2021

ERF Working Papers Series

Do Social Transfers Benefit Local Economic Development? The Case of Cash-for-Work Programmes in Jordan

Markus Loewe and Tina Zintl

ECONOMIC RESEARCH FORUM
منتدى البحوث الاقتصادية

Working Paper No. 1467
March 2021

DO SOCIAL TRANSFERS BENEFIT LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? THE CASE OF CASH-FOR-WORK PROGRAMMES IN JORDAN[1]

Markus Loewe and Tina Zintl[2]

Working Paper No. 1467

March 2021

Send correspondence to:
Markus Loewe
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
Markus.Loewe@die-gdi.de

[1] This article is based on the much more in-depth research report by Loewe, Zintl et al. (2020).

[2] Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn.

First published in 2021 by
The Economic Research Forum (ERF)
21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly Street
Dokki, Giza
Egypt
www.erf.org.eg

Abstract

This article investigates what effects cash-for-work (CfW) can have on local economic development (LED). It is based on the hypothesis that CfW, which is targeted provision of jobs to vulnerable households, affects LED directly (through employment and income for workers and the creation of public goods) but also indirectly (through multiplier and investment effects as well as better social cohesion). The article builds on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan in 2019, Jordan being a particularly interesting case for the topic: Here, different foreign donors have set up a whole bunch of different CfW programmes after 2016 to support Syrian refugees along with vulnerable Jordanians. The results confirm that CfW has an indirect impact on LED through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most of their income locally. In addition, CfW programmes in Jordan improve the skills and employability of their participants. This upgrading does not transform into higher employment rates, however, because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women; they open new doors to the labour market and contribute to a – however not irrevocable – change of traditional gender roles. Our suggestion is thus that other refugee host countries set up CfW programmes as well, covering both refugees and low-income nationals.

Keywords: Cash-for work programmes, public works, social transfer programmes, social protection, refugees, flight context, local economic development (LED), multiplier effects, investment, employment, labour market policies, fragile context, public goods, infrastructure, Middle East, Syria, Jordan.

JEL Classifications: D1; D31; H31; H53; I38; J15; J16; J61; J48; J68.

1. Introduction

The instrument of Cash-for-Work (CfW) has gained immense interest over recent years because evidence is growing that it has its multiple positive effects: In countries such as India, Ethiopia and Peru, CfW programmes have proven that they cannot only provide employment, income and social protection to vulnerable households und dearly needed infrastructure to poor communities but also improve the skills of participants and encourage eligible households to invest in human and physical capital. As a result, international donors have started CfW schemes in contexts of post-conflict reconstruction and migration to test to what degree they unfold similarly positive impacts in less favourable settings.

However, while evidence on the many positive direct effects of CfW schemes is growing, only little is known so far on their more indirect effects in either context. From a theoretical perspective, it is plausible to believe, first, that CfW can have positive effects on social cohesion (see Zintl & Loewe, forthcoming) – unless it is badly targeted, whereby the effects might even turn negative. Second, we can also hypothesise that broader local economic development (LED) benefits from CfW through multiplier and similar effects. However, there is little evidence so far in support of (or against) these assumptions.

This paper is meant to contribute to closing this gap in evidence for the second hypothesis. Based on a three-month mission in early 2019 by six researchers from the German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), it presents findings of a multi-method research project on the effects of donor-funded CfW programmes on LED in Jordan. The programmes mushroomed after the Jordan Compact agreement in 2016 as a means of support for Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.

The paper shows that CfW can have economic effects beyond its direct effects on participants through wages, employment and social protection – and this even in the context of flight and migration. In particular, CfW has multiplier effects benefitting entire local economies. In Jordan, CfW participants spend most of their income locally, and CfW programmes try to source their building materials locally, as well. However, it is difficult to assess the magnitude of these effects. In addition, CfW can generate capacity effects when participants invest parts of their wages into physical or human capital (land, machines, training, seeds, equipment etc.) in order to refine or start new lines of production. In the case of CfW schemes in Jordan, however, these effects are almost negligible so far because the schemes typically employ their participants for only 3-6 months. The wages are thus just enough to allow participants the repayment of debts made earlier but not to make further investments, which would require a longer term employment. Likewise, CfW programmes in Jordan have hardly any labour market effects. Many help their in equal measure male and female participants upgrade soft skills such as commitment, patience or time management, and some also provide them with additional technical skills – but this does not translate into better prospects on the primary labour market after the end of the CfW employment. Of course, this is at least partly due to the particularly manifest lack of employment opportunities on the Jordanian labour market and to the closure of many economic sectors to Syrian refugees. On the positive side again, CfW seems to reduce

the in Jordan quite pervasive so-called "shame culture", making work in previously dishonourable sectors, such as the waste sector, more reputable – even for women.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 defines all major terms and discusses key results of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of CfW on LED. Section 3 describes the situation of refugees in Jordan and the country context. Section 4 informs about CfW programmes in Jordan. Section 5 explains the different elements of our methodology of empirical research on CfW in Jordan. Section 6 presents our findings. And Section 7 concludes with policy implications.

2. CfW and its possible impacts on local economic development (LED)

CfW can be defined as public action providing jobs to poor households at rather low wages, most often for the creation of infrastructure. Its aim is to achieve a "double dividend" by reducing poverty and vulnerability but also creating public goods – preferably for the benefit of the poor. CfW is thus simultaneously an instrument of labour market policy, social protection and pro-poor infrastructure investment. From a social protection perspective, for example, CfW is a non-contributory, pro-poor, conditional cash transfer tool where the conditionality for transfer receipt is the contribution of labour, which is quite often hard physical and disrespected work in the public sphere.

CfW is applied in quite different settings: (i) as short-term relief in contexts of conflict and crisis; (ii) as a stabiliser with a medium-term focus during economic recessions; and, (iii) as employment guarantee schemes with a long-term timeframe (Gehrke and Hartwig, 2018; Roelen, Longhurst and Sabates-Wheeler, 2018).

In academic readings, there is overwhelming consent today that CfW pays off only if it achieves at least two dividends: (i) the provision of jobs to poor and vulnerable households providing income, employment and social protection, (ii) the building of rural streets, water pipes, sanitation, irrigation systems, dams against floods or similar pro-poor infrastructure, and (iii) as another potential dividend, skills development. This third direct effect thus potentially makes up for weak results for one of the main dividends but is not always easy to achieve and, even worse, often conflicts with the other goals of CfW so that priorities have to be set (Gehrke and Hartwig, 2018).

However, this consensus may disappear when CfW's more indirect effects are also considered. Once the possibly positive effects of CfW on LED, gender roles and social cohesion are counted in, CfW may be seen as a quite helpful tool of development even if it does not make a noticeable contribution to both, jobs and income for the poor as well as pro-poor local infrastructure. In such a situation it may suffice, for example, if CfW schemes provide just employment and income for poor and vulnerable households as well as positive effects on LED and social cohesion.

The term LED has been coined to describe the sustainability of economic processes at a local (that is, municipal or quarter of town) level. Just as economic development in general is more than just economic growth, LED is a multidimensional process, where quality of life and employment, equity, the inclusion of vulnerable groups, participatory planning and the reduction of multidimensional poverty are as important as income growth.[3]

In theory, CfW can contribute to LED in five ways: by CfW-created infrastructure, multiplier effects, boosting investment, enhancing employability or strengthened social cohesion.

First, we can assume that it helps to bridge gaps in essential *infrastructure* and thus boost investment, production, and trade in the respective area (thereby reducing poverty and underemployment) as well as the quality of life (for example, if CfW creates a municipal park).

However, there is no clear evidence yet that the created infrastructure can cause such a boost to LED: Perhaps the contexts in different countries implementing CfW as well as the groups of people benefiting from the CfW-created infrastructure vary too much. Possibly, the low skilled cash workers do not produce the required quality of infrastructure. Or perhaps good-quality infrastructure falls into disrepair as, quite often, CfW lacks a maintenance scheme (Gehrke, 2015; Gehrke and Hartwig, 2018).

Second, CfW can have positive impacts on income and poverty reduction beyond the group of participants through so-called *multiplier effects*, which transforms even minor inputs into LED into much larger outcomes. The original multiplier effect has been described by John Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 2007) and refers to the circulation of money within closed and partly-closed economies: since CfW participants are likely to spend most of their income within their communities, by that amount they raise the income of their neighbours as well(Barrientos, 2008). Yet again, these neighbours also spend most of their additional income locally, raising again the income of other neighbours, and so on. The magnitude of the multiplier m can be computed as follows:

$$m = \prod_{1}^{\infty}(1 - s - i) = \frac{1}{s + i} \begin{cases} = 1 & for \quad s + i = 1 \\ \to \infty & for \quad s + i = 0 \end{cases}$$

Where s is the share of the income that people in the respective community save on average and i is the share of the income that people spend on average outside their local community. The relevance of the effect depends thus on the assumption that people save little and buy locally. It is much smaller for example if people buy their goods in near-by towns, if the shops

3 The LED literature looks at social, environmental, and political aspects of development in local communities just as much as on local labour, commodity and capital markets. This understanding is well reflected in the International Labour Organization's definition of LED as "promoting participation and local dialogue, connecting people and their resources for better employment and a higher quality of life for both men and women" (ILO, 2018).

in the community are not owned by locals or if shop owners are quite affluent and save most of their receipts for future investments in other communities (Soifer, 2014).

Also for this second way of CfW impacting LED by virtue of multiplier effects, there is so far hardly any empirical evidence (Bhalla, Kangasniemi and Winder-Rossi, 2021). Some studies confirm that CfW participants spend most of their income locally (e.g. Keddeman, 1998). Tessitore (2013) finds evidence for a small, short-lived multiplier effect in Somalia. And Filipski et al. (2017) show that CfW programmes in Ethiopia have even nation-wide effects, though these are small. Several studies have shown, however, that other kinds of social transfer programmes have significant multiplier effects (Barrientos, 2008; Robinson and Levy, 2014). A World Bank research project has even quantified these effects for social cash transfer programmes to range "from USD 1.34 to USD 2.52 for each USD 1.00 transferred" (World Bank, 2015). Egger et al. (2019), in turn, estimate the nominal multiplier effect of cash transfers in rural Kenya at about USD 2.6 for every US dollar spent.

Third, CfW can boost and stabilise the future income of participants and non-participants through effects on *investments*. If participants invest part of their CfW wages into physical or human capital, they can enlarge and diversify their future income-generation possibilities and possibly even benefit from economies of scale through the extension of their production capacities. If successful, they might even create new jobs for others in addition to their own jobs.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence for this assumption, as well – possibly because most CfW programmes pay only low wages and offer only limited-term employment opportunities such that participants can hardly ever make any savings (Gehrke and Hartwig, 2018) or, if they do, they hoard their savings for if and when future shocks occur. A study by Rosas and Sabarwal (2016) on CfW in Sierra Leone is one of the few exemptions; it found that CfW participants after 50 to 75 days of work are four times more likely to establish a new business than non-participants.

However, even *non-participants* might increase their investment and thereby increase and stabilise their future income as a result of the sheer existence of CfW programmes. As long as they lack social protection, they are vulnerable to manifold risks with the effect that they do not invest and give priority to liquidity and security in the deposit of their money over rates of return. If ever they can make some savings, they hoard these or put them on a bank account in order to be able to cope with any shock that may occur. They give priority to liquidity and security in the deposit of their money over rates of return. They will only start to consider investments in human or physical capital when they enjoy social protection at least against their most basic risks. Investments of this kind can diversify and increase income expectation but they also bring about new risks because the investment can fail.

Gehrke (2017) has shown that many poor farmers in India have changed their behaviour when the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme was set up. It is the world's largest CfW

scheme and guarantees all vulnerable households in rural India 100 days of paid employment per year. Each year, just a quarter of all rural households participates but all others know that they could resort to the programme, as well, if they needed support. As a result, many feel better "protected" than before and have started to invest in assets with higher but less stable rates of return – with the effect that their average income increased even if they had never actually participated in the CfW scheme.

Fourth, CfW can improve the *employability* of participants and thereby reduce under- and unemployment in local communities. The main avenue in this regard is the existence of a training component within the CfW programme, even though some programmes without an explicit training component also impart participants – intentionally or not – with additional technical, social and behavioural skills: e.g. to use a brush, settle disputes with colleagues or organize oneself at work. Skills of this kind can be particularly important for women who suffer often from difficulties in access to labour markets (Jones, 2021). For them, participation in CfW can be an asset as such – especially where many people think that women cannot and should not do work in public sphere (Kabeer, 2011; Sudarshan, 2011).

Empirical studies, however, provide quite limited and contradictory evidence on these assumptions, as well. The main reason is probably that the utility of skills acquired in CfW schemes varies extremely in terms of nature, degree and applicability (Estache, Ianchovichina, Bacon and Salamon, 2013; Gehrke and Hartwig, 2018). Of course, CfW training courses cannot make up for a longer-term vocational training.

Finally, as a trustful atmosphere adds to economic development, CfW can promote LED by adding to communities' social cohesion. All elements of social cohesion, "*the vertical and the horizontal relations among members of society and the state […], an inclusive identity, and cooperation for the common good*" (Leininger et al., forthcoming), can be crucial for LED. This is particularly important in a context where social cohesion is weak; here, any improvement in social cohesion is likely to foster the exchange of goods and factors on the markets and the readiness of people to invest into new lines of production. Once social cohesion has reached a certain quality level, any further improvement might not have any tangible effects on LED anymore. Testing whether or not CfW contributes in fact to LED through improving social cohesion would require a double-check: first, to what extent CfW enlarges the different aspects of social cohesion[4], and second to what degree these different aspects of social cohesion are really helpful for LED[5]. Therefore, we leave out this line of possible causality in the remainder of this article. We will discuss the first part of the respective causal chain, i.e. to what extent

4 Except for the fleeting reference to CfW programmes made by Babajanian (2012) on the interplay between social protection and social cohesion, there is only evidence available on how other kinds of social transfer programmes affect social cohesion. Social transfer programmes unfold positive impacts on (i) horizontal trust and community members' sense of belonging (Adato, 2000; FAO, 2014; Köhler, 2021) respectively on their willingness to cooperate (Attanasio et al., 2009) as well as (ii) on vertical trust (Evans, Holtemeyer and Kosec, 2019; Reeg, 2017; Zepeda and Alarcón, 2010).

3 For a recent discussion see Sommer (2019).

and how CfW affects social cohesion in Jordan, in more depth in another article (Zintl and Loewe, forthcoming).

3. Syrian refugees in Jordan

Jordan is an upper middle-income economy, which has achieved a comparatively high level of human development[6] although it started from a very low human development level in 1946 and suffers from rather unfavourable framework conditions (very limited water and natural resources, almost land-locked, unstable neighbouring countries, inflow of millions of migrants throughout history, neopatrimonial policy-making, wide-spread favouritism[7] on all levels). Poverty rates are comparatively low but a tangible share of households are living only little above the poverty line and are hence highly vulnerable to shocks.[8] The country suffers a dire lack of productive employment: The official unemployment rate rose from 11 per cent in 2010 to 23 per cent in 2020, with youth unemployment at 42 per cent (World Bank, 2020), but there is a much higher share[9] of people in qualitative and quantitative underemployment, which is mainly due to a lack of private sector investment and structural change but also to rapid population growth (between 2010 and 2016 from 6.7 to 9.8 million inhabitants) (Krafft, Assaad and Keo, 2019).[10]

This population growth is partly due to the arrival of large numbers of approximately 670,000 refugees from Syria, representing 7 per cent of Jordan's total population in 2020 (UNHCR,

6 Life expectancy is 74 years; the average years of schooling are 12; adult literacy stands at 98 per cent; 35 per cent of labour market entrants hold a university degree. 97 per cent of households have access to improved sanitation and piped drinking water; 88 per cent of Jordanians have a mobile phone subscription and 67 per cent use the internet regularly. More critical aspects include a medium level of infant mortality (14.6 per 1000) and a low level of female labour force participation outside agriculture (16.5 per cent) (Assaad et al., 2019; UNDP 2020).

7 Many studies have provided empirical evidence for the very significant negative effects of *wasṭa* (favouritism) on state-business relations, investment, economic development and equity in Jordan (e.g. Loewe et al., 2007).

8 Just 1.7 per cent of Jordanians are poor by the definition of the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI); 0,1 per cent have an income of less than 1.90 International Dollars (USD in purchasing power parities 2015) per capita and day, 2 per cent have less than 3.10 International Dollars and 18 per cent less than 5.5 International Dollars. 14.5 per cent are living below Jordan's national poverty line (UNDP, 2020; World Bank, 2020).

9 Recently, 37 per cent of all gainfully employed Jordanians had only part-time jobs, even though they were ready to work more hours (quantitative underemployment), while 19 per cent had full-time jobs but believed that they were able to produce much more during their working time if there was more to do (qualitative underemployment) (World Bank, 2019b).

10 The main cause of underemployment is that Jordan's private sector is not creating enough jobs. Entrepreneurs argue that they face too many problems in terms of bureaucratic hurdles, corruption, access to land and credit as well as taxes (Al-Nashif & Tzannatos, 2013) and do not find adequately trained workers (Loewe et al., 2007). However, numerous jobs are also filled with migrant workers from Egypt, China or the Philippines, who are ready to work at lower wages without a contract, social insurance and workplace protection and in jobs that many Jordanians refuse (e.g. construction, agriculture, housekeeping) (World Bank, 2016a). Some authors (e.g. Abbott and Teti, 2017) suggest that many Jordanians are in fact gambling: they accept unemployment for a while because they still hope to get a well-paid job in the public administration or abroad one day. Even though there are no unemployment benefits, those with sufficient financial reserves or secure financial support from friends or relatives can allow themselves to be unemployed. High unemployment and demographics are reflected in an economic dependency ratio of 3.7, which means that whoever has a job supports on average 3.7 additional people who are not working (Galal and Said, 2019).

2020). They have added to other migrant populations, who had entered Jordan in previous decades: Palestinians, Iraqis, Yemenis, Sudanese, Egyptians and other.[11]

The presence of the refugees constitutes a considerable additional burden for Jordan, in terms of serious infrastructure challenges and a threat to social cohesion. 20 per cent of Syrian refugees live in a refugee camp (almost exclusively in Zaʿatarī and Al-Azraq) but 80 per cent live in host communities, where they compete with the locals over scarce resources and add to the various problems on the local level – mainly in the areas of water, waste management, energy, transportation, housing and schooling (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016; Schubert and Haase, 2018). Many Jordanians complain about water shortages and waste management problems and that housing prices have risen since the Syrians came. In addition, they voice fears about Syrians taking away jobs and houses and overcrowding their schools (ESCWA, 2018).[12] These fears affect social cohesion. Several studies found that the sense of belonging and commitment for common goods have weakened a bit, while horizontal trust between Jordanians and non-Jordanians has weakened even more (Kuhnt et al., 2017; REACH and British Embassy, 2014). Nevertheless, open clashes broke out only in a few cases (UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, 2014).[13]

Syrians, in contrast, are mainly suffering from high and rising living costs in Jordan and unemployment (Lockhart and Barker, 2018). Syrians face significant barriers to entering the Jordanian labour market (REACH and British Embassy, 2014). Most economic sectors are fully closed to non-Jordanian workers, even if there are no qualified Jordanians to fill vacant jobs (World Bank, 2019a). Only some sectors, in particular food processing, handicrafts, and tailoring, were opened[14] to 200'000 Syrians in 2016 as a result of the so-called 'Jordan Compact'. It is an agreement between Jordan and the European Union, which promises Jordan increased official development aid (ODA) and enhanced access to the common European product market once Jordan has set up a work permit programme for Syrian refugees.

11 Some 800'000 Palestinians have come in three waves after the wars against Israel in 1948/49 and in 1967 as well as during the Lebanese civil war 1975-90, and their descendants represent today by far the majority of the population in Jordan. Most of them hold a Jordanian passport, which is why their exact number is unknown, but some 660'000 Palestinians in Jordan are still stateless. One million Iraqis came to Jordan in two waves after the Iraq wars in 1991 and 2003, some 130'000 of them are still in Jordan. At the same time, at least a million Egyptians came as migrant workers but most of them temporarily or seasonally. After the uprisings in several Arab countries in 2011, in addition to the Syrian refugees, about 20,000 people came from Libya, about 30,000 from Yemen and some from Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and 25 other countries (De Bel-Air, 2016; Department of Statistics Jordan, 2015; Krafft, Razzaz, Keo, & Assaad, 2019; UNHCR, 2020).

12 While many schools have adopted double-shifts to also accommodate Syrian children, classrooms are still over-crowded and the quality of education has dropped (Kuhnt et al., 2017). Yet, a fifth of all Syrian children at school age are not enrolled even though they are entitled to be and 41 per cent of those who go to school have experienced corporal punishment and discrimination (Jones et al., 2019).

13 In Al-Mafraq, for example, clashes erupted because rents had gone up steeply and wages had fallen as a consequence of the fact that large numbers of Syrians in town were ready to accept any shelter or any job to survive (Grawert, 2019, p. 20; Mercy Corps, 2012, p. 3). In other towns, tensions intensified when the communities had to curtail the available amount of water per inhabitant.

14 In summer 2020, the Jordanian government expressed its willingness to make additional economic sectors accessible for Syrian workers, which may provide new employment opportunities also for refugees who acquired skills in CfW programmes.

However, only a third of all Syrians at working age have got a work permit so far (Tiltnes et al., 2019) and even these are rarely employed in any of the sectors that the Jordan Compact opened to them. Many of these jobs are low paid with high costs for social security contributions and bad working conditions, and many are located in either of Jordan's few the special economic zones, which are typically far from the places where refugees live and, hence, difficult to reach in a country with a weak public transportation system (Grawert, 2019; Staton, 2018).[15] In addition, many Syrians are still not aware of the fact that they can get a work permit for some sectors (Jones et al., 2019).

Most Syrians thus try to get a job on the informal labour market, where they compete, however, with other migrants and low-skilled Jordanians. In addition, if caught, they can be sent from their current host community to a formal camp or even back to Syria. In the end, only 20 per cent of Syrians at working-age and outside camps had any kind of a job in 2016 – compared to 32 per cent of Jordanians and 42 per cent of people with other nationality. And of those Syrians who worked, only 9 per cent were formally employed, while 10 per cent were self-employed and 80 per cent had informal wage employments (Krafft, Assaad & Keo, 2018).

More than half of Syrian refugee households depend thus solely on transfers paid by foreign donor organisations (Jones et al., 2019). Once, they register with UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), they are entitled to a regular cash assistance: UNHCR provides 65-360 EUR per month and household depending on the household size, and UNICEF grants a top-up of 25 EUR for each child (Röth et al., 2017). Several other donors run much smaller cash transfer programmes in parallel.[16] On average, Syrian households receive 285 Jordanian Dinar (JOD) per month from wages and transfers, most of which they have to spend on housing (69 per cent). Health and food account for just 11 per cent of their spending, education for 9 per cent, and transportation for 8 per cent. As a result, 17 per cent of adolescents suffer from hunger, while 35 per cent report chronic illnesses (Jones et al., 2019).

4. CfW programmes in Jordan

Jordan spends 12 per cent of GDP on social insurance, public health and unconditional social transfer schemes but these schemes benefit the middle class more than the poor.[17] Most of them

15 In addition, employers in the Special Economic Zones do not seem to be very interested in employing Syrians as they are content with other migrant workers (mostly Asian workers living on site; Lenner and Turner, 2018) and, in turn, Syrians are often not familiar with the Special Economic Zones (Tiltnes et al., 2019).

16 The World Food Programme (WFP) issues food vouchers to 525,000 Syrian households, which are co-funded by the German Foreign Office. In addition, WFP provides school meals in cooperation with the Jordanian Ministry of Finance. UNHCR runs a winterisation programme, which distributes blankets, heating equipment, clothes and emergency cash transfers during cold months. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has an emergency cash benefit programme extending a fixed JOD 115 per household. Oxfam supports Syrian refugees with non-food in-kind transfers. CARE International runs a cash-for-education-and-protection programme covering about 3'000 households. It is co-funded by the German Foreign Office and meant to prevent early marriage. It supports families with out-of-school children with approximately 90 EUR per month for a period of ten months under the conditions that all children attend school again regularly and do not marry before the age of 16 (Jones et al., 2019).

17 The social insurance scheme covers only formal sector employees and hence excludes the poor. The public health system is heavily subsidised but households with low income cannot even afford to pay the reduced user fees. Very poor households can apply for waivers granting entirely free health treatment but their number is limited. The social transfer schemes reach out to less than a quarter of the poorest 20 per cent of the population while

cover almost exclusively Jordanians: Hardly any refugees have a formal employment, which is the precondition for social insurance coverage, and the three social assistance schemes are so far not providing any individual benefits to non-Jordanians.[18] Only the Ministry of Health has agreed to extend so-called 'green-cards' allowing for free treatment at least in public primary health care facilities not only to very poor Jordanian households (Loewe et al., 2001) but also to Syrian refugees (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2018).[19]

Foreign donors have therefore set up parallel social transfer programmes targeting Syrian refugees explicitly but also vulnerable Jordanian households. The older ones are unconditional cash benefit and voucher schemes (see above) while most of those established after 2016 are, as agreed on in the Jordan Compact, CfW programmes.

The total budget of these CfW programmes over the last five years has been about EUR 300 million, and they have employed at least 70,000 workers during this time. Most have been initiated by Germany, Norway, Korea, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF, but they are typically implemented by international or Jordanian non-government organisations, Jordanian government agencies or international organisations (see Table 1).

Table 1

All employ Jordanians along with Syrians, and women along with men because they are meant to (i) support Syrian refugees as well as vulnerable Jordanians; (ii) strengthen social cohesion between Syrians and Jordanians; (iii) reduce competition on the labour market; and (iv) promote the integration of women into economic life (Loewe, Zintl et al., 2020).

In some programmes, women do the same kind of work as men, either together with men or in separate work teams. In others, they do slightly different kind of work either in the same or another work team (excluding the hardest kinds of physical work). And in some schemes, women assume totally different tasks, for example, to cook for the male participants who work in construction. Women account for about 16 per cent in ILO programmes, 23 per cent of all

spending more than half of its budget on non-poor households (Loewe, 2019; Loewe and Jawad, 2018; Silva, Levin and Morgandi, 2013).

18 The National Aid Fund (NAF) provides means-tested cash transfers (40-180 JOD per month) to households without work-enabled males at working age (15-64 years). In 2018, NAF supported some 105'000 Jordanian households. Negotiations on an extension of outreach to Syrians have failed, so far. The National Zakat Fund (NZF) provides cash assistance (15-30 JOD per month) to orphans and very poor households not receiving assistance from the NAF and selected by community-based targeting. In 2015, the NZF extended benefits to 60,000 families and 43,000 orphans. It may also support Syrians but has not done so, yet, with the exception of a one-time collective transfer of JOD 200,000 to the inhabitants of Za'atarī Camp in 2014. The Ministry of Social Development provides also in-kind benefits, legal counselling and rehabilitation services to vulnerable Jordanian families only (Hassan, 2015; Loewe et al., 2001; Loewe, Zintl et al., 2020; Mechado, Bilo and Helmy, 2018; Zureiqat and Abu Shama, 2015).

19 To get a 'green card', Syrians must be registered not only with UNHCR (see above) but also with the Jordan Ministry of the Interior in order to get an "MoI service card" or "security card" (*biṭāqa amniyya*). Until the end of 2019, the Jordanian health system dealt with about 328,000 medical consultations of refugees under this programme (UNHCR, 2019).

participants in GIZ programmes and almost half in WFP programmes (Loewe, Zintl et al., 2020).

Typical activities are the rehabilitation, development and cleaning of 'grey' infrastructure (streets, dams, schools and health clinics), 'green' infrastructure (water reservoirs, irrigation systems, municipal parks and ecosystems), waste collection and recycling, and support for the intensification of agriculture (see Figure 1). The bulk of CfW activities take place in local communities in the north of Jordan (mainly Irbid and Al-Mafraq governorate), where most Syrians live, and in the Za'atarī and Al-Azraq refugee camps (see Table 1).

Figure 1

Some design features, such as the number of participants and the duration of employment, vary considerably between the projects (see Table 1) but recently, all donors have agreed on joint standard operating procedures to be applied for all CfW projects in Jordan. Though this regulation is being discussed, participants are typically employed for a period of 40-90 working days and cannot be employed again before a new calendar year has begun. This requirement is meant to guarantee that as many households as possible benefit at least once from either CfW scheme, and in fact, one out of five Syrian refugees in Jordan had already participated in a CfW programme between 2018 and 2019 (Tiltnes et al., 2019).

Some CfW programmes, such as those of the WFP, provide also training for their participants – in addition to employment and wage as well as infrastructure upgrading – as to improve the capabilities of participants and their potential on the labour market (Loewe, Zintl et al., 2020).

5. Research methodology

In order to provide an answer to the overarching research question "*What effects has CfW on LED?*" and following the theoretical clues from the reviewed literature (see section 2), we formulated five research hypotheses:

1. Infrastructure: The creation and maintenance of public goods (e.g. infrastructure or municipal parks) by CfW programmes increases (a) the quality of life and (b) the investment, production and income in the local communities.
2. Multiplier effects: The wages paid by CfW programmes have positive (a) direct effects on the participants and (b) indirect effects on non-participants through multiplier effects and thus on income in the local communities.
3. Investment: The wages paid by CfW programmes have positive effects on the level of income expectations in the local communities and thereby on the investment behaviour of participants' and non-participants' households.
4. Employability: Skills acquired during participation in CfW lead to better employment opportunities after completion – especially for women.

In order to test the hypotheses, we applied a *quali-quanti mixed research methodology* including four main elements (see Loewe, Zintl, et al. 2020 for more details):

- *Extraction of the existing theoretical and empirical literature* on the effects of CfW and other social transfer schemes in Jordan and elsewhere in the world. This includes, among others, a survey conducted by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions on behalf of the International Labour Office (ILO) among 572 participants of the CfW programme of ILO implemented in Jordan with support by KfW Bank in Germany, as well as an impact evaluation of CfW programmes by the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).[20]
- *Qualitative analysis* of open interviews with *133 neutral observers* from the government, public administration, the private sector, civil society, academia and the donor community (i) inside the communities of selected CfW sites, (ii) in Amman, (iii) in Germany and (iv) elsewhere (focussing on the *pure opinions* of interviewees about all five research hypotheses).
- *Qualitative and quantitative analysis* of semi-structured interviews with *247 local community members* (77 CfW participants, 97 shop-keepers in the local communities and 73 other non-participants, with tailored interview guidelines for each group) focussing on changes in earnings and spending levels, spending patterns, employment, investment and opinions about the CfW programmes in the local community and their effects (see Table 2).

Table 2

- *Econometric analysis* of a *census of all 1847 (984 in 2019 and 863 in 2020) closed interviews with all participants of GIZ's CfW Green Infrastructure Programme*[21] at the end of their engagement (what we will call the "GIZ Post-employment Survey" in the remainder of this article) focussing also on changes in earnings and spending levels, spending patterns, employment, investment and opinions about the CfW programmes in the local community and their effects (see Table 3).

Table 3

We conducted our research in Amman and in nine rural sites (see Table 1). We selected them on the basis of four criteria (i) the presence of a significant number of refugees, (ii) a concentration of CfW activities with hypothetically large impacts on LED due to (iii) a small size and (iv) a high degree of isolation from other communities guaranteeing that the effects of

20 The latter is based on qualitative and quantitative research conducted during 2018-20 including a survey among 667 participants of three GIZ programmes in Jordan. All 667 respondents were interviewed in 2018 when they were still employed in either of the three GIZ programmes, while 426 were interviewed for a second time in 2019 after their CfW employment had ended, thereby forming a survey panel (cf. Roxin et al., 2020). The survey did not cover, however, participants of the CfW programmes funded by BMZ through KfW or by the German Foreign Office.

21 The questionnaire was comparatively short, easily answered within 15 minutes. Roughly a quarter of the interviewees were women (253 interviewees in 2019, 235 in 2020) and almost half were Syrians (471 interviewees in 2019, 423 in 2020).

CfW programmes do not diffuse /evaporate too much into neighbouring communities and are hence still measurable.[22]

We aspired to cover an even number of Jordanians and Syrians, CfW participants and non-participants, men and women in our research sample. However, this was not always possible. For example, some assumed non-participants turned out to be participants of earlier CfW programmes; and some groups – for instance, female non-participants – were more difficult to access; respectively, shopkeepers in rural Jordan are mostly male (see Table 2 or, for more detail, Loewe, Zintl et al., 2020).

An advantage of the qualitative research elements was that we were able (i) to get an impression ourselves of the respective atmosphere and the mood of interviewees and ultimately better interpret their statements; (ii) to change the order of questions and add questions where we had the impression to get more information in this way; and (iii) to get a better understanding of the concrete situation that Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians are facing. While we are aware of the disadvantages of qualitative interviewing,[23] in doing so we conducted a medium number of high-quality, flexible interviews (instead of a high number of standardised and less informative interviews following a quantitative methodology). For reasons of confidentiality, interview quotations are fully anonymised, only revealing the role of the interviewee or his/her connection to the CfW programme (participant, non-participant, shop-keeper, project staff, etc.) and sometimes the interviewee's gender, nationality or community affiliation.

6. Findings

Our research failed to deliver tangible evidence for the alleged positive effects of the public goods created or maintained by CfW programmes in Jordan (Hypothesis 1) but we found clear evidence for the positive direct and indirect effects of the wages paid by CfW programmes (Hypotheses 2-3). Our research also confirmed that some CfW programmes improve the skills and hence the employability of their participants (Hypothesis 4) even though these effects do not transform into higher employment rates because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. In particular, CfW programmes contribute to female empowerment: They open the door for women to the labour market and contribute to overcoming societal disapproval of them working in public.

22 The implementing agencies supported this process by providing us with access to a mapping of projects. For more details on the methodology, see Loewe, Zintl et al. (2020).

23 Qualitative research bears the risks of gathering only a medium-sized sample, which is not sufficiently representative and suffering from (i) an unintended selection bias; (ii) interviewer effects, especially if the interviewers are 'outsiders' from abroad; and (iii) biases due to the presence of a translator. We controlled against the selection bias by (i) avoiding snowballing selection but instead relying on the recommendations by international donors, local implementing agencies and independent community-based organisations (e.g. women's associations and charities) and (ii) randomly walking the field sites and approaching people in shops, on the streets and elsewhere. We minimized the 'outsiders bias' by the presence of Jordanian translators, who also acted as moderators, while at the same time controlling the 'translators bias' by hiring student interlocutors from Amman, who were not involved in local village issues and too young to have much influence on policy makers. For details cf. Loewe, Zintl et al. (2020).

Hypothesis 1: The creation and maintenance of public goods (e.g. infrastructure or municipal parks) by CfW programmes increases (a) the quality of life and (b) the investment, production and income in the local communities.

We did not find reliable ways to separate the effects of the public goods created or maintained by CfW programmes from the effects of public goods created at another point in time and of other factors.

Some CfW programmes produce or maintain public goods that are very likely to have a positive effect on LED. This includes the rehabilitation of dams, water reservoirs and irrigation systems, the intensification of agriculture, and protective measures against soil erosion. But these effects are very difficult to measure because they may emerge only in the long term, diffuse across the country and mix with the effects of manifold other factors (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

The goods and services created by other CfW programmes in contrast are likely to have rather limited effects on LED. For instance, the collection and recycling of waste, the embellishment of public parks, and the planting of trees may contribute to the quality of life of local residents but are insignificant for any economic activity. Likewise, the renovation of schools and health clinics may matter for the well-being of students and patients but presumably has no major economic effects. Even the building and maintenance of village roads has probably no larger impact because the Jordanian road network does not suffer from major gaps (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

Still, numerous interviewees stated that the public goods created or maintained by the CfW programmes were very important for LED in general and their own quality of life in particular. Most of them referred in this context to the rehabilitation of schools, health centres, street lamps and telecommunication lines. Others appreciated cleaner village streets, upgraded municipal parks and nature reserves and tree plantations (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). These findings are in line with those of Roxin et al. (2020) where 97 per cent of 667 interviewed cash workers confirmed that the CfW programme outputs were regarded in a positive way throughout their respective host communities.[24]

Hypothesis 2: The wages paid by CfW programmes have positive (a) direct effects on the participants and (b) indirect effects on non-participants through multiplier effects and thus on income in the local communities.

Our research confirmed Hypothesis 2 as we found clear positive effects of CfW programmes in Jordan on the levels of income of both, CfW participants and non-participants.

24 This satisfaction is due to both, the creation and maintenance of public goods in the communities and the fact that locals and refugees benefit equally from them. Just 26% of the interviewed cash workers reported that other community members had told them what they think about the CfW programmes but out of these, 71% had heard positive opinions, cf. Roxin et al. (2020).

The income of CfW participants' households increases, on average, by almost a quarter, as Roxin et al.'s (2020) quantitative approach was able to demonstrate. Households participating in any of the three CfW programmes of GIZ had on average a monthly income of JOD 376 in 2017 when they applied for a job in any of the GIZ programmes and a total monthly income of about JOD 460 during their participation. The GIZ programmes would thus raise the income of participating households by on average JOD 85, or 22 per cent, even though the typical wage of CfW participants in Jordan is 220 JOD. The difference is due to substitution effects: CfW participants give up their previous jobs to be able to participate in CfW or they receive less transfers from public social assistance programmes or other households (Roxin et al. 2020, p. 60). The increase in household income is particularly high for households with a female CfW participant. This is due to the fact that women have much better chances to get a job in CfW programmes than elsewhere on the labour market so that the substitution of residual income is lower than for men – if a woman gets a CfW job, she is less likely than a man to just replace one job by the other. Instead, it is probably her first paid employment at all or since long (ibid.).

After the end of CfW employments, the positive net effect on household incomes ends. On average, the household income then is even lower than before the CfW participation, especially for households with an above average household income (Roxin et al. 2020, 64 and Figure 10). This is probably due to the fact that former cash workers cannot just re-enter, without friction, the jobs given up for the sake of CfW employment (see also Hypothesis 4 below).

At the same time, the income of non-participants in host communities increases, as well, because CfW participants spend most of their income locally. 30 per cent of our respondents told us that they spend most of their income on food, which is normally purchased in local shops (in contrast to clothes, for example). 47 per cent spend most of their income on housing rents, which is also a contribution to local income levels because most landlords live in the same villages (while some live, of course, far away, such as in Amman). 22 per cent spend their CfW income mostly on the repayment of debts, and most of their creditors are again locals (neighbours, landlords and local shopkeepers) (see Table 4).

Of course, some fraction of CfW wages flow out of local communities such as, for example, most of the amounts spent on health care, education, building materials for the improvement of dwellings, water, electricity, and clothes. However, here, once again, the CfW participants we interviewed told us that they bought large parts of even these items within the local communities – not least because most of the places that we visited are so remote that it would be too expensive and too time-consuming to buy at another place.

The results of the GIZ post-employment census are similar. Its participants were asked about the three main ways they spent their CfW wage. The largest share ticked house rent (50 per cent), followed by food (42 per cent), open bills (41 per cent), debt repay (33 per cent), health

(24 per cent), household items (21 per cent) and transportation (17 per cent) (see Table 5).[25] With the exception of health and transportation, the bulk of these expenditures benefit other people in the community such as shop owners or landlords.[26]

Local shop-keepers confirmed these multiplier effects of wages spent by CfW participants. We asked 61 shop-keepers close to the sites of CfW programmes whether their sales had risen when CfW programmes were set up and whether some of their clients had higher incomes to spend. In fact, 28 of the interviewed shop-keepers confirmed that they had realised that some CfW participants were spending more money in their shops, while 6 shop-keepers even said that their sales had increased significantly when many of their customers got employed by a CfW programme. One shop-keeper in al-Qasr said that it was "*not only on me, the whole souk [Arabic: market] benefitted from the programmes. People come here and spend their money and will buy more goods than before*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). People from Kafr Ṣawm told us that a local chicken restaurant had increased its sales because of the CfW programmes: "*One place […] used to sell 50 chickens, now it can sell 70*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). And some shopkeepers said that CfW participants do not spend more money in their shops than before but at least repaid their debts, which also means that money is channelled into the local circuit.

25 Interestingly, CfW participants' spending patterns differ with nationality, marital status, educational achievement and location. The spending patterns of Syrians and Jordanians differ substantially. According to the GIZ Post-employment Survey of 2019 and 2020, Syrians more often spend a particularly high share of their CfW wage on house rent (74 per cent against 27 per cent for Jordanians) and health (27 per cent against 20 per cent), while Jordanians more often spend a particularly high share of their income on leisure (7 per cent against 1 per cent for Syrians). For the data on 2019, both findings are statistically significant at the 1 per cent, respectively even at the 0.1 per cent level according to regressions run with different probit models. Possibly, the difference is due to the fact that a higher share of Jordanians lives in their own houses (and hence does not have to pay a rent), has access to a form of health insurance (covering all medical treatment costs) and has a longer history of making debts (now to be paid back) or extra income (that allows the CfW wage to be used for leisure activities).

At the same time, CfW workers pay significantly more on house rent, bills and food and less on debt repayment when they are married rather than single (for the data on 2019, this finding is statistically significant at the 95 per cent (food), respectively 1 per cent (house rent, bills) confidence level). Possibly, they live in larger houses and less often with their parents. This would explain why an above average share of married CfW participants stated in the GIZ Post-employment Survey that their CfW wage did not cover all of their daily needs (for the 2019 data, this finding is statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level).

Statistically more often, CfW participants with a university degree spend a high share of their wages on education and their house rent (for the 2019 data, this finding is statistically significant at the 95 per cent (house rent), respectively 99.9 per cent (education) confidence level). In contrast, participants who had not even completed primary school spend statistically more often a high share of their wages on repaying debts and less often on transportation (both are statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level for the 2019 data).

Finally, the GIZ survey also reveals that CfW participants in the south of Jordan more often used a high share of their wages for their house rent, due bills and food than those in the north of Jordan but less often on transportation, health and repaying debt (these regional differences are all statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent confidence level for the 2019 data). Participants in urban areas more often used a relatively high share of their CfW wage on transportation and repaying debts (for the 2019 data, this is statistically significant at the 95 per cent (transportation), respectively 99.9 per cent (debt repay) confidence level).

26 The findings are also in line with two other studies: Jones et al. (2019) found that Syrian refugees in Jordan spend 69 per cent of their total on housing and just 11 per cent each on health and food. And the respondents of a survey among the participants of the KfW and ILO's CfW programme who were asked about the three main designated uses of their CfW wages responded as follows: 83 per cent mentioned 'daily consumption', 31 per cent debt repay, 8 per cent the education of their children, 7 per cent medical expenses, and just 3 per cent savings (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

In addition, local experts also affirmed that CfW participants spend the largest share of their wages within their local communities (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

However, the indirect effect of CfW on income is just as temporary as the direct effect. A shopkeeper stated: "[I]*n those three months* [when the programme was running], *I noticed an increase in sales. But when the programme ended, the increase also stopped*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

Another indirect effect of CfW programmes on income is due to local procurement. Some CfW projects try to buy as many machines and required building materials from vendors in the host communities. A project staff member stated: "*We try to buy all materials and intermediate products locally, which in turn benefits the local economy*". Likewise, most CfW programmes buy the food for the lunch meals that they offer to their workers from local markets. Another project staff member explained: "*The local market of Kafr Ṣawm saw development because they are providing us with the food for the programme*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). Of course, some shopkeepers complained that the CfW programmes had not bought their equipment at a local shop. Thus, the positive effect on LED by locally procured materials needs to be weighed against implementers' regulations obliging them to choose the best-priced offer.

Hypothesis 3: The wages paid by CfW programmes have positive effects on the level of income expectations in the local communities and thereby on the investment behaviour of participants' and non-participants' households

Our results confirm that CfW programmes can have investment effects but these are very small in the Jordanian context – mainly because the CfW wages are low and the employments are short.

Several observers of local developments stated that the CfW programmes have a positive, if rather diffuse effect on investment. For example, a project staff member remarked: "*Also, there is impact on the local economic market and there is more investment in communities*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). Likewise, a shop-keeper said: "*I have heard that the people invest more because of the programmes. It has affected our markets*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

However, only some CfW participants can make savings because most of them need the CfW wage to cover their daily expenses or to repay debts. Only seven interviewed CfW participants told us that they were planning to invest part of their CfW wages: Two had the idea to plant some crops in their gardens and sell them later on the local market; two wanted to buy cattle; one planned to keep bees for honey; one intended to open a bakery; and one wanted to set up a household repair shop (see Table 4).

These findings are in line with the workers survey conducted in 2019 among the participants of the ILO employment infrastructure programme. Only 0.9 per cent of the households interviewed reported investing part of their CfW wages in private business. Another 0.5 per cent bought animals as an additional source of income while 1.4 per cent planned to save part of their wages (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

Likewise, the GIZ's Post-employment Survey found that only 27 per cent of the respondents were able to make any savings at all and, of those, most saved for personal items, that is, future consumption. Just 12 per cent reported having made provisions for future health care spending, 9 per cent for future spending on education, and only 3 per cent for small business investment (see Table 5).

And yet, the CfW programmes may promote investments of non-participants through multiplier effects and especially because they allow participants to repay debts. Fourteen out of 72 interviewed CfW participants told us that they had used a high share of their CfW wage to repay debts to local shops, neighbours, relatives, friends or landlords (see Table 4). Most debts were informal credits and the repayment, on top of stable or higher income from sales, allowed the creditors in turn to increase their consumption or investments.

Hypothesis 4: Skills acquired during participation in CfW leads to better employment opportunities after completion – especially for women.

Finally, we also found that some CfW programmes enhance the employability of their participants but not the effective employment opportunities because there are hardly any vacancies on the Jordanian labour market.

Quite many CfW participants we interviewed mentioned the importance of acquiring new skills and stressed the importance of skills to improve their job opportunities. The prospects of acquiring new skills was also a major motivation for many participants to apply for participation in CfW programmes.[27] In the DEval study, too, 44 per cent feel better prepared for future jobs because of the skills that they had acquired during their employment in a CfW project (Roxin et al., 2020, 74-75). But these statements need to be discussed in more detail as to the participants' most pressing needs and the actual nature of skills acquired.

CfW participants look mainly for income to cover their cost of living as their most immediate and pressing need. In the survey conducted by DEval among 667 cash workers, 69 per cent of the respondents said that their primary need is higher income. Just 34 per cent mentioned employment, 9 per cent better accommodation, 8 per cent better food, 3 per cent education, 2 per cent access to health services and less than 1 per cent better security, political participation

27 Strictly speaking, this may distort the self-selection of the most vulnerable persons into CfW. Yet, local implementers see the need to develop criteria through which to select people for the programmes who can use the newly developed skills afterwards.

or other issues (Roxin et al., 2020, Figure 9). CfW programmes hence meet just exactly the needs of their target groups: In all three programmes that the DEval study covers, at least 65 per cent of the participants perceive the generation of income as the primary benefit of the programmes; in two of the three programmes, the respective percentage is even higher. In one programme (Green Infrastructure), more than 12 per cent of all participants considered the learning of skills as the primary benefit. But all other items were seen by just very few interviewees as a primary benefit (improvement of self-esteem, independence, structured life, integration into the formal sector, community reputation) (Roxin et al., 2020, Figure 16).

CfW projects in Jordan perform quite differently in terms of skill provision. Only very few have an explicit training component.[28] But several others are also imparting some useful skills to their participants – especially those focusing on the repair of schools, health centres, street lights or other physical infrastructure but also some of those that engage in agriculture, forestry or the rehabilitation of nature reserves and municipal parks. One CfW participant told us: "*I learnt a lot. Now, I can deal with electricity, fix things in the house, paint and much more. Now I can do it alone without external help and repair my own house*". Another one stated: "*I have already learned a lot about modern farming techniques*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). Likewise, 86 per cent of the respondents of the GIZ Post-employment Survey covering all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure programme reported that they were satisfied or even very satisfied with the training that they had received. Just 8 per cent said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, amongst them a significantly higher share of university graduates (21 per cent, for 2019 confirmed at a 99.9 per cent confidence level) (GIZ, 2019; 2020).

Yet, often CfW participants considered not the technical skills but soft skills as most useful: In the GIZ Post-employment Survey, 63 per cent considered the necessity and ability to work in teams as one of the most useful things that they had learnt, 51 per cent named friendship, 48 per cent commitment, 23 per cent patience and only 22 per cent new technical skills, another 18 per cent mentioned time management (GIZ, 2019; 2020). Also the respondents to the DEval study highlighted the notable positive effects going beyond the provision of employment and income: 96 per cent say that participation in a CfW programme had improved their self-esteem. 91 per cent valued that CfW programmes had helped them structure their lives. 91 per cent highlighted that participating in a CfW programme had helped them establish additional social contacts. 89 per cent valued the respect that CfW project staff had given to them. The aforementioned 44 per cent that felt the skills learnt during their CfW employment prepared them for the job market are rather few in comparison (Roxin et al., 2020, 74-75).

However, some CfW projects seem not to convey any tangible skills. Several of our interviewees said frankly that they had not learnt anything during their CfW employment. Some of them argued that the problem was mainly due to the short durations of employment contracts in the majority of CfW programmes in Jordan, which did not allow participants to acquire any

28 Some local experts cite skills training as an aim of CfW while others do not on the grounds that, as one staff member puts it, "*CfW programmes are meant to provide short-term economic opportunities for participants. They are thus responding to short-term needs but they are also willing to achieve longer term effects*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

particular skills. Others, however, stated that the kind of work that participants do in certain CfW programmes such as waste collection or street cleaning were too basic to allow for any kind of learning (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

In a context as Jordan, even the most appropriate training with quite positive effects on the employability of CfW participants might still not be enough to help them get a job after the end of the CfW employment. The survey conducted among participants of the CfW programme of ILO and KfW Development Bank found that employment rates and average wages directly after CfW participation were worryingly low: before participating in CfW, 57 per cent of the male and 43 per cent of the female interviewees had a job, with an average daily wage of 7-14 JOD, but right after their CfW participation only 32 per cent of the men, respectively 13 per cent of the women, had a job mostly earning 5-12 JOD. Out of these, on average, 29 per cent with jobs after the end of their CfW contracts, just 10 per cent reported that their CfW employment had helped them find that new job. Even in these few cases, CfW participation had been helpful most often because of the *wasṭa* (connections) that the workers had built during their CfW employment (6 per cent) rather than the skills they had acquired (3 per cent) (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

Likewise, according to the DEval study, just 25 per cent of the participants of the three CfW programmes initiated by GIZ had a job after their CfW employment, while 40 per cent had a job before. First, the pre-CfW employment rate for individuals selected to participate was quite counterintuitively 12 percentage points higher than for the members of a control group of Syrians and Jordanians who were similarly eligible for participation in a CfW programmes but had not being accepted. Second, the employment rate for participants decreased by 15 percentage points from before to after their CfW engagement. The employment rate for the control group dropped also during that period but only by nine percentage points (Roxin et al., 2020, 77f.).

One possible explanation for this drop of the employment rate of former CfW participants might be that many hope to find a new job with similar conditions: a salary of 220 JD per month, limited working hours, health insurance, a written labour contract and a meal at midday. They would thus accept more informal or less well paid jobs only after a while when they realise that they have no realistic chances to get the same working conditions on the regular labour market (Roxin et al., 2020, 79). Hence, it could be expected that the employment rate goes up again several months after CfW participants' engagement in a CfW project; but there is no tangible information on that. So far, data from the GIZ Post-employment Survey did not find that former participants of the Green Infrastructure CfW Programme necessarily aspire future employment in the formal sector: 77 per cent of them looked for a new CfW job, 38 per cent for a different job with longer-term employment contract and 20 per cent were looking for participation in a longer-term training programme. Just 4 per cent considered an informal sector job and 1 per cent thought about migration (multiple answers were possible) (GIZ, 2019; 2020). Respondents

previously unemployed were likely to look for another CfW opportunity and only educated respondents were more likely to look for a formal job afterwards.[29]

What is for sure, the situation on the Jordanian labour market continued to deteriorate during the period under research (2018-19), which explains to some degree why it was so difficult for CfW participants to find a follow-up employment after the end of their CfW contract. And of course, the situation is always much more difficult for the Syrian CfW participants than it is for the Jordanians because of the manifold restrictions in access to the formal Jordanian labour market (see Section 3 above).

Even *wasṭa* (connections) did not help many CfW participants to get a job in the private sector – which is mainly due to the fact that most CfW projects do not involve private companies. According to Roxin et al. (2020, 76), 63 per cent of the workers in either of the three GIZ programmes were able to approach staff members of the municipality. 25 per cent established contacts with GIZ staff members. But less than 1 per cent were able to get in touch with private enterprises.

CfW may, however, help to identify and open up possible employment opportunities by raising participants' motivation to work in sectors they had previously discarded. Jordan's so-called "shame culture", labelling certain manual labour as disreputable and unacceptable, is a strong factor in job searches. Several interviewees brought up the topic, highlighting that CfW stretched these boundaries by providing reputable work with good working conditions in such repudiated sectors. Mostly the waste sector was mentioned, though CfW programmes can have similar effects for the agricultural or construction sectors. One of the interviewed participants said: "large numbers of people [were] looking for jobs. They changed their perception about what is shameful" (Loewe, Zintl et al., 2020). While economic pressure played a role, too, such changed perceptions were mainly due to CfW programmes' design – a formal contract, favourable working conditions, skills trainings and well-targeted awareness campaigns.

Changed perception also played a role for CfW programmes' effects on the labour market access of women. While the quantitative surveys do not provide significant evidence for gender-specific effects of CfW on the employment potential of participants, the qualitative analysis of our interviews shows that CfW can have an empowering effect on women. It helps female participants to gain their first labour market experience and helps them to overcome wide-spread societal reservation towards females working in public.

Many female interviewees described the setting of CfW projects as a 'safe work environment' – much better than most other workplaces because all workers are treated respectfully and labour rights are adhered to. In this way, CfW programmes improved the acceptability of female labour force participation among females and males. A Syrian non-participant noticed that the

29 For 2019 data, findings at a 99 per cent confidence level (unemployed respondents; respondents with secondary education or vocational training) or at 95 per cent confidence level (with a BA degree).

CfW programmes "*removed the shame culture on working women*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). Many women perceive CfW programmes as the only realistic entry point into the labour market. A female participant told us: "*It* [female labour force participation] *has become more acceptable. In the past, it was more shameful. The opportunities specifically for women arose*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

Furthermore, CfW programmes seem to contribute even to a more general change in gender roles. Some interviewees stated that their existence increased the overall recognition of women as part of society because the programmes employ a relatively high share of them and let them do similar work to men. A Syrian man stated that the local CfW project has "*changed the attitudes* [so] *that the woman is an active part of the society* […] *The project has transformed the whole community*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). A Jordanian woman said: "*I felt change because they made us feel the importance of the women's role in community. We became equal with men. We are doing the same work. In the past there were plenty of taboos about women going out and working. But now this has changed. Men look at women as equals to them. I'm very happy about that. They* [the CfW programmes] *improved our lives. Now we* [women] *have an income. We can contribute to improve the household*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020). Several women stressed that they had joined CfW programmes because they enjoyed the work and the interaction with others at the workplace. A female cash worker highlighted that working in a CfW programme '*helped to shape my personality; I became more confident. I can now be an active member of the society*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

Of course, CfW programmes cannot bring about a full change in gender roles. In our sample, most women and men judged female labour force participation as acceptable or even positive. Just 3 men and 1 woman said that females should not work in public. However, an additional 7 men and 2 women said that women should only work if the nature of work was acceptable and the work environment was safe. As a female CfW participant stated this might be a generational issue: "*Especially old people have difficulties in accepting women in jobs like mine. But all the young people have no problems with this anymore*" (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

In addition, we discovered differences between the attitudes of Jordanians and Syrians. A female Jordanian CfW participant told us: "*It is very normal among Jordanians that girls work outside the house. Syrians, in contrast, think that women cannot work for pay and that they should stay at home.* […] *When we sit together, I try to convince the other girls that it is normal for us to work.* […] *I try to convince them that they have to be more educated and self-reliant."* Syrian respondents shared this impression about Syrians being usually less open to women taking up work outside the houses, though it becomes more common out of economic necessity (Loewe, Zintl et al. 2020).

Finally, the lack of income was in some instances the real reason for women to apply for a CfW employment. Some interviewees stated that female wage employment was culturally inappropriate but a last option for poor families to survive when the male family members had no chance to get a job anywhere or earned too little to sustain the family. Several women

workers stressed that they were only working because of the difficult economic circumstances and would rather stay at home. Once the economic framework conditions improve, these women are likely to end their wage employment.

7. Conclusions and policy implications

We conclude that CfW programmes are recommendable tools of development even in contexts of flight and migration. They satisfy the primary needs of participating migrants and vulnerable locals by providing access to wage and employment and by upgrading their skills (more often soft skills than hard skills) and employment-potential, especially for participating women. Notably, they have also quite positive effects on other households in the host communities through (i) the creation and maintenance of public goods such as streets, dams, municipal parks, school buildings and nature reserves, (ii) multiplier effects, when CfW wages are spent (and thereby recycled sometimes several times) locally, (iii) the investment of additional income into new income-generating activities.

Other refugee-hosting countries might thus consider setting up CfW programmes as well, which should also cover refugees together with low-income locals of both sexes in order to prevent negative effects on social cohesion. The international donor community should support host countries in such efforts. Many interviewed CfW participants stressed that they liked the fact that CfW programmes provide a wage for a work effort instead of an unconditional cash transfer. According to them, cash payments are like alms while wages are more decent. Also, the employment distracts the workers from their day-to-day worries, and guards against feelings of boredom, frustration or anger. It brings people together and protects them from feelings of loneliness, isolation and uselessness.

In addition, CfW programmes have an in-built self-targeting mechanism that works often better than the targeting of cash transfer schemes: Only poor and vulnerable households apply for CfW programmes because better-off households are not willing to do the hard work that these programmes offer. CfW programmes are, however, not suitable for the support of people who are work-disabled and they are often more expensive than unconditional cash transfer schemes because of the costs caused by designing and planning the work schemes, buying building material and monitoring the work.

All the more, it is important that CfW programmes are designed in such a way that they do not just provide wage and employment but have also substantial positive effects on LED through the creation and maintenance of public goods, multiplier and investment effects and the provision of relevant hard and soft skills to workers. For this goal, project planners should

- carefully decide what kind of infrastructure can effectively promote LED,
- employ cash workers for longer periods such that they can make some savings which can be invested into their own income-generating activities,
- make sure that CfW participants learn something during their employment that can be useful for them after the end of their employment (these can be very simple things like

the use of basic tools or soft skills like the ability to communicate clearly or the readiness to stick to fix working times),

- ensure that work environment and skills training caters to women as well, in order to boost female labour force participation, to the greater benefit of host communities' LED.

References

Abbott, P., & Teti, A. (2017). *A generation in waiting for jobs and justice: Young people not in education, employment or training in North Africa* (Arab Transformations Working Paper 19). Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen.

Adato, M. (2000). *The impact of PROGRESA on community social relationships*. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFT). Retrieved from https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/16015/files/mi00ad04.pdf

Al-Nashif, N., & Tzannatos, Z. (2013). Only Fair. *Finance & Development*, *50*(1), 18-21. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/nashif.htm

Assaad, R., Krafft, C. & Keo, C. (2019): 'The Composition of Labor Supply and Its Evolution from 2010 to 2016 in Jordan', in: C. Krafft & R. Assaad (Eds.), *The Jordanian Labor Market Between Fragility and Resilience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Attanasio, O., Pellerano, L., & Reyes, S. (2009). 'Building trust? conditional cash transfer programmes and social capital'. *Fiscal Studies*, 30 (2), 139–177.

Babajanian, B. (2012). *Social protection and its contribution to social cohesion and state-building.* Eschborn:Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Retrieved fro m https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/ 7759.pdf

Barrientos, A. (2008). *Social transfers and growth: A review* (Working Paper 52). Manchester: University of Manchester, Brooks World Poverty Institute (BWPI).

Bhalla, G., & Kangasniemi, M., & Winder-Rossi, N. (in press). Effects of social protection on economic development. In M. Loewe & E. Schüring (Eds.), *Handbook on social protection systems.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

De Bel-Air, F. (2016). *Migration profile: Jordan.* Florence: European University Institute (EUI). Retrieved from https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44065/MPC_PB_201606.pdf?sequence=1

Department of Statistics Jordan. (2015). *General population and housing census 2015, Amman.* Retrieved from http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ Census2015_Eng.pdf

Egger, D., Haushofer, J., Miguel, E., Niehaus, P., & Walker, M. (2019). *General equilibrium effects of cash transfers: Experimental evidence from Kenya* (NBER Working Papers 26600). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Retrieved from https://www.givedirectly.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/General-Equilibrium-Effects-of-Cash-Transfers.pdf

ESCWA (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia). (2018). *Multidi mensional poverty in Jordan, Beirut* (E/ESCWA/EDID/2018/WP.5). Retrieved from https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/multidimension al_poverty_in_jordan-ry.pdf

Estache, A., Ianchovichina, E., Bacon, R., & Salamon, I. (2013). *Infrastructure and employment creation in the Middle East and North Africa.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

Evans, D. K., Holtemeyer, B., & Kosec, K. (2019). Cash transfers increase trust in local government. *World Development* 114, 138-155. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.020

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization oft he United Nations) (2014). *The Economic Impacts of Cash Transfer Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Rome. Online: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4194e.pdf

Filipski, M., Taylor, J. E., Abegaz, G. A., Ferede, T., Taffesse, A. S., & Diao, X. (2017). *General equilibrium impact assessment of the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia*. New Delhi: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). Retrieved from https://www.3ieimpact.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ie66-productive-safety-ethiopia.pdf

Galal, R., Said, M. (2019). 'The Evolution of Wage Formation and Inequality in Jordan, 2010-2016'. In C. Krafft & R. Assaad (Eds.), *The Jordanian Labor Market Between Fragility and Resilience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Gehrke, E. (2015). *Can public works infrastructure affect employment outcomes? Evidence from NREGS in India.* Discussion Paper 9/2015. Bonn: German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

Gehrke, E. (2017). An employment guarantee as risk insurance? Assessing the effects of the NREGS on agricultural production decisions. *World Bank Economic Review 33* (2), 413-435.

Gehrke, E., & Hartwig, R. (2018). Productive effects of public works programs: What do we know? What should we know? *World Development*, 107 (C), 111-124.

GIZ. (2019). *Post-employment survey conducted among cash workers of the GIZ project "Improvement of green infrastructure in Jordan through labour-intensive measures (cash for work)".* Jordan. Received via email on 12 November 2019.

GIZ (2020): *Post-employment survey conducted among cash workers of the GIZ project "Improvement of green infrastructure in Jordan through labour-intensive measures (cash for work)".* Jordan. Received via email on on 23 December 2020.

Grawert, E. (2019). *Between aid dependence, neighbourhood solidarity and the EU-Jordan Compact. Livelihood analysis of Syrian refugees in Greater Amman* (Working Paper 4/2019). Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Retrieved from https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/wp_4_19_web.pdf

Hagen-Zanker, J., & Mallett, R. (2016). *Journeys to Europe: The role of policy in migrant decisi on-making.* London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Retrieved from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10297.pdf

Hagen-Zanker. J., Ulrichs, M., & Holmes, R. (2018). What are the effects of cash transfers for refugees in the context of protracted displacement? Findings from Jordan. *International Social Security Review 7*(2), 57-77.

Hassan, A. (4 November 2015). Ministry extends social protection to women of all nationalities. *Jordan Times*. Retrieved from http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/ministry-extends-social-protection-women-all-nationalities-%E2%80%94-abu-hassan

ILO (International Labour Organization). (2018). *Local economic development.* Geneva. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/local-economic-development/lang--en/index.htm

Jones, N. (2021). Gender and social protection. In M. Loewe & E. Schüring (Eds.), *Handbook on social protection systems.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Jones, N., Baird, S., Presler-Marshall, E., Małachowska, A., Kilburn, K., Abu Hamad, B., …Abu Hammad, B. (2019). *Adolescent well-being in Jordan: Exploring gendered capabilities, contexts and change strategies: A synthesis report on GAGE Jordan baseline findings (Baseline Report Series October)*. London: Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence (Gage).

Kabeer, N. (2011). *Contextualising the economic pathways of women's empowerment: Findings from a multi-country research programme (Pathway Policy Papers, October)*. Brighton: Pathways of Women's Empowerment RPC. Retrieved from http://www.lse.ac.uk/gender/assets/documents/research/choice-constraints-and-the-gender-dynamics-of-lab/Contextualising-the-EconomicPathways-of-WomensEmpowerment.pdf

Keddeman, W. (1998). *Of nets and assets: Effects and impacts of employment-intensive programmes - A review of ILO experience*. Geneva: International Labour Office (ILO). Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_policy/---invest/documents/publication/wcms_asist_6866.pdf

Keynes, J. M. (2007). *The general theory of employment, interest and money.* London: Macmillan (original work published 1936).

Köhler, G. (2021). Effects of social protection on social inclusion. Social cohesion and nation building. In M. Loewe & E. Schüring (Eds.), *Handbook on social protection systems.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Kuhnt, J., Rischke, R., David, A., & T. Lichtenfeld (2017). *Social cohesion in times of forced displacement - the case of young people in Jordan*. Poverty, Equity and Growth Discussion Paper 243. Göttingen: Courant Research Centre, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen.

Krafft, C., Assaad, R., & Keo, C. (2018). *The composition of labor supply and its evolution from 2010 to 2016 in Jordan* (Working Paper 1183). Cairo: Economic Research Forum (ERF). Retrieved from https://erf.org.eg/publications/the-composition-of-labor-supply-and-its-evolution-from-2010-to-2016-in-jordan/

Krafft, C., Razzaz, S., Keo, C., & Assaad, R. (2019). *The number and characteristics of Syrians in Jordan: A multi-source analysis* (Working Pape 1288). Cairo: Economic Research Forum

Krafft, C., Sieverding, M., Salemi, C. & Keo, C. (2018). *Syrian refugees in Jordan: Demographics, livelihoods, education and health*. ERF Working Paper 1184, Cairo: Economic Research Forum

Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., … Strupat, C. (forthcoming). Social cohesion: a new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa. DIE Discussion Paper. Bonn: German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

Lenner, K., & Turner, L. (2018). Learning from the Jordan compact. *Forced Migration Review*, *57*, 48-51.

Lockhart, D. & Barker, K. (2018). *Syrian refugees and social cohesion in Jordan.* Amman: West Asia-North Africa Institute (WANA). Retrieved from http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publication_SocialCohesion_English_0.pdf

Loewe, M. (2019). Social protection schemes in the Middle East and North Africa: Not fair, not efficient, not effective. In R. Jawad, N. Jones & M. Messkoub (Eds.), *Social policy in the Middle East and North Africa* (pp. 35-60). Camberley, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar.

Loewe, M., Blume, J., Schönleber V., Seibert, S., Speer, J., & Voss, C. (2007). *The impact of favouritism on the business climate: A study on Wasta in Jordan*. DIE Studies 30. Bonn: German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

Loewe, M., & Jawad, R. (2018). Introducing social protection in the Middle East and North Africa: Prospects for a new social contract? *International Social Security Review*, *71* (2), 3-18.

Loewe, M., Ochtrop, J., Peter, C., Roth, A., Tampe, M., & Türkner, A. (2001). *Improving the social protection of the urban poor and near-poor in Jordan*. DIE Reports and Working Papers 12/2001. Bonn: German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Retrieved from https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BuG_12_2001_EN.pdf

Loewe, M., Zintl, T. et al. (2020). *Community effects of cash-for-work programmes in Jordan: supporting social cohesion, more equitable gender roles and local economic development in contexts of flight and migration*. DIE Studies 103. Bonn: German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

Loewe, M., Zintl, T. & Houdret, A. (2020). 'The social contract as a tool of analysis: introduction to the special issue on "Framing the evolution of new social contracts in Middle Eastern and North African countries"', *World Development* 4 May 2020 (online first)

Mechado, A., Bilo, C., & Helmy, I. (2018). *The role of* zakat *in the provision of social protection – a comparison between Jordan, Palestine and Sudan*. Brasilia: International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG).

Mercy Corps. (2012). *Analysis of host community-refugee tensions in Mafraq, Jordan*. Edinburgh. Retrieved from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/38297

NAMA (NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions) & ILO (International Labour Organization, Country Office Jordan). (2019). *Workers survey phase II: Employment through labour intensive infrastructure in Jordan (Analytical report)*. Amman.

REACH, & British Embassy in Amman. (2014). *Perceptions of external support in Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees* (Thematic Assessment Report June 2014). Amman. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/REACH_JOR_Report_PerceptionsofExternalSupportinJordanianCommunitiesHostingSyrianRefugees.pdf

Reeg, C. (2017). *Public works programmes in crisis and post-conflict states. Lessons learned in Sierra Leone and Yemen*. Mimeo. Bonn: German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

Robinson, S., & Levy, S. (2014). *Can cash transfers promote the local economy? A case study for Cambodia* (IFPRI Discussion Paper 1334). Washington, DC: International Food Policy (IFP) Research Institute. Retrieved from http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getdownloaditem/collection/p15738coll2/id/128107/filename/128318

Roelen, K., Longhurst, D., & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2018). *The role of cash transfers in social protection, humanitarian response and shock-responsive social protection* (IDS Working Paper 517). Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). Retrieved from https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/14081/Wp517_Online.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Rosas, N., & Sabarwal, S. (2016). *Can you work it? Evidence on the productive potential of public works from a youth employment program in Sierra Leone* (Policy Research Working Paper 7580). Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/105531467996736274/pdf/WPS7580.pdf.

Röth, H., Nimeh, Z., & Hagen-Zanker, J. (2017). *A mapping of social protection and humanitarian assistance programmes in Jordan: What support are refugees eligible for?* (ODI Working Paper 501). London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Retrieved from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11253.pdf

Roxin, H., Kocks, A., Wedel, R., Herforth, N., & Wencker, T. (2020). *Wirksamkeit deutscher Entwicklungszusammenarbeit bei konfliktbedingten Fluchtkrisen. Die Beschäftigungsoffensive Nahost.* Bonn: German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval).

Silva, J., Levin, V., & Morgandi, M. (2013). *The Way Forward for Social Safety Nets in the Middle East and North Africa*. MENA Development Report 73835. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Soifer, S. D. (2014). *Community economic development in social work. Foundations of social work knowledge.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Sommer, C. (2019). *Social cohesion and economic development: unpacking the relationship*. DIE Briefing Paper 16. Bonn: German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

Staton, B. (2018). A compact for Syrian refugee women? *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 30,* 72-81. Retrieved from https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/a-compact-for-syrian-refugee-women/

Sudarshan, R. M. (2011). *India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act: Women's participation and impacts in Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Rajasthan (CSP Research Report 6).* Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Center for Social Protection. Retrieved from https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ResearchReport06FINAL.pdf

Tessitore, S. (2013). *Like a good trip to town without selling your animals: A study of FAO Somalia's Cash for Work programme.* Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Retrieved from https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/cfw-study-21-july-final.pdf

Tiltnes, A., Zhang, H., & Pedersen, J. (2019). *The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Results from the 2017-2018 survey of Syrian refugees inside and outside camps*. Oslo: Fafo Institute for Labour and Social Research (FAFO). Retrieved from

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39ccd1e00/t/5c5c2adeec212d4fd49638f0/1549544185986/The+living+conditions+of+Syrian+refugees+in+Jordan+-+Final+report.pdf

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2020). *Rethinking human development in an era of planetary transformation. Human Development Report 2020*. New York, NY.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2019). *Women*. New York, NY. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/women.html?query=women

UNHCR. (2020): Jordan Operational Update (October 2020), Amman. Online: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/83228

UNHCR/UNICEF/WFP (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children Fund & World Food Programme). (2014). *Joint assessment review of the Syrian refugee response in Jordan.* New York, NY. Retrieved from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/39484

World Bank. (2015). *The state of social safety nets 2015*. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/415491467994645020/pdf/97882-PUB-REVISED-Box393232B-PUBLIC-DOCDATE-6-29-2015-DOI-10-1596978-1-4648-0543-1-EPI-1464805431.pdf

World Bank. (2016a). *Country partnership framework for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the period FY17-FY22.* Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24679/Jordan000Count0the0period0FY170FY22.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

World Bank. (2016b). *Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan promoting poverty reduction and shared prosperity: Systematic country diagnostic*. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/368161467992043090/pdf/103433-replacement.pdf

World Bank. (2019a). *The mobility of displaced Syrians. An economic and social analysis*. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-mobility-of-displaced-syrians-an-economic-and-social-analysis

World Bank. (2019b). *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators

World Bank (2020). Data (World Development Indicator data-base) at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=JO (26 November 2020)

Zepeda, E., & Alarcón, D. (2010). *Employment guarantee and conditional cash transfers programs for poverty reduction.* Conference paper presented at the UNDP's Ten Years of War against Poverty Conference, 8-10 September, Manchester

Zintl, T., & Loewe, M. (forthcoming). 'More than the sum of its parts: Donor-sponsored Cash-for-Work Programmes and social cohesion in Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees', to be published in *European Journal of Development Studies*

Zureiqat, G., & Abu Shama, H. (2015). *Social protection and safety nets in Jordan.* Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Centre for Social Protection. Retrieved from https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/SocialprotectionandsafetynetsinJordan.pdf

Annex

Table 1: Overview of donor-funded CfW programmes in Jordan

Name	Funding	Budget (million Euro)	Implementation	Start	Number of participants	Typical duration of employment (working days)	Geographical focus
Cash-for-Work/ Water (C4WW)	BMZ through GIZ	29	Ministries, DRC, NRC, ACTED, AAH, WVI, University of Hamburg, Jordan Valley Authority, UNESCO	2017	24,898 in all 3 projects altogether until May 2019 (overall share of women: 23%). In 2018, some 80% were in WtPE and 10% each in the two other programmes. GI alone had 2,200.	About 50 outside and about 35 inside camps	All parts of Jordan
Waste to (positive) Energy (WtPE): Waste management and recycling	BMZ through GIZ	56	Municipalities, DRC, ACTED, AAH, Oxfam, Caritas Switzerland, FPEC	2016			Mainly in the north of Jordan (several communities and the two camps)
Green Infrastructure (GI)	BMZ through GIZ	16	Municipalities, DRC, NARC, VNG International, AVSI, RSCN, FPEC	2017			Mainly in the north of Jordan
Labour-intensive maintenance of Public Schools	BMZ through KfW	8	UNOPS in coordination with the Ministry of Education	2018	About 4,000 until the end of 2021	40 (unskilled) to 120 (foremen)	All parts of Jordan (Amman, Irbid, Mafraq, Balqa, Aljoun and Ma'an)
Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP)	BMZ through KfW	49	ILO through ministries and municipalities	2016	14,200 until end of 2021	40 (unskilled) to 120 (foremen)	Mainly in the north of Jordan
	NORAD (Norway)	4	ILO through ministries	2016	3,200 in 2 years	30	Centre and south of Jordan
Food for Training (FFT)	World Food Programme (WFP)	n/a	Najma	2012	10,000 in 5 years	4 x 15	Mainly in the north of Jordan
Food for Assets (FFA)	World Food Programme (WFP)	n/a	Najma	2017 (replaced FFT)	2,650 in 2 years	6 x 15	Mainly in the north of Jordan
CfW in Refugee Camps	UNHCR and UNICEF	n/a		n/a	6,000 per month	Flexible	Camps (Zaᶜtari, Al-Azraq)
CfW	ICDF *	n/a	VDP	n/a	n/a	n/a	Centre of Jordan
Support to the Education Sector **	BMZ through KfW	6	UNICEF through NGOs and private contractors		Up to 1,350 per year	10 x 20	All of Jordan

Notes:

* International Cooperation and Development Fund of Taiwan.

Source: Loewe, Zintl et al. (2020).

Table 2: Research sites and sample composition of DIE's own qualitative survey: participants, shop-keepers and other non-participants (but excluding local experts)

Site	CfW activities	**Total**	Jordanians	Syrians	Egyptians	Females	Males	CfW participants	Shop-keepers	Other non-participants
Deyr ʿAllā	(i) GIZ and NARC: (i) Green Infrastructure (agricultural work) (ii) GIZ: Waste collection and recycling	**18**	10	8	0	6	12	10	4	4
Kafr Asad	(i) WFP and An-Najmah: School rehabilitation (ii) GIZ and NRC: Waste collection	**49**	34	15	0	14	35	15	22	12
Tal al-Rummān	GIZ and NRC: Water dam rehabilitation	**5**	5	0	0	2	3	1	4	0
Al-Azraq	(i) ICDF with AAH: Waste collection; (ii) GIZ: Green Infrastructure (rehabilitation of nature reserve)	**29**	14	11	4	7	22	11	12	6
Umm al-Jimāl	GIZ and Oxfam: Waste collection (men) and sorting (women)	**39**	26	13	0	14	25	13	8	18
Kafr Ṣawm	GIZ and World Vision: Cooking (women) and water dam rehabilitation (men)	**52**	39	13	0	26	26	12	17	23
Irbid Highway	KfW and ILO: (i) waste collection on roads	**9**	5	4	0	2	7	9	0	0
Faqūʾa	(i) Norway, ILO and Agricultural Directorate: Tree planting (ii) GIZ with DRC: Water dam rehabilitation	**29**	23	5	1	8	21	6	16	7
Al-Mafraq	KfW and ILO: (i) waste collection on roads	**17**	14	3	0	3	14	0	14	3
Total		**247**	170	72	5	82	155	77	97	73

Source: Own design based on Loewe, Zintl et al. (2020).

Table 3: Composition of the post-employment census among participants of GIZ's Green Infrastructure Programme until December 2020

Region, site, marital status, level of education	**Total number**	Share (per cent)					
	all	females	males	Jordanians	Syrians	2019	2020
Urban	**670**	27.6	71.8	50.7	48.7	36.9	63.1
Rural	**1,177**	25.6	74.1	52.1	47.6	62.6	37.4
North of Jordan	**793**	27.9	71.4	52.6	46.7	49.3	50.7
Centre of Jordan	**556**	29.1	70.7	53.8	46.0	36.9	63.1
South of Jordan	**498**	20.7	79.1	47.6	52.2	77.9	22.1
ʻAjlūn	**81**	35.8	64.2	58.0	42.0	80.2	19.8
Al-Baqaʻah	**23**	21.7	78.3	47.8	52.2	100.0	0.0
Al-Mafraq	**140**	40.7	59.3	56.4	43.6	66.4	33.6
Al-Quwayrah	**307**	37.8	61.9	54.1	45.6	74.3	25.7
Balʻamā	**152**	32.9	67.1	53.3	46.7	11.2	88.8
Ḍānā	**145**	11.7	87.6	49.7	49.7	82.1	17.9
Deyr ʻAllā	**110**	30.0	69.1	50.0	49.1	45.5	54.5
Fayfā	**74**	23.0	77.0	36.5	63.5	98.6	1.4
Khaldiyyah	**85**	18.8	80.0	49.4	49.4	70.6	29.4
Marū	**112**	25.0	75.0	51.8	48.2	44.6	55.4
Mūjib	**139**	8.6	91.4	42.4	57.6	74.1	25.9
Saḥāb	**190**	28.9	71.1	49.5	50.5	26.8	73.2
Umm al-Jimāl	**114**	5.3	91.2	51.8	44.7	11.4	88.6
Wādī al-Gharaba	**175**	25.7	74.3	58.9	41.1	22.3	77.7
Single	**705**	16.3	83.4	76.0	23.7	48.8	51.2
Married	**1,068**	29.3	70.3	36.1	63.5	55.8	44.2
Divorced	**46**	73.9	23.9	50.0	47.8	56.5	43.5
Separated	**9**	88.9	11.1	22.2	77.8	55.6	44.4
Widowed	**19**	84.2	10.5	31.6	63.2	68.4	31.6
Less than pre-secondary	**387**	26.4	73.1	27.9	71.6	55.0	45.0
Pre-secondary	**764**	20.2	79.2	46.9	52.5	54.3	45.7
Secondary	**373**	33.2	66.5	75.9	23.9	38.1	61.9
Vocational	**122**	35.2	68.9	78.7	25.4	52.5	51.6
Bachelor or higher	**127**	29.1	66.9	60.6	35.4	88.2	7.9
Other	**74**	33.8	60.8	40.5	54.1	51.4	43.2
2019	**984**	25.6	74.3	52.1	47.6		
2020	**863**	27.2	72.3	51.0	49.0		
Total	**1,847**	26.4	73.4	51.6	48.2	53.3	46.7

Source: Own design, based on the results of the GIZ Post-employment Survey (GIZ, 2019; GIZ, 2020).

Table 4: Spending patterns of CfW participants (N=64)

Item	Number of answers	Share of respondents (multiple answers possible)	Share of answers given
Housing (rent, electricity, water)	30	47%	23%
Food	19	30%	15%
Household equipment	15	23%	12%
Education of children (school items, university, etc.)	15	23%	12%
Debt repayment	14	22%	11%
Support children or other relatives	13	20%	10%
Investment in small projects	7	11%	5%
Health	6	9%	5%
Personal needs	5	8%	4%
Clothes	3	5%	2%
Transportation	2	3%	5%
Holidays	1	2%	0.5%
Sum	130		100%

Source: Authors

Table 5: CfW-income spending and saving patterns (results of GIZ Post-employment Survey, 1,847 respondents)

	Total number	Share of all answers (per cent)	Share of all respondents in the respective category (per cent)							
	All	All	All	Fe-males	Males	Jorda-nians	Syrian s	2019	2020 before COVI D19	2020 since COVI D 19
Had debts before CfW employment	**1,318**		71.4	72.4	71.2	68.1	75.2	63.5	83.0	79.0
CfW wage covered daily needs	**1,445**		78.2	85.8	75.8	78.2	78.7	74.2	85.5	81.6
Among top three spending items										
House rent	**916**	*20.6*	49.6	50.4	49.3	26.9	74.0	45.3	43.3	59.9
Food	**769**	*17.3*	41.6	40.1	42.1	39.3	44.0	31.0	36.9	62.0
Paying open bills	**761**	*17.1*	41.2	46.3	39.4	38.8	43.8	32.4	35.8	58.7
Debt repay	**606**	*13.6*	32.8	41.6	29.6	36.5	28.8	34.1	36.5	28.7
Health	**435**	*9.8*	23.6	26.5	22.6	19.9	27.7	22.1	28.4	23.8
Household items	**379**	*8.5*	20.5	22.0	20.0	29.2	11.2	20.0	25.5	18.9
Transportation	**305**	*6.9*	16.5	20.8	14.9	18.6	14.2	17.0	18.8	14.6
Education	**128**	*2.9*	6.9	8.8	6.3	8.2	5.6	7.6	7.8	5.3
Leisure	**77**	*1.7*	4.2	3.7	4.3	7.1	0.9	4.7	4.3	3.3
Other	**75**	*1.7*	4.1	4.5	3.9	5.0	3.0	6.6	2.1	0.7
Among top three savings items										
Personal items	**293**	*37,6*	15,9	19,1	14,5	19,4	11,7	14,1	22,0	15,8
Health	**225**	*28,9*	12,2	15,2	11,1	11,5	12,9	12,8	16,3	9,1
Education	**162**	*20,8*	8,8	11,9	7,6	9,1	8,4	9,0	8,5	8,4
Small business	**51**	*6,5*	2,8	2,5	2,9	4,1	1,4	2,9	3,2	2,2
Other	**48**	*6,2*	2,6	3,5	2,3	2,6	2,6	3,7	2,1	1,0
Could not save at all	***1,349***		*73,0*	*72,4*	*73,3*	*68,7*	*77,8*	*69,5*	*70,2*	*80,4*

Source: Own design, based on the results of the GIZ Post-employment Survey (GIZ, 2019; GIZ, 2020).

Figure 1: Donor-funded CfW activities in Jordan by sector



Source: Authors, based on data provided by GIZ, ILO, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF