Syrian Migrants, Domestic and International Politics: Parsing out Sentiments on Turkish Twitter

Emre Hatipoglu, Osman Zeki Gökçe, Inanç Arın, and Yücel Saygın

ECONOMIC
RESEARCH
FORUM

منتدى
البحوث
الاقتصادية

Syrian Migrants, Domestic and International Politics: Parsing out Sentiments on Turkish Twitter

DRAFT - Please Do Not Cite

Emre Hatipoğlu, Osman Zeki Gökçe, İnanç Arın, Yücel Saygın
Sabancı University, Istanbul Medipol University

ABSTRACT

Migration, in general, and, refugee flows in particular has constituted a central topic of scholarly inquiry over the last decade. Turkey has been one of the countries that received high number of refugees, both per capita and in absolute figures, during this time period. Inevitably, the issue has become an important topic both in Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy.

Although public opinion has played an important role in shaping Turkey's policies towards Syrian refugees, our knowledge on how these attitudes form is scant. This study aims to address this gap. To do so, we have taken a four-month snapshot of Turkish tweets on Syrian refugees and assessed the picture they depict regarding the refugees in online social media. Such clustering made the hand-coding of the content of these tweets feasible. Our findings suggest that security concerns trump over all others. They also indicate that the issue of Syrian refugees is a highly politicized issue as attitudes in almost half of the tweets are associated with a Turkish political party. We also find that being pro-Syrian refugee does not necessarily associate with humanitarian concerns. Such tweets display various undertones; a large number of pro-Syrian refugee tweets also carry a Sunni-racist tone.

This study carries two main theoretical contributions: the study (i) extends the emerging literature on the link between domestic politics and foreign policy in Turkey; and, (ii) offers one of the first systematic descriptions of a host population's online attitudes and perceptions towards refugees. The study's methodological contribution relates to a novel clustering technique, developed by the authors, which allows tweets with similar contents to be clustered under distinct groups, hence making hand-coding of their content a feasible endeavor.

Keywords: Syrian, migrants, migration, Twitter, sentiment, Turkey, tweet, cluster, methodology

Note on the presenter: Osman Zeki Gökçe is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Medipol University. He earned his Ph.D. from Sabancı University with the thesis entitled "The Role of Energy Interdependence in Shaping World Politics." During his Ph.D.,, he had been at Harvard University as a visiting research fellow. His research interests include international relations, energy politics, Turkish foreign policy, conflict, and quantitative research methods.

1. INTRODUCTION

Migration, in general, and refugee flows, in particular, has constituted a central topic for scholarly inquiry in international relations over the last decade. Such human flows across borders have had discernible political consequences, both domestically and internationally, in the host countries. Refugee inflows bring a number of policy challenges for the host state; such challenges have often arose in the areas of healthcare (Morris et al. 2009; Onyut et al. 2009; Iqbal 2006), housing (Carter and Osborne 2009; Murdie 2008; Phillips 2006; Fitzsimmons et al.2003), education (Waters and LeBlanc 2005) and economic integration (Facchini and Mayda 2008; Hanson 2005), among others. Committing resources to address such needs often come at the expense of other public spending. The hosting and eventual integration of refugee populations can lead to frictions domestically, often turning into violence. At a larger scale, such refugee flows also carry the risk of exporting civil conflict to host countries (Gleditsch and Salehyan 2006; Salehyan 2008).

Refugee inflows and transflows also affect foreign policy of host states in a number of ways. Economically, many refugee crises include a burden-sharing component among states, either through bilateral agreements, ad hoc multilateral frameworks, or through international institutions such as the UNHCR or the European Refugee Fund. Often, multilateral attempts at burden sharing lead to cooperative and competitive bargaining among states (Betts 2003; Thielemann 2005; Roper and Barria 2010). Security issues emanating from such flows (Gleditisch et al. 2008) become a concern for the foreign policy of host states. For instance, the ethnic composition of refugees may pit their host state against other states where co-ethnics of the refugees are the majority (Davis & Moore 1997). Alternatively, such refugee flows may force the host state to take a proactive stance and militarily intervene in the country of the refugees.

Public attitudes play a key role in the host government's response to such domestic and international challenges raised by refugee inflows. The allocation of resources towards addressing issues raised by refugee flows inevitably becomes a central topic for domestic politics. Often such allocation requires commitment from various branches of government. For instance, healthcare service to refugees often is accompanied by language and social assistance (Morris et al. 2009). Similarly, housing assistance often requires concomitant investments in local policing, community-building and integration efforts. Such refugee policies come at significant cost, and carry the potential to crowd out other spending items in public finances. To illustrate, in 2016, the government of Canada spent about 365 million US Dollars to settle 25000 Syrian refugees in Canada (Sevunts 2016). In 2017, the government of Uganda and the Secretary General of UN appealed to the international community for eight billion US Dollars to provide for the immediate needs of one million South Sudanese who took refuge from civil strife in their country (Uganda, UN appeal for $8 billion for South Sudan refugees, 2017).

Regardless of its burden on public finances, the opposition can score political points by framing such allocation to refugees as diversions from resources that were otherwise earmarked for citizens. The presence of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, Burmese refugees in Thailand, Ethiopian refugees in Sudan, and more recently Syrian refugees in a number of European countries and Turkey have caused salient domestic debates in their respective host countries. For instance, it took until 2010, and months of parliamentary debates, for Lebanon to grant Palestinian refugees, many of whom had been in refugee status for decades, the right to work there as other foreigners do (Bakri 2010). The "open-borders" policy announced by Angela Merkel amidst Europe's refugee crisis in 2015 resulted in a noticeable hit in the Chancelor's popularity as well as small-scale rebellions within the CDU, the party she leads (Connolly 2015). This resistance against Merkel was partially motivated by the demands admitting refugees put on education, security and housing policy in Germany.

Security-issues, acute or potential, can also shape public opinion, and thus constrain host government's policies. The violent clashes that erupted between Buddhist and Muslim guest workers from Myanmar in Malaysia in June 2013 exemplify such a mechanism. These clashes, fueled by the suffering of Rohingya Muslims back in the guest workers' home country, raised security fears of Malaysian citizens. Raising public concern for such a sensitive topic, in turn, forced the Malaysian government to reject a policy of "wholesale acceptance of the Rohingya refugees" to the country (Xioing 2015). In Italy, those saw refugees and immigration as a serious issue jumped from 3% in 2014 to 35% in 2017 (Politi 2017).

Public attitudes towards refugees also have discernible impact of the host country's foreign policy. The management of refugee flows often requires substantial international effort and negotiation. Within this context, the host public's attitudes can either bolster or debilitate a state's bargaining position in the international arena. On the one hand, public's pressure on the government with electoral consequences looming in the background can result in the host country getting a better deal in a multilateral bargaining setting (Putnam 1988; Fearon 1994). On the other hand, a too-hostile public sentiment towards refugees can strip a host government to credibly commit in such instances of multilateral bargaining and lead to a breakdown of negotiations. The potential role public attitudes play in shaping refugee policies of a host country, in turn, highlights the need to better understand the nature of these attitudes. This role is especially salient in Turkey, where a recent poll found 84% of Turkish citizens are concerned with Syrian refugees in Turkey, 73% want Syrian refugees to go back to Syria, and 68% believe more restrictive policies should be adopted against Syrian refugees in Turkey (German Marshall Fund 2015).

The vast amounts of Syrian refugees in Turkey, exceeding 3 million by 2016 official figures (AFAD 2017), have fueled debates in the country on a diverse set of issues. A cursory look at media and reports on Syrian refugees highlight diverse topics. At the domestic level, these issues

range from employment and rising house rents in big cities to public health and epidemic risks (Dinçer et al. 2013, 27-29; İçduygu 2015), from changing Sunni-Alevite demographic balance in Anatolian towns and villages due to the settling of Syrian refugees in these towns (Çağaptay and Menekşe 2014, 16-22) to the burden services rendered to Syrian refugees impose on public finances. Many Turkish citizens voiced disapproval when the Turkish government floated the idea of placing Syrian refugees in government owned housing developments. The tone of disapproval was even stronger when the government hinted at the possibility of granting Turkish citizenship to Syrian refugees en masse. At the international level, the role Syrian refugee issue should play in Turkey's foreign policy towards Syria and the Middle East, and even towards the European Union constitute important points of debate. The increasing salience of Syrian refugees in Turkish politics also manifested itself in the electoral manifestos of Turkish political parties for the June 2015 elections: the topic of Syrian refugees constituted a separate topic for each major political party's manifesto (Aksoy and Hatipoglu, n.d.).

Despite their importance, our knowledge on the details of public attitudes on Syrian refugees is scant. One of the reasons underlying this paucity of knowledge relates to the conflation of multiple topics into a single concept: "the Syrian issue." As discussed above, the Syrian issue is an amalgamation of various topics. Each of these topics can often be framed in varying contexts. For instance, the prospect of giving citizenship to Syrian refugees can be framed through security (e.g. whatif, once citizens, Syrian refugees pursue secession of Hatay province from Turkey?), or through economics (e.g. why exacerbate the unemployment problem in Turkey by granting Syrian refugees citizenship?). In relation, available public opinion data on Syrian refugees are mostly confined to measuring general attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and are unable to parse out attitudes towards individual dimensions of the Syrian issue (e.g. EDAM 2014; The German Marshall Fund 2015; cf. Erdoğan 2015).

In this study, we aim to further our understanding of attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey by examining social media, namely Twitter. To do so, we have taken a fourth-month snapshot of Turkish tweets on Syrian refugees, and assessed the picture these tweets depict regarding the refugees. To take this snapshot, we utilized novel code developed by the authors. This code allowed us to cluster similar tweets together. Coding these clusters for content, we then present relative frequency and contingency tables to see which issues tend to come up more, and under what contexts Syrian refugees tend to be mentioned in Turkish online social media. Our findings suggest that security concerns trump over all others for those who tweet on Syria in Turkish language. They findings also indicate that the issue of Syrian refugees is a highly politicized one, as almost half of the tweets on Syrian refugees also mention at least one Turkish political party. Manifested sympathy towards Turkish political parties also correlate with the issues raised on Twitter. AKP supporters are less likely to raise issues relating to Turkey's security. Lastly, pro-Syrian refugee tweets are not necessarily based on humanitarian grounds; many pro-Syrian refugee tweets carry outright Islamo-fascist arguments.

4

Our analysis proceeds in seven sections. Following this introduction, Section Two highlights the increasingly salient relationship between public opinion and Turkish foreign policy. Section Three, then, elaborates on how Syrian refugees relate to both of these concepts. Section Four motivates our study's unique focus on Twitter as a source of gathering public opinion data. Section Five discusses our novel methodology and gives a brief overview of the code developed for this paper. The presentation and the discussion of the findings constitute Section Six. Section Seven concludes.

2. PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The level of information citizens possess in foreign policy, and the extent to which such information is consistent has been a main topic of interest for post-World War scholars of foreign policy. This line of research has initially focused on the American electorate, eventually branching out to other polities around the world. Broadly speaking, these scholars are grouped under two main camps regarding the nature of public opinion on foreign policy: one camp has argued that the public is generally uninformed, inconsistent and fickle in its attitudes (e.g. Almond 1950; Converse 1964; Erskine 1963), while the other claims that individuals tend to hold consistent ideas that adhere to some sort of structure (e.g. Aldrich et al. 1989; Hurwitz and Peffley 1985). More recent studies have solidly established that public opinion plays an important role in shaping in many aspects of foreign policy (see, *inter alia*, Putnam 1988; Fearon 1994; Schultz 1999; DeRouen 2000). Understanding how these attitudes form, in turn, become a central concern for foreign policy scholars (Hurwitz et al 1993; Tomz 2007; Ehrlich and Maestas 2010 exemplify some of the excellent work done on this topic).

The link between domestic politics and foreign policy in Turkey has become increasingly visible over the last decades as well. Following global trends since the end of Cold War (Fearon 1994; Smith and Hayes 1997), the effect international events have on Turkish politics have manifested itself in a multitude of areas, such as public opinion (Çarkoğlu 2003; Şenyuva 2009; Erdoğan 2013), electoral manifestos of Turkish political parties (Hatipoglu et al. 2015), and eventually, voting behavior (Kalaycıoğlu 2009). Similarly, domestic politics has been increasingly influencing Turkish foreign policy. While Hale (2002, 208) has argued that domestic constituencies have partially shaped successive Turkish governments' foreign policy choices, the new millennium has witnessed an increase in the salience of this influence. In economics, Turkish foreign policy has responded to the secure markets for export of Turkish manufacturers, to the extent that Turkey has been dubbed as a 'trading state' (Kirişçi 2008). Cultural sensitivities of the incumbent party's electorate, especially the desire to express solidarity with their fellow co-religionists, also resonated in Turkish foreign policy as Turkey has been actively involved in wide-reaching Muslim geographies in various capacities, such as its mediation efforts in Bosnia

(Zenelaj et al, 2015), humanitarian intervention in Somalia (Akpinar 2013) and peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan (Yalçınkaya 2013).

3. SYRIAN REFUGEES AND PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY

The inflow of refugees to Turkey following the eruption of the Syrian civil war in 2013 has impacted Turkish politics in a number of ways. With a refugee inflow of more than three million people over a short time span, Turkey was challenged on a number of domestic and international fronts. The immediate need for sheltering led Turkey to erect camps and dedicate unused government property for these refugees. Many of the refugees, however, opted to travel to bigger cities. In the longer term, the influx of Syrian refugees in large numbers inevitably raised a number of policy challenges for the government. These challenges ranged from addressing epidemiological risks in public health (such as resurfacing of otherwise eradicated childhood polio) to rising rents in moderate neighborhoods of metropolitan cities due to increasing demand from Syrian families. Security continued to be a concern for those who escaped the civil war in Syria; the more vulnerable such as women and children were often discussed in the media as targets for exploitation and abuse.

Its strong link to domestic politics in Turkey makes the topic of Syrian refugees an interesting scholarly topic. Ethnicity, sectarianism and economic expectations have been among major shapers of an individual's political attitudes in Turkey (Mardin 1989; Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007, 2009; Başlevent et al. 2005). In line with this, public debates on Turkey's response to Syrian refugees have often been framed through these three concepts. The theme of "Sunni brotherhood," often voiced among conservative Sunni circles in Turkey, found their echo in the government. Meanwhile, a number of Alevite groups voiced their sensitivity towards changing demographics in Anatolian towns and villages where Syrian refugees, who are predominantly Sunni, were placed by the government (International Crisis Group 2013). On another note, a sizeable part of Turkish population voiced their concerns that such refugee inflows could (i) strengthen the separatist Kurdish movement in Turkey. Many Turks on Twitter also argued many of these refugees were "crypto-Armenians," descending from Armenians forced to migrate from today's Turkey to Syria in 1915, and had the hidden agenda of re-establishing Armenian presence in Anatolian towns and villages. That four out of every five Syrian refugees live in a large number of Turkish cities (and not camps) have had direct impact on "everyday" life of Turkish citizens (AFAD 2015); such migration patterns have tremendously increased social interaction between citizenry and refugees. For instance, the nature of the economic impact Syrian refugees have had on Turkish economy has been a major topic of debate in politics; at one point, President Erdogan felt the need to highlight the contribution "highly qualified" Syrian refugees can make to Turkish economy.

In addition to Turkish domestic politics, Syrian refugees have posed a series of challenges for Turkish foreign policy. A major challenge relates to the dimension of security. Turkey's active support of anti-Assad forces, primarily the Free Syrian Army, has pitted Turkey first against the Assad regime, and later, against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The challenge of controlling the flow of militants across a porous border with Syria coupled with the proximity of many Turkish towns to the Syrian border, have resulted in a number of attacks on Turkish soil with significant loss of life. Many of these attacks were linked to individuals who crossed the Turkey-Syria border. Other attacks carried across the border were also linked to the policies Turkey pursued in the Syrian civil war. Similarly, the Syrian civil war witnessed to the rise of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (YDP), its militant arm People's Protection Units (YPG), and YDP and YPG's eventual merge with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Not surprisingly, a popular sentiment in Turkey, which our analysis below also confirms, was that the PKK was benefitting from the inflow of Syrian refugees.

The intervention of other countries in the Syrian civil war, and especially the coalitions these countries formed with warring factions in Syria exacerbated the challenges towards Turkey's ability to manage its security policies relating to the Syrian civil war. Its direct opposition to the Assad regime put Turkey against Assad's main supporters, namely Iran and Russia. Turkey's official declaration of YPG as a terrorist organization brought about a separate diplomatic impasse for Turkey with its main NATO ally, the United States. Some of these crises have escalated into the use of militarized force, such as the downing of a Turkish reconnaissance plane by Syrian forces, and Turkey's downing of a Russian fighter plane at the Turkish-Syrian border.

Turkey's efforts to share the economic and humanitarian burden of Syrian refugees led to a series of conflictual exchanges with another neighbor, namely Europe. Many Syrian refugees, joined by refugees from other less developed countries, such as Afghanistan or Somalia, wanted to settle in a European country, and decided to use Turkey as a transit state. The chaos and the humanistic drama that engulfed the plight of these refugees frequently pitted Turkey against member states of the EU as well as the European Commission. A protracted bargain between Turkey and Europe ensued on shouldering the burden of Syrian refugees and the conditions under which some of these refugees could be returned to Turkey. Neither Turkish nor European leaders were reluctant to mobilize their publics against the each other during this process of bargaining.

Despite the extent to which the issue of Syrian refugees has permeated Turkish politics and foreign policy, little systematic analysis has been done to assess (i) the relative importance of these issues vis-a-vis each other (e.g. are security concerns or economic burdens associated with Syrian refugees voiced more on Turkish twitter?), and (2) how these attitudes correlate with other attitudes regarding Turkish politics (e.g. does expressing sympathy for a certain political party in Turkey make an individual more likely to highlight issues relating to refugees and

economics?). To answer these questions, we adopt a novel approach and look at public opinion on Twitter.

4. TWITTER AND PUBLIC OPINION

In Turkey, and elsewhere, quick and far-reaching dissemination of information on social media have been redefining popular politics In regimes based on popular support, politicians and policy makers increasingly have increasingly become sensitive and responsive to online perceptions and attitudes of the public. Foreign policy has been one such area where Twitter seems to reflect salient debates in society. For instance, recent studies have shown that the contours of the Turkish online debate on the battle for Kobani very much resembled the fault lines in conventional Turkish politics (Hatipoglu et al. 2016).

5. METHODOLODGY

Twitter is a popular social platform that people share their ideas and reactions towards daily events. Analyzing tweets sent for a specific topic is important since these tweets give important insight to online public opinion (Gökçe et al. 2014; Hatipoglu et al. 2016; Tumasjan et al. 2010; Ikufor 2010). However, analyzing large volume of tweets in an unbiased way is a challenging task. Conventional hand-coding is simply unfeasible for very large data. Automated sentiment analysis and machine coding of text is another option (Schrodt 2012). Language used on Twitter, however, is "dirty" (i.e., unstructured), hence very difficult to form a relevant "ontology" from which a computer can learn. In addition, the "ontology" of Turkish developed for automated text programming is quite weak to start with; in other words, little programming has been done to teach machines to "understand" texts in Turkish. Other, popular off-the-shelf content analysis programs have very limited information processing capacity, and are unsuited for large-data analysis.

Our approach evades problems regarding automated content coding of Turkish, such as ontology and dirty language, altogether, while offering a scalable solution, which can analyze entries from low-hundreds to hundreds of thousands. Since our technique assesses similarities based on individual character and not words, it is applicable to most alphabetic languages.[1] As such, this article also serves as proof of concept for the applicability of this methodology to social sciences. More specifically, the methodological contribution of this paper relates to the use of a novel text clustering mechanism developed by the authors. Using original code developed at Sabancı University, this clustering mechanism allows the computer to automatically cluster similar tweets under one leading tweet, i.e. the cluster header, based on a similarity threshold arbitrarily set by the researchers. The level of similarity for clustering is scalable: depending on the threshold

---

[1] We are currently assessing the applicability of our code to logographic languages such as Chinese.

deemed sufficient by the researchers, this clustering technique allows researchers to collapse the number of tweets that need to be coded for content by a factor of three to fifty.

In this study, our novel clustering technique allowed 52845 of the 60146 tweets to be grouped into 3553 clusters, while 7301 of these tweets turned out as stand-alone tweets. These 10874 (3553 cluster headers + 7321 remaining stand-alone tweets) individual entries were, then, coded for content by the authors. Further statistical analyses were conducted on these groups to gauge the relationship between various aspects of the content of the tweets. Clustering led to a decrease of the number of entries that needed to be hand-coded dataset by a factor of 5.5. The subsections below elaborate on the processes of data collection, clustering and statistical analysis.

Data Collection

We started to collect real time Turkish tweets by using Twitter Stream API, which contain the keyword of *mülteci* [refugee], including the spelling with English letters, i.e. *multeci* as well as the word *Suriye* and its inflections in Turkish (such as Suriyeli, Suriyeliler etc.). The collected tweets were, then, filtered for language; this filter eliminated tweets that were not in Turkish language. As a result, our analysis comprises of 60146 tweets, which were posted between May 2nd 2016 and August 25th 2016. An important limitation at this step was Twitter's limited access for legal retrieval of related tweets via Twitter Stream API upon a word query (Twitter, 2006). The true number of tweets that contained the word *mülteci and Suriye* are much higher than 60146. Nonetheless, we have no apriori reason to believe that Twitter censors results from query in a non-random way.[2] Therefore, our sample is sufficiently large for the inferences made below.

Clustering of Tweets

Standard document clustering methods in data mining do not work well on Twitter data due to several reasons. The first reason is that tweets are very short documents that contain 140 characters at most. The second point is that users tend to use a "dirty" language in Twitter; misspelled words, emoticons, and abbreviations make it hard to obtain good, clean clusters for standard document clustering methods. To address this challenge, we utilized an algorithm that utilizes an adaptive clustering approach for Twitter which is based on lexical similarity (Arin et al. nd).

Lexical similarity In order to calculate lexical similarity among tweets, we use Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) similarity metric. LCS is the longest set of characters from two sequences (tweets) that are common between these two sequences in the same order. For example, if the first sequence is "thisisatest" and the second sequence is "testing123testing"; LCS between these two sequences is "tsitest":

---

[2]Twitter does not publicly disclose the sampling mechanism; however, the company officially declares that "the Sample endpoint provides a statistically relevant sample of 1% of the full firehose." See
https://twittercommunity.com/t/is-the-sample-streaming-api-truly-random/14942/3

thi**si**sa**test**
tes**ti**ng123**test**ing
LCS: **tsitest**

Figure 1: Illustration of Longest Common Subsequence Metric

To illustrate technically, let's assume X and Y are two sequences and $X_i = x_i\ x_2\ ...\ x_i\$$ is the prefix of X and $Y_j = y_1\ y_2\ ...\ y_j\$$ is the prefix of Y. Then the length of the LCS can be found as follows:

$$LCS(X_i, Y_j) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = 0 \text{ or } j = 0 \\ LCS(X_{i-1}, Y_{j-1}) + 1 & \text{if } x_i = y_j \\ max(LCS(X_{i-1}, Y_j), LCS(X_i, Y_{j-1})) & \text{if } x_i \neq y_j \end{cases}$$

LCS problem can be solved with a dynamic programming approach in O(m*n) time and space complexity where m and y are the length of two strings. Our adaptive clustering algorithm is based on Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) as defined above. This measure, however, needs to be normalized: since different tweets will have different lengths, longer tweets are more likely to have longer common subsequences regardless of content.[3] To render a normalized similarity score between two tweets, we use the following formula:

$$NormalizedScore(t_i, t_j) = \frac{2 * LCS(t_i, t_j)}{Length(t_i) + Length(t_j)}$$

A naive algorithm for LCS based tweet clustering process is given in Figure 2. This algorithm calculates the level of similarity between a single tweet and a pre-defined cluster-header tweet. If our algorithm indicates that an individual tweet is sufficiently similar to a given cluster header, then this tweet is assigned to this cluster. In other words, for each unclustered tweet (referred as tweet i), we pass over all other following unclustered tweets (referred as tweet j). If the normalized score that we defined above, between tweet i and tweet j is higher than the threshold, then we include indices of these tweets (which are i and j) in the same cluster c. However, not all

---

[3] To iterate, our algorithm calculates similarities at the level of characters, and not at the level of words. This techniques saves us the trouble of "teaching" the computer how to understand Turkish (or any langugage for that matter), and allows us to significant save on computing. One important shortcoming, however, is that we are unable to separate sarcastic tweets from "honest" ones, since both types of tweets exhibit very high levels of similarity in character content.

clusters are included into the set of clusters C; instead only the clusters whose sizes are greater than or equal to k are included into C where k is the minimum number of tweets a cluster must have. To keep the highest level of generalizability, we set k=2, i.e. the minimum number of tweets a cluster can have is two. The first tweet (t_i) in c becomes the representative tweet of cluster c, which is called the *cluster header*. Once we include the cluster c into the set C, then we remove the tweets included in cluster c from the dataset. This algorithm ensures that the cluster sizes are greater than or equal to k.

Our technique guarantees that every tweet, which belongs to a cluster, passes the similarity threshold with the cluster header. We should also note that there is no guarantee that the similarity between any two non-cluster header tweets in a cluster is above the threshold. However, experiments show that tweets belonging to even very large clusters are similar to each other in content as well as to the representative tweet.

For this study, we set the threshold at 0.7, leading to 82% reduction in the number of cases to be content-coded by hand. To restate, higher thresholds make it more difficult for our algorithm to decide that two tweets are alike, and therefore, cluster these tweets together. Due to the novelty of our technique, we kept this threshold relatively high. Table 1 illustrates the reduction in coding burden when the threshold is relaxed to 0.5, which increases the reduction in coding burden to 90%. Other studies that operate on more structured, clean text may decrease this threshold, and substantially reduce the time required to hand-code content of the text.

```
C = {};

for i ← 1 to n do
    ti.isClustered ← false;        ▷ Initially, all tweets are marked as unclustered;
end

for i ← 1 to n do
    if ti.isClustered = false then
        c = {i};
        for j ← (i + 1) to n do
            if tj.isClustered = false and NormalizedScore(ti, tj) ≥ threshold
            then
                | c ← c ∪ j;                        ▷ Find first unclustered similar tweet
            end
        end
        if |c| ≥ k then
                                                   ▷ If cluster size is big enough
            C ← C ∪ c;                             ▷ Add this cluster to set of clusters
            foreach index ∈ c do
                | tindex.isClustered ← true;       ▷ Mark these tweets as clustered
            end
        end
    end
end
```

Figure 2. LCS based tweet clustering algorithm

Table 1: The Relationship between Set Threshold and Reduction in Burden of Coding

Threshold Set	Number of Clusters	Number of Unclustered Tweets	Reduction in Coding Burden (%)
0.7	3553	7301	82.0
0.6	3378	6622	83.4
0.5	2748	3609	89.4

Sample: 60146 Tweets

As a result of our algorithm, 52845 of the 60146 tweets clustered successfully under 3553 clusters, while 7301 unclustered individual tweets remained. We calculate intra-cluster similarity of a cluster by calculating the pairwise similarity of each tweet inside the cluster as follows:

$$intraCSim(c) = \frac{2}{|c| * (|c| - 1)} * \sum_{i=0}^{|c|} \sum_{j=i+1}^{|c|} NormalizedScore(t_i, t_j)$$

Using the intra-cluster similarity formula defined above, we find the average intra-cluster similarity as follows:

$$avgISim(C) = \frac{1}{m} * \sum_{i=0}^{m} intraCSim(c_i)$$

Our calculations indicate that the average intra-cluster similarity was 0.93 across the 3553 clusters, meaning that the tweets grouped within a cluster were quite similar in content.

Content Coding, Categories and Statistical Analyses

Having clustered tweets under cluster headers, our next task was to hand-code each of these cluster-header tweets for content. These cluster-headers were coded with respect to the following content: (1) the specific issue (if any) raised related to migrants, (2) whether any political party(ies) were referred to in the tweet, (3) attitudes towards any of these political parties: and finally, (5) whether the tweet entails a positive, negative or neutral tone towards the refugees.

13

Issues: Drawing from the current debate on Syrian refugees, we have identified the following issues: *physical security inside Turkey*, *physical security outside of Turkey*, *physical security and well-being of the immigrants*, *economics*, *social services* (such as education, health, social support), *ethnicity / identity*, *citizenship*, and *demographic balance*. If an issue mentioned does not subscribe to any of the categories above, we coded it as *other*. If no specific issue was mentioned, the tweet was coded under the general category. These categories are not mutually exclusive; a tweet may mention more than one issue. The most popular cluster headers (and their translations in English) with respect to issue topics are listed in the Appendix.

Political Party Mentions and Attitudes: This paper assumes that the topic of Syrian refugees is intertwined with Turkish politics. To confirm this assumption, we coded whether or not tweets mentioned at least one political party in Turkey.[4] In addition, we also coded whether the tweet projected a positive, negative or neutral attitude to any of the political parties it entailed.

Rebel / Terrorist Group: A number of rebel/terrorist groups play a shaping role in the Syrian civil war, as well as the refugees this civil war has been producing. Furthermore, the policies of these groups have been impacting Turkey; and Turkey's policies in the region, in turn, in various ways. Accordingly, we coded whether the related tweet mentioned any of the following groups: PKK, YPG/PYD or ISIS. Other groups (such as Al-Nusra) were collapsed under the "other" category.

Attitudes towards Refugees: Finally, we also coded whether a tweet's attitude towards refugees carries a positive, negative or a neutral tone. Two tweets that share the same concern over an issue may carry different attitudes towards refugees. For example, while one tweet

Our study offers two substantive inquiries: (1) relevant frequencies of domestic and international issues raised in tweets, and (2) correlations between these issues raised relating to Syrian refugees and other attitudes manifested in a tweet. Simple frequency tables will answer our first inquiry. Towards the second inquiry, we conducted Pearson's Chi-squared tests. Since collecting information for control variables, such as age, sex, and socioeconomic status is not practically feasible, we are unable to conduct multiple linear regression models. Therefore, we underline that our findings suggest patterns of covariation among various sentiments. Our study does not gauge the determinants regarding the formation of such attitudes.

6. FINDINGS

Basic descriptive results: One-way Frequencies

---

[4] The word "government" or any derivatives thereof is also coded under AKP.

We coded each of 10874 cluster headers with respect to topics mainly reflected in contents. We have 10 pre-determined categories to identify topics which might overlap for a given cluster header: Security within the borders of Turkey (TR Security), security outside of Turkey (Security Abroad), immigrants' safety, economy, social aid, identity/ethnicity, Turkish citizenship (TR Citizenship), demography, general (for headers without specific topic), and other (for headers not having any connection with Syrian-refugee issues). Moreover, we extended the coding with respect to attitudes stated towards the government party — AKP —, as well as opposition parties — CHP, MHP, HDP —, and the names of terrorist organizations — PKK, PYD/YPG, DAESH— quoted or referred, if any. For each of the cluster headers, we also counted number of cluster elements (or tweet frequencies) and used these frequencies to weight each header.[5] While reporting one-way frequency tables, we present both weighted and unweighted results. However, our analyses for two-way tabulations mainly rely on weighted results.

Table 1: Frequencies based on topics

	Unweighted			Weighted			Average Tweets per Cluster Header
	Frequency	%	TOTAL	Frequency	%	TOTAL	
TR Security	3,925	36.10	10,874	22,102	34.91	63,312	5.6
Security Abroad	775	7.13	10,874	2,931	4.63	63,312	3.8
Immigrants' Safety	1,753	16.12	10,874	13,327	21.05	63,312	7.6
Economy	1,580	14.53	10,874	8,775	13.86	63,312	5.6
Social Aid	636	5.85	10,874	4,614	7.29	63,312	7.3
Identity/Ethnicity	1,344	12.36	10,874	5,116	8.08	63,312	3.8
TR Citizenship	1,622	14.92	10,874	10,104	15.96	63,312	6.2
Demography	484	4.45	10,874	758	1.2	63,312	1.6
General	1,904	17.51	10,874	9,703	15.33	63,312	5.1
Other	693	6.37	10,874	4,947	7.81	63,312	7.1

*Any given cluster header might be coded under multiple topics according to its content.

Table 1 shows unweighted and weighted frequencies based on topics. Not surprisingly, TR Security is the far most enunciated topic related to Syrian refugees. Tweets regarding immigrants' safety constitute the second most popular topic among others. Comparison of unweighted and weighted percentages might tell us an interesting story: Almost all of the unweighted percentages decline after weighting headers with tweet frequencies, except topics associated with immigrants' safety, social aid, and Turkish citizenship. This observation might

---

[5] For each topic category, we reported five cluster headers (in Turkish) with the highest tweet frequencies. Please see Appendix Table A1.

indicate that these topics are found worthy to be shared or conveyed among Twitter users to create more awareness or increase visibility. Tweets per cluster headers coded under any of these three topics are more than six, on average.

Table 2: Overlaps between topics

	TR Security	Security Abroad	Immigrants' Safety	Economy	Social Aid	Identity /Ethnicity	TR Citizenship	Demography
TR Security		212	267	237	82	374	552	118
Security Abroad	212		188	48	8	46	17	4
Immigrants' Safety	267	188		205	75	117	39	26
Economy	237	48	205		238	68	142	42
Social Aid	82	8	75	238		27	57	16
Identity/Ethnicity	374	46	117	68	27		129	53
Citizenship	552	17	39	142	57	129		51
Demography	118	4	26	42	16	53	51	

*Since the category named "General" does not convey any information about topics, we do not include this category here. We omit the category named "Other" due to its irrelevance to our subject of interest.

Since any given cluster header can be categorized in multiple topics according to its content, knowing which topics are mentioned jointly in what frequencies might help us understand how Twitter users relate various topics on refugees that they are exposed to. Table 2 shows number of overlaps between topics for 10874 cluster headers. According to the results, Twitter users frequently relate Turkey's domestic security with issues regarding Turkish citizenship planned to be conferred to Syrian refugees. Topics regarding identity or ethnicity also appear relational with Turkish domestic security.

Of 10874, 5496 cluster headers explicitly refer to either the government party or opposition parties, or both. Table 2 shows unweighted and weighted frequencies with respect to references to parties in contents. Note that, while coding based on parties we considered not only written party names, but also other party-related indicators, such as references to political figures having publicly known connection with a party (e.g. Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu, Bahçeli, Demirtaş), positions in a system of government (e.g. president, prime-minister, main opposition leader), or implied decision- and/or policy-makers found responsible for the situation (e.g. state, government).

Table 3: Frequencies based on parties

	Weighted

	Frequency	Percentage	TOTAL
AKP (or Government)	25,625	86.83	29,511
CHP	4,101	13.9	29,511
HDP	2,012	6.82	29,511
MHP	258	0.87	29,511

Any given cluster header might be coded under multiple party categories according to its content.

Strikingly, almost 50% of cluster headers refer to one or more parties in their content. One of the important implications that we can make out of this result is that Syrian refugees or refugee crises have mostly been discussed around parties and their policies. Echoing Hatipoğlu et al. (2016), these results supports the argument that perceptions and attitudes of Turkish Twitter users are organized based on sense of belonging to a party or an ideology. Therefore, observing party-oriented approach to this issue is not an unexpected outcome. Frequency results also show that AKP or Government, as a decision-/policy-making body, is the far most cited or implied party among others, as expected. However, these results do not tell us anything about attitudes towards these parties regarding Syrian refugee crisis. To learn more about attitudes towards parties, we also coded cluster headers with respect to three main attitude categories: positive, negative, and neutral. Table 3 shows attitudes towards parties with weighted frequencies.

Table 4: Frequencies of attitudes conditional on parties

	Positive		Negative		Neutral		
	Frequency	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**	**TOTAL**
AKP	1,822	7.11	21,241	82.89	2,562	10	25,625
CHP	1,975	48.16	1,406	34.28	679	16.56	4,101
HDP	596	29.62	1,219	60.59	197	9.79	2,012
MHP	69	26.74	111	43.02	78	30.23	258

Results at Table 3 show that negative attitudes towards parties regarding their actions or positions during Syrian refugee crisis strikingly dominate positive ones, except CHP. AKP, as a government party and decision-making body, seems to be heavily accused by adverse consequences of Syrian refugee crisis. Results might suggest that CHP's prudent approach against government's policies regarding Syrian refugee crisis has a favorable response in the eyes of public opinion.

Table 5: Frequencies based on cited active terrorist organizations in the region

	Weighted		
	Frequency	**Percentage**	**TOTAL**
PKK	6,048	67.60	8,947
PYD/YPG	1,638	18.31	8,947
DAESH	3,163	35.35	8,947
OTHERS**	757	8.46	8,947

*Any given cluster header might be coded under multiple terrorist organizations according to its content. **This category includes other terrorist organizations except first three ones: Feto, Hamas, Hizbullah, Pjak, Dhkp-C, Ibda-C, El-Nusra, El-Kaide.

Of 10874, 1826 cluster headers cite prominent terrorist organizations playing a role in the region. Table 4 presents unweighted and weighted frequencies with respect to these cited organizations. PKK is the far most cited organization in cluster headers. DAESH is the second most popular organization among others.

Two-way tabulations and independence tests across categories: Attitudes towards AKP and issues discussed

Associating categorical variables with each other

Referring to our previous finding that refugee crisis has mostly been handled in a party-oriented approach, we ask whether attitudes towards parties are associated with issues discussed in social media outlets. To analyze this association, we generated four 2x2 cross tabulations where attitudes — positive, negative — towards the government party (AKP) are on the X-axis and indicators of a given issue for given cluster header — yes, no – are on the Y-axis. Table 6 shows frequencies (first line) and percentages (second line) for cross tabulations and gives statistical results for Chi-square independence test. Please note that neutral attitudes have been left out; this analysis aims to correlate tweets that elaborately manifest attitudes towards a political party with attitudes towards other issues.

Table 6: Attitudes towards AKP vs. topics discussed

AKP Attitude	TR Security				AKP Attitude	TR Citizenship		
	NO	YES	TOTAL			NO	YES	TOTAL
NEGATIVE	15,333 72.19	5,908 27.81	21,241 100.00		NEGATIVE	16,200 76.27	5,041 23.73	21,241 100.00
POSITIVE	1,612 88.47	210 11.53	1,822 100.00		POSITIVE	1,421 77.99	401 22.01	1,822 100.00
TOTAL	16,945 73.47	6,111 26.53	23,063 100.00		TOTAL	17,621 76.40	5,442 23.6	23,063 100.00
Pearson chi2(1) = 228.4239 Pr = 0.000					Pearson chi2(1) = 2.7653 Pr = 0.096			

	(A)				(B)		
	Economy				Social Aid		
AKP Attitude	NO	YES	TOTAL	**AKP Attitude**	NO	YES	TOTAL
NEGATIVE	16,063 75.62	5,178 24.38	21,241 100.00	NEGATIVE	18,983 89.37	2,258 10.63	21,241 100.00
POSITIVE	1,521 83.48	301 16.52	1,822 100.00	POSITIVE	1,405 77.11	417 22.89	1,822 100.00
TOTAL	17,584 76.24	5,479 23.76	23,063 100.00	TOTAL	20,388 88.40	2,675 11.60	23,063 100.00
Pearson chi2(1) = 57.1929 Pr = 0.000				Pearson chi2(1) = 245.8541 Pr = 0.000			

(C)   (D)

Chi-square independence test results for these four tables show that there is a significant association between attitudes towards AKP and issues discussed in tweets, except issues related to Turkish citizenship (Table 6B, at 5% significance level). This exception suggests that we cannot say anything about the difference in tendencies of both AKP supporters and opponents to discuss government policies to confer Turkish citizenship to Syrian refugees. Indeed, a sizeable portion of the Twitter users in our dataset warned AKP, as a self-claimed AKP supporter, that granting citizenship

Remaining three tables are worth explaining because association between attitudes towards AKP and tendency to discuss a topic seems to differ across topics. Ratios in Table 6A and 6C show that tweets that praise AKP touch upon issues related to security of Turkey and economy considerably less compared to tweets that hold a negative attitude towards AKP (11.53% of pro-AKP tweets vs. 27.81% of anti-AKP tweets for security of Turkey, and 16.52% for pro-AKP tweets vs. 24.38% for anti-AKP tweets for economy). However, as ratios in Table 6D show, tweets that praise AKP tend to talk more about issues regarding social aid (22.89% of pro-AKP tweets vs. 10.63% of anti-AKP).

7. CONCLUSION

This study aims to explain how attitudes in public opinion are formed based on Turkey's policies towards Syrian refugees, our knowledge on form are scant. To that end, we used a fourth-month snapshot of Turkish tweets on Syrian refugees, and analyzed the picture they depict regarding the refugees in online social media and made some inferences in the light of current literature. To take this snapshot, we employed novel code developed by the two authors of this study. Our

findings suggest that security concerns trump over all others. They also indicate that the issue of Syrian refugees is a highly politicized one; almost half of the tweets explicitly associate their attitudes with a Turkish political party. Moreover, party-oriented approach even in discussion of topics was demonstrated in out analyses. Chi-square independence test results establish significant association between attitudes towards AKP and issues discussed in tweets. Equally important, association between attitudes towards AKP and tendency to discuss a topic seems to differ across topics.

APPENDIX:

Table A1: Most popular cluster headers with respect to issue topics

Topic	Most popular cluster headers
TR Security	A Syrian guy said: Bombs had rarely been exploding in our country and we had not cared at all, until planes bombed our houses. @LastTutelage: I swear they said: 2 Syrian guys designating a bomb become a story. Turks never designate a bomb. What did Einstein do? https://t.co/kcyGCfz5Sd RT @KorayaydinMHP: Welcome and support of our Syrian Turkmen brothers during operations was also important. We all thank our cognates. RT @metafizik1907: 2 Syrian refugees whom you want to confer citizenship exploded while designating a bomb in a house in Hatay Reyhanlı. 2 votes go something! RT @Murat_ide: pkk set up bombs everywhere. PARDON ME! 3.5 million Syrians are everywhere. PARDON ME! Gülen's community acted flagitiously.. PARDON ME again but who will pay the bill?
Security Abroad	Hırbit Coz region is an irrelevant place PKK-PYD or DAESH. While sufferings of oppressed Syrians cause to tremble the ninth heaven, may God destroy who does not object this situation. RT @topraktozu: Our foreign policy! Syria>>Al Nusra Russia>>Esad Iran>>Sarraf the EU>>Refugee the US>>PYD Germany>>Armenian#LeaveArmenianLookatSolingen#EitherDiplomaOrResignation RT @solhaberportali: Robert Fisk wrote about Syrian soldiers withstanding DAESH's siege for all three-year long. https://t.co/OwaHihIPZk RT @HalkinPortali: 13 million Syrian refugees.. Russian planes are bombing

	#Halep. Russian artists are producing a work of art at #Palmira. https://t.co/ODBXouu6Pd

RT @AJTurk: Syrian opposition groups to prepare operation towards Cerablus https://t.co/lCDsV3ML5D https://t.co/9RsWyy7tin |
| **Immigrants' Safety** | 30 children — ages change between 8 and 12 — had been raped in Nizip refugee camp where AKP stated as perfect. https://t.co/TYokrDTtpn

English fans in France for EURO 2016 are witlessly mocking Syrian children refugees. https://t.co/f7DAPlvm9S

RT @orhanaydin6: I say, Taksim Square at nights, is a place for Syrian women and children to be sold for prostitution. Hey! Did you hear me humanity?

RT @mustafahos: Afad, which is infamous for rapes against refugee children, is a project of AKP/Erdoğan. It is not inspected, seems to be privileged, and does not have a transparent financial statement.

RT @Malikejder47: Complaints on incidents occurring at Hatay-Syria border have been legitimized: Hatay Gendarme commander is under custody because of oppressing and opening fire on Syrian refugees. |
| **Economy** | RT @acikcenk: There are almost 1.2 million refugees paid approximately 700 Euros monthly in Germany. Germans do not lament unconscientiously as much as we do.

RT @zek_i_nesli: Saudi Arabia have $60K per capita income and do not accept any refugee. Turkey have $9K per capita income and accept 3 million refugees. Economy is super, right?

RT @aozturk70: Here is Erdoğan's and AKP's treachery. Veteran salary: 350TL Refugee salary: 800TL. On the top of it they will give apartments from TOKİ. https://t.co/i7Zf7nCQb8

Erdoğan said that Turkey have spent 20 billion dollars in total so far. That means 3000TL per household.

RT @hic_ender_hicim AKP supporters should welcome a Syrian family as a brother in their houses so that we can learn how to be "ENSAR-MUHACIR" #TokiHousesforMartyrsFamilies https://t.co/5kDDYcnPz1 |
| **Social Aid** | 110 Turkish and Syrian orphan children have received clothing aid. https://t.co/9IZVuLeOTw |

	RT @aozturk70: Here is Erdoğan's and AKP's treachery. Veteran salary: 350TL Refugee salary: 800TL. On the top of it they will give apartments from TOKİ. https://t.co/i7Zf7nCQb8
	RT @mecertas: We get together with Syrian young brothers at heart table at Hacı Bayram Veli, thanks to our Ankara organization https://t.co/3vVoXrzzrH
	RT @beyonceturkeyy: Do you still vote for AKP conferring citizenship and giving apartments to Syrians only for presidency?
	RT @hic_ender_hicim: AKP supporters should welcome a Syrian family as a brother in their houses so that we can learn how to be "ENSAR-MUHACIR" #TokiHousesforMartyrsFamilies https://t.co/5kDDYcnPz1
Identity/Ethnicity	RT @teroretavizyok: Assad's regime bombing terrorist organizations Pkk/Ypg but Ntv reports this as "Assad bombs Syiran Kurds." Is this also a kind of perception operation? https://t.co/KnbzLQr2Fh
	@Tivitistiniz Don't let akp buy 3 million Syrian votes and make our country an Arab country. Don't be silent, speak up! https://t.co/IgtyQvu8MY
	RT @erkan_karaarsln: Iraqi Turkmens having to live in the streets of Ankara. They do not have a chance to get a house from TOKİ because they are not Syrian. https://t.co/znx5O6GVhK
	RT @sahinkilicTR: That was a war environment. Hatay is a province densely populated by our Syrian Arabic brothers. First, they declared Turkish as their official language.
	https://t.co/ifTmb4edbc: AKP's continuing enmity against Alawis. Preparations going on for a refugee camp in Dersim. https://t.co/MwwHnWawzu
TR Citizenship	RT @metropoll: 78% of AKP supporters, 97% of CHP supporters, 94% of MHP supporters, and 69% of HDP supporters are against conferring Turkish citizenship to Syrian immigrants.
	RT @mytepe: Do you think that Syrian refugees should be bestowed with enfranchisement? Please vote and retweet. #suriye #akp #chp #mhp
	RT @metafizik1907: Two of Syrian refugees whom you plan to confer citizenship have exploded while designating a bomb in their house. Two votes go something!
	RT @bekiservet: Muslim Syrians are not wanted in Turkey where there are

	Armenian Jewish Greek Assyrian Nestorian Chaldean Polish Molokan citizens. https://t.co/NErPjDytpa @Tivitistiniz Don't let akp buy 3 million Syrian votes and make our country an Arab country. Don't be silent, speak up! https://t.co/IgtyQvu8MY
Demography	@Tivitistiniz Don't let akp buy 3 million Syrian votes and make our country an Arab country. Don't be silent, speak up! https://t.co/IgtyQvu8MY RT @IlkerEraydin: TODAY'S FLASH NEWS: 10 SYRIAN FAMILIES WILL BE RESIDED IN EACH VILLAGE AND ENDOWED WITH LAND https://t.co/mlSw4c0bG5 RT @aknbasaran1: Congratulations! AKP will place one Syrian family per village and endow with pasture lands. Godd luch with it our Syrian brothers. RT @MucadeleTeror: Zarathustra and terrorist pkk proponents residing in eastern provinces should be replaced by Syrian Muslims. (Circulate this #SURVEY RT) RT @OlumculHasret: Lots of our Syrian brothers have come to Sultan Ahmet Mosque for Fajr Prayer.
General	RT @KorayaydinMHP: Bankrupt and downfallen Syrian policies of AKP government have already led to severe refugee problems in our country. RT @markaresayan: There is no Armenian diaspora in Germany. Last year, this proposal was postponed lest refugee agreement goes to pot. Hypocrisy at its finest. RT @Murat_ide: pkk set up bombs everywhere. PARDON ME! 3.5 million Syrians are everywhere. PARDON ME! Gülen's community acted flagitiously.. PARDON ME again but who will pay the bill? RT @leylasarall__: #TheThingIWannaTellTonight 3 million Syrians cannot not harm this country as much as CHP and HDP can do. Relax! Good night! Times: Giving concessions to Ankara does not resolve refugee crisis. In English newspaper Times' editorial… https://t.co/wKeoksAXNw
Other	RT @USEmbassyTurkey: Due to recent incidents, all non-immigrant visa applications dated on July 18th in İstanbul and Ankara are cancelled.https://t.co/ckc0yW9ve6 RT @_aliyalcin_: Syrian activist and teacher Mulhem El Said, biking all the way from Mardin to Ankara, visited us today with his family.

| | https://t.co/TcMCraZvoA

RT @Gizli_Golge: Our director has come to Turkey. On January 12th, we get started with visits to orphan children at Urfa, Antep, Hatay refugee camps.

RT @AbdulkadirSen_: Syrian artist brings forward Iran's and Russia's massacres by making bombs and bullets into artwork. https://t.co/H79vLysnpD

RT @SUZANIM_: During AKP government era, how many Caucasus-Chechen refugees under the custody of Turkish security office have been repatriated to Russia to be killed? |

REFERENCES:

AFAD – Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey. 2014. *Population Influx from Syria to Turkey: Life in Turkey as a Syrian Guest*. Ankara: AFAD.

Akpınar, Pınar. "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy." *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 4 (2013): 735-757.

Aksoy, Faruk and Emre Hatipoglu. n.d. "Determinants of Change in Turkish Political Party Manifestos," *working paper*

Akşit, Sait, Özgehan Şenyuva, and Işık Gürleyen. "The Turkish parliamentary elite and the EU: Mapping attitudes towards the European Union." *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 3 (2011): 395-407

Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. "Foreign affairs and issue voting: Do presidential candidates "waltz before a blind audience?"." *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 1 (1989): 123-141.

Almond, Gabriel., 1950. The American People and Foreign Policy. *New York*.

Arin, Inanc., Erpam, Mert Kemal & Saygin, Yucel. (nd). I-TWEC: Interactive Clustering Tool for Twitter. Unpublished Manuscript.

Bakri, Nada, 2010. "Lebanon Gives Palestanians New Work Rights," *New York Times*, 17 August.

Başlevent, C., Kirmanoğlu, H. and Şenatalar, B., 2005. Empirical investigation of party preferences and economic voting in Turkey. *European Journal of Political Research*, *44*(4), pp.547-562

Betts, Alexander. 2003. Public goods theory and the provision of refugee protection: The role of the joint-product model in burden-sharing theory. Journal of Refugee Studies 16:274-96.

Cagaptay, S. and Menekse, B., 2014. "The impact of Syria's refugees on southern Turkey." *Washington Institute For Near East Policy*, 130.

Çarkoğlu, Ali. "Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU Membership", Special Issue on Turkey and the European Union, Turkish Studies, 4:1 , 2003, 171-194.

Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Binnaz Toprak. *Religion, society and politics in a changing Turkey*. TESEV, 2007.

Carkoglu, A. and Kalaycıoglu, E., 2007. Turkish democracy today: Elections. *Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society, IB Tauris, London*

Carkoglu, Ali, and Ersin Kalaycioglu. "The Rising Tide of Conservatism." (2009). New York: Palgrave and McMillan

Carter, Thomas S., and John Osborne. "Housing and neighbourhood challenges of refugee resettlement in declining inner city neighbourhoods: A Winnipeg case study." *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 7.3 (2009): 308-327.

Converse, Philip E. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press." (1964).

David R. Davis, Will H. Moore; Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 41, Issue 1, 1 March 1997, Pages 171–184

DeRouen, Karl. "Presidents and the diversionary use of force: A research note." *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000): 317-328.

Dinçer, Osman Bahadır, Vittoria Federici, Elizabeth Ferris, Sema Karaca, Kemal Kirişci, and Elif Özmenek Çarmıklı. Turkey and Syrian refugees: The limits of hospitality. International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) and Brookings Institute, 2013.

EDAM. 2014. "Reaction Mounting against Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *Public Opinion Surveys of Turkish Foreign Policy*, no. 1.

Ehrlich, Sean, and Cherie Maestas. "Risk orientation, risk exposure, and policy opinions: The case of free trade." Political Psychology 31, no. 5 (2010): 657-684.

Erdoğan, Emre. "Dış Politikada Siyasallaşma: Türk Kamuoyunun "Davos Krizi" ve Etkileri Hakkındaki Değerlendirmeleri", Uluslararası İlişkiler , 10: 37, 2013, 37-67.

Erdoğan, Murat. 2015. *Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum*, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları

Erskine, Hazel Gaudet. "The polls: Exposure to international information." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1963): 658-662.

Facchini, Giovanni, and Anna Maria Mayda. "From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and evidence." *Economic Policy* 23, no. 56 (2008): 652-713.

Fearon, James D. "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 577-592.

Fitzsimons, James, Palmer, Grant C., Antos, Mark J. and White, John 2003-03, Refugees and residents: densities and habitat preferences of lorikeets in urban Melbourne, Australian field ornithology, vol. 20, pp. 2-7.

German Marshall Fund of the United States. *Turkish* Perceptions *Survey*. Washington DC: GMF.

Gleditsch, Kristian, and Idean Salehyan. "Refugees and the spread of civil war." *International Organization* 60, no. 2 (2006): 335-366.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Schultz. "Fighting at home, fighting abroad: How civil wars lead to international disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 4 (2008): 479-506.

Gökçe, Osman Zeki, Emre Hatipoglu, Gökhan Göktürk, Brooke Luetgert, and Yücel Saygin. "Twitter and Politics: Identifying Turkish Opinion Leaders in New Social Media." *Turkish Studies* 15, no. 4 (2014): 671-688.

Hanson, Gordon H. *Why does Immigration Divide America?*. No. 129. Peterson Institute, 2005.

Hatipoglu, Emre, İlker Aslan and Brooke Luetgert. "Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU: Exploring Trends in Electoral Manifestos," *2015* in Ahmet O. Evin and Peter Balasz (Eds.) *Turkey and the European Union: Strategic Partners and Competitors*, Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 17-36

Hatipoglu, Emre, Osman Zeki Gökçe, Berkay Dinçer, and Yücel Saygin. "Sosyal Medya ve Türk Dış Politikası: Kobani Tweetleri Üzerinden Türk Dış Politikası Algısı." *International Relations/Uluslararasi Iliskiler* 13, no. 52 (2016).

Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*. Taylor & Francis US, 2002

Hurwitz, Jon, Mark Peffley, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Foreign policy belief systems in comparative perspective: The United States and Costa Rica." *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 245-27

Ifukor, Presley. "'Elections' or 'Selections'? Blogging and Twittering the Nigerian 2007 General Elections." Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 30, no. 6 (2010): 398–414.

International Crisis Group (2013), *"Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spill Over Risks for Turkey,"* *Europe Report* 225, Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Iqbal, Zaryab. (2006), Health and Human Security: The Public Health Impact of Violent Conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 50: 631–649.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Public Choice and Foreign Affairs: Democracy and International Relations in Turkey", New Perspectives on Turkey, 40, 2009, 59-83.

Kirişçi, Kemal. "The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 29-56

Mardin, Şerif. *Religion and social change in modern Turkey: The case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi*. Suny Press, 1989.

Morris, Meghan D., Steve T. Popper, Timothy C. Rodwell, Stephanie K. Brodine, and Kimberly C. Brouwer. "Healthcare barriers of refugees post-resettlement." *Journal of community health* 34, no. 6 (2009): 529-538.

Murdie, Robert A. "Pathways to housing: The experiences of sponsored refugees and refugee claimants in accessing permanent housing in Toronto." *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale* 9, no. 1 (2008): 81-101.

Onyut, Lamaro P., Frank Neuner, Verena Ertl, Elisabeth Schauer, Michael Odenwald, and Thomas Elbert. "Trauma, poverty and mental health among Somali and Rwandese refugees living in an African refugee settlement–an epidemiological study." *Conflict and health* 3, no. 1 (2009): 6-22

Peffley, Mark A., and Jon Hurwitz. "A hierarchical model of attitude constraint." *American Journal of Political Science* (1985): 871-890.

Phillips, Deborah. "Moving towards integration: the housing of asylum seekers and refugees in Britain." *Housing Studies* 21, no. 4 (2006): 539-553

Politi, James. 2017. "Migration opens the door to Italy's populists," Financial Times, August 1. Accessed at https://www.ft.com/content/b964453a-72b1-11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c on 2 August 2017.

Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-460.

Roper, Steven D., and Lilian A. Barria. "Burden sharing in the funding of the UNHCR: Refugee protection as an impure public good." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 4 (2010): 616-637.

Salehyan, Idean. (2008), The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict. American Journal of Political Science, 52: 787–801.

Schrodt, Philip A. "Precedents, progress, and prospects in political event data." *International Interactions* 38.4 (2012): 546-569.

Schultz, Kenneth A. "Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two institutional perspectives on democracy and war." *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): 233-266

Sevunts, Levon (2016). "Bringing 25,000 Syrian refugees to Canada cost $385M," *Radio Canada International*, 29 November, accessed at http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2016/ 11/22/bringing-25000-syrian-refugees-to-canada-cost-385m/ on 14 August 2017.

Şenyuva, Ozgehan. (2009). "Türkiye Kmuoyu ve Avrupa Birliği 2001-2008: Beklentiler, İstekler ve Korkular", Uluslararası İlişkiler, 6:22,97-123.

Smith, Alastair, and David R. Hayes. "The shadow of the polls: Electoral effects on international agreements." *International Interactions* 23, no. 1 (1997): 79-108

The German Marshall Fund of the United States. 2015. *Turkish Perceptions Survey.*

Thielemann, Eiko R. (2005), Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing? Redistribution, Side-payments and the European Refugee Fund. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 43: 807–824.

Tomz, Michael. "Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach." *International Organization* 61, no. 4 (2007): 821-840

Tumasjan, Andranik, Timm Oliver Sprenger, Philipp G. Sandner, and Isabell M. Welpe. "Predicting Elections with Twitter: What 140 Characters Reveal about Political Sentiment." In Proceedings of the Fourth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM), 178–185. Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2010.

Twitter. (2016, May 12). *API Rate Limits*. Retrieved May 12, 2016, from Twitter Developers: https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/rate-limiting

Uganda, UN appeal for $8 billion for South Sudan refugees. 2017. Deutsche Welle. 22 June. Accessed at http://www.dw.com/en/uganda-un-appeal-for-8-billion-for-south-sudan-refugees/a-39368102 on August 14, 2017.

Waters, Tony and Kim LeBlanc. (2005). Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation-State. *Comparative Education Review* 49:2, 129-147.

Xioing, David Han Guo. 2015. "Rohingya Crisis Tests Malaysia," Fairobserver.com, July 3. Retrieved from https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/rohingya-refugee-crisis-tests-malaysia/ on September 3, 2017.

Yalçınkaya, Haldun. "The nongovernmental organizations–military security collaboration mechanism: Afghanistan NGO Safety Office." *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (2013): 489-510

Zenelaj, Reina, Nimet Beriker, and Emre Hatipoglu. "Determinants of mediation success in post-conflict Bosnia: a focused comparison." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 4 (2015): 414-437

	AKP Attitude		
Attitudes towards Immigrants	NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	TOTAL
NEGATIVE	3,222 92.80	61 29.90	3,283 89.31
POSITIVE	250 7.20	143 70.10	393 10.69
TOTAL	3,472 100.00	204 100.00	3,676 100.00
Pearson chi2(1) = 798.3435 Pr = 0.000			