Women's Electoral Participation in Turkey: Micro and Macro Factors

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WOMEN'S ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY: MICRO AND MACRO FACTORS

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Abstract

Women's electoral participation in Turkey is studied, using the probit procedure. The novelty of the study is the use of both micro-level and macro-level variables simultaneously. Furthermore, a wider range of variables are used in each of these categories than other studies on turnout in Turkey, including some variables never considered before. Results show that women's propensity to vote is related to age (at least until 49) being married and residing in an electoral district with large number of viable female candidates, positively, and to being an ethnic minority, having children under 6, living in an urban area, living in an electoral district with a large number of parliament members and large effective number of parties, negatively. Education and household wealth have inverted-U shaped relationships with women's probability to vote. Being a migrant reduces the likelihood of voting unless it occurs in a province with heavy migrant concentration and large number of parliament members.

ملخص

تجري دراسة مشاركة المرأة في الانتخابات في تركيا باستخدام إجراء الاختبار. ومن المستجدات في هذه الدراسة، هو استخدام المتغيرات على المستويين الجزئي والكلي في وقت واحد. علاوة على ذلك، يتم استخدام مجموعة واسعة من المتغيرات في كل من هذه الفئات مقارنة بالدراسات الأخرى حول الإقبال في تركيا، بما في ذلك بعض المتغيرات التي لم يتم النظر فيها من قبل. تظهر النتائج أن ميل المرأة للتصويت مرتبط بالعمر (حتى 49 على الأقل) الزواج والإقامة في دائرة انتخابية بها عدد كبير من المرشحات القادرات على البقاء، بشكل إيجابي، وكونهن أقلية عرقية، ولديهن أطفال تحت سن 6 أعوام، ويعيشن في منطقة حضرية، ويعيشن في دائرة انتخابية بها عدد كبير من أعضاء البرلمان وعدد كبير من الأحزاب الفعلية، بشكل سلبي. أدى التعليم وثروة الأسرة إلى قلب العلاقات واحتمال تصويت المرأة. كون المرأة مهاجرة يقلل من احتمالية التصويت ما لم يحدث ذلك في مقاطعة بها تركيز كبير للمهاجرين وعدد كبير من أعضاء البرلمان.

1. Introduction

For a well-functioning democracy and economy, it is essential to have voters that evaluate the performance of governments from time to time and reward or punish them accordingly. For that reason, low and declining electoral turnout rates across the globe, especially in established democracies of North America and Europe, is viewed with alarm[5]. Consequently, the amount of research devoted to understanding the determinants of electoral participation has exploded in the last two decades. Frank and Coma (2023), Stockemer (2017), Concela and Geys (2016), Smets and Van Ham (2013), Geys (2006) and Blais (2006) provide reviews of this literature. According to these reviews, in explaining turnout, researchers typically consider demographic factors such as population size, population concentration, population stability, age, ethnicity, marital status, children at home, birth place, migration status; socioeconomic factors such as urbanization, education, economic well-being; political factors such as effective number of parties and the level of electoral competition; and institutional factors such as the number of officials being elected, the election system, registration and voting requirements, and the presence of other elections on the ballot. Relative importance of these variables varies depending on the context.

Turnout studies fall under two main categories: Micro studies which consider demographic and socioeconomic traits of individual voters, ignoring political and institutional factors, and Macro studies which consider aggregate demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate at national, subnational or supranational level, together with political and institutional factors. To gain more insight, some studies investigate various subgroups of the electorate separately. In that regard, female voters are of particular interest because women constitute about half of the society and the electorate and vote differently than men. In the U.S, and Canada, women voters outnumber men and vote at a higher rate than them. However, the reverse is true for the majority of the countries in Western Europe and in other continents.

Turkey is an interesting case for studying electoral participation. Its turnout rate is high and shows no tendency to fall. In fact, in the last five parliamentary elections, it increased steadily from 83.2 in 2011 to 87.0 in 2023. These rates are substantially higher than great majority of countries in the world, including Canada, U.S.A. and almost all of the Western European countries. Also, according to official statistics, women voters in Turkey exceeded men by 1.4 percentage points in every election since 2011 and had a higher turnout rate than them in every age group except those over 65[6]. This is remarkable, considering the fact that lowest female turnout rates in the world are found in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. Solijonov (2016) show that the difference between turnout rates of women and men for Tunisia, Iraq, Morocco, Palestine, Libya, Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt rank 48th through 57th among 58 countries.

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[5] For global trends on electoral turnout, see Solijonov (2016).
[6] See Şık (2023).

Despite its uniqueness, there are very few quantitative studies on electoral participation in Turkey. Those investigating women's turnout is even fewer. Micro studies on Turkey use only a subset of micro variables mentioned in the literature and the macro studies, only a subset of the macro variables. None of them use both individual and province level variables.

In this study, we intend to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we will use micro and macro variables simultaneously by combining individual level data obtained from a survey with province level data. Second, we will use wider variety of variables in each category than other studies on turnout in Turkey. Third, we will consider a factor not considered in other studies: whether female candidates encourage women to vote. Thus, we aim to measure each effect more accurately and more reliably and capture a new effect as well.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our model and give the rationale behind each variable included in it. In section 3, the data is discussed. In section 4, other studies on Turkey are contrasted with ours. In section 5, the empirical results obtained by the probit procedure are presented and interpreted. Finally, in section 5, the conclusions reached are summarized.

2. The Model
The variables we consider in our model are as follows:

Dependent Variable	
PARTICIPATE:	Equals 1 if the survey participant indicated that she votes regularly, and zero if she indicated that she does not vote or vote only occasionally.
AGE:	Survey participant's age in years.
EDUCATION:	Years of formal education completed by the survey participant (ranges between zero and 22).
EDUCATION_SQUARE:	Square of EDUCATION.
MARRIED:	Equals 1 if the survey participant is married, and zero if she is never-married, widowed, divorced or separated.
CHILDREN_0-5:	Equals 1 if the survey participant has children aged 5 or younger, and zero otherwise.
URBAN:	Equals 1 if the survey participant resides in an urban area (settlement with a population of at least 10,000), and zero otherwise.
NATIVE:	Equals 1 if the survey participant is born in the province she is living and zero, if the she was born in another province.
NON_TURKISH:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's mother tongue is not Turkish, regardless of whether she can also speak Turkish, and zero otherwise.
WEALTH_LOWEST:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's household wealth is in the first (lowest) quintile, and zero otherwise.
WEALTH_SECOND:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's household wealth is in the second quintile, and zero otherwise.
WEALTH_MIDDLE:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's household wealth is in the third (middle) quintile, and zero otherwise.
WEALTH_FOURTH:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's household wealth is in the fourth quintile, and zero otherwise.
WEALTH_HIGHEST:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's household wealth level is in the fifth (highest) quintile, and zero otherwise.

PARTIES:	Effective number of parties (10,000 divided by the sum of squared vote shares of the AKP, CHP, MHP and BDP in 2011 parliamentary election) in survey participant's province.[7]
PARTIES_SQUARE	Square of PARTIES
MP:	Number of parliament members elected in 2011 parliamentary election from the survey participant's electoral district.
WEALTH_FOURTH:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's household wealth is in the fourth quintile, and zero otherwise.
WEALTH_HIGHEST:	Equals 1 if the survey participant's household wealth level is in the fifth (highest) quintile, and zero otherwise.
PARTIES:	Effective number of parties (10,000 divided by the sum of squared vote shares of the AKP, CHP, MHP and BDP in 2011 parliamentary election) in survey participant's province.[8]
PARTIES_SQUARE	Square of PARTIES
MP:	Number of parliament members elected in 2011 parliamentary election from the survey participant's electoral district.
MP*MIGRANT_RATIO:	Product of MP and Migrant ratio (proportion of population in the survey participant's province in 2011 who were born in another province).
.WMP:	Number of female members of parliament who got elected in 2011 in the survey participant's electoral district.
WMP_SQUARE:	WMP squared.

The last eight of these are macro variables, measured at the provincial level, and the rest are micro variables measured at the individual level, except for the Wealth variables which are at household level. The former uses figures related to the 2011 election because that is the closest election to 2013, when the survey from which the figures for micro variables are taken was conducted.

We ignored institutional variables such as election system, day of the week and month of the year the election was held, voting age, whether voting is compulsory or optional, and the ease of registration, as these do not vary from one person to another. Elections in Turkey are held on the same day and under the same rules in every province.

Age is one of the most important determinants of turnout. We hypothesize that the relationship between age and turnout is inverted-U shaped. Young people, who are in a transitional phase in life, busy moving away from home, getting an education, establishing families and careers, and gradually moving into adult roles, vote less. Turnout is found to be highest among the middle-aged. For older citizens, who withdraw from social life as their social network deteriorates, turnout is expected to be low. That is why modelers often include in their turnout equations, in addition to age, age-squared. Coefficient of the former is expected to be positive and the latter negative. However, in our data, the age range is 22-49, as will be explained in the next section, but in Turkey, female turnout begins to decline after age 65. According to official statistics, this has been the case in every election since 2011[9].

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[7] This is the index suggested by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for measuring effective number of parties.
[8] This is the index suggested by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for measuring effective number of parties.
[9] See Şık (2023).

Consequently, we included in our model, AGE, but excluded its square. When the latter was tried, not surprisingly it turned out to be insignificant.

The motivation for considering EDUCATION is that without some education, just the act of voting will be a difficult task, let alone gathering and evaluating information on candidates, parties and issues facing the country and the province. However, although one's facility with gathering information and voting rises with increased education, it is likely to be subject to diminishing returns. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of one's time rises as her education rises, especially after graduation from a university. The EDUCATION_SQUARE variable is added to see if the effect of education on turnout dampens after some critical point. We anticipate the sign of EDUCATION to be positive and EDUCATION_SQUARE to be negative.

Research shows that people with stable family structures have a higher propensity to participate in civic activities such as elections. MARRIED variable is included in the model to capture that. We expect this variable to have a positive coefficient. Children require constant care and attention of their mother, especially those under six. Thus, having children at home would make voting more difficult for a woman. CHILDREN_0-5 is in the model to take that into consideration. We expect it to have a negative sign.

Immigrants tend to have lower turnout rates than natives. There are two reasons for this. First, migration takes place from less developed regions, where turnout rate is low, to modern areas. Habits change very slowly. Akarca and Başlevent (2010) show that migrants' political behavior are associated more with the voting patterns prevailing in their origin provinces than their destination provinces and Akarca and Tansel (2015) show that turnout is significantly lower in Turkish provinces with high emigration rates. Second, immigrants are too busy trying to make it in the big city to spare time for political activity. They have less knowledge of candidates and issues at their new locations, and those issues may not be their own. Consequently, fewer of them vote. The NATIVE variable is considered to account for this phenomenon. We expect its coefficient to be positive.

Individual-level studies find that participation in elections is much higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Voting in urban areas is more cumbersome and the stigma associated with not voting is less as it will be hardly noticed in the anonymity of the city. Villages on the other hand are closely knit societies where each person has intimate knowledge about the activities of others. To capture this, URBAN variable is considered. We expect its coefficient to be negative.

The variable NON_TURKISH aims to identify survey participants that are ethnic minorities such as Zaza, Kurd and Arab. In other countries, minorities tend to vote less. Perhaps this is because they don't feel as part of the general society or feel that the outcome of the election is not going to change their circumstances. With this variable, we aim to check whether that is

the case in Turkey as well. If studies on other countries are any guide, the coefficient of NON-TURKISH should be negative.

There are several reasons why turnout is related to wealth. For one thing, as one's wealth increases, her means to gather information about candidates, parties and issues increases as well and getting to the polling place is facilitated. Second, more wealth means that the individual who owns it has more at stake. She will be affected by bad governance and by government's tax and transfer policies more. Thus, we included in our model the wealth quintiles WEALTH_SECOND, WEALTH_MIDDLE, WEALTH_FOURTH and WEALTH_HIGHEST and expect them to have positive coefficients. However, wealthiest people have better ways to influence election outcomes than mere voting. They can donate money to campaigns, place advertisements in newspapers and social media, and lend cars, office space, workers, etc. not only where they live but at other locations as well. They can also protect their interests by lobbying politicians. Availability of such additional options to them will reduce their incentive to vote. Thus, we would expect the coefficients of the wealth variables mentioned to decrease after some level of wealth.

As the effective number of parties increases, by making it harder for voters to make up their minds, it discourages them from turning out. On the other hand, as the effective number of parties increases, electoral competition increases, and it becomes easier for voters to find a party close to their ideology. This encourages them to vote. Thus turnout-parties relationship is likely to be non-linear. So, besides PARTIES, PARTIES_SQUARE is included in the model. The expected signs of these variables are negative and positive, respectively.

As the number of parliament members (MP) elected from a province rises, the incentive to vote declines for two reasons. First, this increases the complexity of the ballot, and the cost involved in gathering information about the candidates. Second, due to the election system which assigns one MP to each of the 81 provinces and then distribute the remainder of the seats among provinces according to their population, it takes more votes to elect an MP in provinces with larger populations than smaller ones. This lowers the reward from voting in provinces with larger number of parliament members. Thus, the MP variable in the model should have a negative coefficient.

Even though the turnout rate tends to decrease as the number of parliament members being elected and the proportion of migrants in the constituency increase, an exception has to be made in the case of large urban constituencies where high numbers of immigrants from particular provinces are concentrated and where the number of deputies being elected is large. In such provinces, seeing an opportunity to elect one of their own, immigrants, will have higher incentives to participate in elections. MP*MIGRANT_RATIO is introduced to capture this. It should have a positive coefficient.

It stands to reason that existence of female candidates on the ballot at electable (viable) positions would encourage women to vote. This has not been investigated for the Turkish

case but some support exists for it in other countries. For example, Lee (2022) finds it in South Korea, Safarpour, et al. (2022) and Stauffer and Fisk (2022) find it in the U.S. That is why we included the WMP variable in our model. Its square, WMP_SQUARE, is also added to entertain the possibility of the effect diminishing as the number of candidates rises. We anticipate the coefficients of these variables to be positive and negative, respectively.

3. The Data

The source of data for all of the micro variables is the 2013 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey conducted by the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (2014). However, cases for which the interview was interrupted, or the "not applicable" option is selected, are eliminated from the sample. Although the age range in the survey is 15-49, to include in our sample only those with at least two election encounters, women between ages 15 and 21 are excluded. This reduced the number of observations to 7,613.

MP and PARTIES variables are constructed using the provincial data provided in Tuncer (2011). MIGRANT_RATIO is computed using data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat).

In Turkey, each province, with the exception of three most populous ones, is considered a constituency. Members of parliament are awarded to political parties according to the D'Hondt proportional election system. In 2011, Istanbul was divided into three electoral districts with 30, 27 and 28 members of parliament, Ankara into two with 16 and 15 members of parliament, and Izmir into two with 13 members of parliament each. We approximated MP to be 28.3 for Istanbul, 15.5 for Ankara and 13 for Izmir. Similarly, WMP is obtained for these provinces by averaging women members of parliament elected from their electoral districts.

In computing the effective number of parties, PARTIES, only the vote shares of the parties which in 2011 either exceeded the 10 percent nationwide threshold or was able to bypass it by fielding independent candidates, were used. In computing the party vote shares, the shares of parties not included in the index were ignored, as is done by the election system.

The number of women actually elected to the parliament in 2011 from each province are taken as the number of candidates in viable ranks on their parties' electoral lists (WMP). These figures are obtained from the Supreme Election Council (YSK).

4. Empirical results

The descriptive statistics related to the variables in our model are given in Table 1. In Table 2, the coefficients, obtained through maximum likelihood estimation of probit model, are given. The table also presents the corresponding average marginal effects of the explanatory variables, where all other variables are held fixed. We will base our analysis on these. The marginal effects compute the effect of a unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability of women voting, while holding all other variables constant. To assess the significance of the coefficients and the marginal effects, the table also provides the probability values. These are for one-tailed tests. We should note that all variables in the table are significant at conventional levels, individually as well as collectively, and have the expected signs. As the marginal effects can easily be read from Table 2, in this section we will not give specific figures, except in cases of non-linear relationships which cannot be readily deciphered from the table.

We can see from the table that getting older (at least up to age 49) and getting married raises the propensity to vote. Having children aged 5 or under, being an internal immigrant or an ethnic minority, and living in an urban area lowers it.

Education and wealth have inverted-U shaped relationships with the propensity to vote. Analyzing the results in the table further, we can see that a woman with no formal education has a 95 percent probability of voting, a surprisingly high value. As years of education increases, this probability rises, reaching a peak value of 96.6 percent between 10 and 11 years of education. Then it gradually declines to 94.4 percent at 22 years of education. Thus it appears that getting as far as second or third year of high school is optimal from the point of view of participating in elections. Further education depresses turnout. This can explain the Brody's (1978) puzzle, namely why, despite rising education levels, political participation fails to increase in America. Wealth increases the propensity to vote. This effect rises until the middle quintile but declines for the rich.

As the effective number of parties in a woman's electoral district increase her propensity to vote decreases steadily and at an increasing rate. When the effective number of parties equals 1.45, the lowest in our sample, the probability of women voting is about 99.9 percent. The rate of decrease becomes higher especially after effective number of parties equal 2.45. When it reaches 3.50, the highest in our sample, the probability of women voting decreases to 31.8 percent. It appears that as the number of parties increase, turnout stimulating effect of increased inter-party competition is more than cancelled by the ballot complications and higher information cost it brings to the voters.

As the number of parliament members being elected from a woman's district rises, her propensity to vote declines. However, this is not the case if it is accompanied by an increase in the proportion of migrants in the district's population. In short, being a migrant reduces the

propensity to vote but being surrounded by migrants raises it due to the reasons listed in section 2.

As the number of viable female candidates on the ballot increase women's propensity to vote rises as well. However impact of each additional candidate wanes as the number of candidates increase. In a province with no viable female candidates, a woman's probability of voting is zero but it rises to 99 percent in an electoral district with six viable female candidates which is the highest in our sample.

To check whether additional explanatory power was gained by including both micro and macro variables in the model, we conducted likelihood ratio tests. They showed that exclusion of either group of variables from the model results in a highly significant drop in the likelihood function.

5. Comparison with other studies on Turkey

Quantitative studies on electoral participation in Turkey that go beyond an analysis of descriptive statistics or pairwise simple correlations are the following: Micro studies by Güvercin (2019), Cesur and Mocan (2018) and Russell (2016), and Macro studies by Kama, Aksoy and Taştan (2022), Güvercin (2017), Akarca and Tansel (2015), Başlevent (2013), Taşkın (2007) and Çulhaoğlu (2007). The first two of these investigated the determinants of women's turnout rate.

To contrast our model with the ones above, perhaps it is best to begin with which variables they have ignored. The micro studies of course ignore variables at the province level, and the macro studies, the ones at the individual level. However, in addition, Güvercin (2019), lacks variables related to migration and ethnicity; Cesur and Mocan (2018) variables on migration, marital status and children at home; Russell (2016), variables on urbanization, migration, ethnicity, children at home, and economic well-being; Kama, Aksoy and Taştan (2022), variables on age, education, migration and the number of officials being elected; Güvercin (2017), variables on urbanization, migration, ethnicity and the numbers of parties and the number of officials being elected; Akarca and Tansel (2015), variables on ethnicity; Başlevent (2013), variables on migration, ethnicity, the numbers of parties and officials being elected; Taşkın (2007), variables on age, education, migration, ethnicity, the number of officials being elected; Çulhaoğlu (2007), variables on age, education, urbanization, migration, ethnicity and the number of officials being elected. None of the studies mentioned consider the impact of women candidates on women's turnout.

Now let's compare our various findings with similar findings of other studies. We hypothesized an inverted-U shaped relationship between age and turnout but was able to observe only its rising portion due to our data not covering those above 49. However, Güvercin (2019), who used the same survey data as us but with fewer controls and a different

estimation procedure, found the age-turnout relationship for women to be inverted-U shaped. Cesur and Mocan (2018) found an inverted-U shaped relationship for males but a U-shaped one for females. Akarca and Tansel (2015) and Başlevent (2013) found for both genders combined, a U-shaped relationship. Güvercin (2017) and Russell (2016) who included in their models the age variable but not its square, estimated its coefficient as negative and positive, respectively.

We found an inverted-U type of relationship between education and turnout. Akarca and Tansel (2015) and Başlevent (2013 found the relationship to be inverted-U shaped as well. Güvercin (2017) and Russell (2016), on the other hand, assumed the relationship to be linear, and found the effect of education on electoral participation to be negative and positive, respectively. Güvercin (2019) and Russell (2016) considered marital status and, like us, found being married to be turnout boosting.

Güvercin (2019), like us, found that having children under 6 hindered a woman's tendency to vote but he also considered having children between the ages 6-9 and 10-13 to have similar effects. When we tried the latter two categories however, we found their impact on the electoral participation to be insignificant. Like what we found here, Akarca and Tansel (2015), analyzing provincial data for the country, and Bașlevent (2013), examining both province-level data for the country and district-level data for the Istanbul province found that migrants' election turnout is lower than that of the natives.

We found that living in an urban area reduces a woman's tendency to cast a ballot but Güvercin (2019) and Başlevent (2013) found the opposite and Akarca and Tansel (2015) the difference to be insignificant. Like us, Cesur and Mocan (2018) found that Kurdish and Arab minorities in Turkey tend to participate in elections less. Like us, Güvercin (2019), found the wealth-turnout relationship to be inverted-U shaped.

We found here that as the effective number of parties rise, propensity of women to vote falls. Taşkın (2007) reached the same conclusion. Kama, Aksoy and Taştan (2022) and Çulhaoğlu (2007) however found that the opposite is the case. Akarca and Tansel (2015) on the other hand found the effect to be insignificant.

Our finding that being an internal migrant reduces a woman's propensity to vote but that being surrounded by migrants raises it, is the same as the one reached by Akarca and Tansel (2015). Some of the above findings are contrary to what was found by other studies on Turkey discussed in the previous section but we should note that more variables are controlled for in the present study and individual and provincial level variables are used simultaneously.

6. Summary and conclusions

It appears that wide variety of factors affect women's turnout in Turkey. Some of these have to do with personal characteristics of the voters. Some have to do with characteristics of the electorate and the political and institutional environment in the voters' provinces. By combining both micro and macro factors, we were able to provide more comprehensive explanation and measure the influence of each determinant more accurately.

Being older, being married, being native, not being an ethnic minority, having close to 10-11 years of formal education, not having children under 6, not having too much or too little wealth, living in a rural area, living in an electoral district with few members of parliament, few number of parties and a lot of potentially electable female candidates, raises the propensity to vote. On the other hand, being younger, being not-married, being an ethnic minority, having less than or more than 10-11 years of education, having children under 6, having too little or too much wealth, living in an urban area, being a migrant, living in an electoral district with many members of parliament many parties and few viable female candidates, lowers the propensity to vote.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
PARTICIPATE	0.9610	0.1936	0	1
AGE	34.8034	7.7437	22	49
EDUCATION	6.8983	4.4757	0	22
EDUCATION_SQUARE	67.6163	73.1331	0	484
UNMARRIED	0.1541	0.3610	0	1
MARRIED	0.8459	0.3610	0	1
CHILDREN_0-5 (No)	0.5763	0.4942	0	1
CHILDREN_0-5 (Yes)	0.4237	0.4942	0	1
NON-NATIVE	0.3337	0.4714	0	1
NATIVE	0.6666	0.4714	0	1
RURAL	0.2598	0.4386	0	1
URBAN	0.7402	0.4386	0	1
NON_TURKISH	0.2141	0.4102	0	1
TURKISH	0.7859	0.4102	0	1
WEALTH_LOWEST	0.2003	0.4003		
WEALTH_SECOND	0.2211	0.4150	0	1
WEALTH_MIDDLE	0.2043	0.4032	0	1
WEALTH_FOURTH	0.1894	0.3919	0	1
WEALTH_HIGHEST	0.1848	0.3882	0	1
PARTIES	2.3777	0.4397	1.45215	3.5043
PARTIES_SQUARE	5.8466	2.2046	2.1087	12.2803
MP	10.0251	7.0935	1	28.3
MP*MIGRANT_RATIO	431.6008	660.3418	15.6838	2375.07
WMP	1.5556	1.7774	0	6.3
WMP_SQUARE	5.5787	11.1702	0	39.69

Table 2: Probit Estimates of the Model

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Prob.	Marg. Effc.	Std. Err.	Prob.
AGE	0.0188	0.0043		0.0015	0.0003	0.00
EDUCATION	0.0368	0.0204	0.04	0.0029	0.0016	0.04
EDUCATION_SQUARE	-0.0019	0.0012	0.06	-0.0002	0.0001	0.06
MARRIED	0.2566	0.0814	0.00	0.0200	0.0064	0.00
CHILDREN AGED 0-5	-0.1141	0.0654	0.04	-0.0089	0.0051	0.04
NATIVE	0.2608	0.0637	0.00	0.0203	0.0050	0.00
URBAN	-0.1267	0.0775	0.05	-0.0099	0.0060	0.05
NON TURKISH	-0.1702	0.0759	0.01	-0.0141	0.0067	0.02
WEALTH_SECOND	0.4152	0.0882	0.00	0.0407	0.0096	0.00
WEALTH_MIDDLE	0.5598	0.1047	0.00	0.0495	0.0102	0.00
WEALTH_FOURTH	0.4872	0.1116	0.00	0.0454	0.0110	0.00
WEALTH_HIGHEST	0.3549	0.1208	0.00	0.0363	0.0125	0.00
PARTIES	-2.3663	0.6833	0.00	-0.1842	0.0536	0.00
PARTIES_SQUARE	0.4790	0.1370	0.00	0.0373	0.0107	0.00
MP	-0.0639	0.0110	0.00	-0.0050	0.0009	0.00
MP*MIGRANT_RATIO	0.0009	0.0002	0.00	0.0001	0.0000	0.00
WMP	0.1759	0.0547	0.00	0.0137	0.0043	0.00
WMP_SQUARE	-0.0420	0.0124	0.00	-0.0033	0.0010	0.00
CONSTANT	3.5828	0.8671	0.00			
Log-likelihood	-1142.47					
LR chi2(18)	224.18					
Prob > Chi2	0.00					
N	7,613					