The Juba Power-Sharing Peace Agreement: Will It Promote Peace and Democratic Transition in Sudan?

Nils-Christian Bormann and Ibrahim Elbadawi

THE JUBA POWER-SHARING PEACE AGREEMENT: WILL IT PROMOTE PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SUDAN?

Nils-Christian Bormann[1] and Ibrahim Elbadawi[2]

Working Paper No. 1490

October 2021

Send correspondence to:
Nils-Christian Bormann
Witten/Herdecke University
nils.bormann@uni-wh.de

[1] Department of Philosophy, Politics & Economics, University of Witten/Herdecke, Germany.
[2] Economic Research Forum (ERF), Cairo, Egypt.

Abstract

The signing of the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (JAPS) constitutes an important step for the country to achieve lasting peace and complete its transition towards democracy. In this paper, we will review the JAPS in light of scientific evidence on the effectiveness of power-sharing. Reviewing multiple studies that evaluate power-sharing, we conclude that a larger number of power-sharing provisions and the effective inclusion of previously marginalized ethnic groups increase the chances of peace. However, leaving out previously peaceful groups carries some risk. The beneficial effects of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements and ethnically inclusive governments pertain to the likelihood of democratic transitions. We find only weak evidence for the benefits of power-sharing in ensuring democratic survival due to the small number of post-conflict democracies that exist around the world. While the JAPS contains a reassuring number of power-sharing provisions and should be effective in bringing about stability and improving the chances of democratization according to the best available scientific evidence, much uncertainty remains. For Sudan to succeed in achieving lasting stability and effective democracy, political leaders will be required to respect the agreement and depend as much on positive background factors such as economic development outside the scope of the JAPS. To address these concerns, we propose five future initiatives: a national peace conference; a firm term limitation for the transitional authority; broad-based political parties and coalitions; a better institutionalized and sufficiently funded "Peace Fund"; and two national bargains in the critical areas of security reforms and transitional justice.

Keywords: Sudan, Juba, peace, power-sharing.

JEL Classifications: F5, P1, P2

ملخص

بالرغم من أن اتفاق جوبا لقسمة السلطة بين الحكومة الانتقالية في السودان وبعض الحركات المسلحة في الثالث من أكتوبر 2020 لا يرقى إلى مستوى اتفاقية شاملة للسلام في السودان، إلا أنه، برأى الكثير من المراقبين، يعتبر خطوة "براغماتية" هامة نحو تحقيق السلام والانتقال الديمقراطي في البلاد. آخذين في الاعتبار أوضاع السودان السياسية والاقتصادية والتقاطعات الإثنية والجهوية المائلة، نحلل في هذه الورقة مآلات هذا الاتفاق كمنهج لبناء السلام وتحقيق الانتقال الديمقراطي في ضوء الأدلة العلمية المتينة المُستقاة من تجارب أكثر من 120 اتفاقية لقسمة السلطة في مجتمعات ما بعد الحروب الأهلية، شملت حوالي 48 بلداً منذ الحرب العالمية الثانية. بمراجعة العديد من الدراسات عن قسمة السلطة، نستنتج أن التوفر على أحكام كافية لقسمة السلطة على المستويين القومي والإقليمي وكذلك الإدماج الفعال للمجموعات العرقية المهمشة سابقاً يزيد من فرص بناء السلام. كذلك فإن تقاسم السلطة المفضي إلى حكومات ذات تمثيل واسع في المجتمعات المنقسمة هويوياً وجهوياً يمكن أن يحسن فرص حدوث انتقالات ديمقراطية. إلا أننا لم نجد سوى أدلة ضعيفة عن فوائد قسمة السلطة لضمان استدامة الديمقراطية على المدى البعيد، ذلك لأن استدامة الديمقراطية تتطلب توافر عوامل أخرى كثيرة تتجاوز قسمة السلطة. على اية حال، بينا تحتوي اتفاقية جوبا على عدد كافٍ من أحكام قسمة السلطة والتي يُتوقع أن تكون فعالة في تحقيق الاستقرار وتحسين فرص التحول الديمقراطي وفقًا لأفضل الأدلة العلمية المتاحة، لا يزال هناك الكثير من عدم اليقين. في هذا السياق ينذر استبعاد الكيانات العرقية والجهوية التي كانت مسالمة في السابق من قسمة السلطة، كما في حال اتفاق جوبا، ينذر بمخاطر حقيقية لجهة احتمالات لجوء هذه الكيانات لذات الوسائل التي أوصلت الحركات المسلحة لاتفاق تقاسم السلطة مع الحكومات القائمة. عليه، فإن نجاح السودان في تحقيق الاستقرار الدائم والانتقال الديمقراطي يتطلب من شركاء الفترة الانتقالية ليس

فقط احترام الاتفاق وتنفيذ استحقاقاته، بل أيضاً اعتماد ترتيبات إضافية خارج إطار الاتفاق حتى يتسنى تطويره ليصبح مشروعاً قومياً شاملاً للسلام. في هذا السياق، تقترح الورقة خمس مبادرات لتصويب ودعم الاتفاق :

- أولاً، عقد مؤتمر قومي للسلام لتوسيع قاعدة المشاركة في السلطة الانتقالية لتشمل الكيانات الجهوية والإثنية غير الممثلة في الاتفاق، مما يعزز من شرعيته ومدى قبوله على المستوى القومي وكذلك لاحتواء احتمالات تجدد نزاعات مسلحة في المستقبل

- ثانياً، يصـــار إلى تحديد قطعي وملزم لتاريخ نهاية الفترة الانتقالية لتفادي تفاقم التباينات والتقاطعات بين شركاء الحكم، وبالتالي تعرض شرعية الحكم الانتقالي، المتآكلة أصلاً، للمزيد من التجريف مما يهدد مشروع الانتقال الديموقراطي، فضلاً عن اتفاق السلام

- ثالثاً، التحضـــير الجاد للانتخابات (إعادة توطين النازحين واللاجئين، التعداد السـكاني، ترسـيم الدوائر الانتخابية، التشريعات والقوانين ...إلخ)؛ كذلك على الحركة السياسية العمل على بناء تحالفات انتخابية واسعة النطاق على أسس برامج وطنية وازنة، خاصة بين الأحزاب السياسية التاريخية والحديثة من جهة وحركات الكفاح المسلح من جهة أخرى

- رابعاً، إنشـاء "صـندوق قومي للسـلام" يدار بواسـطة مفوضية قومية مقتدرة وشـفافة، تمثل فيها كل المكونات المجتمعية والسياسية في الأقاليم المتأثرة بالنزاعات، ويحظى بالتمويل الكافي من الموارد الذاتية والعون الأجنبي

- خامسـاً، إبرام تسـوية وطنية تتسـم بالشـفافية، تتوفر على دعم شـعبي واسـع، لمعالجة اسـتحقاقات إعادة هيكلة القوات المسلحة والأمن والشرطة وتحقيق العدالة الانتقالية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: السودان، جوبا، قسمة السلطة، السلام، الانتقال الديموقراطي.

Introduction

After the Sudanese Revolution in 2019, the Sudanese people rightfully wondered whether the signing of the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (JAPS) in 2020 would usher in a new period of stability and democracy. Hailed by the United Nations Secretary General António Guterres as a "historic achievement" (Sudan, 2020), the agreement between Sudan's transitional government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) as well as Minni Minawi's Sudan Liberation Movement promises to end 17 years of armed conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile region. The architects of the agreement drew on post-Cold War scholarly research that presents power-sharing between former combatants as one of the most promising avenues towards peace and democracy. Multiple studies by political scientists show that sharing power in the central government or the military and between the center and subnational regions has the potential to overcome the severe mistrust between former civil war antagonists.

In this paper, we review the scholarly literature, describe three central forms of post-conflict power-sharing – inclusive/political, dispersive/territorial, and military – and evaluate their effectiveness in keeping peace, promoting democratic transitions, and ensuring democratic survival. The findings of the paper provide some ground for optimism but also highlight problems and future challenges. We conclude by discussing the considerable challenges faced by scholars in designing studies that capture the true effects of power-sharing – a medicine that is given to patients with the lowest chances of survival. Overall, the paper concludes that the JAPS is a step in the right direction, but by itself is unlikely to ensure that Sudan successfully resolves its armed conflicts and transitions to democracy.

What is power-sharing and how does it work?

In his survey on "Politics in West Africa," William A. Lewis (1956) was the first to describe power-sharing practices between political elites. Just over a decade later, political scientist Arend Lijphart popularized power-sharing through his work on coalitions between Dutch political elites divided by their religious convictions (1968, 1969). Lijphart combined grand coalitions in the central government between relevant cultural segments, a veto against decisions that violated minority rights, proportionality appointments to the bureaucracy, and cultural autonomy in his concept of "consociationalism." He concluded that power-sharing offered "the best – that is the least unfavorable – prospects for peaceful democratic change" (Lijphart, 1977, p. 238).

The concept of power-sharing gained broad international acceptance after the end of the Cold War when the United Nations (UN) sought effective ways to end numerous civil wars that originated during the Cold War. The UN established peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in dozens of countries and mediated ceasefires and peace agreements between former combatants (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008). Conflict researchers and UN diplomats embraced PKOs and power-sharing arrangements to overcome the central obstacle to reconciliation after civil war: the lack of trust between the government and its violent non-state challengers.

After armed conflicts without a clear winner, both the government and armed movements fear betrayal by the other side. Non-state actors in particular worry that giving up their weapons and integrating into state institutions will leave them defenseless and invite future repression by the government (Walter, 1997). In contrast, governments are concerned that former rebels will use their newly gained access to state institutions to topple the government in a coup d'etat (Roessler, 2011) or prepare secession from the state (Bunce, 1999).

Third parties, such as peacekeeping operations, can serve as neutral arbiters to overcome the trust or commitment problem that exists in the aftermath of violent conflict (Walter, 1997). Additionally, diplomats and conflict researchers advocate power-sharing provisions in formalized peace agreements and/or constitutions. Building on the work by Lijphart, a newer generation of scholars identified three main power-sharing types (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Strøm et al., 2017).[3]

1. **Inclusive or political power-sharing** describes joint decision-making in the central government. It takes the form of coalition governments that include former conflict opponents, reserved parliamentary seats for minorities, and/or veto rights on specific policy areas. Inclusive power-sharing enables political elites to monitor their former enemies, grants power to the government and the armed movement to veto violations of each sides' vital interests, and, ideally, creates room for future dialogue and cooperation.

2. **Dispersive or territorial power-sharing** creates separate policy spheres in which each side is autonomous in making decisions. Former rebel forces hold taxation power or linguistic and educational autonomy in federal or devolved administrative units. Dispersive power-sharing may also include distinct legal rules for different cultural groups that are not bound to a particular territory. Autonomy protects former armed movements from government policies that violate the movement's interest.

3. **Military power-sharing** denotes the integration of former fighters into one military force. Integrating military leaders and officers follows a logic similar to that of inclusive power-sharing at the political level. Integrating rank and file soldiers not only aims to promote trust between former enemies, but also provides income for former fighters with few other economic prospects who might otherwise return to the battlefield in new rebel outfits or engage in illicit activities that undermine peace locally.

---

3   Hartzell & Hoddie (2003a, p. 320) consider economic power-sharing as a fourth dimension: "the distribution among groups of economic resources controlled or mandated by the state." With the exception of Mattes & Savun (2009) other scholars have not followed their example, and economic power-sharing is usually understood as part of political or inclusive power-sharing. Next to inclusive and dispersive power-sharing, Strøm et al. (2017, p. 169) identify constraining power-sharing arrangements that "limit the power of any party or social group and thus protect ordinary citizens and vulnerable groups against encroachment and abuse." The constraining dimension has little connection to earlier work on power-sharing and the authors themselves acknowledge that constraining institutions are "comparatively rare in states with current or recent civil conflicts" (ibid., p. 165). Due to its limited relevance to the case of Sudan, we do not consider it in this study.

Scholars and practitioners argue that formalizing these three approaches in peace agreements or constitutions reduces the fear of future betrayal and enables the sharing of information between former combatants or the monitoring of actions taken by the other side. By promising former enemies equal access to power, these institutions are therefore supposed to overcome the trust deficit that exists after civil war (Mattes & Savun, 2009, 2010).

The "prescriptive" approach of formal power-sharing institutions contrasts with a more voluntary or liberal approach in which institutions incentivize cooperation between antagonistic political groups (McGarry & O'Leary, 2009; Nomikos, 2020) or cooperation is the outcome of non-institutional dynamics (e.g. Bormann, 2019). Informal, voluntary cooperation between former combatants is, however, less likely to emerge in post-conflict settings where mistrust between former enemies is high.

A final question pertains to the effectiveness of the implementation of peace agreements in the political practice of post-conflict states. Most research on post-conflict power-sharing focuses on the presence or absence of specific provisions in agreements but does not follow up on its actual implementation. Those studies that do investigate implementation find that relatively few provisions are fully implemented (e.g. Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). However, scholars that study de facto power-sharing between representatives of different ethnic groups find that inclusion – and, to a lesser extent, autonomy – provides an effective means of conflict prevention and recurrence (Cederman et al., 2015).

This study reviews the three most commonly used power-sharing measures – inclusive/political, dispersive/territorial, and military – in post-conflict states to investigate their effectiveness with regards to conflict recurrence, the chances of democratization, and the chances of democratic survival.

Power-sharing provisions in the JAPS
The JAPS covers all three power-sharing types. At the national level, it envisions political power-sharing through the inclusion of representatives from Darfur as well as the areas of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan/Nuba in executive and legislative bodies. Three members of the armed movements shall be represented in the Sovereign Council (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 1 §4) and five members in the Ministerial Council (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 1 §5). Twenty-five percent of all seats (75) in the Transitional Legislative Council are also reserved for representatives from the different regions (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 1 §6). Moreover, the JAPS seeks to proportionally fill positions in the national civil service (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 2, Chapter 1 §26) and the judiciary (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 2, Chapter 1 §27) to population shares of major cultural groups. To address the under-representation of minority groups such as the Nuba, the government promises to pursue a strategy of positive discrimination. These provisions fulfill the conditions of different understandings of political power-sharing.[4]

---

4   The appendix to this paper reviews the coding criteria for different data sources in detail.

Turning to territorial power-sharing, the JAPS aims to establish a genuine federal system (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 2, Chapter 1 §25) that effectively grants taxation and borrowing powers to the regional government in Darfur. Additionally, regional governments shall hold authority over education, family law, and land distribution (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 2, Chapter 1 §30). Similar provisions exist for other regions. In the Blue Nile and South Kordofan/Nuba regions, representatives of former armed movements are guaranteed executive and legislative representation in future regional governments during the transitional period. Once more, these provisions fulfill the conditions of territorial power-sharing as understood by conflict researchers.

The agreement foresees future negotiation rounds over the implementation of a ceasefire and subsequent military reform. However, the JAPS already sets out specific goals for these negotiations, including the integration of military rank and file and officers (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 2, Chapter 8 §26) along with an integration of police forces (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 2, Chapter 8 §27). Specifically, the agreement demands:

> *To reform, develop, and modernize the military and other security services; build a single national professional army with a new unified military doctrine that reflects the demographic diversity of Sudan and defends the supreme interests of Sudan composed of all parties to the final security arrangement agreement signed by the negotiating parties in Juba* (Juba Agreement, 2020, Title 2 Chapter 8 §33.5).

While less specific than the provisions for its political and territorial counterparts, these goals would establish military power-sharing if implemented. In sum, the JAPS covers all three types of power-sharing that we review in this paper.[5]

Power-sharing and stability

The key promise of power-sharing in the aftermath of civil war is stability or the absence of continued fighting. Over the last 20 years, multiple studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements, although conflict researchers disagree over how power-sharing promotes stability. Table 1 displays the key results from four prominent models that estimate the effectiveness of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements. Hartzell & Hoddie (2003a, 2007) argue that a greater *quantity* of power-sharing provisions to peace agreements increases trust between former belligerents and decreases the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

In contrast, others stress on the *type* of power-sharing provisions. Jarstad & Nilsson (2008) suggest that military power-sharing is the most effective, particularly when the provision is

---

5   The JAPS also covers Hartzell & Hoddie's fourth type, economic power-sharing, both independently as specified in the Wealth Sharing Protocoll for Dafur (Darfur Peace Agreement, 2006, Title 2 Chapter 2) and in the various taxation powers granted to the regional governments.

implemented.[6] Mattes & Savun (2009) show that political/inclusive power-sharing along with other fear-reducing provisions decreases the risk of conflict recurrence. Finally, Johnson investigates the likelihood of conflict termination, i.e. the chances that conflict does not recur within five years, on a sample of government-rebel group dyads. Unlike the preceding three studies, she distinguishes between individual signatories to peace agreements and highlights the important distinction between short- and long-term commitments. Focusing on the latter, she finds strong evidence for a positive effect of all three types of power-sharing on peace.

While demonstrating the promise of power-sharing in peace agreements, the reported analyses sometimes contradict each other. Hartzell & Hoddie (2003a, 2007) do not find significant or statistically meaningful effects of individual power-sharing types. Jarstad & Nilsson (2008) emphasize the importance of military power-sharing, while Mattes & Savun (2009) stress on the relevance of political power-sharing. Other work on peace agreements is similarly equivocal.

Table 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Hartzell & Hoddie (2003a)	**Jarstad & Nilsson (2008)**	**Mattes & Savun (2009)**	**Johnson (2020)**
# of PS Provisions	-0.76* (0.37)			
Political/Inclusive PS		-0.19 (0.36)	-0.35[+] (0.20)	2.13** (0.68)
Territorial/Diffusive PS		-0.52 (0.32)	-1.13 (0.90)	2.80** (0.78)
Military PS		-1.70* (0.70)	0.26 (0.44)	2.55** (0.62)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Variable	Recurrence	Recurrence	Recurrence	Peace
Unit of Analysis	Peace Agreements	Peace Agreements	Peace Agreements	Peace Settlement Dyad
N	38	83	46	161
Regression	Weibull	Cox Proportional Hazards	Cox Proportional Hazards	Logistic

Standard Errors in Parentheses. + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

Mukherjee (2006) finds that political power-sharing effectively reduces the risk of recurrence only after government victory. To address the strategic selection of power-sharing concessions in post-conflict cases, Ranft & Bethke (2018) use matching to compare 34 peace agreements with political power-sharing to 34 settlements without it. Their analyses reveal a positive effect

---

6   Results for implemented provisions not shown in Table 1. Although the results are substantively strong, they depend on a small number of cases (10 military, 18 territorial, and 27 political pacts).

of political power-sharing on peace duration. Turning to military power-sharing, Glassmyer & Sambanis (2008) show that it has no effect on post-conflict stability, partially because it is rarely implemented. In a case study on post-civil war Burundi, Samii (2013) uncovers causal evidence that the military integration of government and rebel troops decreases prejudicial behavior between Hutus and Tutsis in integrated units. Despite some positive findings, the analysis of power-sharing in peace agreements suffers from small sample sizes and endogeneity concerns.

In an effort to overcome the data limitations inherent in the study of peace agreements, conflict researchers have turned towards studying conflict actors. Work by Cederman et al. (2015) focuses on whether representatives of specific ethnic groups are included in the central government or hold territorial autonomy. These two concepts relate closely to inclusive and dispersive power-sharing but go beyond formal agreements by also considering informal, de facto arrangements. Table 2 includes Cederman et al.'s main analysis of power-sharing in ethnically divided societies, both before and after civil war. Whereas the authors find strong evidence that ethnic inclusion decreases the risk of ethnic armed conflict onsets in general, territorial power-sharing only decreases the risk of conflict in pre-conflict settings. In additional models, Cederman et al. show that the combination of inclusive and territorial power-sharing increases the chances of peace after conflict.

Table 2

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Cederman et al. (2015)	**Wucherpfennig et al. (2016)**	**Cunningham (2013)**	**Bormann & Savun (2018)**
Political/Inclusive PS	-1.94*** (0.40)	-0.73* (0.30)		-1.17*** (0.30)
Territorial/Diffusive PS	-1.41*** (0.20)		-0.48** (0.24)	0.59 (0.30)
Inclusive PS * Post-Conflict	0.40 (0.73)			
Diffusive PS * Post-Conflict	1.08** (0.36)			
Post-Conflict	0.98*** (0.29)			
SD Factions (Log)			1.01** (0.20)	
Observing Political PS				1.63* (0.77)
Observing Territorial PS				1.37*** (0.25)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Variable	Ethnic Armed Conflict Onset	Ethnic Armed Conflict Onset	Civil War Onset	Ethnic Armed Conflict Onset
Unit of Analysis	Ethnic Group Years	Ethnic Groups in UK & French Colonies	State-Self-Determination Movement Dyad-Years	Ethnic Group Years
N	23,525	169	2,625	27,011
Regression	Logistic	Bivariate Probit (Instrumental Variable)	Logistic	Logistic

Standard Errors in Parentheses. + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$.

In an innovative follow-up analysis, Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) identify the effect of inclusive ethnic power-sharing as causal. Exploiting the difference in colonial strategies by France and the United Kingdom, they demonstrate that different colonial-era policies of inclusion have lasting effects in the post-colonial era and indeed decrease the risk of conflict recurrence for included ethnic groups. Unfortunately, similar analyses do not yet exist for territorial power-sharing.

Although the focus on actors has yielded important insights on the effects of power-sharing, it also created new challenges. First, existing studies treat ethnic groups as unitary actors. Real-world cases frequently diverge from this assumption. Consider the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which emerged from the parent movement, Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), after the partitioning of the country in 2011. Subsequently, the

SPLM-N splintered into two rival factions, one led by Mr. Abdel Aziz Alhilu and another by Mr. Malik Agar. Each of these factions claim to represent the Nuba and other ethnic groups in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile States – the so-called Two Areas – and they violently compete over control of these areas. Whereas Agar's faction is a signatory to the JAPS, Alhilu's faction is still holding out, though it started preliminary discussions with the transitional authority. While Alhilu's faction has a strong presence on the ground in South Kordofan, both factions have strongholds in the Southern Blue Nile region. In the Darfur region, three rebel groups compete with each other: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Jibril Ibrahim, the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM), and the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid (SLM-AW). Although the first two signed the JAPS, they only represent part of the constituencies in the region. Moreover, SLM-AW appears to have stronger military presence on the ground.

Research by Cunningham (2013) highlights the complications that arise when self-determination movements are internally fractionalized. While concessions to self-determination movements, such as the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that led to the creation of the Republic of South Sudan,[7] reduce the risk of civil war onsets, internally fragmented movements experience a far higher frequency of civil war onset than internally unified movements (Table 2, Model 3).

Second, research on actors ignores that previously peaceful organizations from other ethnic groups may rebel if left out of the original settlement in order to obtain government concessions. Under the heading of reputation theory, Walter (2006, 2009) argues that concessions in the form of territorial power-sharing to one non-state challenger demonstrate the government's weakness to other ethnic groups that had not yet raised any demands. In response to witnessing the government's willingness to concede territorial power-sharing when violently challenged, these hitherto peaceful challengers mobilize for rebellion in order to gain their own concessions. Bormann & Savun (2018) test this argument for both territorial and political power-sharing in post-conflict societies. They find a small positive risk of armed conflicts initiated by other – excluded and non-autonomous – ethnic groups in the immediate aftermath of government concessions to earlier challengers (Table 2, Model 4). While Walter's reputation theory has been challenged (Forsberg, 2013; Sambanis et al., 2018), the strategic effects she identifies should not be dismissed lightly.

To illustrate what these models mean for Sudan, we simulate the predicted probabilities of conflict recurrence in Sudan from three models. Johnson's (2020) study provides the most encompassing work on power-sharing concessions in peace agreements. Cederman et al.'s (2015) research permits an interpretation of conflict risk for the groups covered by the JAPS. Finally, Bormann & Savun's (2018) analysis provides a baseline estimate for groups not covered by the JAPS.

---

[7]   However, though the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the regime of Omer Al-Bashir and the SPLM ended the longest conflict in Africa, it might have provided an impetus for the flaring up of the conflict in Darfur.

Figure 1. Predicted probability of conflict termination for Sudan based on Johnson (2020)

Figure 2. Predicted probability of conflict recurrence for Sudanese ethnic groups based on Cederman et al. (2015)

Figure 1 displays predicted probabilities of conflict termination, i.e. no return to conflict within five years, based on Johnson's analysis of peace agreements for three scenarios. The first scenario assumes that the JAPS and its inclusive and territorial power-sharing provisions will be implemented and remain in place even after elections. It predicts the probability of conflict termination at 93.5 percent. In contrast, the second scenario considers that the JAPS fails to be implemented and yields a predicted probability of conflict termination of just under ten percent. On average, peace prevails in 43 percent of the 168 cases Johnson analyses (scenario 3). While these results are promising overall, the large confidence intervals around the predictions advice caution in inherently unstable post-conflict environments such as that of contemporary Sudan.

Simulations based on the analysis by Cederman et al. (2015) in Figure 2 underline this point. These authors investigate the effect of de facto inclusion in the central government and territorial autonomy on conflict recurrence for individual ethnic groups. Figure 2 compares predictions for ethnic groups represented by armed movements that either signed or did not sign the JAPS.[8] Conditional on effective implementation, the combination of inclusive and territorial power-sharing implies an annual risk of conflict recurrence of four percent on average for the signatory groups. Ethnic groups that are likely to be de facto followers of the non-signatory SLM-AW, like the Fur, or those not necessarily holding allegiance to any particular movement, such as the Masalit, Berti and the Arabs, face a risk of conflict recurrence that is six times as large at about 25 percent. Compared to the average annual risk of conflict recurrence of 2.8 percent in the sample, these risks are sizable and the substantive effect of power-sharing is large.

Finally, we simulate the risk of armed conflict due to concessions to armed movements while not sharing power with all ethnic groups in the country. To exemplify this dynamic, we choose the Masalit as one non-signatory group. Figure 3 displays the conflict onset risk for the Masalit group after witnessing the power-sharing concessions to armed movements with links to the Nuba and Zagawa. Compared to a world in which these groups would not have received concessions, the likelihood of rebellion by the Masalit increases by four percent in year 1 after the concession, two percent in year 2, 1.3 percent in year 3, 0.8 percent in year 4, and 0.5 percent in year 5 according to the model by Bormann & Savun (2018). The model predictions do not vary much between the six ethnic groups included in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset that were not involved in any power-sharing deal.[9] Thus, Sudan's government should carefully manage relations with all ethnic groups and create an inclusive government.

---

[8]   We count the Nuba (represented by the SPLM/A-North – Malik Agar's faction), Zagawa (Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi – SLM-MM) as signatories, and the Fur (Sudanese Liberation Movement – SLM-AW) and most other groups, including the Masalit, as non-signatories. We emphasize that these movements have supporters beyond the mentioned groups; however, they are likely to constitute their main power bases.

9   These are the Beja, the Rashaida, the Zaghawa, Other Arab Groups, and Other Northern Groups. The [Geographic Research on War Unified Platform (GROW[UP])](#) provides further information on why these groups are considered politically relevant actors in Sudan (*GROWup - Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform*, o. J.).

Figure 3. Change in predicted probability of conflict onset for the Masalit group after witnessing concessions to the Nuba and Zagawa. The Masalit serve as an example for an ethnic group whose political representatives did not sign the JAPS.

While the large confidence intervals in all analyses of post-conflict environments signal that these models come with large amounts of uncertainty, they do agree on the conflict-dampening effect of power-sharing for those groups that receive it. Overall, the success of the JAPS with respect to preventing additional armed conflict will thus depend on its effective implementation (cf. Marsden, 2020), and on the government's ability to extend inclusive and/or territorial power-sharing to other challengers.

Power-sharing and democracy

Next to achieving peace, the architects of the JAPS and the people of Sudan aspire for a democratic future for their country. Despite its importance, political scientists and economists have paid far less attention to the relationship between post-conflict power-sharing and the prospect of democratic transitions. In part, this lack of insights is derived from a mismatch at the level of analysis. Whereas democracy clearly operates at the country-level, power-sharing occurs between the central government and one or more challengers. Consider, for example, the government of India, which frequently experiences rebellions by distant minorities that make up less than a tenth of a percentage point of the country's overall population. Any power-sharing agreements between the Indian government and rebel groups from these minorities have little impact on the presence and quality of democracy at the national level. Another difficulty arises from the type of power-sharing. What is the relationship between territorial

autonomy in one part of a country and democracy at the national level? Post-conflict power-sharing frequently omits relevant and powerful actors at the national level that either did not fight the government in the past or fought the government but did not sign a peace agreement.

In spite of these difficulties, some researchers studied the link between power-sharing and democracy. Table 3 lists the main results. Fortna & Huang (2012) investigate the relationship between negotiated settlements and any positive change in democracy scores on the widely-used Polity IV scale.[10] Their sample includes all states that experienced an end to civil war between 1945 and 1999. They find a positive relationship between settlements and democratization two and five years after civil wars end, but not after ten or 20 years (Model 1 in Table 3 shows the two-year estimate). Moreover, the model estimates show, at most, a two-point improvement on the 21-point Polity scale. While the null-results after ten and 20 years might result from many cases that drop out of the sample, the small effect size should caution against overly optimistic expectations towards negotiated settlements in general.

Focusing on the emergence of minimalist democracy, Hartzell & Hoddie (2015) compare the quantity of power-sharing concessions in all states that ended civil wars with negotiated settlements (Model 2 in Table 3). To estimate the probability of democratization, the authors utilize a bivariate probit framework with an instrumental variable approach that models the selection of the degree of power-sharing first, and its effect on democratization second. The authors find that negotiated settlements with at least two power-sharing types increase the chances of democratization compared to settlements with one or fewer power-sharing provisions in the years following the end of the armed conflicts. As the JAPS includes four power-sharing provisions (political, territorial, military, and economic), Hartzell & Hoddie's analysis seems promising for Sudan, though the small sample size of only 50 cases should once again limit the overall confidence in the results.[11]

---

10 Positive changes on the Polity IV include three distinct outcomes: (1) autocratic liberalization, which does not entail full-scale democracy, (2) democratization, and (3) democratic consolidation.

11 Simulations for Sudan based on Hartzell & Hoddie's model yield extremely wide confidence intervals for the power-sharing variable that include almost all possible probabilities of democratic transitions. Most likely, this uncertainty results from the combination of a complex model and the small number of post-conflict cases.

Table 3. Power-sharing and democratization

|	Fortna & Huang (2012)	Hartzell & Hoddie (2015)	Bormann (2014)	Bormann (2014)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Settlements	1.06[*]			
	(0.58)			
PS Provisions (H&H)		2.219[***]		
		(0.502)		
Included Group Share			1.667*	0.885
			(0.690)	(0.590)
Constant	-10.412[*]	-6.024	-0.673	-0.658
	(4.291)	(4.438)	(0.416)	(0.373)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Variable	Democratization (2 years after civil war)	Democratic Transition (Uhlfelder)	Democratic Transition (Polity IV)	Democratic Transition (GWF)
Unit of Analysis	Post-Civil War Countries	Post-Civil War Country-Year	Country-Year	Country-Year
Observations	117	570	1,873	1,674
Log Likelihood		-245.539	-182.092	-202.087
Regression	Linear Model	Bivariate Probit (Instrumental Variable)	Logistic	Logistic

[*]p<0.05; [**]p<0.01; [***]p<0.001

In a new book, Hartzell & Hoddie (2020) provide additional evidence for the positive link between power-sharing provisions and the likelihood of democratization when using different measures of democracy. The authors test the effect of the quantity of power-sharing types on two continuous democracy indices from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project that range from 0 to 1 (Coppedge et al., 2017). Five years after the end of civil war, one additional power-sharing provision in peace agreements increases the level of democracy on the *polyarchy* and the *liberal democracy* scales on average by 3.7 and three percentage points, respectively (see Figure 4). All else equal, complete implementation of the JAPS with up to three power-sharing provisions implies that Sudan should move from 0 to 0.12 on the *polyarchy* scale and from 0.1 to 0.19 on the *liberal democracy* index. Given its low starting points at the autocratic end of both indices, the improvements imply that Sudan will become less authoritarian but not a full democracy. By itself, power-sharing, as outlined in the JAPS, will not bring about full democracy in Sudan. In fact, should the JAPS be pursued as an open-end sequential process to accommodate the two other remaining "freedom struggle" movements, it could very well lead to a de facto long-reigning "authoritarian" "transitional" political order.

Figure 4. Marginal effect of number of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements on subsequent democratic change on V-Dem scales (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2020, pp. 121-122)

Figure 5. Predicted probability of democratization (Polity IV) as a function of share of ethnic groups included in the central government

To complement the picture of power-sharing provisions, we draw on Bormann's work that investigated the effect of multiethnic coalition governments on the likelihood of democratization in all authoritarian states between 1946 and 2009 (Bormann, 2014, Chapter 6). In Models 3 and 4 (Table 3), we re-estimate these models for post-conflict states. Compared to the original analysis, the results become slightly weaker. Increasing the share of ethnic

groups represented in the central government significantly increases the chances of democratization only for transitions on the Polity IV democracy scale (Model 3). In Model 4, which relies on the Geddes et al. (2014) definition of democratization, the effect of more inclusive governments on democratization remains positive but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Simulations based on Model 3 show that states with a very narrow ruling coalition only have a two percent chance of becoming democratic in any given post-conflict year (Figure 5). In contrast, fully inclusive states exhibit an annual predicted probability of democratization that is five times as large at about ten percent. As the JAPS only invites representatives from two other groups into the central government, its impact on the likelihood of democratization is limited. All else equal, the chances of democratization for Sudan rise from about 2.4 percent to about 3.6 percent per annum.[12] As long as Sudan's government does not fully represent all of the country's ethnic groups, its chances of democratization will remain limited.

Although the models presented so far are fraught with uncertainty due to small sample size, the general picture is that the JAPS will improve the chances of democratization, if only slightly so. Next to these insights from quantitative data, critical voices warrant caution. They point to an inherent contradiction between power-sharing and democracy. The right of voters to choose their own government and the resulting uncertainty of elites on whether they will be elected lies at the core of representative democracy (Przeworski, 1991). Power-sharing, however, cements the influence of specific elites, namely leaders of former violent armed movements, and impedes voters' ability to remove these elites from office. In the worst-case scenario, former enemies with guaranteed representation in government institutions continue their rivalry by non-violent means and block the will of voters due to a lack of accountability. Experiences in Bosnia (Bieber, 2005), Lebanon (Zahar, 2005), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Lake, 2017) support this critical view.

To strengthen the influence of non-elites, three further institutional mechanisms could be useful: First, define an expiration date for the JAPS and the transitional authority to give the people of Sudan a chance to vote for their own government but ensure that important power-sharing mechanisms carry over into a new constitutional order (cf. Johnson, 2020). Second, involve civil society actors next to representatives of armed movements from the conflict-afflicted regions (Nilsson, 2012). Third, institutionalize direct cash transfers to individuals living in the conflict-affected regions that bypass the political elites empowered through the JAPS. Admittedly, the economic agenda for the peace agreement requires an overarching reconstruction and service delivery program for Darfur and the Two Areas. However, a national family support project through direct cash transfers is indispensable for making a direct impact

---

12 According to the Ethnic Power Relations data (Vogt et al., 2015), before the transition, the central government was dominated by Nile riverine social groups. The JAPS includes leaders from other marginalized communities while at least five other ethnic groups remain excluded from central government power.

on poverty and achieving progress on other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[13] Though the people of Sudan suffer from massive poverty and low human development standards, the crisis has been particularly acute in the conflict-affected regions of the country (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Poverty headcount ratio by state, 2014/15 (in percent)

Source: Sudan Poverty Reduction Strategy, March 2021 (World Bank staff calculations based on 2009 NHBS and 2014/15 NHBPS).

Power-sharing and democratic survival

It is difficult to assess the effect of power-sharing on the survival chances of democracy in post-conflict states because too few post-conflict democracies exist. Dictatorships outnumber democracies two to one within five years after conflicts end (Boix et al., 2013; Marshall et al., 2011). At most, 25 cases of democracies exist within all post-conflict states with peace agreements. Between the different datasets, the number of democratic failures range from three

---

[13] For a review of the international evidence on the effectiveness of cash transfer programs, see, for example, a comprehensive study by the British Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2016): https://www.odi.org/sites/ odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10748.pdf.

to 11. Drawing conclusions from a quantitative comparison of 25 cases will not yield reliable insights.

Instead, we focus on the failure rate of post-conflict democracies in the presence and absence of peace agreements. Figures 7 and 8 display the patterns for the Hartzell & Hoddie and Jarstad & Nilsson datasets, respectively. In the majority of post-conflict states, democracy fails without a peace agreement. Although the Hartzell & Hoddie – BMR combination with 13 cases of democratic survival and 11 cases of failure leaves some room for doubt (red bars in Figure 7), it is reassuring to note that ten of the 11 failures do not include power-sharing provisions. In contrast, the post-Cold War record reflected by the Jarstad & Nilsson data in Figure 8 allows for a clear verdict. In the presence of peace agreements, democracies hardly fail.

Figure 7. Democratic breakdowns and peace agreements in post-conflict states (Hartzell & Hoddie data)

Figure 8. Democratic breakdowns and peace agreements in post-conflict states (Jarstad & Nilsson data)

A similar picture emerges when evaluating the de facto inclusiveness of central governments of post-conflict states. Using the EPR data, Table 4 displays the average included group and population shares for post-conflict democracies that survived and those that failed. In three out of four combinations, country-years that experienced democratic breakdown are less inclusive than country-years in which democracy survived. Surviving democracies are slightly less inclusive than cases of democratic failure when using the BMR definition of democracy and the share of the included population measure. In terms of size, none of the differences are substantial.

Table 7. Democratic survival and ethnic inclusion in central government (EPR data)

	Democratic Survival	Cases	Share of Included Groups	Share of Included Population
BMR	Yes	1801	2.30	0.83
	No	24	1.88	0.85
Polity IV	Yes	1808	2.30	0.83
	No	15	1.87	0.79

Yet, the results confirm unpublished results on the positive effect of ethnically inclusive governments on democracy in all democratic states between 1946 and 2009 (Bormann, 2014, pp. 154-156). They also support findings by Graham et al. (2017) on the beneficial consequences of constitutions that mandate inclusive power-sharing for democratic stability in post-conflict states. To conclude, peace agreements in general and inclusive power-sharing in particular seem to safeguard democratic survival after armed conflict.

Problems of existing scientific findings and what this means for Sudan

Several problems complicate the analysis of power-sharing in the aftermath of civil war. Here, we highlight three: (1) the *level-of-analysis,* (2) the *selection,* and (3) the *background conditions* problems.

First, the level-of-analysis problem describes the mismatch between the explanation of power-sharing and the outcomes reviewed in this paper. Power-sharing is a conflict or actor-level phenomenon that links a central government and one or more armed movements. Yet, peace agreements such as the JAPS hardly ever cover all the relevant actors that influence future conflict outbreaks, democratization chances, or risks to democratic survival. So far, the JAPS does not include two major rebel movements with presence on the ground in both Darfur and the Two Areas, as discussed above. Moreover, the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Force, as well as the civilian parties and civil society organizations, will most likely exert greater influence over the future of Sudan's democracy than the armed movements included in the JAPS. Ideally, an evaluation of the effectiveness of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements would disentangle the direct effects of power-sharing provisions on the risk of conflict recurrence, democratization, and democratic survival from their indirect effects.

Regarding conflict recurrence, scholars would need to trace the breakdown of peace to signatories of any agreement (direct effects) while simultaneously accounting for second-order effects, such as reputation losses by the government that might trigger conflict with new groups (indirect effects). Existing studies that limit their attention to direct effects generally evaluate power-sharing positively. Yet, these studies ignore the conflict-increasing effects of reputation loss. To date, conflict researchers have not directly compared these direct and indirect effects, and it is thus unclear which one will prevail.

With respect to democratization and democratic survival, future studies need to evaluate the actions of the signatories of peace agreements in combination with other coalition dynamics in the central government that lie outside the peace agreement. To illustrate direct and indirect effects, consider the three ways democracy in Sudan might fail. First, in response to unfavorable election results, any of the armed movements that signed the JAPS might restart their violent struggle, therefore triggering the introduction of emergency measures that undermine democratic rule (direct effects). Second, should the non-signatory armed movements and the government reach a deadlock, the former might abandon the current de facto truce and resume the war (indirect effects). Third, military officers in Khartoum who believe that the JAPS grants too many concessions to the signatory armed movements might attempt to stage a coup, causing instability and derailing democracy (indirect effects).

Selection bias is the second problem that plagues evaluations of power-sharing agreements. Are governments that share power with armed movements comparable to those that do not? If they were different, then evaluations of the effectiveness of power-sharing would not yield reliable results. Arguably, governments that share power with armed challengers are weaker than those governments that defeat armed challengers or do not concede much. Such governments are then like patients who need to go to the hospital for treatment, where the death rate is higher than outside. The patients in need of treatment would, of course, die at even higher rates without hospital admission. The analogy suggests that naïve analyses of power-sharing underestimate its positive effect, and studies that address this selection effect by modeling it directly (Bormann & Steinwand, 2020), using instrumental variable approaches (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015; Wucherpfennig et al., 2016), and using matching techniques agree (Ranft & Bethke, 2018). The JAPS may be more effective than demonstrated in this analysis.

Finally, power-sharing arrangements make up only one part of the story that determine the chances of conflict recurrence, democratization, and democratic survival. Several studies show that peacekeeping operations fundamentally improve the odds of post-conflict stability (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Fortunately, the JAPS foresees an active UN role, especially in the more forward-looking and much-needed areas of democratic transitions, peacebuilding, rule of law, and economic reconstruction. To achieve this agenda, the UN and the Sudanese authorities agreed to replace the United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which completed its mandate on 31 December 2020,[14] with the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). The UN Security Council resolution 2524[15] from 3 June 2020 describes the Mission's specific strategic objectives as follows:[16]

- Assisting political transition, progress towards democratic governance, protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace: SDGs 5, 10, 16 and 17.

---

[14] More information about the mission's past activities and achievements are on this website: https://unamid.unmissions.org/.

[15] https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2524(2020)

[16] https://unitams.unmissions.org/en/mandate.

- Supporting peace processes and the implementation of future peace agreements: SDGs 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16 and 17.
- Assisting peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, particularly in Darfur and the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile states): SDGs 5, 10, 11, 16 and 17.
- Supporting the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance by ensuring an integrated approach with UN agencies, funds, and programs, and through collaboration with international financial institutions: all SDGs.

However, the new mission has already encountered several challenges, from budgetary constraints to skepticism by local communities who had hoped its mandate – limited to political and technical assistance – would include a peacekeeping force like its predecessor, UNAMID. To address the ensuing security challenges, the JAPS calls for the establishment of a 12,000-strong military force composed of rebel combatants, the Sudanese army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Armed peacekeepers do not seem to be widely welcomed in Darfur, especially among the internally displaced in the camps who predominantly hold allegiance to the non-signatory SLM-AW.[17] Moreover, the "National Committee for Coordination with UNITAMS," which was established in July 2020 by the Prime Minister to support the UN mission and inculcate ownership of the transition agenda, was hampered by limited financial and institutional support by the executive branch that created it in the first place. The national committee had to compete with two other committees established by the Sovereignty Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for resources and influence. The national committee, therefore, was not only hampered in providing much-needed support to the UN mission, but it was also undermined in fulfilling its potentially critical role as a champion for promoting national ownership of the transition agenda.[18]

Another important background condition is economic development. When the economy grows, rival factions will have less trouble compromising, and citizens will be more satisfied with the new arrangements. When the economy falters and foreign aid falls short, politicians in Khartoum may find it difficult to arrange the much-needed funding for integrating former fighters from the armed movements, thus undermining the territorial and military power-sharing provisions, much less providing support for reconstruction and other transfers stipulated under the agreement. In sum, power-sharing alone will not be a panacea to the challenges facing the people of Sudan. Nevertheless, it is most likely a step in the right direction.

---

[17] Sentiments such as "the joint security forces are unacceptable to us" seem to reflect the widely-held view among the estimated 1.5 million-strong internally displaced people living in these camps (https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/4/6/sudans-peace-deal-finds-resistance-in-darfur).

[18] The discussion about the "National Committee for Coordination with UNITAMS" builds on a conversation with Ambassador Omer Alsheikh, the former President and Coordinator of the Committee who resigned in July 2021.

Conclusions and reflections on prospects for Sudan

In this paper, we reviewed the scholarly literature on the effectiveness of power-sharing after armed conflicts with conflict recurrence, democratization, and democratic survival as our outcomes of interest. Our findings are generally positive, although we counsel caution when it comes to embracing the empirical results at face value. Several estimates come with large uncertainty, and some empirical effects are rather small. In the Sudan context, power-sharing is a step in the right direction, but might be more effective if it were broadened and inclusive of all of Sudan's social groups and relevant actors – at least for a transition period. Furthermore, transition to electoral democracy might be risky and short-lived in socially fractionalized societies with a history of civil conflicts (Brancati & Snyder, 2013). Therefore, appropriate constitutional designs as well as indirect measures, such as inclusive political parties, will be necessary for safeguarding peace and democracy post transition.

These conclusions come with the additional caveat that analyzing the effectiveness of power-sharing is difficult. Studies that model selection bias, i.e. the idea that the weakest governments share power, find generally more positive results than those that simply compare cases with and without power-sharing. Similarly, research that focuses only on the direct effects of peace agreements, i.e. those driven by the agreement's signatories, reach more optimistic conclusions than research that addresses indirect effects of peace agreements, i.e. effects on actors left out of the agreements. Following studies of direct effects, the JAPS follows the formula that scholars have found to be successful in decreasing the risk of conflict recurrence and improving the chances of democracy: it includes many power-sharing provisions, the most important of which is political/inclusive power-sharing.

Reflections on prospects for Sudan

The JAPS' future success will, however, depend not only on its successful implementation, but also on resolving the complex and challenging issues associated with the fragmentation of the Sudanese insurgency on the one hand, and the multiple transitions for a country coming out of a long-reigning kleptocratic regime on the other. The uprising that led to the demise of General Omer Al-Bashir dictatorship – popularly referred to as the "Glorious December 2018 Revolution" – has unleashed its own discourse, centered on its iconic slogan: "Freedom, Peace and Justice." It powered the revolutionary zeal of Sudanese youth in the streets of Khartoum and other cities and has continued to shape the national debate ever since. The JAPS, of course, would not have seen the light of day without this political transition, but, as we will explain below, the requirements for achieving the overarching slogan of the revolution might run counter to the process pursued in the context of JAPS.

The fragmentation of the Sudanese insurgency along both ideology and ethnic affiliation has been widely documented in the literature, as reviewed in this paper. This fragmentation complicates the peace process considerably and undermines its external legitimacy beyond the popular bases of the three signatory movements to the JAPS (JEM, SPLM-N (MA), SLM/A (AM)). As a result, some rebel movements remain outside the peace process. Although Nilsson

(2008) argues that even a "partial peace" can be a step in the right direction, more work is needed to bring in the hold-out groups. Including the excluded, such as the SPLM-N (Al Hilu faction) and SLM/A (Abdel Wahid faction), is expedient because power-sharing reduces the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Despite not signing the JAPS, the SPLM-N (Al Hilu) has nonetheless continued to negotiate with the Sudan Transitional Government. In March 2021, commander Abdelaziz Adam Al-Hilu, the leader of the movement, signed a Declaration of Principles (DoP) with general Abdulfatah El-Burhan Abdulrahman, Chairman of the Sovereign Council, which stresses on stronger commitment to a secular and federal state and aspires to unify armed forces – a step in the direction of military power-sharing.[19]

The other major non-signatory movement, the SLM (AW), takes a radically different position by eschewing the JAPS piecemeal approach and calling for a national peace conference. Its spokesman declared that "the Movement proposes a comprehensive peace conference gathering all the components of the society: political parties, armed groups, displaced persons and refugees, religious leaders, traditional leaders of the Native Administration, the military, and civil society organizations" (December, 2020).[20]

A more inclusive peace will have two additional benefits. First, it might curb interfactional rivalries that threaten the implementation of the JAPS. Violent competition between armed groups, such as the two wings of SPLM-N in South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile and ethnic divisions in Darfur, stand in the way of delivering the promises of security and development to local people. Second, bringing in groups and constituencies such as civil society organizations (Nilsson, 2012) and other major groups, such as the Arabs of Darfur, will send a clear signal that the transitional authority is truly interested in an inclusive Sudan and does not reward fighting. If only armed movements gain concessions, others might ask if violence is the key to power.

Despite some of the concerns expressed above, the supporters of the JAPS rightly argue that including leaders from Darfur and other marginalized regions will rebalance a lopsided political system long dominated by the central Nile riverine elites. The JAPS is thus a step in the right direction. However, it also creates new problems. Even if the holdout rebel movements eventually agree to a comprehensive deal, the piecemeal approach to the peace process will inevitably lead to extending the transitional period. Already, the SPLM-N (Al Hilu) leaders demand the extension of the transitional period to ensure the implementation of the various protocols of the peace agreement. Other members of the transitional regime likely harbor the same views. Delays to the transition from the unelected transitional authority to an elected government, however, risk a return to authoritarian rule under the guise of "peacebuilding."

---

[19] The appendix includes the precise wording. More information can be found here: https://suna-news.net/read?id=708406

[20] https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/slm-s-al-nur-launch-initiative-peace-conference-inside-sudan.

Such a development would contravene one of the central objectives of the December Revolution and likely undermine the national legitimacy of the JAPS, despite the undeniably strong popular support for the peace effort.

Finally, two additional challenges could derail the peace process and impede democratic transition and survival. The first one pertains to securing the required funds for financing the peace agenda. The second relates to resolving daunting complications associated with the required security reforms and the questions of "transitional justice," especially with regard to the victims of the 3 June, 2019 massacre that resulted from the violent dispersal by the security forces of the sit-in in front of the Sudanese Army High Command in Khartoum.

In response to these concerns, we propose five future steps.

First, we advocate a national peace conference:

The peacebuilding project is an undisputed top national priority. The JAPS process could be justified as a pragmatic approach to ending ongoing violence quickly, but it has its flaws. In particular, it is not inclusive enough with respect to four constituencies: (1) excluded rebel movements, (2) pro-government armed factions not integrated into the army (3), powerless groups that have not yet picked up arms against the state, and (4) civil society actors. Leaving these constituencies out of the existing power-arrangements endangers the future of peace and democratic transition in Sudan.

A national peace conference would invite representatives from the aforementioned groups and aim to expedite the peace process. Providing a seat at the table for national political parties and civil society institutions would improve the representation of the people of Sudan and increase the chances of a democratic transition. Furthermore, an inclusive peace conference with civil society groups would increase the chances that the promised development funds reach regular people, and not only members of armed groups.

A national peace conference would additionally tackle two more issues of military power-sharing. For one, it would appeal to currently left-out rebel movements, such as the SLM-AW, that demand national forum as a condition for its participation in the peace process. In addition, the national peace conference should tackle splits between the Sudanese army and pro-government factions such as General Hemedti's Rapid Support Force (RSP) that resist integration into the mainstream Sudan Armed Force (SAF). The RSP has been a central pillar in the post-Al-Basheer transition and a much-needed counterweight to the supporters of the Ancien regime. Although the SAF has purged most Al-Basheer supporters, General Hemedti continues to resist integration into the army, as an independent RSP serves as the only credible assurance for its ambitious leader to remain relevant against the vastly stronger SAF.

Nonetheless, unification under one command must happen, including to fulfill a key requirement of the JAPS and secure a peace deal with the powerful SPLM-N (Al Hilu). Resolving this conundrum requires integrating the RSF into the army while making credible assurances for General Hemedti. We do not offer a specific proposal here, but we highlight that guaranteed forms of military power-sharing solve these types of commitment problems, especially when working jointly with third-party assurances (Walter 2002). In this regard, a revitalized National Committee for Coordination with UNITAMS could effectively work within the mandate of UNITAMS to facilitate UN-sponsored international guarantees for such a nationally brokered bargain.

Second, we recommend a firm term limitation for the transitional authority:

The national peace conference must aim to reach a consensus on the duration of the transitional period. Aware of the destabilizing consequences of rushing to the polls (Autesserre, 2019; Brancati & Snyder, 2011), we believe that a transitional period is necessary. Yet, using the peace project as a "Trojan horse" to extend the transitional rule violates the Constitutional Charter[21] poses an imminent danger to the revolution and the democratic transition and even to the sustainability of the peace project itself. Peace is undoubtedly an important condition for Sudan to break free from the vicious cycle of regime failure, armed conflicts, coups, and reinstated authoritarian rule. Yet, building peace should not come at the expense of a timely democratic transition; rather, it should be its solid building block. For peace and democracy to go hand in hand, important power-sharing provisions should carry over into a new constitutional arrangement (Johnson 2020). Setting a binding time constraint should constitute a motive to move the peace process forward. The international and regional communities would have a significant role to play; not only by providing political and financial support to the initiative, but also by helping to pressure those who choose not to attend a well prepared and fully participatory national peace conference.

Third, we propose building broad-based political parties and coalitions:

Although conflict researchers still know too little about the consequences of armed groups' participation in elections (Matanock & Staniland, 2018), we believe that political parties and coalitions are necessary for the success of democracy. Yet, well-organized and programmatic political parties do not suddenly emerge. Instead, political parties are the vehicles of elites to win elections (Aldrich, 1995). In Sudan, these elites are currently leaders of the armed movements and the military establishment who hold the reins of power. To represent the people of Sudan and be responsive to their voters, political parties must build links to the population. Without these links, parties risk leaders' remaining instruments to hold on to power (Stokes, 1999). In this context, the recent move by the Umma Party, a historical political party believed to have a wide national popular base, and SPLM-N (MA) and SLM/A (MM) to resuscitate their

---

[21] The Constitutional Charter was signed on 4 August, 2019 between the then-ruling Transitional Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change, the coalition representing the bodies that led the December 2018 Revolution. This Charter provides the legal and constitutional basis for the Sudan Transitional Political order.

"Sudan Call coalition" attains a critical significance, as these three political institutions are likely to be among the main contenders in the conflict-affected regions in future elections.

Fourth, we recommend a better-institutionalized and sufficiently funded "Peace Fund":

The JAPS, like its predecessors during the former regime, calls for the establishment of "Peace Funds" for financing the peace agenda stipulated in the agreement. However, success requires the effective mobilization of domestic resources and their efficient allocation toward well-planned programs. In turn, efficient domestic resource mobilization requires reforming the tax system, including by implementing robust digital transformation to expand the tax base and contain tax avoidance and evasion. Sudan currently collects a mere seven to eight percent of GDP in tax revenue, which is about half the 15 percent threshold, below which states are characterized as suffering from fiscal fragility (Mansour and Schneider, 2019). Such states are barely able to finance the very basic functions of government, much less the legitimate but ambitious reconstruction and service delivery programs associated with the peace agreement.

As daunting as these fiscal efforts may be, it is in fact the easier part of the challenge to fund the peace process. The much harder task lies in reaching political agreement over the distribution of funds and establishing credibility with donors in support of the economic peace agenda by creating transparent mechanisms of distribution. Domestic constituencies and external partners agree that the fulfillment of the economic peace agenda is *sine qua non* for peace in Sudan. However, transparent, non-partisan, and professional management of the Peace Fund and the associated economic agenda is currently missing, even though it is the key precondition for securing the much-needed national consensus and donor support.

We propose that the Peace Fund be under direct oversight of national institutions, though authorities at the regional level will have a role to play in the execution of local programs. National oversight, like nationally-managed family support programs, should be seen as tantamount of a new "social contract" between the federal government and the citizens in the marginalized and conflict-affected regions of the country rather than via the armed movements that signed the JAPS. The received literature on peace-building and democratic transitions suggests that such nationally-mandated programs are likely to inculcate allegiance to national belong and weaken divisive sub-national and co-ethnic political associations.[22]

Fifth, we recommend the introduction of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission:

Justice for the victims of the Army High Command Massacre: three months after the massacre, the Prime Minister formed an independent national commission of inquiry, headed by prominent lawyer and human rights defender Nabil Adib. After almost three years since its formation and after taking testimonies from more than 3,000 witnesses, the Commission is yet to release its report to the public. Many commentators believe that the reason for the considerable delay is political rather than technical. It is an open secret that the pursuit of a

---

[22] See, for example, Sambanis (2020), for a more detailed discussion on this issue.

rigorous legalistic course might create a major crisis and perhaps trigger a coup; ushering in a new cycle of conflicts and instability.

Nevertheless, we believe that the aggrieved families of the victims deserve justice and that the perpetrators of this heinous crime need to be held accountable. To this end, the late Imam Al Sadig Al-Mahdi, the last democratically elected prime minister of Sudan, proposed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) modeled on the South African experience to resolve this national crisis. At the time, several politicians dismissed and ridiculed the idea, and the civilian leadership of the Transitional Government and the FFC coalition failed to support it. The TRC model, at the very least, offers the Sudanese people the truth, reconciliation with some measure of justice, and accountability – without representing an existential threat to those that remain in power. Again, we do not provide a solution to this quagmire but call for addressing it in a transparent and amicable way.

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1995). *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. University of Chicago Press.

Autesserre, S. (2019). The Crisis of Peacekeeping – Why the UN Can't End Wars. *Foreign Affairs*, *98*(1).

Bieber, F. (2005). Power Sharing after Yugoslavia. Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power Sharing Institutions in Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo. In S. Noel (Hrsg.), *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies* (S. 85–103). McGill-Queens University Press.

Boix, C., Miller, M., & Rosato, S. (2013). A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007. *Comparative Political Studies*, *46*(12), 1523–1554.

Bormann, N.-C. (2014). *The Causes and Consequences of Ethnic Power-Sharing* [PhD Thesis, ETH Zürich]. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010194513

Bormann, N.-C. (2019). Uncertainty, Cleavages and Ethnic Coalitions. *Journal of Politics*, *81*(2), 471–486.

Bormann, N.-C., & Savun, B. (2018). Reputation, Concessions, and Territorial Civil War: Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall, or Don't They? *Journal of Peace Research*, *55*(5), 671–686.

Bormann, N.-C., & Steinwand, M. C. (2020). Power-Sharing Coalitions and Ethnic Armed Conflict. *Available at SSRN 3581852*.

Brancati, D., & Snyder, J. L. (2011). Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Early Post-conflict Elections. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *55*(3), 469–492.

Brancati, D., & Snyder, J. L. (2013). Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Postconflict Stability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *57*(5), 822–850.

Bunce, V. (1999). *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, L.-E., Hug, S., Schädel, A., & Wucherpfennig, J. (2015). Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late? *American Political Science Review*, *109*(2), 354–370.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C. H., Krusell, J., Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Mechkova, V., Olin, M., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., … Wilson, S. (2017). V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v7. *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project*.

Cunningham, K. G. (2013). Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, *57*(3), 659–672.

Darfur Peace Agreement, (2006). https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_050505_DarfurPeaceAgreement.pdf

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton University Press.

Forsberg, E. (2013). Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall: Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups. *International Studies Quarterly*, *57*(2), 329–340.

Fortna, V. P. (2008). *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War*. Princeton University Press.

Fortna, V. P., & Huang, R. (2012). Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise [1]: *Democratization* After Civil War. *International Studies Quarterly*, *56*(4), 801–808. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00730.x

Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Dataset. *Perspectives on Politics*, *Forthcoming*.

Glassmyer, K., & Sambanis, N. (2008). Rebel: Military Integration and Civil War Termination. *Journal of Peace Research*, *45*(3), 365–384.

Graham, B. A., Miller, M. K., & Strøm, K. W. (2017). Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival. *American Political Science Review*, *111*(4), 686–704.

GROWup—Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform. (o. J.). Abgerufen 28. Juni 2021, von https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Sudan

Hartzell, C. A., & Hoddie, M. (2015). The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post–Civil War Democracy. *World Politics*, *67*(1), 37–71.

Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science*, *47*(2), 318–332.

Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2007). *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2015). The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post–Civil War Democracy. *World Politics*, *67*(1), 37–71.

Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2020). *Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States: The Art of the Possible*. Cambridge University Press.

Jarstad, A. K., & Nilsson, D. (2008). From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *25*(3), 206–223.

Johnson, C. (2020). Power-Sharing, Conflict Resolution, and the Logic of Pre-Emptive Defection. *Journal of Peace Research*, 0022343320924699.

Juba Agreement, 242 (2020).

Lake, M. (2017). Building the Rule of War: Postconflict Institutions and the Micro- Dynamics of Conflict in Eastern DR Congo. *International Organization*, *71*(2), 281–315.

Lewis, W. A. (1956). *Politics in West Africa*. Allen & Unwin.

Lijphart, A. (1968). *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. University of California Press.

Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational Democracy. *World Politics*, *21*(2), 207–225.

Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. Yale University Press.

Mansour, Mario and Jean-Luc Schneider (2019). *How to Design Tax Policy in Fragile States?* IMF Fiscal Affairs Department. How To Notes 19/04, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC- September.

Marsden, D. R. (2020, September 14). *Is the Juba Peace Agreement a Turning Point for Sudan?* Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/09/juba-peace-agreement-turning-point-sudan

Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2011). *The Polity IV Project—Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010.* Center for Systemic Peace. www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Matanock, A. M., & Staniland, P. (2018). How and why armed groups participate in elections. *Perspectives on Politics*, *16*(3), 710–727.

Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2009). Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design. *International Studies Quarterly*, *53*(3), 737–759.

Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2010). Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements. *American Journal of Political Science*, *54*(2), 511–524.

McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (2009). Power Shared after the Deaths of Thousands. In R. Taylor (Hrsg.), *Consociational Theory*. Routledge.

Mukherjee, B. (2006). Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others? *International studies quarterly*, *50*(2), 479–504.

Nilsson, D. (2008). Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements. *Journal of Peace Research*, *45*(4), 479–495.

Nilsson, D. (2012). Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace. *International Interactions*, *38*(2), 243–266.

Nomikos, W. G. (2020). Why Share? An Analysis of the Sources of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing. *Journal of Peace Research*, 0022343320929732.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

Ranft, F., & Bethke, F. S. (2018). *Executive Power-Sharing, Relative Military Capabilities, and Post-Conflict Peace Duration.* https://felixbethke.netlify.app/publication/eps/

Roessler, P. G. (2011). The Enemy From Within. Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil Wars in Africa. *World Politics*, *63*(2), 300–346.

Saeid, Elshafie Khidir (2019). Do not Ignore the Equation of the Army and the People. Alguds Alarabi-London, Vol. 31- Issue 9536, Monday, 6 May (in Arabic).

Sambanis, N. (2020). Power-Sharing and Peace-Building. ERF Working Paper No. 1396. Economic Research Forum, Cairo. June.

Sambanis, N., Germann, M., & Schädel, A. (2018). SDM: A New Data Set on Self-Determination Movements with an Application to the Reputational Theory of Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *62*(3), 656–686.

Samii, C. (2013). Who wants to forgive and forget? Transitional justice preferences in postwar Burundi. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(2), 219–233. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312463713

Stokes, S. C. (1999). Political Parties and Democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *2*(1), 243–267.

Strøm, K., Gates, S. G., Graham, B. A. T., & Strand, H. (2017). Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World's States, 1975-2010. *British Journal of Political Science*, *47*(1), 165–185.

Sudan: Darfur deal welcomed by UN chief as „historic achievement". (2020, August 31). UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1071392

Vogt, M., Bormann, N.-C., Ruegger, S., Cederman, L.-E., Hunziker, P., & Girardin, L. (2015). Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *59*(7), 1327–1342.

Walter, B. F. (1997). The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. *International Organization*, *51*(3), 335–364.

Walter, B. F. (2002). *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton University Press.

Walter, B. F. (2006). Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede. *International Organization*, *60*(1), 105–135.

Walter, B. F. (2009). *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent*. Cambridge University Press.

Wucherpfennig, J., Hunziker, P., & Cederman, L.-E. (2016). Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule and Post-Colonial Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, *60*(4), 882–898.

Zahar, M.-J. (2005). Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure. In P. G. Roeder & D. Rothchild (Hrsg.), *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (S. 219–240). Cornell University Press.

Data Appendix

In this study, we use four main data sources to measure power-sharing and simulate predictions for Sudan: (1) Hartzell & Hoddie's peace agreement data, (2) Jarstad & Nilsson's IMPACT dataset on the implementation on peace agreements, (3) Johnson's dataset (4) and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database that measures the power access of leaders of ethnic groups. In the following, we describe the main variable definitions for each dataset.

Hartzell & Hoddie's peace agreement data

Hartzell & Hoddie's work focuses on power-sharing institutions in 68 peace agreements after major civil wars in the period 1945-2006. They define these institutions as "rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power" (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003, 320). They then classify each power-sharing provision along four dimensions. First, political power-sharing encompasses "proportional representation in elections, proportional representation in the government's administration, and proportional representation in the government's executive branch" (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015, 41). Second, military power-sharing is "integrating the antagonists' armed forces into a unified state security force" (ibid., 42). Third, territorial power-sharing requires "provisions for federalism or regional autonomy [that] offer regionally concentrated groups a degree of power that is independent from the central government" (ibid.). Fourth, economic power-sharing distributes "wealth, income, or control of natural resources or production facilities on some group basis" (ibid., 43).

Jarstad & Nilsson's IMPACT data

Jarstad & Nilsson (2008) identify 83 peace agreements after armed conflicts that resulted in at least 25 battle deaths per year since 1989. The authors distinguish between (1) political, (2) military, and (3) territorial pacts, and code the implementation of these pacts. First, Jarstad & Nilsson (2008, 213) follow Walter (2002) in defining political pacts as "guaranteed positions in the new government at the level of cabinet or above, or a specific quota of political power in at least one of the main branches of government." Second, a military pact "is a provision that offers the combatants guaranteed integration into the national armed forces and/or command structures" (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008, 213). Third, a territorial pact is "a provision for some form of regional autonomy, [...] if one or both sides was allowed to continue to administer areas under their control, [...] or if specific self-governing zones were established" (ibid., 214). All three of Jarstad & Nilsson's dimensions of power-sharing are very similar to Hartzell & Hoddie's definitions. The main differences in results between the two datasets must then stem from the different sample of cases in terms of the definition of conflicts (civil war versus minor armed conflicts) and time periods (post-World War 2 versus post-Cold War periods).

Johnson (2020)

Johnson's data on power-sharing identifies group-specific provisions in negotiated settlements between 1975 and 2015. Thus, she codes different provisions for different rebel movements in one peace agreement. Her complete dataset includes 168 government-armed group dyads across 124 negotiated settlements from 48 states (Johnson, 2020, 740). Her main innovation vis-à-vis the two preceding datasets is a distinction between transitional and constitutional or permanent provisions. In terms of political power-sharing, she distinguishes between transitional "inclusive executive coalitions or unity governments" and constitutional changes that include "electoral quotas, PR rules, or effective legislative vetoes … in parliamentary democracies, and the distribution of ministerial positions" in presidential democracies (ibid., 741). With respect to military power-sharing, she distinguishes between provisions that involve "a restructuring of the high command, officer corps, or Ministry of Defense in order to include rebel leaders" from provisions on "troop integration, which merely require that ex-combatants be incorporated into the national military" (ibid.). Finally, she codes territorial power-sharing in line with earlier approaches, "in that the settlement stipulates a devolution of resource wealth or political, administrative, or fiscal powers away from the national level" (ibid.).

Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset

The EPR data by Cederman, Wimmer & Min (2010) identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups along with their access to central and regional government power. The sample encompasses all independent states between 1945 and the present, in which either political organizations make political claims on behalf of an ethnic group in national politics, or the state politically discriminates against an ethnic group (ibid., 99). In terms of political power-sharing, EPR identifies ethnic groups as included if they have a representative in the highest executive body of a state, and excluded if they do not belong to the ruling coalition (Vogt et al., 2015, 1331). The EPR data code regional autonomy or territorial power-sharing under two conditions. First, "there must be a meaningful and active regional executive organ that operates below the state level (e.g. the departmental, provincial, or district level) but above the local administrative level, and [second] group representatives must exert actual influence on the decisions of this entity, acting in line with the group's local interests" (ibid.). Unlike in the preceding three datasets that focus on power-sharing provisions in negotiated settlements, power-sharing in the EPR dataset can occur before and after armed conflict, and encompasses both formal and informal arrangements.

Declaration of principles between SPLM-N (Al Hilu) and Sovereign Council

Religious freedom and secular character of new constitution

"The establishment of a civil, democratic, federal State in Sudan, wherein, the freedom of religion, the freedom of belief and religious practices and worship shall be guaranteed to all Sudanese people by separating the identities of culture, region, ethnicity and religion from the state. No religion shall be imposed on anyone and the State shall not adopt any official religion. The State shall be impartial in terms of religious matters and matters of faith and conscience. The State shall guarantee and protect the freedom of religion and practices. These principles shall be enshrined in the constitution" (Clause 2-3).

Professionalization of army

"Sudan shall have a single professional national army that operates according to a new unified military doctrine that is committed to protecting national security in accordance with the constitution; security and military institutions shall reflect Sudanese diversity and their allegiance shall be to the country and not any other political parties or groups. The process of integration and unification of forces shall be gradual and completed by the end of the transitional period and after resolution of the relationship between religion and state...etc." (Clause 3).