	Tunisia
1.Top income quartile	0.393*** (0.0996)	0.660*** (0.155)
1.Working contract	0.322*** (0.106)	0.213* (0.125)
1.Top income quartile #1.Working contract	-0.130 (0.189)	-0.504* (0.283)
Constant	-0.871*** (0.0457)	-0.893*** (0.0533)
Observations	1,503	1,003
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members. Source: authors based on survey IDOS survey conducted in autumn 2019		

Table A4: Interrelation between education and religion (only native Lebanese)	
	Participated in protests
1.Tertiary education	0.508*** (0.110)
1.Christian	0.0994 (0.154)
1.Tertiary education#1.Christian	-0.0268 (0.188)
Constant	-0.918*** (0.0845)
Observations	1,001
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Table A5: Who pulls to the streets in Lebanon and Tunisia? Impact of income and education

	Participated in protests	
	Lebanon	Tunisia
1.Top or 2nd income quartile	0.346*** (0.122)	0.457*** (0.124)
1.Tertiary education	0.591*** (0.0961)	0.624*** (0.133)
0b.Top or 2nd income quartile#0b.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
0b.Top or 2nd income quartile#1o.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1o.Top or 2nd income quartile#0b.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1.Top or 2nd income quartile#1.Tertiary education	-0.165 (0.156)	-0.246 (0.193)
Constant	-1.135*** (0.0660)	-1.144*** (0.0712)
Observations	1,503	1,003
	Participated in protests	
	Lebanon	Tunisia
1.Top income quartile	0.247 (0.159)	0.668*** (0.212)
1.Tertiary education	0.539*** (0.0836)	0.622*** (0.104)
0b.Top income quartile#0b.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
0b.Top income quartile#1o.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1o.Top income quartile#0b.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1.Top income quartile#1.Tertiary education	0.0199 (0.190)	-0.538** (0.271)
Constant	-1.073*** (0.0597)	-1.053*** (0.0605)
Observations	1,503	1,003
	Participated in protests	
	Lebanon	Tunisia
1.2nd income quartile	0.334** (0.156)	0.286** (0.135)
1.Tertiary education	0.653*** (0.0806)	0.629*** (0.111)
0b.2nd income quartile#0b.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
0b.2nd income quartile#1o.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1o.2nd income quartile#0b.Tertiary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1.2nd income quartile#1.Tertiary education	-0.411** (0.197)	-0.162 (0.206)
Constant	-1.086*** (0.0600)	-1.069*** (0.0663)
Observations	1,503	1,003

<i>Table A5 continued</i>		
	Participated in protests	
	Lebanon	Tunisia
1.3rd or bottom income quartile	-0.350*** (0.0901)	-0.371*** (0.104)
1.Less than secondary education	-0.482*** (0.167)	-0.928*** (0.275)
0b.3rd or bottom income quartile#0b.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
0b.3rd or bottom income quartile#1o.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1o.3rd or bottom income quartile#0b.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1.3rd or bottom income quartile#1.Less than secondary education	-0.0733 (0.204)	0.316 (0.307)
Constant	-0.427*** (0.0596)	-0.408*** (0.0727)
Observations	1,318	956
	Participated in protests	
	Lebanon	Tunisia
1.Bottom income quartile	-0.288** (0.123)	-0.334** (0.150)
1.Less than secondary education	-0.594*** (0.0992)	-0.713*** (0.142)
0b.Bottom income quartile#0b.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
0b.Bottom income quartile#1o.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1o.Bottom income quartile#0b.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1.Bottom income quartile#1.Less than secondary education	0.0237 (0.213)	0.163 (0.256)
Constant	-0.521*** (0.0442)	-0.562*** (0.0546)
Observations	1,503	1,003
	Participated in protests	
	Lebanon	Tunisia
1.3rd income quartile	-0.265*** (0.0962)	-0.183* (0.108)
1.Less than secondary education	-0.628*** (0.107)	-0.812*** (0.142)
0b.3rd income quartile#0b.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
0b.3rd income quartile#1o.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1o.3rd income quartile#0b.Less than secondary education	0 (0)	0 (0)
1.3rd income quartile#1.Less than secondary education	0.0905 (0.186)	0.217 (0.237)
Constant	-0.494*** (0.0473)	-0.547*** (0.0621)
Observations	1,503	1,003
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All variables are binary (1/0). Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members. Source: authors based on survey IDOS survey conducted in autumn 2019		

Table A6: Impact of general grievances on protests engagement

	Participated in protests							
	Lebanon				Tunisia			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Believes that the country is going the wrong direction	0.323*** (0.107)				0.080 (0.110)			
Does not consider the performance of the government as good (just 1-3 on a scale of 10)		0.493*** (0.084)				0.145 (0.089)		
Believe that there is no reason to be loyal with the government			0.110*** (0.040)				0.096** (0.046)	
Believes that the economic situation is (very) bad				-0.126 (0.134)				-0.176 (0.118)
Constant	-1.000*** (0.100)	-1.084*** (0.073)	-0.752*** (0.038)	-0.842*** (0.134)	-0.848*** (0.098)	-0.863*** (0.066)	-0.800*** (0.045)	-0.945*** (0.118)
Observations	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7: Why do people pull to the streets in Lebanon?																		
	Participated in protests																	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Top income quartile	0.224** (0.0904)	0.221** (0.0901)	0.213** (0.0904)	0.227** (0.0909)	0.227** (0.0909)	0.229** (0.0906)	0.227** (0.0908)	0.210** (0.0912)	0.204** (0.0910)	0.214** (0.0908)	0.188** (0.0916)	0.223** (0.0909)	0.202** (0.0914)	0.202** (0.0914)	0.195** (0.0908)	0.204** (0.0905)	0.185** (0.0909)	0.216** (0.0903)
Bottom income quartile	-0.182* (0.105)	-0.180* (0.105)	-0.176* (0.105)	-0.196* (0.107)	-0.190* (0.106)	-0.179* (0.106)	-0.174 (0.107)	-0.202* (0.107)	-0.200* (0.106)	-0.169 (0.106)	-0.179* (0.106)	-0.168 (0.106)	-0.177* (0.107)	-0.177* (0.107)	-0.177* (0.105)	-0.186* (0.106)	-0.183* (0.106)	-0.177* (0.105)
Tertiary education	0.255*** (0.0988)	0.263*** (0.0987)	0.254** (0.0987)	0.247** (0.0995)	0.244** (0.0994)	-0.279** (0.114)	-0.261** (0.114)	-0.248** (0.115)	-0.254** (0.114)	-0.251** (0.115)	0.224** (0.0998)	0.266*** (0.0997)	0.231** (0.100)	0.231** (0.100)	0.252** (0.0992)	0.263*** (0.0990)	0.244** (0.0991)	0.255*** (0.0988)
Less than secondary education	-0.268** (0.114)	-0.270** (0.113)	-0.273** (0.113)	-0.280** (0.115)	-0.277** (0.115)	0.249** (0.0997)	0.231** (0.0997)	0.238** (0.1000)	0.235** (0.0995)	0.237** (0.0999)	-0.239** (0.115)	-0.223* (0.115)	-0.200* (0.116)	-0.200* (0.116)	-0.276** (0.114)	-0.281** (0.114)	-0.290** (0.114)	-0.273** (0.114)
Craftsperson	-0.487* (0.284)	-0.483* (0.281)	-0.474* (0.281)	-0.512* (0.287)	-0.509* (0.287)	-0.450 (0.277)	-0.487* (0.283)	-0.527* (0.282)	-0.512* (0.282)	-0.429 (0.279)	-0.478* (0.283)	-0.465* (0.281)	-0.482* (0.281)	-0.482* (0.281)	-0.497* (0.283)	-0.465* (0.279)	-0.472* (0.281)	-0.511* (0.285)
Housewife	-0.212** (0.0945)	-0.212** (0.0944)	-0.206** (0.0944)	-0.218** (0.0952)	-0.220** (0.0952)	-0.216** (0.0947)	-0.224** (0.0954)	-0.218** (0.0951)	-0.210** (0.0950)	-0.202** (0.0953)	-0.192** (0.0953)	-0.190** (0.0958)	-0.201** (0.0960)	-0.201** (0.0960)	-0.209** (0.0948)	-0.183* (0.0950)	-0.185* (0.0949)	-0.221** (0.0945)
Unmarried	0.252*** (0.0841)	0.242*** (0.0839)	0.244*** (0.0838)	0.261*** (0.0850)	0.257*** (0.0849)	0.245*** (0.0841)	0.232*** (0.0848)	0.263*** (0.0846)	0.241*** (0.0846)	0.239*** (0.0845)	0.232*** (0.0845)	0.275*** (0.0848)	0.254*** (0.0849)	0.254*** (0.0849)	0.241*** (0.0843)	0.256*** (0.0843)	0.253*** (0.0844)	0.233*** (0.0842)
Christian	0.154* (0.0819)	0.158* (0.0818)	0.158* (0.0818)	0.132 (0.0828)	0.137* (0.0826)	0.184** (0.0834)	0.158* (0.0826)	0.178** (0.0837)	0.160* (0.0825)	0.163** (0.0825)	0.120 (0.0830)	0.122 (0.0829)	0.109 (0.0832)	0.109 (0.0832)	0.163** (0.0821)	0.142* (0.0823)	0.149* (0.0824)	0.142* (0.0823)
Believes that the country is going the wrong direction	0.300*** (0.111)																	
Believes that the economic situation is (very) bad		0.0467 (0.262)																
Believes that there is no reason to be loyal with the government			0.0634 (0.0417)															
Does not consider the political system as democratic (just 1-3 on a scale of 10)				0.0811 (0.0785)														
Does not consider the performance of the government as good (just 1-3 on a scale of 10)				0.470*** (0.0892)	0.489*** (0.0874)													

<i>Table A7 continued</i>																		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Dissatisfied with education policy						0.096** (0.0395)		0.074* (0.0401)										
Dissatisfied with health policy							0.050 (0.0410)			0.089** (0.0395)								
Dissatisfied with social welfare policy								0.107** (0.0436)	0.126*** (0.0423)									
Dissatisfied with housing policy							0.0116 (0.0393)											
Dissatisfied with government regarding employment creation							0.046 (0.0813)											
Dissatisfied with government regarding inequality reduction								0.062 (0.0628)										
Dissatisfied with government regarding security							0.118*** (0.0402)		0.132*** (0.0387)									
Dissatisfied with government regarding inflation reduction						0.039 (0.0639)												
Dissatisfied with government regarding defence of the country						0.031 (0.0417)												
Dissatisfied with government regarding elections						0.083* (0.0442)				0.091** (0.0426)								
Dissatisfied with government regarding political participation							0.107** (0.0462)	0.107** (0.0457)										
Primary group of identification: religious group										0.234 (0.237)								
Primary group of identification: tribe										-0.170 (0.149)								
Primary group of identification: ethnic group										-0.264 (0.376)								

<i>Table A7 continued</i>																		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Primary group of identification: nation										0.126 (0.0927)								
Primary group of identification: social class										-0.029 (0.0999)								
Core value deciding on political opinions: safety										0.0699 (0.151)								
Core value deciding on political opinions: freedom of speech										0.327*** (0.0876)			0.277*** (0.0821)	0.277*** (0.0821)				
Core value deciding on political opinions: peace among citizens										0.111 (0.0875)								
Core value deciding on political opinions: poverty relief										0.239** (0.0962)			0.174* (0.0918)	0.174* (0.0918)				
Core value deciding on political opinions: business opportunities										0.296*** (0.0940)			0.237*** (0.0894)	0.237*** (0.0894)				
Core value deciding on political opinions: glory of the nation										0.297 (0.184)								
Primary challenge of the country: the economy													-0.0530 (0.120)					
Primary challenge of the country: corruption													0.300** (0.123)	0.305*** (0.0840)	0.305*** (0.0840)			
Primary challenge of the country: governance													0.328 (0.222)					
Primary challenge of the country: religious extremism													0.599** (0.259)	0.568** (0.243)	0.568** (0.243)			
Primary challenge of the country: terrorism													0.436 (0.336)					
Primary challenge of the country: public services													-0.382 (0.610)					
Primary challenge of the country: security													0.0641 (0.384)					

<i>Table A7 continued</i>																		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Primary challenge of the country: political/ party issues												0.299*	0.284**	0.284**				
												(0.163)	(0.137)	(0.137)				
Main duty of the state: provide for safety															-0.0942			
															(0.0832)			
Main duty of the state: defend the country																0.0858		
																(0.117)		
Main duty of the state: education, health and sanitation																-0.00467		
																(0.0831)		
Main duty of the state: provide for employment																-0.159**	-0.119	
																(0.0798)	(0.0800)	
Main duty of the state: provide for political participation																0.309***	0.304***	
																(0.109)	(0.104)	
Main duty of the state: provide for elections																0.212**	0.221**	
																(0.102)	(0.101)	
Citizens should be loyal if government provides for security																		-0.113*
																		(0.0684)
Citizens should be loyal if gov't provides for elections																		0.0898
																		(0.0686)
Citizens should be loyal if government provides economic and social services																		-0.103
																		(0.0798)
Constant	-1.13***	-0.92***	-0.89***	-1.23***	-1.22***	-0.90***	-0.96***	-0.98***	-0.90***	-0.93***	-1.15***	-1.02***	-1.19***	-1.19***	-0.87***	-0.82***	-0.87***	-0.75***
	(0.138)	(0.269)	(0.0987)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.120)	(0.110)	(0.0995)	(0.112)	(0.125)	(0.139)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.132)
Observations	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503
Standard errors in parentheses																		
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1																		
Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members.																		
All variables are binary (1/0) or categorical with three categories (1/0/-1).																		

Table A8: Why do people pull to the streets in Tunisia?														
	Participated in protests													
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Top income quartile	0.206 (0.137)	0.205 (0.137)	0.195 (0.137)	0.208 (0.137)	0.193 (0.138)	0.217 (0.138)	0.208 (0.138)	0.211 (0.138)	0.204 (0.140)	0.204 (0.138)	0.200 (0.137)	0.195 (0.138)	0.203 (0.138)	0.204 (0.139)
Bottom income quartile	-0.174 (0.126)	-0.176 (0.126)	-0.183 (0.127)	-0.176 (0.126)	-0.170 (0.128)	-0.176 (0.127)	-0.170 (0.127)	-0.183 (0.127)	-0.171 (0.127)	-0.182 (0.128)	-0.181 (0.127)	-0.168 (0.127)	-0.174 (0.127)	-0.182 (0.128)
Tertiary education	0.437*** (0.109)	0.435*** (0.109)	0.449*** (0.109)	0.418*** (0.110)	-0.277*** (0.100)	-0.282*** (0.101)	-0.284*** (0.0999)	0.440*** (0.111)	0.338*** (0.114)	0.448*** (0.110)	0.440*** (0.110)	0.441*** (0.110)	0.431*** (0.110)	0.358*** (0.113)
Less than secondary education	-0.533*** (0.129)	-0.530*** (0.130)	-0.523*** (0.130)	-0.523*** (0.130)	-0.519*** (0.131)	-0.502*** (0.131)	-0.503*** (0.132)	-0.543*** (0.131)	-0.493*** (0.131)	-0.530*** (0.131)	-0.533*** (0.130)	-0.524*** (0.131)	-0.535*** (0.130)	-0.465*** (0.132)
Female	-0.275*** (0.0994)	-0.276*** (0.0994)	-0.267*** (0.0996)	-0.290*** (0.100)	0.408*** (0.110)	0.424*** (0.110)	0.432*** (0.110)	-0.277*** (0.100)	-0.265*** (0.101)	-0.269*** (0.100)	-0.281*** (0.101)	-0.284*** (0.100)	-0.275*** (0.0995)	-0.244** (0.101)
Less than 30 years old	-0.225** (0.111)	-0.224** (0.111)	-0.229** (0.112)	-0.231** (0.112)	-0.200* (0.114)	-0.214* (0.113)	-0.215* (0.112)	-0.223** (0.112)	-0.242** (0.113)	-0.232** (0.112)	-0.224** (0.113)	-0.222** (0.112)	-0.232** (0.113)	-0.239** (0.114)
Believes that the country is going the wrong direction	0.041 (0.115)													
Believes that the economic situation is (very) bad		0.077 (0.228)												
Believes that there is no reason to be loyal with the government			0.0946** (0.0481)											0.093* (0.0486)
Does not consider the political system as democratic (just 1-3 on a scale of 10)				-0.100 (0.105)										
Does not consider the performance of the government as good (just 1-3 on a scale of 10)				0.131 (0.0970)										
Dissatisfied with education policy						0.043 (0.0565)								
Dissatisfied with health policy							0.0289 (0.0542)							
Dissatisfied with social welfare policy					0.102* (0.0558)									0.109** (0.0546)
Dissatisfied with housing policy							0.057 (0.0482)							
Dissatisfied with government regarding employment creation							0.130* (0.0737)							
Dissatisfied with government regarding inequality reduction						0.164** (0.0809)								

<i>Table A8 continued</i>														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Dissatisfied with government regarding security						0.0306 (0.0508)								
Dissatisfied with government regarding inflation reduction					0.138* (0.0762)									
Dissatisfied with government regarding defence of the country					0.008 (0.0514)									
Dissatisfied with government regarding elections						-0.039 (0.0505)								
Dissatisfied with government regarding political participation					0.000 (0.0535)									
Primary group of identification: religious group								0.304 (0.210)						
Primary group of identification: tribe								0.0337 (0.189)						
Primary group of identification: ethnic group								-0.528 (0.404)						
Primary group of identification: nation								0.0501 (0.131)						
Primary group of identification: social class								-0.0365 (0.141)						
Core value deciding on political opinions: safety								0.166 (0.210)						
Core value deciding on political opinions: freedom of speech								0.480*** (0.126)					0.390*** (0.113)	
Core value deciding on political opinions: peace among citizens								0.157 (0.121)						
Core value deciding on political opinions: poverty relief								0.359*** (0.115)					0.263*** (0.101)	
Core value deciding on political opinions: business opportunities								0.156 (0.123)						
Core value deciding on political opinions: glory of the nation								0.351* (0.208)					0.279 (0.200)	
Primary challenge of the country: the economy										-0.354 (0.219)				
Primary challenge of the country: corruption										-0.215 (0.223)				

<i>Table A8 continued</i>														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Primary challenge of the country: governance										-0.470 (0.433)				
Primary challenge of the country: religious extremism										-0.214 (0.471)				
Primary challenge of the country: terrorism										-0.555* (0.291)				-0.307 (0.217)
Primary challenge of the country: public services										-0.00199 (0.346)				
Primary challenge of the country: security										-0.117 (0.356)				
Primary challenge of the country: political/ party issues										-0.247 (0.256)				
Main duty of the state: provide for safety											0.0627 (0.108)			
Main duty of the state: defend the country											-0.0174 (0.115)			
Main duty of the state: education, health and sanitation											0.115 (0.162)			
Main duty of the state: provide for employment												0.101 (0.218)		
Main duty of the state: provide for political participation												-0.117 (0.137)		
Main duty of the state: provide for elections												-0.0215 (0.102)		
Citizens should be loyal if government provides for security												-0.0185 (0.0747)		
Citizens should be loyal if gov't provides for elections												3.66e-05 (0.0677)		
Citizens should be loyal if government provides economic and social services												-0.0431 (0.0800)		
Constant	-0.652*** (0.128)	-0.693*** (0.235)	-0.642*** (0.0898)	-0.645*** (0.105)	-0.764*** (0.110)	-0.770*** (0.117)	-0.743*** (0.107)	-0.640*** (0.132)	-0.979*** (0.141)	-0.342 (0.219)	-0.639*** (0.141)	-0.592*** (0.118)	-0.567*** (0.121)	-0.890*** (0.112)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003

<i>Table A8 continued</i>														
	Participated in protests													
	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Top income quartile	0.423*** (0.132)	0.416*** (0.133)	0.415*** (0.132)	0.410*** (0.133)	0.387*** (0.133)	0.417*** (0.133)	0.410*** (0.133)	0.425*** (0.133)	0.366*** (0.136)	0.425*** (0.133)	0.416*** (0.132)	0.418*** (0.133)	0.418*** (0.133)	0.373*** (0.136)
Bottom income quartile	-0.409*** (0.118)	-0.407*** (0.118)	-0.418*** (0.118)	-0.402*** (0.118)	-0.401*** (0.119)	-0.397*** (0.119)	-0.384*** (0.119)	-0.412*** (0.119)	-0.353*** (0.120)	-0.406*** (0.120)	-0.410*** (0.119)	-0.395*** (0.118)	-0.412*** (0.118)	-0.367*** (0.121)
Female	-0.146 (0.0943)	-0.150 (0.0944)	-0.138 (0.0946)	-0.184* (0.0958)	-0.154 (0.0953)	-0.162* (0.0958)	-0.166* (0.0951)	-0.142 (0.0948)	-0.173* (0.0967)	-0.136 (0.0951)	-0.154 (0.0960)	-0.160* (0.0953)	-0.153 (0.0946)	-0.137 (0.0969)
Less than 30 years old	-0.113 (0.108)	-0.115 (0.108)	-0.117 (0.108)	-0.128 (0.109)	-0.092 (0.111)	-0.102 (0.110)	-0.106 (0.109)	-0.105 (0.109)	-0.161 (0.111)	-0.124 (0.109)	-0.109 (0.109)	-0.108 (0.109)	-0.124 (0.109)	-0.157 (0.112)
Believes that the country is going the wrong direction	0.0602 (0.111)													
Believes that the economic situation is (very) bad		0.290 (0.223)												
Believes that there is no reason to be loyal with the government			0.093** (0.0466)											0.090* (0.0476)
Does not consider the political system as democratic (just 1-3 on a scale of 10)				-0.211** (0.102)										
Does not consider the performance of the government as good (just 1-3 on a scale of 10)				0.198** (0.0942)										
Dissatisfied with education policy						0.073 (0.0551)								
Dissatisfied with health policy							0.088* (0.0519)							
Dissatisfied with social welfare policy					0.143*** (0.0542)									0.147*** (0.0534)
Dissatisfied with housing policy							0.046 (0.0471)							
Dissatisfied with government regarding employment creation							0.164** (0.0714)							
Dissatisfied with government regarding inequality reduction						0.200** (0.0787)								
Dissatisfied with government regarding security						0.046 (0.0498)								
Dissatisfied with government regarding inflation reduction					0.145* (0.0746)									

<i>Table A8 continued</i>														
	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Dissatisfied with government regarding defence of the country					0.017 (0.0503)									
Dissatisfied with government regarding elections						-0.027 (0.0494)								
Dissatisfied with government regarding political participation					0.012 (0.0525)									
Primary group of identification: religious group								0.115 (0.200)						
Primary group of identification: tribe								-0.168 (0.184)						
Primary group of identification: ethnic group								-0.570 (0.393)						
Primary group of identification: nation								0.0671 (0.127)						
Primary group of identification: social class								-0.137 (0.137)						
Core value deciding on political opinions: safety									0.320 (0.205)					
Core value deciding on political opinions: freedom of speech									0.669*** (0.120)					0.518*** (0.109)
Core value deciding on political opinions: peace among citizens									0.243** (0.119)					
Core value deciding on political opinions: poverty relief									0.447*** (0.112)					0.282*** (0.0994)
Core value deciding on political opinions: business opportunities									0.297** (0.118)					
Core value deciding on political opinions: glory of the nation									0.443** (0.202)					0.309 (0.195)
Primary challenge of the country: the economy										-0.318 (0.215)				
Primary challenge of the country: corruption										-0.195 (0.219)				
Primary challenge of the country: governance										-0.312 (0.413)				
Primary challenge of the country: religious extremis										-0.153 (0.465)				

<i>Table A8 continued</i>														
	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Primary challenge of the country: terrorism										-0.674** (0.283)				-0.419** (0.211)
Primary challenge of the country: public services										-0.130 (0.341)				
Primary challenge of the country: security										-0.232 (0.350)				
Primary challenge of the country: political/ party issues										-0.279 (0.251)				
Main duty of the state: provide for safety											0.0816 (0.104)			
Main duty of the state: defend the country											0.0563 (0.111)			
Main duty of the state: education, health and sanitation											0.164 (0.158)			
Main duty of the state: provide for employment												-0.0886 (0.214)		
Main duty of the state: provide for political participation												-0.236* (0.132)		
Main duty of the state: provide for elections												-0.0101 (0.0991)		
Citizens should be loyal if government provides for security													-0.0804 (0.0716)	
Citizens should be loyal if gov't provides for elections													0.0216 (0.0660)	
Citizens should be loyal if government provides economic and social services													-0.0352 (0.0779)	
Constant	-0.705*** (0.115)	-0.931*** (0.224)	-0.673*** (0.0731)	-0.675*** (0.0908)	-0.828*** (0.0970)	-0.838*** (0.103)	-0.820*** (0.0909)	-0.633*** (0.120)	-1.180*** (0.131)	-0.386* (0.212)	-0.741*** (0.128)	-0.606*** (0.104)	-0.579*** (0.104)	-0.978*** (0.0997)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1														
Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members.														
All variables are binary (1/0) or categorical with three categories (1/0/-1).														

Table A9: Correlation of the impact of people’s dissatisfaction with the effect of their income and education on their participation in protests

	Participated in protests															
A. Dissatisfaction and top income quartile (Lebanon)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1.top_income_quartile	-0.0682 (0.249)	0.315 (0.733)	0.110 (0.147)	0.472*** (0.105)	0.418** (0.170)	0.282*** (0.104)	0.563*** (0.135)	0.338** (0.149)	0.357*** (0.115)	0.168 (0.311)	0.282 (0.234)	0.366*** (0.123)	0.185 (0.263)	0.362*** (0.110)	0.478*** (0.123)	0.370** (0.153)
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	0.201* (0.121)															
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.top_income_quartile	0.530** (0.265)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad		0.180 (0.273)														
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1.top_income_quartile		0.0809 (0.738)														
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt			0.148* (0.0830)													
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt #1.top_income_quartile			0.396** (0.180)													
1.believes_country_not_democratic				0.176** (0.0845)												
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.top_income_quartile				-0.199 (0.174)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad					0.501*** (0.0979)											
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.top_income_quartile					-0.0284 (0.196)											
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy						0.0278 (0.0835)										
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.top_income_quartile						0.361** (0.177)										
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy							0.271*** (0.0868)									
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.top_income_quartile							-0.259 (0.172)									

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy								0.332***								
								(0.0851)								
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.top_income_quartile								0.0423								
								(0.181)								
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy									0.131							
									(0.0823)							
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.top_income_quartile									0.0995							
									(0.168)							
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt										0.303**						
										(0.147)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.top_income_quartile										0.244						
										(0.323)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality											0.278**					
											(0.115)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.top_income_quartile											0.123					
											(0.250)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security												0.329***				
												(0.0829)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.top_income_quartile												0.0489				
												(0.169)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation													0.232			
													(0.278)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.top_income_quartile													0.232			
													(0.278)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence														0.189**		
														(0.0839)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.top_income_quartile														0.0716		
														(0.170)		

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															0.357***	
															(0.0829)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.top_income_quartile															-0.179	
															(0.168)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.399***
																(0.0875)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.top_income_quartile																0.00655
																(0.183)
Constant	-0.986***	-0.989***	-0.895***	-0.880***	-1.183***	-0.824***	-0.987***	-1.013***	-0.878***	-1.088***	-1.047***	-0.982***	-0.906***	-0.888***	-0.991***	-1.068***
	(0.112)	(0.270)	(0.0623)	(0.0527)	(0.0856)	(0.0536)	(0.0703)	(0.0669)	(0.0585)	(0.141)	(0.106)	(0.0603)	(0.116)	(0.0534)	(0.0595)	(0.0711)
Observations	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503
B. Dissatisfaction and bottom income quartile (Lebanon)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
1.bottom_income_quartile	-0.301	-0.368***	-0.187	-0.524***	-0.509**	-0.467***	-0.474***	-0.596***	-0.360**	-0.189	-0.498*	-0.402***	-0.339	-0.550***	-0.407***	-0.453***
	(0.269)	(0.0982)	(0.142)	(0.133)	(0.218)	(0.136)	(0.171)	(0.181)	(0.147)	(0.289)	(0.254)	(0.142)	(0.261)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.167)
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	0.338***															
	(0.118)															
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.bottom_income_quartile	-0.100															
	(0.288)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad		0.0543														
		(0.278)														
i.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1.bottom_income_quartile		0														
		(0)														
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt			0.307***													
			(0.0805)													
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt #1.bottom_income_quartile			-0.342*													
			(0.196)													

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
1.believes_country_not_democratic				0.0929 (0.0811)												
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.bottom_income_quartile				0.282 (0.198)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad					0.476*** (0.0916)											
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.bottom_income_quartile					0.145 (0.244)											
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy						0.0817 (0.0805)										
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile						0.140 (0.196)										
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy							0.184** (0.0811)									
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile							0.119 (0.209)									
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy								0.329*** (0.0813)								
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile								0.290 (0.217)								
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy										0.178** (0.0782)						
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile										-0.0817 (0.197)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt											0.382** (0.151)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.bottom_income_quartile											-0.207 (0.307)					

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality											0.283**					
											(0.113)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.bottom_income_quartile											0.139					
											(0.276)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security												0.331***				
												(0.0787)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.bottom_income_quartile												0.0447				
												(0.197)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation													0.164			
													(0.124)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.bottom_income_quartile													-0.0519			
													(0.281)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence														0.159**		
														(0.0796)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.bottom_income_quartile														0.353*		
														(0.198)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															0.297***	
															(0.0785)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.bottom_income_quartile															0.0880	
															(0.197)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.377***
																(0.0842)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.bottom_income_quartile																0.142
																(0.207)
Constant	-0.945***	-0.706**	-0.837***	-0.687***	-1.003***	-0.684***	-0.768***	-0.856***	-0.737***	-1.005***	-0.894***	-0.825***	-0.798***	-0.717***	-0.807***	-0.903***
	(0.110)	(0.275)	(0.0631)	(0.0489)	(0.0796)	(0.0495)	(0.0645)	(0.0645)	(0.0541)	(0.146)	(0.104)	(0.0575)	(0.117)	(0.0507)	(0.0572)	(0.0693)
Observations	1,503	1,493	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
C. Dissatisfaction and tertiary education (Lebanon)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)
1.tertiary_education	0.426**	0.614***	0.530***	0.588***	0.446***	0.595***	0.653***	0.470***	0.464***	0.217	0.483**	0.472***	0.710***	0.552***	0.566***	0.668***
	(0.203)	(0.0743)	(0.115)	(0.0936)	(0.149)	(0.0961)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.102)	(0.261)	(0.192)	(0.106)	(0.214)	(0.0948)	(0.105)	(0.129)
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	0.193															
	(0.156)															
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.tertiary_education	0.179															
	(0.218)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad	-0.316															
	(0.277)															
1o.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1o.tertiary_education	0															
	(0)															
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt			0.169													
			(0.111)													
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt #1.tertiary_education			0.0674													
			(0.150)													
1.believes_country_not_democratic				0.140												
				(0.112)												
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.tertiary_education				0.0275												
				(0.151)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad					0.376***											
					(0.127)											
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.tertiary_education					0.173											
					(0.172)											
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy						0.133										
						(0.111)										
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.tertiary_education						0.0300										
						(0.150)										
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy							0.246**									
							(0.116)									
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.tertiary_education							-0.101									
							(0.153)									

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy								0.224**								
								(0.112)								
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.tertiary_education								0.136								
								(0.153)								
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy										-0.0214						
										(0.111)						
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.tertiary_education										0.251*						
										(0.147)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt											0.106					
											(0.169)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.tertiary_education											0.390					
											(0.272)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality												0.189				
												(0.142)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.tertiary_education												0.105				
												(0.208)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security													0.204*			
													(0.111)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.tertiary_education													0.195			
													(0.148)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation														0.177		
														(0.161)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.tertiary_education														-0.142		
														(0.228)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence															0.119	
															(0.116)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.tertiary_education															0.0579	
															(0.151)	

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																	
	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															0.270**	(0.111)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.tertiary_education															-0.0118	(0.148)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.442***	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.tertiary_education																-0.177	(0.157)
Constant	-1.203***	-0.736***	-1.130***	-1.096***	-1.309***	-1.100***	-1.195***	-1.164***	-1.030***	-1.132***	-1.192***	-1.138***	-1.192***	-1.081***	-1.160***	-1.304***	
	(0.144)	(0.272)	(0.0818)	(0.0719)	(0.109)	(0.0754)	(0.0931)	(0.0842)	(0.0749)	(0.159)	(0.128)	(0.0777)	(0.149)	(0.0687)	(0.0756)	(0.0919)	
Observations	1,503	1,494	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	
D. Dissatisfaction and less than secondary education (Lebanon)	(49)	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)	(64)	
1.less_than_secondary_education	-0.776***	-0.578	-0.767***	-0.764***	-0.731***	-0.594***	-0.811***	-0.553***	-0.497***	-0.484*	-0.359*	-0.577***	-0.628***	-0.642***	-0.496***	-0.605***	
	(0.248)	(0.515)	(0.138)	(0.117)	(0.188)	(0.117)	(0.152)	(0.134)	(0.116)	(0.267)	(0.199)	(0.125)	(0.230)	(0.111)	(0.118)	(0.143)	
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	0.256**																
	(0.125)																
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.less_than_secondary_education	0.178																
	(0.265)																
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad		0.116															
		(0.343)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1.less_than_secondary_education		-0.0493															
		(0.523)															
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with govt			0.166**														
			(0.0845)														
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with govt #1.less_than_secondary_education			0.267														
			(0.178)														

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(49)	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)	(64)
1.believes_country_not_democratic				0.0803 (0.0855)												
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.less_than_secondary_education				0.298* (0.176)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad				0.455*** (0.0968)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.less_than_secondary_education				0.141 (0.213)												
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy				0.161* (0.0852)												
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education				-0.107 (0.175)												
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy				0.127 (0.0856)												
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education				0.283 (0.186)												
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy				0.320*** (0.0877)												
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education				-0.0616 (0.177)												
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy				0.180** (0.0824)												
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education				-0.273 (0.175)												
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt				0.331** (0.164)												
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.less_than_secondary_education				-0.142 (0.282)												

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(49)	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)	(64)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality											0.340***					
											(0.126)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.less_than_secondary_education											-0.305					
											(0.221)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security												0.343***				
												(0.0830)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.less_than_secondary_education												-0.0746				
												(0.174)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation													0.104			
													(0.135)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.less_than_secondary_education													0.00737			
													(0.248)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence														0.171**		
														(0.0833)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.less_than_secondary_education														0.0642		
														(0.178)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															0.332***	
															(0.0830)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.less_than_secondary_education															-0.223	
															(0.175)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.351***
																(0.0899)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.less_than_secondary_education																0.0317
																(0.181)
Constant	-0.783***	-0.674**	-0.661***	-0.589***	-0.898***	-0.619***	-0.641***	-0.771***	-0.651***	-0.868***	-0.856***	-0.741***	-0.654***	-0.632***	-0.737***	-0.800***
	(0.117)	(0.341)	(0.0662)	(0.0515)	(0.0843)	(0.0519)	(0.0683)	(0.0716)	(0.0587)	(0.158)	(0.118)	(0.0609)	(0.128)	(0.0542)	(0.0612)	(0.0750)
Observations	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
E. Dissatisfaction and top income quartile (Tunisia)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1.top_income_quartile	0.0409 (0.307)	0.540*** (0.130)	0.563*** (0.204)	0.647*** (0.151)	0.598*** (0.192)	0.393 (0.280)	0.466* (0.255)	0.950*** (0.256)	0.681*** (0.187)	0.437 (0.405)	1.020*** (0.330)	0.706*** (0.173)	0.584 (0.426)	0.640*** (0.162)	0.613*** (0.166)	0.696*** (0.244)
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	-0.00294 (0.118)															
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.top_income_quartile	0.595* (0.339)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad	0.223 (0.227)															
1o.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1o.top_income_quartile	0 (0)															
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with govt	0.176* (0.0975)															
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with govt #1.top_income_quartile	-0.0757 (0.262)															
1.believes_country_not_democratic	-0.0708 (0.103)															
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.top_income_quartile	-0.466 (0.293)															
1.believes_govt_performance_bad	0.161* (0.0970)															
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.top_income_quartile	-0.135 (0.258)															
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy	0.208* (0.111)															
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.top_income_quartile	0.154 (0.316)															
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy	0.231** (0.107)															
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.top_income_quartile	0.0678 (0.295)															

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy								0.389***								
								(0.109)								
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.top_income_quartile								-0.588**								
								(0.296)								
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy									0.159							
									(0.0995)							
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.top_income_quartile									-0.272							
									(0.258)							
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt										0.376***						
										(0.139)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.top_income_quartile										0.0763						
										(0.427)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality											0.570***					
											(0.160)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.top_income_quartile											-0.563					
											(0.359)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security												0.215**				
												(0.0998)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.top_income_quartile												-0.434*				
												(0.259)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation													0.388***			
													(0.145)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.top_income_quartile													-0.0864			
													(0.447)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence														0.144		
														(0.0999)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.top_income_quartile														-0.307		
														(0.265)		

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															0.0497 (0.0995)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.top_income_quartile															-0.219 (0.262)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.156 (0.0989)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.top_income_quartile																-0.260 (0.287)
Constant	-0.853*** (0.105)	-1.068*** (0.222)	-0.954*** (0.0737)	-0.832*** (0.0588)	-0.942*** (0.0720)	-1.008*** (0.0960)	-1.019*** (0.0911)	-1.130*** (0.0929)	-0.953*** (0.0784)	-1.174*** (0.129)	-1.356*** (0.152)	-0.934*** (0.0611)	-1.189*** (0.136)	-0.908*** (0.0608)	-0.874*** (0.0610)	-0.949*** (0.0772)
Observations	1,003	1,000	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003
F. Dissatisfaction and bottom income quartile (Tunisia)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
1.bottom_income_quartile	-0.114 (0.226)	0.395 (0.460)	-0.708*** (0.194)	-0.576*** (0.144)	-0.495*** (0.169)	-0.111 (0.201)	-0.321* (0.195)	-0.559** (0.227)	-0.354* (0.183)	-0.0591 (0.271)	-0.331 (0.329)	-0.546*** (0.146)	-0.389 (0.297)	-0.501*** (0.142)	-0.449*** (0.145)	-0.574*** (0.194)
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	0.164 (0.127)															
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.bottom_income_quartile	-0.471* (0.263)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad		0.572** (0.280)														
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1.bottom_income_quartile		-0.913* (0.475)														
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt			0.117 (0.100)													
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt #1.bottom_income_quartile			0.376 (0.243)													

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
1.believes_country_not_democratic				-0.196*												
				(0.108)												
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.bottom_income_quartile				0.315												
				(0.239)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad					0.124											
					(0.0998)											
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.bottom_income_quartile					0.0526											
					(0.230)											
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy						0.322***										
						(0.120)										
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile						-0.498**										
						(0.246)										
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy							0.256**									
							(0.114)									
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile							-0.194									
							(0.242)									
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy								0.301***								
								(0.111)								
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile								0.122								
								(0.264)								
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy									0.142							
									(0.101)							
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.bottom_income_quartile									-0.197							
									(0.235)							
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt										0.496***						
										(0.153)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.bottom_income_quartile										-0.474						
										(0.300)						

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality											0.470***					
											(0.154)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.bottom_income_quartile											-0.159					
											(0.351)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security												0.117				
												(0.102)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.bottom_income_quartile												0.229				
												(0.239)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation													0.386**			
													(0.158)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.bottom_income_quartile													-0.0717			
													(0.322)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence														0.0688		
														(0.102)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.bottom_income_quartile														0.103		
														(0.242)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															0.0377	
															(0.102)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.bottom_income_quartile															-0.0580	
															(0.237)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.130
																(0.102)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.bottom_income_quartile																0.161
																(0.241)
Constant	-0.819***	-1.237***	-0.753***	-0.626***	-0.755***	-0.934***	-0.875***	-0.900***	-0.771***	-1.116***	-1.095***	-0.732***	-1.026***	-0.713***	-0.701***	-0.767***
	(0.114)	(0.275)	(0.0753)	(0.0595)	(0.0743)	(0.106)	(0.0985)	(0.0942)	(0.0779)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.0635)	(0.149)	(0.0629)	(0.0629)	(0.0809)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
G. Dissatisfaction and tertiary education (Tunisia)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)
1.tertiary_education	0.799***	0.617***	0.868***	0.721***	0.730***	0.450**	0.780***	0.497***	0.493***	0.732***	0.823***	0.728***	0.711**	0.590***	0.574***	0.727***
	(0.210)	(0.0945)	(0.143)	(0.111)	(0.143)	(0.199)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.146)	(0.268)	(0.279)	(0.122)	(0.281)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.156)
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	0.152															
	(0.144)															
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.tertiary_education	-0.244															
	(0.234)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad	0.0409															
	(0.232)															
1o.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1o.tertiary_education	0															
	(0)															
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with govt		0.377***														
		(0.120)														
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with govt #1.tertiary_education		-0.447**														
		(0.189)														
1.believes_country_not_democratic			0.0953													
			(0.118)													
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.tertiary_education			-0.462**													
			(0.215)													
1.believes_govt_performance_bad				0.179												
				(0.115)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.tertiary_education				-0.236												
				(0.189)												
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy					0.121											
					(0.128)											
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.tertiary_education					0.177											
					(0.226)											
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy						0.246**										
						(0.124)										
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.tertiary_education						-0.260										
						(0.220)										

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy								0.221*								
								(0.124)								
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.tertiary_education								0.106								
								(0.217)								
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy									0.0308							
									(0.117)							
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.tertiary_education									0.192							
									(0.189)							
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt										0.407**						
										(0.165)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.tertiary_education										-0.166						
										(0.286)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality											0.501***					
											(0.181)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.tertiary_education											-0.261					
											(0.296)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security												0.239**				
												(0.121)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.tertiary_education												-0.333*				
												(0.190)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation													0.396**			
													(0.171)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.tertiary_education													-0.139			
													(0.298)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence														0.0534		
														(0.122)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.tertiary_education														0.0248		
														(0.192)		

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															-0.0210 (0.120)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.tertiary_education															0.0776 (0.191)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.200* (0.119)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.tertiary_education																-0.203 (0.194)
Constant	-1.123*** (0.128)	-1.041*** (0.224)	-1.228*** (0.0946)	-1.040*** (0.0740)	-1.095*** (0.0837)	-1.089*** (0.108)	-1.168*** (0.103)	-1.150*** (0.102)	-1.021*** (0.0910)	-1.344*** (0.152)	-1.435*** (0.170)	-1.084*** (0.0717)	-1.340*** (0.159)	-1.021*** (0.0708)	-0.995*** (0.0720)	-1.124*** (0.0931)
Observations	1,003	998	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003
H. Dissatisfaction and less than secondary education (Tunisia)																
	(49)	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)	(64)
1.less_than_secondary_education	-0.744*** (0.241)	-0.323 (0.440)	-1.041*** (0.193)	-0.832*** (0.150)	-0.780*** (0.166)	-0.492** (0.196)	-0.655*** (0.184)	-0.608*** (0.197)	-0.870*** (0.192)	-0.395 (0.261)	-0.522* (0.292)	-0.806*** (0.140)	-0.455 (0.294)	-0.844*** (0.142)	-0.722*** (0.141)	-0.776*** (0.181)
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction	0.0472 (0.128)															
1.believes_things_going_wrong_direction #1.less_than_secondary_education	0.0105 (0.273)															
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad		0.340 (0.312)														
1.believes_economic_situation_bad_or_very_bad #1.less_than_secondary_education		-0.434 (0.456)														
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt			0.0605 (0.103)													
1.believes_no_reason_to_be_loyal_with_govt #1.less_than_secondary_education			0.509** (0.241)													

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(49)	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)	(64)
1.believes_country_not_democratic				-0.125 (0.113)												
1.believes_country_not_democratic #1.less_than_secondary_education				0.257 (0.233)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad				0.0914 (0.102)												
1.believes_govt_performance_bad #1.less_than_secondary_education				0.0940 (0.228)												
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy							0.239*									
1.unsatisfied_with_education_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education							-0.335 (0.242)									
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy							0.142 (0.121)									
1.unsatisfied_with_health_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education							-0.0950 (0.237)									
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy									0.304***							
1.unsatisfied_with_social_welfare_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education									-0.156 (0.242)							
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy										0.0662 (0.103)						
1.unsatisfied_with_housing_policy #1.less_than_secondary_education										0.204 (0.239)						
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt														0.433***		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_employmt #1.less_than_secondary_education														-0.385 (0.290)		

<i>Table A9 continued</i>																
	(49)	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)	(64)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality											0.439***					
											(0.165)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inequality #1.less_than_secondary_education											-0.229					
											(0.317)					
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security												0.0568				
												(0.103)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_security #1.less_than_secondary_education												0.254				
												(0.242)				
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation													0.449***			
													(0.160)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_reduce_inflation #1.less_than_secondary_education													-0.317			
													(0.319)			
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence														-0.00520		
														(0.104)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_defence #1.less_than_secondary_education														0.327		
														(0.238)		
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections															0.0130	
															(0.104)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_good_elections #1.less_than_secondary_education															-0.0454	
															(0.238)	
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation																0.109
																(0.106)
1.believes_govt_performs_not_participation #1.less_than_secondary_education																0.0772
																(0.233)
Constant	-0.646***	-0.939***	-0.643***	-0.573***	-0.660***	-0.795***	-0.717***	-0.831***	-0.648***	-0.988***	-0.996***	-0.632***	-1.001***	-0.606***	-0.614***	-0.678***
	(0.115)	(0.308)	(0.0781)	(0.0599)	(0.0766)	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.0795)	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.0660)	(0.150)	(0.0647)	(0.0648)	(0.0844)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1																
Income is measured as self-reported total income of all household members divided by the number of household members.																

Table A10: Comparison of the composition of our sample and the sample of ArabBarometer 2018

		Lebanon		Tunisia	
		Arabbarometer 2018	Telephone survey 2020	Arabbarometer 2018	Telephone survey 2020
Age	<i>(average)</i>	<i>40,3 years</i>	<i>44,9 years</i>	<i>42,5 years</i>	<i>42,3 years</i>
Gender	female	50,0%	47,8%	50,0%	49,7%
Education	less than secondary	27,4%	30,6%	49,3%	30,2%
	secondary	63,9%	18,9%	48,9%	54,2%
	BA or more	29,4%	48,7%	17,5%	31,2%
Occupation	employer	5,6%	9,0%	2,4%	5,4%
	employee	19,7%	18,2%	17,4%	16,5%
	student	10,5%	6,1%	4,4%	8,5%
	housewife	27,3%	26,2%	34,8%	16,7%
	retired	5,3%	7,3%	9,4%	11,2%
	unemployed	6,4%	12,4%	11,8%	11,8%
	other	24,8%	20,8%	19,4%	30,1%
Marital status	unmarried	35,7%	26,1%	22,8%	29,6%
	married	59,1%	66,7%	70,9%	65,4%
	divorced or separated	1,5%	2,3%	2,0%	2,1%
	widowed	3,7%	4,9%	4,4%	2,8%
Confession	Muslim	52,9%	69,9%	99,2%	98,9%
	Christian	39,2%	26,7%	0,0%	0,2%
	other/ refused to answer	7,9%	3,3%	0,8%	0,9%
Source: authors					

Questionnaire

Hello my name is _____. I work with ONE TO ONE FOR RESEARCH AND POLLING (Tunis). We are conducting a study about the effect of the Coronavirus pandemic on social and political issues. It has been commissioned by the German Development Institute. The institute is financed by the German government but totally independent in its research and policy advice activities. In order to better understand and address the current every day challenges arising from the current crisis, we would very much like to obtain your opinions. We have a few questions to ask you. This will only take a few minutes. We are only interested in your opinions and all your answers will be treated as strictly confidential. The participation in the survey is voluntary. If at any point you wish to close this – you are entirely at liberty to do so.

Would you please give us 30 minutes of your time?

1. Yes
2. No

Please thank the participant in all the cases whether or not he or she accepted to participate in the survey. Do you have any question before we start the survey?

3. Yes
4. No

PLEASE LISTEN CAREFULLY TO THE QUALITY OF THE VOICES. RESPONDENTS MUST BE ARTICULATE, EASILY UNDERSTOOD, speaking fluently and COMMUNICATE FREELY. TERMINATE IF THEY MUMBLE and SOUND CONFUSED.

Part I: Demographic Questions

First three questions only in Lebanon

1. Are you originally from Lebanon?
 - 1) Yes (go to Q4)
 - 2) no (do to Q2)
 2. If no, are you originally from Syria?
 - a) Yes (do to Q3)
 - b) no (go to Q3a)
 3. If “yes,” Since when have you resided in Lebanon?
 - a) Month _____ Year _____
 - b) Declined to answer
- 3a. Where are you originally from? What is your nationality?

4. In what year were you born?

98. Don't know (Do not read)
99. Declined to answer (Do not read)
 5. What is your gender?
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
 6. What is your highest level of education?
 - a. Illiterate/No formal education
 - b. Elementary
 - c. Preparatory/Basic
 - d. Secondary
 - e. Some university education
 - f. Vocational

- g. License/Bachelor's degree
 - h. MA and above
 - i. 99. Declined to answer (Do not read)
7. What is your occupation?
- a. Employer
 - b. Leading employee
 - c. Professional such as a lawyer, accountant, teacher, doctor, etc.
 - d. Employee
 - e. Manual permanent laborer
 - f. Seasonal or day laborer
 - g. Agricultural worker
 - h. Owner of a farm
 - i. Owner of a shop/grocery store
 - j. Craftsperson/tradesperson
 - k. Unpaid family member
 - l. Working at the armed forces or the police
 - m. Retired
 - n. A housewife (go to Q7)
 - o. A student (go to Q7)
 - p. Unemployed (go to Q7)
 - q. Other (specify) _____
98. Declined to answer (Do not read)
8. And have you got a work contract for your current position? [INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT HAS MORE THAN ONE JOBS, RECORD MAIN OCCUPATION]?
- a. yes
 - b. no
98. don't know (do not read)
99. Declined to answer (do not read)
9. What is your marital status?
- a. Unmarried
 - b. Married
 - c. Divorced or separated
 - d. Widowed
99. Declined to answer (Do not read)
10. How many adults are living in your household?
- Number _____
99. Declined to answer (Do not read)
11. How many children are living in your household?
- Number _____
99. Declined to answer (Do not read)
12. Generally speaking, how would you compare your living conditions with the rest of your fellow citizens?
(Read)
- a. Much worse
 - b. Worse
 - c. Similar
 - d. Better
 - e. Much better
98. I don't know (Do not read)
99. Declined to answer (Do not read)
13. What is the total monthly income for all household members?
- a. Less than 500 TND
 - b. [500-999 TND]
 - c. [1000-1999 TND]
 - d. [2000-2999TND]

- e. [3000-5000 TND]
- f. More than 5000 TND
- 98. Don't know (Do not read)
- 99. Refuse (Do not read)

14. Are you a member of a labor union?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 1. Declined to answer (Do not read)

2. Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 99. Declined to answer (Do not read)

3. Have you ever participated in street rallies or campaigns?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 99. Declined to answer (Do not read)

4. What is your religion?
 - a. Muslim
 - b. Christian
 - c. Other
 99. Declined to answer (Do not read)

5. What are the 2 most important values deciding on your political opinions?
 - a. Belief in God,
 - b. Individual safety
 - c. Freedom of belief and speech
 - d. Peace among citizens,
 - e. Poverty relief
 - f. Business opportunities
 - g. Glory of the nation

6. What is your primary group of identification beyond your own family
 - a. Religious group
 - b. Tribe
 - c. Local community / village,
 - d. Ethnic group
 - e. Nation
 - f. social class

Part II: Social and Economic Indicators

7. In general, do you think that things in [COUNTRY] are going in the right or wrong direction?
 - a. Going in the right direction
 - b. In between [Do not read]
 - c. Going in the wrong direction
 - d. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

8. What is the most important challenge facing [COUNTRY] today? [INTERVIEWER: READ RESPONSE OPTIONS]
[PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]
 - a. Economic situation
 - b. Financial and administrative corruption
 - c. Democracy and representation/governance
 - d. Foreign interference
 - e. Religious extremism


- f. Fighting terrorism
- g. Public services
[INTERVIEWER: IF ASKED, HEALTH, EDUCATION, ETC.]
- h. Security
- i. Political/party issues
- j. Others, specify: _____
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

9. How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?
- a. Very good
 - b. Good
 - c. Bad
 - d. Very bad
 - 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 - 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

10. What of the following would you consider the Number 1 duty of the state?
[PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]
- 1. Guarantee safety of citizens
 - 2. Provide education, health and sanitation to all citizens
 - 3. Enable citizens to participate in political decisions
 - 4. Allow citizens to elect the government
 - 5. Defend the country against neighboring countries
 - 6. Create employment opportunities

11. And which of the same would you consider the Number 2 duty of the state?
[PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]
- 1. Guarantee safety of citizens
 - 2. Provide education, health and sanitation to all citizens
 - 3. Enable citizens to participate in political decisions
 - 4. Allow citizens to elect the government
 - 5. Defend the country against neighboring countries
 - 6. Create employment opportunities

12. On a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent of your satisfaction with the current government's performance, in which 0 means that you are completely dissatisfied with its performance and 10 means you are completely satisfied. To what extent are you satisfied with the current government's performance?



- 97. Unable to rate [Do not read]
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

13. To what extent do you feel that your own personal as well as your family's safety and security are currently ensured?
- a. Fully ensured
 - b. Somewhat better
 - c. Ensured
 - d. Not ensured
 - e. Not at all ensured
 - 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 - 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

14. I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them. [PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]

(a) Government (Council of minister)

- a. a great deal of trust
 - b. quite a lot of trust
 - c. Not a lot of trust
 - d. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(b) Courts and legal system

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(c) Elected council of representatives (parliament)

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(d) Local government

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(e) Regional government

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(f) Police

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(g) Civil society organizations

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

15. I am going to name some more institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them. [PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]

(a) religious /confessional institutions

- a. a great deal of trust
 - b. quite a lot of trust
 - c. Not a lot of trust
 - d. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(b) the media: TV and newspapers

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(c) charitable organizations

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(d) the extended family

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(e) the neighbourhood

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(f) international organizations

1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

16. I am going to name some more institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them. [PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]

(a) the armed forces

- a. a great deal of trust
 - b. quite a lot of trust
 - c. Not a lot of trust
 - d. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

- (b) Religious leaders
1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

- (c) Political parties
1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

- (d) President / prime minister
1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

- (e) Islamist movement
1. a great deal of trust
 2. quite a lot of trust
 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

17. How satisfied are you with the following?

- (a) The educational system in our country
- a. completely satisfied
 - b. satisfied
 - c. dissatisfied
 - d. completely dissatisfied
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

- (b) The healthcare system in our country
1. completely satisfied
 2. satisfied
 3. dissatisfied
 4. completely dissatisfied
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

18. How satisfied are you with the following?

- (a) The social welfare system in our country
- a. completely satisfied
 - b. satisfied
 - c. dissatisfied
 - d. completely dissatisfied
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

- (b) The housing situation in our country
1. completely satisfied
 2. satisfied
 3. dissatisfied
 4. completely dissatisfied
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
19. I am going to ask a number of questions related to the current government's performance in specific areas. How would you evaluate the current government's performance on [INSERT ITEM]?
[PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]
- (a) Creating employment opportunities
- a. Very good
 - b. Good
 - c. Bad
 - d. Very bad
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (b) Narrowing the gap between rich and poor
1. Very good
 2. Good
 3. Bad
 4. Very bad
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (c) Providing security and order
1. Very good
 2. Good
 3. Bad
 4. Very bad
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (d) Keeping prices down
1. Very good
 2. Good
 3. Bad
 4. Very bad
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
20. I am going to ask some more questions now related to the current government's performance in specific areas. How would you evaluate the current government's performance on [INSERT ITEM]?
[PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]
- (a) Defending the country against neighbouring countries
- a. Very good
 - b. Good
 - c. Bad
 - d. Very bad
 97. this is not the government's responsibility [Do not read]
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (b) Providing health, education and sanitation to all citizens
1. Very good
 2. Good
 3. Bad

- 4. Very bad
- 97. this is not the government's responsibility [Do not read]
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(c) Allowing citizens to elect the government

- 1. Very good
- 2. Good
- 3. Bad
- 4. Very bad
- 97. this is not the government's responsibility [Do not read]
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(d) Enabling citizens to participate in political decisions

- 1. Very good
- 2. Good
- 3. Bad
- 4. Very bad
- 97. this is not the government's responsibility [Do not read]
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

21. Do you think there are some groups of population that receive better government services than other groups?

- 1. Yes, frequently
- 2. Yes, s.t.
- 3. No, hardly ever
- 4. Never
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

22. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

[PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]

(a) Citizens should be loyal to the government if it provides for security

- 1. Agree strongly
- 2. Agree somewhat
- 3. Rather disagree
- 4. Disagree strongly
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(b) Citizens should be loyal to the government only if it has been elected in a transparent and fair manner

- 1. Agree strongly
- 2. Agree somewhat
- 3. Rather disagree
- 4. Disagree strongly
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- 100.

(c) Citizens should be loyal to the government if it provides social and economic services that citizens need

- 1. Agree strongly
- 2. Agree somewhat
- 3. Rather disagree
- 4. Disagree strongly
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

- (d) Currently, there is no reason to be loyal with the government
1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Rather disagree
 4. Disagree strongly
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (e) Citizens have to pay taxes because the government defends their security
1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Rather disagree
 4. Disagree strongly
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (f) Citizens have to pay taxes because the government acts on their behalf
1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Rather disagree
 4. Disagree strongly
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (g) Citizens have to pay taxes because the government is providing useful services
1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Rather disagree
 4. Disagree strongly
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (h) I would be ready to pay more taxes if the government did more for the security of citizens
1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Rather disagree
 4. Disagree strongly
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (i) I would be ready to pay more taxes if the government provided better public services
1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Rather disagree
 4. Disagree strongly
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- (j) I would be ready to pay more taxes if I could participate better in decision making on fund allocation
1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Rather disagree
 4. Disagree strongly
 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

23. Measuring the extent to which your country is democratic, on a scale from 0-10 with 0 meaning there is no democracy whatsoever and 10 meaning that it is democratic to the greatest extent possible. In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
worst										best

- 97 not concerned/not interested (do not read)
98 don't know (do not read)
99 declined to answer (do not read)

24. To what extent do you think that [INSERT ITEM] is guaranteed in your country?
[PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]

(a) Freedom to express opinions

1. Guaranteed to a great extent
 2. Guaranteed to a medium extent
 3. Guaranteed to a limited extent
 4. Not guaranteed at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(b) Freedom to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations

1. Guaranteed to a great extent
 2. Guaranteed to a medium extent
 3. Guaranteed to a limited extent
 4. Not guaranteed at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(c) Freedom to join civil associations and organizations

1. Guaranteed to a great extent
 2. Guaranteed to a medium extent
 3. Guaranteed to a limited extent
 4. Not guaranteed at all
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

25. For each of the following types of people, please tell me how much you would like having people from this group as your neighbors. [PROGRAMMER: RANDOMIZE ITEMS]

(a) People of a different religion

1. Strongly dislike
 2. Dislike
 3. Like
 4. Strongly like
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(b) People of a different race or color

1. Strongly dislike
 2. Dislike
 3. Like
 4. Strongly like
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

(c) Immigrants or foreign workers

1. Strongly dislike
2. Dislike
3. Like

- 4. Strongly like
- 98. Don't know [Do not read]
- 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

Part III: Corona-Specific Questions

201. What do you think, who can best handle the coronavirus outbreak and protect the wellbeing of the people? [Read out options]
- 1. The government / state authorities
 - 2. Local government
 - 3. Traditional leader
 - 4. Religious leader
 - 5. Family
 - 6. Nobody
202. Do you think the reaction of your country's government to the current coronavirus outbreak is appropriate, too extreme, or not sufficient? [Read out options]
- 1. Much too extreme
 - 2. Somewhat too extreme
 - 3. Appropriate
 - 4. Somewhat insufficient
 - 5. Not sufficient
 - 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 - 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
203. Looking ahead, do you expect that the coronavirus will have negative consequences on the political and social confrontation of [this country]? [Read out options]
- 1. Not at all
 - 2. Somewhat but it will return to normal soon
 - 3. Somewhat, and probably the confrontation will remain at this levels
 - 4. A lot, the political and social confrontation have increase remarkably and will remain so or even worsen during the next months
 - 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 - 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
204. Have you/your household received any food, cash, subsidy or other support from anyone that you do NOT usually receive? [Multiple answers possible]
- 1. Yes, from central government
 - 2. Yes, from local government
 - 3. Yes, from traditional leaders
 - 4. Yes, from my relatives
 - 5. Yes, from neighbours or members of my community
 - 6. No
 - 98. Don't know [Do not read]
 - 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]
- 204a. ASK ONLY IF Q204=1 or 2 Otherwise continue with Question 204b
Which type of support did you receive from the government? [Read out options, multiple answers are possible]
- 1. Food transfer
 - 2. Cash transfer
 - 3. Cash for works
 - 4. Free health insurance/Subsidy of premiums
 - 5. Protective equipment (Breathing mask, sanitation kit)
 - 6. Subsidy of electricity/water costs
 - 7. Livelihood support (livestock, seeds etc)
 - 8. Other (specify)
 - 99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

204b. ASK ONLY IF Q40= 3 or 4 or 5 Otherwise continue with Question 205

Which type of support did you receive? [Read out options] [Multiple answers possible]

1. Cash (transfer)
2. Cash (loan)
3. Food
4. Livestock
5. Seeds
6. Fertilizer
7. Other (specify): _____
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]

99

205. In the past months did you earn more, the same, or less than you did in a typical month before the coronavirus outbreak? [Read out options]

1. More
2. Same
3. Less
98. Don't know [Do not read]
99. Declined to answer [Do not read]