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## THE GENDER GAP IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE MENA REGION

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## SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND EXTERNAL SHOCKS IN THE MENA REGION:

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# The Gender Gap in Political Participation: Evidence from the MENA Region

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## **Abstract**

This paper investigates gender differences in political participation across 10 MENA countries using data extracted from the World Values Survey (2010-2014). A distinction is made between two different participation types, institutional and non-institutional. We utilize an ordered logit model to evaluate whether the gender gap in both forms is mediated by demographic and attitudinal controls and assess whether variables influencing participation affect men and women differently. We find that socioeconomic resources and political attitudes are correlated with higher levels of participation. However, the analysis reveals a persistent gender gap that can be generalized to the entire spectrum of engagement in the MENA, with larger gaps for less institutionalized forms.

**Keywords:** Gender Gap; Political Participation; MENA region.

**JEL codes:** P48, P49, Z13, Z18, Z19.

## 1. Introduction

The eruption of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 prompted a reevaluation of nearly every aspect of Arab politics. Scholars were driven to systematically amend numerous long-held assumptions and theories, and those pertaining to female political participation are no exception. Discourse on gender and politics has gained rising attention with considerable effort devoted to countering imbalances in participation. Nonetheless, the gap is far from being closed, with gender discrepancies linked to critical legitimacy problems for democracy. In this context, Verba (1996) asserts the necessity of political participation as an intrinsic democratic good. Thus, finding a pattern of unequal participation across genders is a threat to an existing democratic system. Political engagement is a key element of a democratic system and a means of attaining equality; hence, such discrepancies are both a reflection and a promotion of imbalances across society (Verba et al., 1997; Lister, 2007). In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the Global Gender Gap Index<sup>1</sup> stands at a low 61.1 percent, the lowest among all regions, despite having narrowed down by 0.5 percentage points since 2019. Given this rate of progress, the gap will be closed in about 150 years. Nonetheless, the percentage of parliamentary seats held by Arab women has nearly doubled throughout the last decade, reaching 19.0 percent in 2019 (World Economic Forum, 2020). Despite increased representation, a number of researchers substantiate a persistent gap in different participation forms, with females significantly less engaged than males worldwide (Burns, 2007; Gallego, 2007; Paxton et al., 2007; Dalton, 2008; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010; Coffé and Dilli, 2014). It is evident that the discrepancy attributed to gender is small when compared to other variables like educational attainment and age. However, gender acts as a salient cleavage, cutting across all areas of stratification (Martin, 2004).

This paper adopts a more nuanced approach to the gender gap query in an attempt to reevaluate the aforementioned findings. First, previous work for the region has mostly centered on participation in its “institutional” context, examining forms such as party membership, electoral participation, and working on campaigns. This approach is of systematic importance to the inherent workings of a democracy (Janoski, 1998). Nonetheless, the evidence points to a declining trend in institutional engagement and an increase in broader, citizen-initiated approaches (Norris, 2002; Dalton, 2008; Parvin, 2015). Second, existing studies are mostly dominated by findings from

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<sup>1</sup> The Global Gender Gap Index, based on data collated by the World Economic Forum, ranks countries on computed gender discrepancies in areas of health, educational attainment, and economic and political participation.

developed countries, unfit for generalization to Middle-Eastern democracies. Studying the MENA region allows us to assess whether the results and assumptions based on developed countries hold for less-developed democracies and institutions. This is mainly because political engagement may take on different forms in fragile democracies (Bratton, 1999). As such, it is imperative that gender relations and discrepancies be clearly tailored and extended to the regional frame of reference.

In brief, this paper aims to answer two interrelated research questions for the region. First, we assess whether there is a persistent gender gap in both institutional and activist engagement. Second, we evaluate whether variables influencing political participation affect men and women differently. The formalized hypotheses build on previous work that emphasizes the gendered nature of political participation as it coincides with an individual's socioeconomic characteristics and political attitudes (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010; Coffé and Dilli, 2014; Pfanzelt and Spies, 2018). Prior approaches are extended to account for different forms of engagement, rather than solely a divergence in magnitude, and to investigate a sample of relatively comparable countries in the MENA. Given the importance of political and civic engagement in the region, evaluating such inequalities is essential and novel, to the best of our knowledge, as few studies have assessed the propounded research question in the context of the political transformations resulting from the Arab Spring.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the conceptual framework, presenting the employed definition of political participation, and the theoretical and empirical insights on the participation gender gap and its sources. Section 3 provides the research framework, delineating the data, variables, and empirical methodology utilized. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.

## **2. Conceptual Framework**

### *2.1. Defining Political Participation*

Political theorists recognize the central role of political participation in the functioning of a democracy. Activities such as voting, running for office, and joining political parties serve to structure public discourse and provide citizens with an active voice in their community. This paper commits to a minimal definition of engagement, evading the risk of utilizing a “theory of everything” (van Deth, 2014; Pfanzelt and Spies, 2018). Thus, we refer to political participation as actions conducted by citizens in an attempt to impact decision-making, excluding all

occurrences in the following contexts: schools, families, workplace settings, and voluntary associations. By doing so, we omit all involuntary participation, school or club engagements, political attitudes, and actions by citizens in their roles as elected officials.

Based on this definition, we distinguish broadly between two forms of participation: institutional and non-institutional, (i.e. political activism). The former consists of long-established actions, whose central principle is governmental representation. Participation typically includes voting, party membership, running for office, or working on political campaigns, etc. This includes less “conventional” types of participation, involving actions like protests, demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes as the most prominent examples. The conducted analysis supports theoretically distinguishing between “collective activism” and “private activism”, allowing for a more exhaustive approach (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010).

The adopted classification follows from the established evidence on the global change in citizens’ participation mode (Dalton, 2008). With the increase in educational attainment and internet access, citizens are seeking to influence politics through different methods. Given this change, political theorists have adopted two approaches in evaluating political activity. The first strategy expands the repertoire of participation to incorporate new patterns of engagement emphasizing the need of placing more control in the hands of the citizenry (Norris, 2002). The second strategy stresses differences in the requirements placed on participants depending on the type of engagement (Verba et al., 1978). This is an important consideration for group analyses whereby one must attend to differences that may shape a citizen’s ability and interest in participation (Norris and Curtis 2006; Dalton 2008).

## *2.2. Gender Differences in Political Participation Forms*

Scholars suggest gender discrepancies in political engagement might be rooted in divergent preferences (Sarvasy and Siim, 1994; Burns, 2007). For example, women in the United States are found to favor social movements over radical actions (Hooghe and Stolle, 2004). In general, these preferences are ascribed to differences in demographic characteristics and political attitudes (Section 2.3). Prior evaluations based on European large-scale surveys point to the dependence of political engagement on resource endowments, with men more likely to engage in activities that require more resources like institutional and collective forms (Norris, 2002; Gallego, 2007; Dalton, 2008). Women, on the other hand, may be pushed to specialize in private forms, which do

not strain their relatively limited resources, and are more easily incorporated in their daily lives (Stolle et al., 2005). To clarify, limited access and control of resources may restrict their engagement in time-consuming and costly forms of participation (Burns, 2007; Paxton et al., 2007; Lister and Campling, 2017). Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) use a cross-national dataset for Western countries and find a positive and significant gender gap for collective activism, but women are found to participate more in private political activities. Comparable findings are substantiated by Pfanzelt and Spies (2018) who conduct a similar analysis utilizing data for German adolescents. On the other hand, results for unconsolidated democracies show a consistent gender gap across all participation forms. For instance, Coffé and Dilli (2014) investigate the participation gap for Muslim-majority countries and find that men outperform women across participation forms. Thus, the distinction among types of engagement provides an enhanced understanding of the gender gap. This is especially noteworthy for the target group in this study given that institutional engagement gaps tend to be less pronounced in newly-established democracies (Norris, 2002; Gallego, 2007; Dalton, 2008). In this context, gender gaps in voting and party membership may be less manifested as they are regarded as “safer” arenas for females (Geisler, 2004). In fact, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) investigate the same research question for sub-Saharan African countries and find, in line with results for developed democracies, a relatively smaller gap for institutionalized participation forms.

In brief, we summarize the arguments on the gender gap in participation forms as follows:

*The institutional participation gender gap favors men and is less pronounced than the non-institutional gap. (Hypothesis 1)*

*The non-institutional participation gender gap favors men but is less pronounced for private activism. (Hypothesis 2)*

### *2.3. Drivers of the Gender Gap in Political Participation*

This section distinguishes among the theoretical arguments in the literature to present potential independent variables as sources of the participation gender gap. The arguments are grouped into two broad categories: socioeconomic characteristics and political attitudes. For each category, we highlight the variables’ significance as they relate to political participation, summarize previous findings relating to the gender gap, and discuss expectations pertaining to the region under study.

### *a. Socioeconomic Characteristics*

Researchers have long emphasized the role of individual resources in their effect on political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972). Generally, the established relationship is evident and points to higher levels of participation as resource endowments increase. As such, controlling for socioeconomic resources may mediate an extensive portion of the gender gap. Schlozman et al. (1994) utilize a resource model of political participation to investigate whether disparities can be explained by resource endowment inequalities. They find that income, educational attainment, and employment are regarded as key variables with significant effects, each affecting economic resources potentially available for participation, availability of free time and the requisite civic skills needed for participation. Age, responsibility for children, and marital status are also notably discussed. Political participation is typically shown to increase with age as citizens acquire the pertinent skills and knowledge, although the form of participation may vary among cohorts. This is in line with the acknowledged finding of higher voting participation rates among older people (Quintelier, 2007; Marien et al., 2010; Melo and Stockemer, 2014). On the other hand, obligations to children and marriage are generally shown to decrease participation rates by limiting income and time availability (Coffé and Voorpostel, 2012). However, these effects may vary depending on the form of engagement and the resources and time required by each (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010).

An additional determinant concerns involvement in non-political associations. Associational involvement has become a contested predictor of political engagement where it concerns the mobilization of agents linking individuals to their surroundings (Norris, 2002; Morales, 2009). In this regard, participation in voluntary associations instils norms of social trust and reciprocity that help foster political engagement (Putnam, 2000). We distinguish between leisure and interest associations following Morales (2009) where leisure associations include membership in sports and hobby associations whereas interest associations involve membership in organizations like labour unions and professional associations. In this regard, although interest organizations often do get involved in matters of politics, membership is not solely influenced by political outcomes.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> As previously indicated, we regard participation in voluntary organizations as separate and distinguishable from political participation in defining political engagement.

With regards to gender discrepancies in participation, the effect of resource inequalities is unambiguous. Inequalities in resource endowments form a common explanation for lower female political participation rates (Schlozman et al., 1994; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). Empirical evidence still unanimously points to the persistence of a gender wage gap, with women significantly disadvantaged and more often employed part-time with a lower socioeconomic status (World Economic Forum, 2020). In addition, Coffé and Voorpostel (2012) find that family responsibilities act as a larger constraint to women's participation even if they reach occupational statuses similar to their partners'. This is because the larger share of childcare and domestic work falls on them. Previous work also indicates divorce or separation is more likely to decrease female political participation acting as an additional burden that drains resources (Poortman, 2000). With regards to associational involvement, (Flap & Völker, 2004) find significant differences among men and women on the basis that "men have more strategic locations in social structure on the whole: they are better placed to meet many others, and to enter their networks." For instance, because men are more likely to hold high-status occupations, they are therefore more likely to engage in activities that expand their social networks.

In line with research for developed nations, scholarly work on less-established democracies shows a positive relationship between resource endowments and political participation (Tessler, 2003; Hofmann, 2004). Similarly, gender discrepancies in education and employment persist in the MENA (World Economic Forum, 2020). In fact, women's earning potential remains significantly lower than their male counterparts. Where women do have similar earning potential, their access to credit and financial capital is constrained by legal or cultural barriers. Second, although women's educational attainment is on the rise, female labor force participation persists at relatively low rates. Finally, household chores and childcare in the MENA are distributed unequally with females handling the majority of domestic work (World Economic Forum, 2020). In short, given the positive correlation between socioeconomic resources and political participation and the large gender differences in resource endowments, we propose the following hypothesis:

*As resource endowments increase, political participation will increase. This effect is stronger among men. (Hypothesis 3)*

#### *b. Political Attitudes*

A strong indicator of political participation is an individual's politically-held beliefs. Political attitudes do not essentially precede participation (Quintelier and van Deth, 2014); however, there



is a general consensus among scholars that those with higher degrees of interest and trust in politics will engage more in political activities (Bennett et al., 1989; Verba et al., 1997). Besides the aforementioned variables, an attitudinal characteristic bound to shape citizens' engagement is the individually-reported democratic deficit (i.e., the gap between a respondent's reported democratic aspirations and his/her satisfaction with the country's democratic governance). In this regard, mass protests, demonstrations, and clientelist party relations, etc. are emblematic symptoms of a high democratic deficit (Norris, 2011).

The empirical evidence shows that women display lower levels of interest in politics and regard politics as less important than their male counterparts; such differences in attitudes are evidence of disparities in participation (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). Chhibber (2002) substantiates the gender gap in attitudinal characteristics for the Arab world, and prior work in both developed and new democracies confirms the positive correlation between political attitudes and participation (Helou, 2005).

In short, given the positive correlation between political attitudes and participation and the gender discrepancies in attitudinal characteristics, we propose the following hypothesis:

*As levels of political trust, interest, importance, and democratic deficit increase, political participation will increase. This effect is stronger among men. (Hypothesis 4)*

### **3. Research Framework**

#### *3.1. Data*

We use cross-sectional data extracted from the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 (2010-2014) (Inglehart et al., 2014). The sample includes respondents from Algeria (1200), Egypt (1523), Iraq (1200), Jordan (1200), Lebanon (1200), Libya (2131), Morocco (1200), Tunisia (1205), Palestine (1000), and Yemen (1000). All missing values in the data are dropped; missing values comprise those to which the respondent refused to answer or did not know how to answer, or those which are not applicable or not asked. The final sample size amounts to 12847 respondents (male: N = 6214, 48.37%; female: N = 6633, 51.63%). We present the dependent and independent variables in the following sub-section before turning to the empirical model employed.

### 3.2. Variables

#### a. Dependent Variables

To study the gender differences in political participation exhaustively, we construct three dependent variables: institutional, collective, and private participation. The variables are of ordinal nature, adjusted to range from (0) to (2), with higher levels indicating higher engagement. All variables are presented in Table 1. The first variable, *Institutional Participation*, is operationalized by merging the variables *Political Party Member* and *Electoral Behavior*. Both are ordinal variables measured on a 3-point scale. For party membership, respondents were asked to identify their political party activity level. A value of (0) indicates the respondent does not belong to a party, (1) indicates inactive membership, and (2) indicates active membership. Electoral behavior measures whether the respondent votes never (0), usually (1), or always (2). To measure non-institutional participation, two dependent variables are constructed: *Private Activism* and *Collective Activism*. The former merges responses from the variables *Petition* and *Boycott*, and the latter merges responses from the variables *Demonstrations* and *Unofficial Strike*<sup>3</sup>.

#### b. Independent Variables

To capture potential differences in participation between men and women, we first construct the key independent variable, the *Gender* dummy, which takes on the value of one if the respondent is female, and zero otherwise.

To capture the effect of socioeconomic characteristics, we include eight different indicators. *Educational attainment* refers to the highest completed level of education, consisting of the following categories: no education (0) (reference category), primary education (1), secondary education (2), and, university education (3). *Marital status* has three categories: never married (0) (reference category), married (1), and separated (2). The third category, separated, includes respondents who are separated, divorced, or widowed. *Employment Status* is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if the respondent is employed, and zero otherwise. We also control for income, number of children, and age. *Income* ranges from (1), the lowest group, to (10), the highest group, and captures the respondent's own perception of his/her earnings. *Number of Children* ranges from (0), no children, to (8), eight or more children, and *Age* ranges from a value

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<sup>3</sup> Petition, Boycott, Demonstrations, and Unofficial Strikes are ordinal variables measuring the frequency of respondent's participation in the respective activity. For all variables, respondents were asked to indicate whether they have done (2), might do (1), or would never do (0) the political action.

of 16 to a value of 84. *Leisure Associations* represents membership in religious, recreational, artistic/educational, or mutual aid clubs and *Interest Associations* represents membership in labour unions, professional, consumer, and environmental organizations. Both variables are additive indices rescaled so that a value of one indicates passive or active membership and a value of zero indicates no membership.

For politically-relevant attitudes, we incorporate four variables: political trust, political interest, political importance, and democratic deficit. The *Political Trust Index* is constructed by averaging responses on confidence in the government, political parties, the parliament, and civil service. Responses range from no trust at all (0) to a great deal of trust (3). Accounting for all elements of the political system in measuring a citizen's trust is essential as trust not only covers systemic elements of the political system, but also very specific experiences such as the services provided by the government and experiences with its members (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2001). This method of measurement is considered as the most adequate for tapping into respondents' evaluative perception (Ulbig, 2002). To measure *Political Interest*, we use the survey question: "How interested would you say you are in politics", to which possible responses range from not at all interested (0) to very interested (3). Lastly, *Political Importance* is a measure capturing the importance of politics in the respondent's life. Responses range from not at all important (0) to very important (3). All items have been reverse-coded so that higher values indicate a higher level of trust, interest, and importance, and were adjusted to start at zero. Democratic deficit, utilized extensively by Norris (2011), is measured by the difference between democratic aspirations and satisfaction with democratic governance presently, i.e., the difference between responses to the following questions: "how important is it for you to live in a country that is democratically-governed?" and "how democratically is your country being governed today?"

[Table 1 here]

### 3.3. Descriptive Statistics

Before presenting results from the main model, we analyze gender differences in participation using the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1. The table reports mean values of all variables for both genders separately along with the difference in means, which conveys the gender gap without any controls, and the significance tests results (two-sample t-tests).

The series of mean comparisons show significant gender differences for the dependent variables across the three forms of political engagement, with men more likely to be involved in all forms of political participation. To clarify, women are less likely to participate actively in elections and political parties, suggesting gender discrepancies in formal politics in the region subsist. Women also display lower levels of participation in collective activism, as would be predicted by their lower socioeconomic status in the region. Similarly, the mean comparison shows a significant gender gap in private political activities, which contradicts the literature for developed economies (e.g. Stolle and Micheletti, 2006; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). However, differences in private participation are less pronounced than those for collective activism, and institutional participation variations are the narrowest. These results as yet, before moving to more complex models, indicate alignment with Hypotheses (1) and (2), suggesting that we can generalize the gender gap to all forms of political participation in the MENA region.

Gender differences may diminish after controlling for the set of socioeconomic variables and political attitudes. In fact, the mean comparison mostly points to women having fewer socioeconomic resources than men, which would ultimately depress their political engagement. Notably, men report attaining higher levels of education as about 26.0 percent of male respondents have a university-level education (vs. 20.4 percent for women). Men are also overwhelmingly more likely to be employed (66.0 percent vs. 26.0 percent for women). Similarly, female respondents are more likely to be married and separated, which works to drain the resources that could otherwise have been used for participation (63.2 percent vs. 60.2 percent for men) and (10.6 percent vs. 3.0 percent for men), respectively. Discrepancies in associational involvement are also observed as the difference between men women's engagement is approximately two-fold. With regards to politically-relevant attitudes, the mean comparison shows a positive gender gap as well. Men regard politics as more important than women, and report higher levels of democratic deficit, political interest and trust, although this difference is insignificant.

### *3.4. Empirical Methodology*

Given that our dependent variables are of an ordinal nature (0, 1, 2), we employ an ordered logit model. Consider a latent variable model where  $y_i^*$  depicts the unobserved – latent – dependent

variables,  $\mathbf{x}_i$  is a vector of independent variables<sup>4</sup>,  $\beta'$  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term assumed to have a standard logistic distribution.

$$y_i^* = \beta' \mathbf{x}_i + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Instead of  $y_i^*$ , we observe the following:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y_i^* \leq 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } 0 < y_i^* \leq \mu_1 \\ 2 & \text{if } y_i^* \geq \mu_2 \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Where  $y_i$  is the level of participation ranked on a 3-point scale and  $\mu$  is the threshold level of the latent variable with  $\mu_2 > \mu_1$  to be estimated along with the  $\beta'$  vector.

Consequently, given  $F(\cdot)$  as the standard normal distribution function, the univariate probability of  $y_i^* = j$  with ( $j = 0, 1, 2$ ) is as follows:

$$\Pr[y_i = j] = F[\mu_j - \beta' x_i] - F[\mu_{j-1} - \beta' x_i] \quad (3)$$

This implies that:

$$\Pr[y_i = j] = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mu_j + \beta' x_i}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mu_{j-1} + \beta' x_i}} \quad (4)$$

This equation is used in the derivation of the odds ratio<sup>5</sup>, defined as the probability that the dependent variable has a certain realization  $j$  relative to another independent realization  $j - 1$ .

To test the first research question, we sequentially introduce the socioeconomic and politically-relevant controls to test their mediation effects for each of the three forms of political participation: institutional, private and collective. This is the standard approach used for testing mediation effects (Barron and Kenny, 1986).

To test the second research question and identify whether there are different effects of relevant independent variables on participation among men and women, we fit the models simultaneously using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in order to compute cross-model covariances with institutional, private, and collective participation as dependent variables and the aforementioned demographic and attitudinal characteristics as independent variables. We then use a Chow test to assess significant differences across models.

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<sup>4</sup> Including the socioeconomic and attitudinal variables outlined in Table 1.

<sup>5</sup> Our results are more naturally presented as odds ratios; as the main focus of this study is on the direction of the gender gap, then the odds ratio is sufficient (see Norton & Dowd, 2017).

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Benchmark results

Table 2 presents the odds ratios obtained from running the ordered logit models for institutional, private and collective participation. For each form of political participation, we report a restricted model with only the gender dummy (Model 1), a model incorporating socioeconomic characteristics (Model 2), and a full model, including both socioeconomic characteristics and politically-relevant influences.<sup>6</sup> A comparison of the models will allow us to identify whether gender discrepancies persist, and to what extent the set of controls can explain them.

Four major conclusions can be derived from Table 2. First, moving from the restricted model to the full model for all forms of engagement leads to a reduction in the participation gender gap. In other words, as women generally score lower on attitudinal and socioeconomic influences, controlling for these variables yields a lower participation gender gap. However, even after all socioeconomic and attitudinal variables are included, the gender effect is not completely mediated; as such, it cannot be concluded that these variables serve to fully explain, and thus, eliminate the gap. Second, and in line with Hypotheses (1) and (2), the institutional participation gender gap, which is considered the “safest” arena, is the least pronounced, and the collective participation gap, requiring the most resources and time, is the most pronounced. Specifically, we observe in the full model that the odds of men being on a higher participation level are 1.3 times higher for institutional forms, 1.4 times higher for private forms, and 1.8 times higher for collective political activities<sup>7</sup>. Third, the general picture points to a positive correlation between socioeconomic resources and participation, with a few exceptions.

We observe in the full model that higher education levels and associational involvement are positively and significantly correlated to all participation forms. Employment and income are positively and significantly correlated to non-institutional participation forms, whereas age is only positively correlated to institutional forms. This is reasonable as empirical evidence points to older cohorts favoring traditional participation over non-institutional engagement; thus, as age increases, participation in non-institutional activities such as demonstrations, strikes, or boycotts decreases (Dalton, 2008). Results for marriage and number of children are ambiguous. Being married and

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<sup>6</sup> Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were assessed to investigate collinearity among the explanatory variables in each model, with no problematic collinearity detected.

<sup>7</sup> An odds ratio less than one signifies a negative correlation; an odds ratio exceeding one signifies a positive correlation.

having more children both positively and significantly affect institutional participation; the latter has an insignificant effect otherwise, and the former decreases non-institutional participation.

These results are, however, supported by previous scholarly work. With marriage and an increasing number of children, citizens might opt for more stability in their domestic lives; this is transferred unto the political realm wherein they favor traditional, formal, and safe political participation to influence decision-making over activist participation. (Stoker & Jennings, 1995; Miller and Shanks, 1996). Finally, those who regard politics as more interesting and important engage significantly more in all types of political activities. Similarly, higher levels of democratic deficit correlate positively and significantly with all forms of engagement. Political trust, on the other hand, only has a significant and positive effect on institutional participation. These results are reasonable; in fact, McCall and Gamson (1968) define political trust as “the probability... that the political system (or some part of it) will produce the preferred outcome even if left unattended”, which is not the case for a citizen partaking in private or collective activism.

[Table 2 here]

#### *4.2. Results by gender subsample*

To test our second research question and identify whether there are different effects of relevant independent variables on participation among men and women, we present separate models for each gender (Table 3). The aim is to evaluate the extent to which the explanatory variables impact participation differently among men and among women. Inherent in this analysis is the idea that characteristics influencing engagement affect men and women differently. This assessment will provide insights on the decisive factors when it comes to mediating the participation gender gap. First, the models are run as seemingly unrelated (SUR) regressions, giving the simultaneous equations for the female and male sample, and a Chow test is conducted. The test indicates whether coefficients for an independent variable are significantly different. Specifically, we are testing the null hypothesis that the correlation of  $x_i$  with participation is the same for men and women. Rejecting the null implies there are gender differences in the respective correlation. The gray cells in Table 3 indicate significant differences are detected, i.e. the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level of significance.

Among the socioeconomic characteristics, significant differences are detected in educational attainment and employment status. Having a primary education is positively and

significantly associated with higher collective participation among men but has a negative and insignificant effect among women. Interestingly, being employed is positively and significantly correlated with higher political participation across non-institutional forms for women but has no significant effect among men. Thus, effect sizes for this variable run opposite to the hypothesized (Hypothesis 3). Scholzman et al. (1999) depict several circumstances by which workforce participation is translated into political engagement. These include, but are not limited to, resources, attitudes, psychological predispositions, and networking opportunities. The authors find two exceptions whereby men are disadvantaged. The first is time, which diminishes resource availability for politics among men more than among women. The second is “women’s advantage”, in this context, derived from exposure to workplace discrimination which they will seek to counter through political reform. Nonetheless, we cannot explicitly infer the underlying set of circumstances. The depicted relationship is a result of complex and distinctive workplace experiences that require further study. Among the attitudinal controls. Political trust shows significant gender differences for institutional participation. Although influential among both sexes, it increases participation among men more than among women. The same is true for political interest, which matters differently for private activism. Significant gender differences in democratic deficit are also identified for institutional participation. The variable correlates positively and significantly with higher institutional engagement among men but has an insignificant effect among women. These results confirm Hypothesis (4).

[Table 3 here]

#### *4.3. Results by country*

For a closer examination of the gender gap, Tables 4-6 display the ordered logit model for each form of participation in each examined MENA country. Overall, two main patterns emerge. First, some gender gaps disappear when examined at the country level. Second, where a gender gap does exist, the gap favors men in the majority of cases. We first examine the gender gap in respondents’ likelihood to participate institutionally, displayed in Table 4. For this form, the results indicate that men and women participate at equal rates in half of the examined MENA countries, specifically in Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Women participate less than men in all remaining countries with the exception of Algeria where a gap favoring women is observed.



Numerous factors could contribute to Algeria being an outlier. For example, parliamentary seats occupied by Algerian women reached 31.0 percent in the survey period, the highest among Arab states (UNDP, 2016). Additionally, the country outperformed neighboring MENA nations when it comes to other gender development measures like education, livelihoods and health (ESCWA, 2016). Beyond these findings, further analysis is required to obtain an exhaustive understanding of the link between these potential explanations and the institutional participation gender gap in Algeria.

For non-institutional action, Tables 5 and 6 show that women engage less than their male counterparts in all MENA countries with only two exceptions: Yemen for private activism and Morocco for collective activism. The gender gap in Lebanon and Egypt is insignificant for both forms of activism, and the gap in Jordan and Morocco is insignificant for private activism. Although we are unable to compare specific effect sizes at country-level with those of previous findings, the analysis generally points to a consistent participation gap favoring men across all forms as previously indicated; these results are compatible with findings in Latin America (Espinal and Zhao, 2015), Africa (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2011; Isaksson et al., 2014), and East and Southeast Asia (Liu, 2020) where gender acts as a strong indicator of participation and men are more engaged than their female counterparts.

[Tables 4-6 here]

#### *4.4. Results by political regime type*

As a final assessment, we classify the countries in our sample into 3 categories and run the ordered logit model for each form of participation and for each country classification individually. Our classification is based on the average Democracy Index across the years 2010 to 2014. The Democracy Index, collated by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is a weighted average of five indices: “electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.” Countries are then classified based on the overall score either as fully democracies (score of 9-10), flawed democracies (score of 7-8), hybrid regimes (score of 5-6), or authoritarian regimes (score of 2-4). Our sample of MENA countries score in the range of 2.7 to 5.3, with only three countries, Palestine, Tunisia, and Lebanon classified as hybrid regimes, and the rest categorized as authoritarian. Thus, based on the country rankings, we group Yemen,

Egypt, and Algeria together as “High Authoritarian”; Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Iraq as “Low Authoritarian”, and Palestine, Tunisia, and Lebanon as “Hybrid Regimes”.

The results are displayed in Table 7. We report results including both the demographic and attitudinal controls. Previous work points to a positive, mutually reinforcing relationship, between democracy and gender equality as a democratic system provides the civic space, mobilization, and accountability needed to promote gender equality (Reynolds, 1999; Inglehart et al., 2002). To clarify, authoritarian regimes, which tend to be more conservative, traditional, and religious in nature are more likely to fall back on the provision of gender-sensitive reforms promoting female political participation (Smith and Padula, 1996; Beer, 2009). As such, we observe the highest gender participation gap among the “low authoritarian” grouping across institutional and private participation forms and among the “high authoritarian” grouping for collective participation. The lowest participation gap for non-institutional engagement is observed for the “hybrid regime” grouping, the category scoring highest on civil liberties and political freedoms among the countries in our target group.

[Table 7 here]

## **5. Conclusion**

Following recent uprisings in a number of countries, the hope for democratization and stability warrants scholarly work on participatory inequalities. Studies on the gender gap in the Arab world, and other unconsolidated democracies, has generally lagged. Such investigations might be especially enlightening as women’s involvement in political sphere is known to yield a transformative effect (Wolf and Bystydzienski 1992; O’Regan, 2000; World Economic Forum, 2020).

This paper attempts to explain gender discrepancies in political participation in the MENA region. The scope of the analysis covers two research questions; first, we evaluate whether the gender gap in participation is mediated by socioeconomic and politically-relevant controls, comparing results across engagement forms; second, we assess whether variables influencing participation affect men and women differently. Results indicate men are more politically involved across all forms of engagement; thus, in contrast to findings from developed democracies, one can generalize the gender gap across the entire spectrum of political participation. However,

differences in private participation are less pronounced than those for collective activism, and institutional participation variations are the narrowest (Hypotheses 1 and 2).

Regarding the sources of the participation gender gap, the findings are mixed. First, socioeconomic resources do not always matter as anticipated. Being married and having more children increases engagement in institutional political activities; also, employment is shown to increase participation among women, but has no significant effect among men. Thus, there is not enough evidence in line with Hypothesis 3. Second, political attitudes increase participation across all forms. Although influential among both sexes, the variables increase participation among men more than among women, as anticipated (Hypothesis 4).

Our study has several policy implications. First, non-institutional political activities are increasingly being recognized for their impact on political outcomes, and their stratification among groups, such as gender, is clearly documented in the literature. As such, decision-making must reflect all participation forms. It should not be limited to formal (voting, party membership) or collective (protests, strikes) participation. For example, if collective participation is more likely to yield political reform than private engagement, then policy decisions would be a reflection of men's demands, more than women's. Second, given that employment is a decisive factor in mediating the depicted gap, policies to promote women's participation in labor markets and the economic emancipation of Arab women are imperative. This will increase the bargaining power of women and their access to income, ultimately yielding a cultural shift towards gender equality and democratic political engagement. Finally, a main pillar in increasing female participation across all forms is advancing female parliamentary representation. Although standard approaches entail the use of quotas or reserved shared, this study has shown that a more nuanced approach is requisite. Gender-sensitive reforms must start by targeting the implicit, interconnected constraints that keep women out of politics (e.g. domestic burdens, child-care, cultural barriers, financing constraints, etc.)

In sum, the results of this research extend previous claims and findings yet raise numerous questions with regards to the participation gender gap in the region. Controlling for the relevant demographic and political characteristics do not serve to mediate the gender gap as anticipated and further scholarly work is warranted. For instance, women's political attitudes will converge to men's as they participate more politically; thus, evaluating this research question with a longitudinal component might prove beneficial. Similarly, political engagement might be further

disentangled and classified into a greater subset of actions, allowing for a more exhaustive examination. Extensions of this study should consider implications of participation gaps for each engagement form on political outcomes. Finally, an examination of cross-regional differences would provide a greater understanding of macro-influences driving gender discrepancies as it must be recognized that participation in politics takes place within a regional context under sociological and cultural influences.

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**Table 1:** Descriptive Statistics and Mean Comparison

	<b>N</b>	<b>Range</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Difference</b>	<b>p-value</b>
<b>Dependent Variables</b>						
Institutional Participation	12847	0-2	1.150	1.001	0.149	0.0000
Private Activism	12847	0-2	0.612	0.379	0.233	0.0000
Collective Activism	12847	0-2	0.812	0.464	0.348	0.0000
<b>Independent Variables</b>						
<i>Socioeconomic Controls</i>						
Female	12847	0/1				
Educational Attainment (reference: no education)						
Primary Education	12807	0/1	0.218	0.210	0.009	0.1141
Secondary Education	12807	0/1	0.383	0.346	0.037	0.0000
University Education	12807	0/1	0.260	0.204	0.057	0.0000
Marital Status (reference: never married)						
Married	12845	0/1	0.602	0.632	-0.030	0.9998
Separated	12845	0/1	0.030	0.106	-0.076	1.0000
Employment Status (reference: unemployed)						
Employed	12847	0/1	0.660	0.260	0.401	0.0000
Income	12529	1-10	4.796	4.805	-0.010	0.6002
Number of Children	12754	0-8	2.036	2.369	-0.333	1.0000
Age	12847	18-84	38.201	38.010	0.191	0.2273
Interest Associations	12847	0/1	0.227	0.111	0.034	0.0000
Leisure Associations	12847	0/1	0.237	0.175	0.062	0.0000
<i>Attitudinal Controls</i>						
Political Trust Index	12847	0-3	0.909	0.927	-0.018	0.9208
Political Interest	12847	0-3	1.437	1.284	0.153	0.0000
Political Importance	12847	0-3	1.431	1.272	0.159	0.0000
Democracy Deficit	12010	-9-9	3.461	3.286	0.175	0.0028

**Table 2:** Gender differences in Political Participation, Benchmark results (Odds Ratio, Ordered Logit Results)

	Institutional Participation			Private Activism			Collective Activism		
	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 1.3	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 3.1	Model 3.2	Model 3.3
<b>Gender Gap</b>									
Female	0.702*** (0.024)	0.745*** (0.030)	0.784*** (0.033)	0.555*** (0.022)	0.647*** (0.030)	0.721*** (0.034)	0.451*** (0.018)	0.522*** (0.023)	0.545*** (0.025)
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>									
Primary Education		1.060 (0.064)	0.962 (0.062)		1.381*** (0.112)	1.102 (0.094)		1.426*** (0.110)	1.183** (0.097)
Secondary Education		1.203*** (0.072)	1.084 (0.069)		1.723*** (0.137)	1.297*** (0.108)		1.754*** (0.134)	1.376*** (0.111)
University Education		1.392*** (0.094)	1.207*** (0.087)		2.232*** (0.191)	1.586*** (0.143)		2.212*** (0.183)	1.637*** (0.143)
Married		1.223*** (0.066)	1.222*** (0.068)		0.918 (0.058)	0.873** (0.057)		0.792*** (0.048)	0.767*** (0.049)
Separated		0.890 (0.077)	0.914 (0.083)		0.979 (0.106)	0.962 (0.109)		0.867 (0.091)	0.890 (0.098)
Employed		1.090** (0.045)	1.055 (0.045)		1.269*** (0.060)	1.247*** (0.062)		1.253*** (0.058)	1.231*** (0.059)
Income		1.011 (0.009)	1.002 (0.009)		1.040*** (0.011)	1.033*** (0.011)		1.041*** (0.011)	1.034*** (0.011)
Number of Children		1.049*** (0.011)	1.039*** (0.012)		1.023* (0.014)	1.020 (0.014)		1.024* (0.013)	1.020 (0.014)
Age		1.014*** (0.002)	1.013*** (0.002)		0.996* (0.002)	0.993*** (0.002)		0.990*** (0.002)	0.987*** (0.002)
Interest Associations		1.577*** (0.099)	1.574*** (0.103)		1.370*** (0.088)	1.338*** (0.090)		1.364*** (0.088)	1.331*** (0.089)

Leisure Associations	1.340*** (0.069)	1.286*** (0.069)	1.484*** (0.081)	1.438*** (0.081)	1.895*** (0.102)	1.899*** (0.106)
<b>Attitudinal Controls</b>						
Political Trust Index		1.451*** (0.040)		1.033 (0.033)		0.989 (0.031)
Political Interest		1.287*** (0.030)		1.627*** (0.046)		1.625*** (0.045)
Political Importance		1.113*** (0.024)		1.133*** (0.028)		1.069*** (0.026)
Democratic Deficit		1.026*** (0.006)		1.027*** (0.007)		1.024*** (0.007)
N	12847	12407	11691	12847	12407	11691

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

All models control for country fixed effects.

**Table 3:** Gender Differences in Political Participation, Results by Gender (Odds Ratio, Ordered Logit Results)

	Institutional Participation		Private Activism		Collective Activism	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>						
Primary Education	1.036 (0.087)	0.833 (0.088)	1.026 (0.123)	1.276 (0.164)	0.943 (0.110)	1.378** (0.167)
Secondary Education	1.179* (0.099)	0.896 (0.094)	1.285* (0.150)	1.431** (0.180)	1.294* (0.148)	1.367** (0.163)
University Education	1.359** (0.135)	0.959 (0.109)	1.719*** (0.226)	1.640*** (0.218)	1.609*** (0.208)	1.561*** (0.198)
Married	1.186* (0.092)	1.230* (0.104)	0.871 (0.084)	0.908 (0.085)	0.753** (0.071)	0.823* (0.075)
Separated	0.924 (0.105)	1.006 (0.170)	0.904 (0.133)	1.154 (0.217)	0.829 (0.119)	1.125 (0.211)
Employed	1.120 (0.075)	1.005 (0.060)	1.457*** (0.116)	1.114 (0.073)	1.407*** (0.108)	1.038 (0.068)
Income	1.019 (0.013)	0.988 (0.0139)	1.024 (0.017)	1.042** (0.016)	1.041** (0.016)	1.044** (0.016)
Number of Children	1.057*** (0.016)	1.030 (0.019)	1.030 (0.021)	1.017 (0.020)	1.050* (0.021)	1.008 (0.019)
Age	1.012*** (0.003)	1.014*** (0.003)	0.991* (0.003)	0.994 (0.003)	0.989** (0.003)	0.984*** (0.003)
Interest Associations	1.793*** (0.180)	1.456*** (0.128)	1.562*** (0.167)	1.188* (0.103)	1.484*** (0.155)	1.238* (0.110)
Leisure Associations	1.196* (0.098)	1.336*** (0.095)	1.437*** (0.130)	1.383*** (0.101)	1.958*** (0.170)	1.759*** (0.130)
<b>Attitudinal Controls</b>						
Political Trust Index	1.353*** (0.051)	1.557*** (0.064)	1.084 (0.052)	0.979 (0.044)	0.975 (0.045)	0.989 (0.044)
Political Interest	1.272*** (0.041)	1.326*** (0.046)	1.511*** (0.063)	1.756*** (0.069)	1.651*** (0.068)	1.671*** (0.064)
Political Importance	1.114***	1.129***	1.157***	1.120***	1.094*	1.077*

	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Democratic Deficit	1.007	1.051***	1.037***	1.024**	1.023*	1.027**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
N	5969	5722	5969	5722	5969	5722

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Gray shaded cells indicate regression coefficients vary significantly between men and women (seemingly unrelated estimations test)

**Table 4:** Gender Differences in Institutional Participation, Results by Country (Odds Ratio, Ordered Logit Results)

	Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
<b>Gender Gap</b>										
Female	1.335** (0.183)	0.767 (0.133)	0.843 (0.129)	0.975 (0.141)	0.982 (0.124)	0.560*** (0.055)	0.686** (0.104)	0.937 (0.125)	0.763* (0.114)	0.630** (0.125)
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>										
Primary Education	0.742 (0.177)	1.024 (0.434)	1.096 (0.258)	1.202 (0.380)	1.671 (0.529)	1.992*** (0.451)	0.655* (0.147)	0.915 (0.186)	1.068 (0.166)	0.723 (0.144)
Secondary Education	0.679 (0.170)	1.054 (0.450)	1.465 (0.352)	1.330 (0.419)	1.849** (0.539)	2.275*** (0.515)	0.523*** (0.119)	0.919 (0.200)	1.513*** (0.202)	0.568*** (0.121)
University Education	0.950 (0.265)	1.165 (0.511)	1.089 (0.283)	1.409 (0.465)	1.771* (0.532)	2.257*** (0.529)	1.043 (0.395)	1.120 (0.287)	2.109*** (0.380)	0.797 (0.206)
Married	1.160 (0.237)	1.486* (0.334)	1.319 (0.269)	1.073 (0.207)	1.630*** (0.308)	1.248* (0.161)	0.817 (0.184)	1.230 (0.241)	1.024 (0.180)	1.568** (0.353)
Separated	1.651 (0.515)	1.388 (0.515)	0.647 (0.216)	0.815 (0.289)	0.849 (0.232)	1.060 (0.253)	0.952 (0.323)	0.825 (0.301)	0.801 (0.195)	1.507 (0.541)
Employed	1.438** (0.205)	0.970 (0.176)	0.940 (0.152)	0.658*** (0.097)	0.954 (0.124)	1.050 (0.104)	1.631** (0.379)	1.115 (0.146)	1.439** (0.207)	0.812 (0.159)
Income	0.956 (0.031)	1.089** (0.042)	0.997 (0.037)	0.919*** (0.027)	0.887*** (0.029)	1.068*** (0.022)	1.208*** (0.060)	1.045 (0.033)	1.026 (0.027)	0.958 (0.032)
Number of Children	1.121** (0.059)	1.038 (0.045)	0.944 (0.037)	1.110*** (0.038)	0.939 (0.053)	0.962 (0.025)	1.140* (0.079)	0.999 (0.054)	1.131*** (0.039)	1.094** (0.039)
Age	1.023*** (0.007)	0.995 (0.008)	1.018*** (0.007)	1.012** (0.006)	1.020*** (0.006)	1.012** (0.005)	1.010 (0.009)	1.025*** (0.007)	1.014*** (0.004)	1.017** (0.007)
Interest Associations	1.388 (0.377)	2.296*** (0.508)	1.314 (0.408)	1.471* (0.334)	2.631*** (0.395)	1.450*** (0.189)	0.863 (0.208)	1.492 (0.537)	2.946 (2.761)	2.375*** (0.650)
Leisure Associations	1.707*** (0.277)	1.048 (0.180)	1.631*** (0.297)	0.993 (0.177)	1.035 (0.139)	1.390*** (0.163)	0.795 (0.180)	1.847*** (0.425)	1.087 (0.530)	1.396 (0.312)
<b>Attitudinal Controls</b>										
Political Trust Index	1.421*** (0.110)	2.098*** (0.237)	2.444*** (0.282)	1.296*** (0.124)	1.211** (0.117)	1.439*** (0.100)	1.848*** (0.176)	1.250** (0.139)	1.035 (0.076)	1.043 (0.140)
Political Interest	1.335***	1.256**	1.349***	1.184**	1.737***	1.194***	1.088	1.956***	1.176**	1.126

	(0.100)	(0.122)	(0.127)	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.153)	(0.075)	(0.128)
Political Importance	1.099	1.260***	1.364***	0.974	1.171***	0.996	1.763***	1.110	1.226***	0.939
	(0.069)	(0.110)	(0.116)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.049)	(0.175)	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.094)
Democratic Deficit	1.045**	1.054***	0.997	1.072***	0.991	1.053***	1.102***	1.105***	0.965**	0.972
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.022)
N	1046	951	1160	1154	1138	1900	922	1055	1518	847

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

**Table 5: Gender Differences in Private Activism, Results by Country (Odds Ratio, Ordered Logit Results)**

	<b>Algeria</b>	<b>Palestine</b>	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Jordan</b>	<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>Libya</b>	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>Egypt</b>	<b>Yemen</b>
<b>Gender Gap</b>										
Female	0.610*** (0.095)	0.699** (0.115)	0.654*** (0.098)	0.794 (0.152)	0.865 (0.107)	0.566*** (0.064)	1.128 (0.233)	0.676** (0.108)	0.854 (0.224)	1.892*** (0.430)
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>										
Primary Education	0.983 (0.292)	1.126 (0.553)	0.828 (0.197)	1.454 (0.820)	0.955 (0.307)	1.321 (0.436)	0.786 (0.251)	1.092 (0.283)	0.587 (0.243)	1.680** (0.401)
Secondary Education	1.054 (0.325)	1.890 (0.920)	0.933 (0.221)	1.339 (0.755)	1.059 (0.315)	2.153** (0.696)	0.855 (0.249)	1.408 (0.381)	0.986 (0.285)	1.814** (0.469)
University Education	0.888 (0.298)	2.112 (1.041)	0.931 (0.238)	2.350 (1.333)	1.194 (0.364)	2.660*** (0.875)	1.587 (0.725)	1.831* (0.565)	1.754* (0.573)	2.605*** (0.745)
Married	0.987 (0.237)	0.854 (0.188)	1.234 (0.241)	0.751 (0.191)	1.076 (0.203)	0.620*** (0.093)	0.694 (0.207)	0.902 (0.212)	1.057 (0.330)	0.585** (0.146)
Separated	1.498 (0.524)	0.866 (0.337)	1.230 (0.438)	0.507 (0.256)	1.150 (0.308)	0.580* (0.176)	2.181* (0.988)	1.413 (0.634)	0.833 (0.439)	0.440* (0.191)
Employed	1.258 (0.203)	1.206 (0.203)	1.162 (0.176)	1.677*** (0.313)	1.366** (0.176)	1.199 (0.138)	1.188 (0.347)	1.060 (0.163)	1.465 (0.378)	1.695** (0.380)
Income	1.148*** (0.042)	1.110*** (0.041)	0.988 (0.036)	1.008 (0.040)	0.988 (0.031)	0.986 (0.024)	1.075 (0.075)	1.054 (0.039)	1.147** (0.061)	0.999 (0.038)
Number of Children	1.051 (0.064)	0.993 (0.043)	0.982 (0.036)	0.942 (0.045)	1.051 (0.058)	1.057* (0.033)	0.986 (0.100)	1.058 (0.070)	0.934 (0.069)	1.059 (0.042)
Age	0.976*** (0.008)	1.009 (0.008)	0.995 (0.006)	1.009 (0.008)	0.987** (0.006)	0.996 (0.006)	0.985 (0.014)	0.997 (0.009)	0.976*** (0.009)	0.991 (0.009)
Interest Associations	3.398*** (0.984)	1.503** (0.275)	1.000 (0.255)	1.191 (0.317)	1.346** (0.194)	1.027 (0.147)	1.726* (0.508)	2.041* (0.801)	19.904*** (18.269)	1.794** (0.455)
Leisure Associations	1.306 (0.226)	1.063 (0.169)	1.851*** (0.291)	2.094*** (0.440)	1.087 (0.148)	1.467*** (0.191)	0.946 (0.256)	1.758** (0.461)	2.917** (1.575)	1.972*** (0.433)
<b>Attitudinal Controls</b>										
Political Trust Index	1.346*** (0.120)	1.336*** (0.139)	0.806** (0.084)	0.810* (0.102)	1.076 (0.103)	1.007 (0.079)	0.666*** (0.091)	0.958 (0.130)	1.485*** (0.216)	0.965 (0.146)
Political Interest	2.015***	1.440***	1.425***	1.805***	1.571***	1.339***	1.689***	2.732***	1.415**	1.880***



	(0.178)	(0.142)	(0.131)	(0.213)	(0.113)	(0.082)	(0.236)	(0.270)	(0.192)	(0.243)
Political Importance	0.987	1.452***	1.276***	0.792**	1.191***	1.066	2.303***	0.852**	0.953	1.011
	(0.073)	(0.125)	(0.104)	(0.083)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.268)	(0.068)	(0.123)	(0.112)
Democratic Deficit	1.068**	1.011	1.005	1.086***	0.981	0.998	1.149***	1.129***	1.075**	1.001
	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.026)
N	1046	951	1160	1154	1138	1900	922	1055	1518	847

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

**Table 6:** Gender Differences in Collective Activism, Results by Country (Odds Ratio, Ordered Logit Results)

	<b>Algeria</b>	<b>Palestine</b>	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Jordan</b>	<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>Libya</b>	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>Egypt</b>	<b>Yemen</b>
<b>Gender Gap</b>										
Female	0.664*** (0.098)	0.648*** (0.109)	0.359*** (0.054)	0.633* (0.151)	0.884 (0.109)	0.327*** (0.034)	1.478** (0.262)	0.560*** (0.087)	0.670 (0.182)	0.600** (0.127)
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>										
Primary Education	1.298 (0.357)	1.473 (0.751)	0.614** (0.144)	0.525 (0.315)	0.917 (0.302)	1.477 (0.387)	1.049 (0.267)	1.607* (0.427)	0.347** (0.187)	1.292 (0.289)
Secondary Education	1.358 (0.390)	2.756** (1.397)	0.661* (0.155)	0.611 (0.360)	0.790 (0.239)	1.841** (0.480)	0.953 (0.234)	1.676* (0.461)	1.206 (0.393)	1.348 (0.329)
University Education	2.071** (0.649)	2.941** (1.515)	0.580** (0.147)	0.971 (0.577)	0.757 (0.235)	2.154*** (0.576)	1.077 (0.467)	1.945** (0.606)	1.645 (0.602)	3.172*** (0.878)
Married	0.821 (0.187)	0.644** (0.142)	0.890 (0.177)	0.712 (0.218)	0.935 (0.176)	0.482*** (0.066)	1.162 (0.294)	1.297 (0.297)	0.584* (0.187)	0.597** (0.146)
Separated	1.037 (0.356)	0.705 (0.267)	1.092 (0.392)	0.874 (0.524)	0.923 (0.255)	0.777 (0.192)	2.008* (0.821)	2.284* (1.030)	0.425 (0.271)	0.449* (0.185)
Employed	1.051 (0.163)	1.203 (0.211)	1.271 (0.192)	1.610** (0.358)	1.274* (0.163)	1.116 (0.118)	1.027 (0.250)	0.959 (0.144)	2.565*** (0.702)	1.765*** (0.366)
Income	1.119*** (0.039)	1.045 (0.039)	1.113*** (0.041)	1.008 (0.049)	1.047 (0.033)	1.009 (0.022)	1.112* (0.065)	1.013 (0.037)	1.072 (0.060)	0.934* (0.036)
Number of Children	1.093 (0.064)	0.992 (0.042)	1.049 (0.039)	0.985 (0.061)	1.131** (0.063)	1.020 (0.028)	1.028 (0.083)	0.920 (0.061)	0.983 (0.084)	0.976 (0.038)
Age	0.984** (0.008)	1.006 (0.008)	0.989* (0.006)	0.982* (0.010)	0.973*** (0.006)	0.995 (0.005)	0.973** (0.011)	0.985* (0.008)	0.966*** (0.010)	0.990 (0.008)
Interest Associations	3.283*** (1.079)	1.231 (0.233)	1.198 (0.306)	0.902 (0.298)	1.591*** (0.231)	1.210 (0.163)	1.673** (0.420)	2.222* (0.949)	5.635* (5.514)	1.322 (0.359)
Leisure Associations	2.134*** (0.376)	1.436** (0.232)	2.038*** (0.322)	2.555*** (0.617)	1.403** (0.189)	1.803*** (0.224)	1.932*** (0.434)	4.949*** (1.347)	1.256 (0.821)	1.876*** (0.435)
<b>Attitudinal Controls</b>										
Political Trust Index	1.090 (0.093)	1.072 (0.114)	0.624*** (0.067)	0.742** (0.113)	0.984 (0.093)	1.167** (0.084)	0.622*** (0.072)	1.111 (0.146)	1.367** (0.216)	1.284* (0.190)
Political Interest	1.909***	1.636***	1.622***	2.391***	1.447***	1.370***	1.565***	2.611***	1.776***	1.865***

	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.152)	(0.358)	(0.101)	(0.078)	(0.193)	(0.250)	(0.268)	(0.236)
Political Importance	0.904	1.438***	0.975	0.673***	1.203***	1.028	1.954***	0.819**	0.907	1.154
	(0.065)	(0.125)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.071)	(0.054)	(0.206)	(0.065)	(0.125)	(0.126)
Democratic Deficit	1.071***	0.982	0.945***	1.073**	0.982	1.025**	1.135***	1.083***	1.061*	1.022
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.026)
N	1046	951	1160	1154	1138	1900	922	1055	1518	847

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

**Table 7:** Gender Differences in Political Participation, Results Political Regime Type (Odds Ratio, Ordered Logit Results)

	Institutional Participation			Private Activism			Collective Activism		
	High Authoritarian	Low Authoritarian	Hybrid	High Authoritarian	Low Authoritarian	Hybrid	High Authoritarian	Low Authoritarian	Hybrid
<b>Gender Gap</b>									
Female	0.867*	0.619***	0.977	0.677***	0.613***	0.763***	0.487***	0.497***	0.697***
	(0.074)	(0.037)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.056)
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>									
Primary Education	0.823*	1.972***	1.299*	1.429**	1.150	1.115	1.576***	1.039	1.461**
	(0.082)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.205)	(0.146)	(0.192)	(0.216)	(0.121)	(0.256)
Secondary Education	0.898	2.345***	1.629***	1.100	1.242*	1.529**	1.248	1.093	1.774***
	(0.087)	(0.221)	(0.232)	(0.156)	(0.150)	(0.253)	(0.169)	(0.121)	(0.299)
University Education	1.306**	2.714***	2.014***	1.362*	1.572***	1.877***	2.096***	1.300**	1.944***
	(0.156)	(0.278)	(0.305)	(0.215)	(0.200)	(0.323)	(0.314)	(0.153)	(0.341)
Married	1.354***	1.363***	1.612***	0.545***	0.874	0.979	0.411***	0.707***	0.973
	(0.136)	(0.111)	(0.178)	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.115)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.112)
Separated	1.113	1.054	1.075	0.635**	0.963	1.056	0.426***	1.049	1.030
	(0.169)	(0.152)	(0.198)	(0.142)	(0.174)	(0.204)	(0.093)	(0.174)	(0.201)
Employed	1.262***	0.661***	0.961	1.370***	1.208***	1.193**	1.410***	1.404***	1.084
	(0.108)	(0.040)	(0.075)	(0.150)	(0.086)	(0.098)	(0.145)	(0.095)	(0.088)
Income	0.978	1.050***	0.972	1.111***	1.011	1.034*	1.043**	1.047***	1.028
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Number of Children	1.162***	1.038**	1.066**	1.162***	1.002	1.054*	1.191***	0.985	1.064**

	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.029)
Age	1.011***	1.012***	1.007**	0.980***	0.993**	0.995	0.980***	0.990***	0.982***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Interest Associations	1.895***	1.132	2.431***	3.550***	0.928	1.472***	3.277***	1.237**	1.413***
	(0.342)	(0.102)	(0.272)	(0.623)	(0.092)	(0.156)	(0.607)	(0.117)	(0.152)
Leisure Associations	1.337**	1.280***	1.345***	2.532***	1.621***	1.271**	3.337***	2.151***	1.826***
	(0.160)	(0.097)	(0.123)	(0.320)	(0.134)	(0.119)	(0.425)	(0.172)	(0.169)
<b>Attitudinal Controls</b>									
Political Trust Index	1.105**	1.482***	1.640***	1.211***	0.835***	1.163**	1.080	0.782***	1.090
	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.095)	(0.076)	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.064)
Political Interest	1.241***	1.239***	1.665***	1.471***	1.444***	1.832***	1.413***	1.543***	1.783***
	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.075)	(0.086)	(0.060)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.063)	(0.084)
Political Importance	1.108***	1.137***	1.144***	0.950	1.166***	1.132***	0.881**	1.085**	1.125***
	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Democratic Deficit	0.988	1.027***	1.031***	1.008	1.024***	1.027**	0.999	1.056***	1.007
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.011)
N	3411	5136	3144	3411	5136	3144	3411	5136	3144

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01