

# Power-Sharing and Peace-Building

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**Working Paper No. 1396**

**June 2020**

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was prepared for the Economic Research Forum project on “Conflict, Post-conflict transition and peace-building in the Arab Region.”

First published in 2020 by  
The Economic Research Forum (ERF)  
21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly Street  
Dokki, Giza  
Egypt  
[www.erf.org.eg](http://www.erf.org.eg)

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## **Abstract**

This paper reviews key questions and empirical evidence on the relationship between power-sharing institutions and post-conflict trajectories in countries that have experienced civil war. It identifies open questions and outlines a research agenda that is conducive to mixed methods design. Different measures and concepts of power-sharing are discussed, and a broad set of empirical results is reviewed and replicated. The conditions that are favorable to different types of power-sharing are considered as are the consequences of power-sharing for the risk of war recurrence and for democratic stability. Differences between constraining and dispersive power-sharing are discussed and the pacifying effects of dispersive power-sharing are analyzed, providing new insights on the implications of external intervention for the postwar stability of power-sharing institutions.

**Keywords:** Post-conflict Reconstruction, Social Contract, Economic Agenda, Macroeconomic Reforms, Microeconomic Reforms, power sharing institutions.

**JEL Classifications:** D73, D74, P11, P16, E61, D04.

## 1. Introduction

Civil wars are “sticky:” once they start, they are hard to end. When they do end, there is a high risk the violence will recur within a few years.<sup>2</sup> What makes civil wars so sticky and so likely to restart? Is power-sharing the way to help end civil wars and build peace?

Seen from the prism of the bargaining model of conflict, the “stickiness” of civil war is due to the difficulty of reaching a mutually enforceable settlement that could avoid the high costs of violence in adjudicating disputes over resources or power. The fact that a political conflict has turned violent suggests that it cannot be resolved via a mutually acceptable, self-enforcing bargain that avoids the resort to arms. In light of this, what explains the sharp decline in the prevalence of civil war since the mid-1990s? That decline represents a structural break in the pattern of civil wars since 1945. Is that due to factors that enable parties to negotiate more effectively and reach bargains that avoid or reduce the use of violence? Scholars have argued that the invigorated role of United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War and the decline in major power interventionism and proxy wars is partly responsible for the decline in the prevalence of civil war. Both developments are conducive to a more broadly collaborative environment in which the international community has promoted power-sharing solutions to end civil wars. Power-sharing institutions increase the political inclusion and accommodation of minority groups and former rebels after civil war, thereby reducing grievances that could fuel violent conflict.

Recent studies that present comprehensive data on power-sharing show a sharp increase in all forms of power-sharing as solutions to civil war since the mid-1990s (Graham et al 2017). Whereas most civil wars until about the late 1980s ended in military victory, negotiated settlements are now the most common form of civil war termination (Toft 2010). These settlements are usually reached with the assistance of external actors, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN). UN peace missions have increased since the 1990s and their mandates have expanded in scope and in the degree of intrusiveness in the politics of the host country (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Some form of political inclusion for all minorities and all groups involved in the fighting is now the usual goal of international intervention and this is reflected in the content of negotiated settlements after civil war.

Power-sharing institutions are the means via which inclusion is achieved in postwar states. Yet it is not clear if these institutions are effective or under what conditions we should expect different power-sharing institutions to reduce the risk of war recurrence. This review addresses that question and highlights gaps in the literature that future studies should address.

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<sup>2</sup> See Figure 1 in the Appendix. Plotting the onset and overall prevalence of civil war around the world from 1945 until 2012, we see no clear pattern in the onset of civil war since 1945. Yet there is a steadily increasing prevalence of civil war over that period until the early 1990s, followed by a sharp drop starting in 1995 after the end of a surge of new conflicts surrounding the collapse of the USSR. Data on civil wars are drawn from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).

## 2. Measurement of power-sharing

Typically, the term power-sharing (P-S) has been used to describe institutional mechanism for the distribution of nominal political power (e.g. cabinet positions) according to a fixed rule. That rule reflects groups' relative sizes or relative power. This concept of P-S is due to Lijphart (1985), who argued that consensus-building via consociationalism should be the political system of choice for new democracies or divided societies in which majoritarian systems would be a poor choice. The concept of "consensus" democracy is frequently used in reference to P-S systems that are centered on institutional rules that give all groups access to executive power. This implies that several types of systems can qualify as P-S institutions, including PR electoral systems, federations, or confederal systems as long as all groups have in principle equal access to power. Some P-S systems give veto power over major executive decisions to all groups, whereas others achieve the goal of political inclusion via electoral means by designing electoral rules that ensure the representation of minority groups. Some P-S systems expand central authority whereas others foster decentralization/regional autonomy. At the core of the concept of P-S is that power will rely in different communities and that power allocation will depend on the principles of proportionality and autonomy (Lijphart 1969, 1975; O'Leary 2005).

The fact that there are many different ways that different societies can achieve the goal of inclusion and power-sharing implies that the category of P-S institutions is likely to be quite heterogeneous. Another consequence of the breadth of the concept is that empirical measures of P-S are likely to vary significantly across studies. Focusing on post-conflict cases, Fearon and Laitin (2008) code only 9 cases of power-sharing following civil war since 1945.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), one of the first studies to explore the post-conflict implications of P-S, code over 30 instances of P-S institutions in the same period.<sup>4</sup> Cammett and Malesky (2012) review the same set of conflicts as Hartzell and Hoddie and extend the period coverage to 2010, identifying 53 cases of P-S.<sup>5</sup> Mattes and Savun (2009) explore 46 cases of negotiated settlement coding "fear-reducing" and "cost-increasing" provisions in these settlements to capture the impact of power-sharing.

This brief comparison suggests that definitions and operational criteria for the coding of P-S vary

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<sup>3</sup> They "code civil war outcomes as much as possible on the basis of whether the rebels achieved their end of taking control of the central government or the region they are fighting for, rather than on whether there was a formal "negotiated settlement" or a "truce" (p. 3). The 9 P-S cases include the political deal that ended the period of "*La Violencia*" in Colombia in the late 1950s and the institutional arrangements that followed the end of Apartheid and white rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Their data ends in 1998. Another 10 cases can be coded using the same criteria by extending coding to the period from 1999-2005. See Rothchild & Roeder 2005 and PRIO/UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset.

<sup>5</sup> Cammett and Malesky (2012) propose a new typological classification, distinguishing between closed-list PR, open-list PR, executive coalition, specialized veto rules, proportional civil service appointment rules, and forced legislative coalition. They also code P-S along a set of additional dimensions, including economic, territorial, and military. Glassmyer and Sambanis (2009) distinguish between political and military and political power-sharing and code some form of military power-sharing (integrating former combatants in the government military) in 30% of all civil wars. Military power-sharing refers to agreement to integrate rebel groups into the government military either by directly allotting positions (including in the officer corps) to former rebel groups, or by opening up enlistment possibilities to previously excluded groups (usually ethnic groups).

widely. P-S is as much a process, as it is an outcome;<sup>6</sup> but more commonly, P-S refers to a set of institutional criteria for inclusion in policy-making.<sup>7</sup> P-S differs from the related concept of “power-dividing” (Rothchild and Roeder 2005) chiefly by the fact that P-S institutions usually include veto powers for every actor/group that is a member of the P-S coalition. Consociationalism (Lijphart 1969, 1977) is an example of institutional P-S. However, such institutional features of power-sharing are not always present and in fact it is worth considering under what conditions groups would push for a rigid institutional structure to share power. Nomikos (2017) addresses this question by distinguishing between *electoral P-S* (veto power arises from the possibility of electoral results that overturn an established regime;<sup>8</sup> these can include “grand coalitions” or “unity governments,” which are the norm in post-conflict settings) and *institutional P-S* which divides positions that can be allocated to each party independent of elections.

Electoral P-S is the most common outcome of peace negotiations after civil war when there are mainly two conflicting parties (seen in 76.5% of all cases) and when there are multi-party negotiations with ethnic parties (88.5% of all cases). Nomikos (2017) finds that in post-conflict countries with multi-party systems, institutional P-S is less likely if there is a majority ethnic group; and more likely the more unified the groups are. Nomikos (2017) also finds a positive and statistically significant association between institutional P-S and UN intervention, which is consistent with the earlier observation that the UN’s increased involvement in peacebuilding has coincided with a spike in the use of P-S solutions. This type of P-S contributes to democratization by favoring the formation of larger ethnic coalitions, which is conducive to democratization.

A similar argument about the conditions under which institutionalized P-S will be pursued is developed by Bormann (forthcoming). His research addresses the occurrence of “oversize” ethnic coalitions, which he argues are formed when ethnic elites face intra-group competition and are uncertain about the stability of alliances formed with other co-ethnics. Under such conditions, these elites have incentives to include non-co-ethnics in broader coalitions.<sup>9</sup> Bormann questions the assumption that political institutions constrain elite behavior; P-S need not promote post-conflict stability b/c conflict is simply displaced and now occurs within the governing coalition. He also perceives conflict risk as arising from any ethnic groups not included in the P-S coalition as they mobilize to gain access to the governing coalition.

One of the most influential typologies of P-S used in empirical studies is Graham, Miller, and

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<sup>6</sup> See Mukherjee (2006) on the impact that offers of political power-sharing can have during the negotiation of settlements in civil war.

<sup>7</sup> In the context of postwar transitions, most studies of P-S usually refer to institutional outcomes that are codified in treaties. Yet the universe of cases of P-S is likely to be larger since power-sharing concessions are often necessary to end civil wars even in the presence of significant asymmetries of military power (where most analysts would code the war as ending in a “victory”).

<sup>8</sup> McGarry and O’Leary (2007, 692-693) explain in these terms their recommendation of a PR system for ethnically divided places like Iraq: a PR system is an assurance against one-party rule and against the likelihood of artificially constructing a majority in the legislature out of a plurality in the electorate.

<sup>9</sup> Bormann explores the relationship between ethnic coalitions and civil war. He finds that they reduce the risk of territorial civil war, but have no effect on conflicts over control of the central government.

Strom's (2017) three-way typology, distinguishing between "inclusive, dispersive, and constraining" forms of power-sharing (pp. 688-689).

- Inclusive arrangements "mandate the participation of several parties of groups in particular offices or decision-making processes.... [they] place power broadly and jointly in the hands of multiple recognized groups." Inclusive power-sharing distribute shares in the central government/policy-making to each party. They thereby make it more likely that policies reflect a broader set of preferences. Lijphart's (1985) "grand coalition" is an example of such an institution.
- Dispersive arrangements "divide authority among actors in a well-defined pattern (e.g. territorial decentralization)... [they] limit the power of one faction over others through partitioning or devolution of political authority."
- Constraining arrangements "limit the power of any actor and thus protect ordinary citizens and vulnerable groups against encroachment and abuse... [they] limit the scope of political authority to maximize citizens' autonomy."

Though influential, Graham, Miller, and Strom's (2017) typology is primarily inductive rather than theory-driven. They compile a list of 19 power-sharing indicators (regime characteristics) in 180 countries from 1975 until 2010 and use factor analysis to load these characteristics on the three conceptual types that they consider distinct. It is worth exploring the merits of their typology compared to other possible ways of organizing and classifying cases. It is also worth exploring the accuracy of the coding for the given set of P-S types. cursory inspection of the examples in Graham et al (2017) reveals some coding problems. For example, one of the best examples of inclusive P-S on their list is Cyprus from 1975-2010. The 1960 constitution in Cyprus allocated Turkish Cypriots a significant share of power in government with executive privileges in excess of their relative population size. Technically, the 1960 constitution is still in effect today, which is why Cyprus is on their list as one of the best examples of inclusive power-sharing. However Cyprus was partitioned in 1974 following a Turkish invasion and there is now a *de facto* independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus that is not represented by the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Cyprus. With Turkish Cypriots having "exited" and the *de facto* partition of Cyprus still in effect since 1974, this is hardly an example of inclusive power-sharing. One might argue instead that this is an example of dispersive power-sharing, albeit one in which power is not shared in a consensual manner.

Differences in the coding of power-sharing often account for significant discrepancies in empirical results in studies of the impact of power-sharing institutions. One important source of disagreement concerns whether constitutional provisions should be coded regardless of whether or not they are actually implemented. Some studies (e.g. Graham et al 2017) code any rules in the books, even if they are not followed in practice. Others code only implemented arrangements.<sup>10</sup> Another source of

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<sup>10</sup> Sambanis, Schaedel, and Germann (2018) code two versions of their autonomy concessions variable, one "strict" list and a more "lenient" one. The "strict" list includes only fully implemented concessions though the lenient list includes



coding disagreement concerns whether macro-level variables should be coded (e.g. whether the country is federal) without regard to the “functionality” of federal institutions. In some countries, such as Nigeria, administrative units cross-cut ethnic settlement patterns, so ethnic groups are not as functionally autonomous as they would be in countries where ethnic settlement patterns roughly map on to administrative boundaries, as was the case in the former USSR (see Bormann forthcoming). Thus, a given level of “macro-level” power-sharing might have very different practical implications in different contexts. Other distinctions that have been drawn focus on the macro-level context of P-S institutions. Specifically, the interaction between P-S and regime type is important (Magaloni 2008).<sup>11</sup>

To summarize, while there are many variations in definitions and measures of P-S, most empirical studies code P-S to reflect differences in institutional mechanisms of how to allocate power among social (usually ethnic) groups. A key distinction that can be drawn is between “inclusive” and “dispersive” power-sharing. Inclusive power-sharing refers to allocating access to central government, while dispersive power-sharing refers to granting territorially concentrated groups policy autonomy. We rely on this typology for much of the discussion in the rest of this paper.

### **3. Determinants of power-sharing**

Under what conditions will different types of P-S be adopted? From the perspective of the ERF project, it would be useful to explore this question as a way to consider types of P-S that might be suitable for MENA countries that are emerging from conflict and where P-S is being considered. Determinants of P-S arrangements have not been studied extensively in the extant literature. Some important arguments –with varying degree of empirical support in the empirical literature – are that (a) the power-balance and degree of internal factionalism determines whether P-S rules will be institutionalized; (b) the risk of precedent-setting determines whether states will make dispersive P-S concessions; and (c) countries’ colonial histories shape the type of P-S institutions they are likely to adopt.

#### **3.1. Factionalism**

A recent study by Nomikos (2017) tries to explain differences in the degree of *institutionalization* of P-S arrangements using the most comprehensive list of post-conflict cases of P-S compiled to date. The key argument is that the degree of institutionalization of P-S depends on the nature of the challenges elites expect to face in the post-conflict period. If challenges to elites are likely to be external to their group (i.e. stemming from out-groups/the main wartime rivals), then institutionalization of governance rules could help guard against backsliding on the opposing group’s commitments to share power. If, however, challenges are mainly internal to the group due to high factionalism, then institutionalized P-S is unnecessary and might even be undesirable. Thus,

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any concessions announced by the state regardless of implementation status on the assumption that such announcements might actually impact group behavior toward the state.

<sup>11</sup> Magaloni (2008) explores the conditions under which power-sharing agreements between autocrats and members of the ruling elite are credible. This type of P-S is different than democratic P-S in that the focus is on including elites who can undermine the dictator’s rule if excluded, rather than on including large segments of the population.

the balance of power at the end of war is a key variable as is the degree of internal factionalism. Nomikos (2017) finds that the probability of institutionalized P-S increases by 20-40% when ethnic groups are unified rather than factionalized. He also finds that institutionalized P-S increases when the UN is involved in the peace process.

### **3.2. Precedent-setting**

An influential argument concerning the conditions under which governments are likely to grant autonomy concessions to ethnic groups is put forward by Walter (2006) who draws on the logic of the bargaining model in international relations theory. Focusing on autonomy concessions (i.e. “dispersive power-sharing”), Walter argues that governments are less likely to make concessions when they face many potential challengers who will be emboldened by the perception that the state is making concessions because it is weak. Walter (2006) tests this argument by regressing an ordinal variable measuring the degree of “accommodation” (government concessions on cultural reform, autonomy, or independence) on the number of ethnic groups in the country as well as other empirical proxies of her reputation theory.<sup>12</sup> While the theoretical argument about reputation is plausible, a replication of Walter’s analysis shows that there is no support for her empirical claims (see Sambanis, Schaedel, Germann 2018). The number of ethnic groups in the country is not a good proxy for the reputation argument and there is no negative and statistically significant correlation between the number of ethnic groups and the government’s proclivity to accommodate claims for self-determination. Further research is needed to establish the conditions under which granting autonomy concessions is likely to be perceived as weakness, which would increase demands from other groups in the country.<sup>13</sup>

### **3.3. Colonial histories**

A major source of data on power-sharing is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which has been used in multiple studies of the consequences of patterns of ethnic group exclusion (see, especially, Cederman et al 2010; Wimmer et al 2009). These studies have analyzed a number of outcomes, but the main focus is on the effect of political exclusion on the onset of violent conflict. Because of the apparent endogeneity of institutions of exclusion on factors that might also affect conflict risk, the best studies in that literature attempt to identify the effect of exclusion via instrumental variables regression (Wucherpfenning et al 2016). Via those analyses, we get useful information on the determinants of political exclusion in first-stage regressions. Focusing on post-colonial states, Wucherpfenning et al (2016) exploit differences in colonial rule to explain differences in which ethnic groups were represented in government at the time of independence. Via the path-dependent nature of institutional design, this exogenous advantage could be carried through to influence contemporary conflicts. The effect of P-S institutions on conflict propensity could therefore be identified via instrumental variables (IV) regression using colonial history as an

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<sup>12</sup> Other empirical proxies of the reputation theory include the economic or psychological value of the land under dispute. The key argument is that governments are less likely to accommodate groups the higher the value of land.

<sup>13</sup> As Fearon (2003) shows, most countries in Europe and the Americas have one large group that comprises the majority of the population (often with a share of total population above 80%). By contrast, most African countries have at least two large groups, with the size of the second largest group often around 40% of the population.

instrument under the assumption that colonial history does not affect conflict outcomes in other pathways that are not modeled. One could debate whether the instrument actually satisfies this exclusion restriction but for our purposes, this estimation strategy is useful because it provides a glimpse (even if only a partial one) at the determinants of inclusion among a set of explanatory variables used in the first stage regressions of their IV model. Their analysis shows that political inclusion of ethnic minorities is *less likely* among former British colonies and *more likely* for larger ethnic groups. Other country-level variables, such as per capita GDP, population size, violence at independence, country size, and other geographic controls (e.g. distance of the group to capital; distance to the coast) that are often included as covariates in civil war models do not significantly affect the likelihood of minority group inclusion.

Missing from the first-stage regressions in Wucherpfenning et al (2016) is a measure of the degree of ethnic difference or fragmentation at the country level. Given that P-S has been used extensively as a way to manage the conflicting interests and anxieties of ethnic groups in multi-ethnic states, it would be reasonable to control for country-level heterogeneity. Perhaps doing so is not crucial for African states, most of which are very ethnically diverse,<sup>14</sup> so we might not find much of a correlation between power-sharing and ethnic fragmentation. However, in other regions, high levels of ethnic fragmentation are taken into account in the design of federal or other decentralized systems (Weingast 1995; McGarry and O’Leary 2009). Moving beyond the degree of ethnic or cultural difference, it would also be important to control for the degree of power symmetry between the ruling group and its challengers as that is likely to affect the type of P-S, including the degree of institutionalization (see earlier discussion of Nomikos 2017). In weak states with a high underlying risk of internal armed conflict, if the ruling group’s power and the challengers’ power are symmetrical, then we are more likely to see P-S emerging. In countries where the ruling group is weak and is facing a strong rival, we could see repressive minority regimes and where both the rival and the ruling group are weak, we could see unstable, violent, and exclusive regimes with no power-sharing (Roessler and Ohls, forthcoming).

Summarizing results from available studies, a number of factors appear to influence the adoption of P-S institutions. P-S is more likely in ethnically diverse states, particularly those with a majority ethnic group; in post-conflict states, especially those where the UN has intervened to stop the violence; in states with prior exposure to democratic governance; and states where challengers are relatively strong. However, it is difficult to draw lessons that apply broadly across types of P-S since most empirical studies focus on a preferred definition of P-S. It is likely the case that differences in the type of P-S and in the strength of different P-S institutions across the world are a function of differences in the relative size and strength of ethnic groups, historical contingencies, and particularities of each case. This literature is now ripe for a meta-analysis that could help organize the many disparate findings regarding the correlates of different forms of power-sharing.

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<sup>14</sup> However, given the appeal of the conceptual argument, it is worth considering if different empirical formulations of the argument have more predictive power. We return to this question in the conclusion, where we suggest a modification of Walter’s argument that could be explored in the context of the case study project.

#### 4. Consequences of power-sharing

What is the effect of P-S on postwar risk of conflict recurrence and democratic stability? These are distinct outcomes, though they are often connected. Democratic stability could be a function of the underlying risk of violent conflict (war recurrence) in a post-war state. Indeed, war recurrence is the most common reason for democratic failure in postwar settings. Separatist claims by a group reneging on a pre-existing dispersive P-S arrangement is a key reason of democratic failure (Graham et al 2017).

I note at the outset that the cross-country empirical literature on P-S is inherently limited by the fact that the causal effect of P-S on different outcomes cannot be identified due to the lack of a valid instrumental variable. Most studies treat P-S as an exogenous variable and do not discuss the plausibility of that assumption. Other studies recognize that P-S institutions are endogenous, but are unable to address this problem except by adding a number of controls that reduce the risk of confounding and omitted variable bias.<sup>15</sup> Thus any review of the empirical effects of P-S cannot preclude that established correlations in published studies might be subject to unknown sources of bias.

##### 4.1. Democratic stability

One of the primary motivations for promoting P-S as a solution to civil war is the idea that P-S promotes inclusion, which in turn contributes to democratization. Nonetheless, the effects of P-S institutions on democratization after civil war have not been studied extensively. One exception is a prominent study by Graham, Miller, and Strom (2017), which provides an analysis that is likely to frame the next wave of studies on this topic. In light of the importance of that article, I discuss it focus on it below though I note that this does not represent an exhaustive review of the relationship between power-sharing and democratization.

According to by Graham, Miller, and Strom (2017), the effects of P-S on democratic survival are heterogeneous and depend on the type of P-S. Their analysis is based on new data on their tripartite typology of power-sharing (inclusive, dispersive, and constraining). Their new data on P-S show clearly that all types of P-S have been increasing over time. Drawing on the theory of democratic survival, they estimate an empirical model of democratic stability, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator that denotes whether a country remains a democracy five years into the future. The analysis is done on a sample of democratic countries and the dependent variable is regressed on the institutional P-S variables mentioned above and several controls (per capita GDP level and rate of growth; population size; oil/fuel dependence; ethno-linguistic fractionalization; regime age; past democratic breakdowns in the country; irregular turnovers of power; and time-dependence controls). The study produces a broad range of new results, though I focus only on differences between the effects of different types of institutions. Their key finding (p. 698) is that *only constraining* P-S exerts a statistically significant and positive effect on the probability of democratic survival in the full sample.

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<sup>15</sup> An exception is Wucherpfennig et al (2016) who use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect of political exclusion.

In post-civil war settings, Graham, Miller, and Strom (2017) find that the only type of power-sharing that produces positive outcomes on democratic stability is “inclusive” power-sharing. This has important implications for policy design after ethnic wars since “dispersive” power-sharing is often used as a way to bring the parties to the negotiating table. Without autonomy concessions, it is questionable whether ethnic or separatist wars would end in negotiated settlements. Key here is the interpretation of the coefficient for the interactive terms in Graham et al’s results since they use an indicator variable for “post-civil war states” interacted with each type of P-S. The base term for type of P-S gives an estimate of the effect of P-S in countries without recent conflict whereas the coefficients for the interactive terms capture the difference in the effects of P-S between post-conflict states and states without conflict. It is notable that, while inclusive power-sharing has a significant positive effect on democratic survival, dispersive power-sharing has a negative effect (Graham et al, 2017, p. 699).

The policy implications of these findings cannot be over-stated. The fact that the international community promotes both inclusive and dispersive P-S as solutions to ethnic war is premised on an assumption that both types are likely to produce positive outcomes. Democratization has been one of the primary stated goals of civil war interventions and an even more prominent motive in so-called FIRC (forced regime transitions).<sup>16</sup> The mechanism underlying the discrepancy between the effects of dispersive and inclusive institutions is not clear.

This debate is far from settled, however. Much of the empirical literature is based on results that are not robust to using different datasets on conflict. In the appendix, Table 1 presents results of a reanalysis of Graham et al (2017), replacing the UCDP/ACD data on conflict used in their analysis with a new dataset on conflict by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Using different data on conflict onset and duration results in a different set of countries and periods that are classified as “post- conflict” and that change alone is enough to produce massive changes in the estimated impact of power-sharing. As we show in the appendix, it is possible to find substantial support for the claim that regional autonomy (i.e. “dispersive” power-sharing) reduces the risk of post-conflict recurrence. Given the sensitivity of the results in Graham et al (2017), it is fair to say that the jury is still out on the effects of P-S on democratic survival.

#### **4.1.1. Power-sharing and National Identification**

A key channel through which power-sharing could affect the risk of secessionist conflict is via its impact on national identification. Does P-S strengthen national identification at the expense of ethno- sectarian identities, or vice versa? A strong national identity should be correlated with long-term democratic stability as well as low risk of conflict recurrence.<sup>17</sup> Yet we do not know which types of political institutions encourage national identification.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> On FIRCs, see Downes and Montan (2014).

<sup>17</sup> The stronger the population’s national identity, the lower the probability of violence along ethno-sectarian lines, and vice-versa. For a model of this process, showing how countries can get stuck in high ethnic conflict and ethnic identification equilibria as compared to low-conflict and national identity equilibria, see Sambanis and Shayo (2013).

<sup>18</sup> It is known that decentralization in and of itself need not produce consistent effects of national identification across

One of the few large-N studies to make the connection between P-S institutions and democratization via the national identification mechanism is Elkins and Sides (2007). Their argument (p. 693) is that democratic consolidation depends on the ability of political institutions to create a strong, unifying identity that fosters allegiance to the state without limiting civil liberties. A strong national identity can produce such loyalty to the state, but not all states are equally good at fostering national identification. Democracies are thought to cultivate allegiance of citizens to the state, but democratic institutions—especially elections—can actually exacerbate ethnic, religious, or other cleavages if leaders politicize group identities in order to gain the allegiance of members of their in-group (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999). Electoral competition along ethnic lines can divide nations, which can diminish the foundations of democratic stability.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, several authors argue that federal systems are ideally suited to maximize political stability because of the checks and balances that they create (Weingast 1995). However, Elkins and Sides (2007) find no evidence that power-sharing institutions promote minority attachment to the state and so they question whether power-sharing really fosters inclusion in a meaningful sense.

Another promising study by Ray (2018) combines attitudinal data from the World Values Survey (2010-2012) and data from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset to show that between-ethnic group political inequality (what we called “exclusion” previously) significantly weakens national pride and national identification. That study demonstrates that support for ethnic separatism in divided societies increases due to group status declines (which occurs when ethnic groups are “downgraded” in terms of their degree of inclusion). It follows that P-S could help reduce the risk of separatist conflict by increasing national identification among “included” groups.

It might be that the effects of P-S on national identification depend on the *type* of power-sharing. Specifically, “inclusive” power-sharing that brings peripheral minorities closer to the center and gives them access to the design of policy should minimize differences between minorities and the rest of the country, which would in turn result in stronger national identification.<sup>20</sup> By contrast, territorial or “dispersive” power-sharing may have the opposite effect if it minimizes contact between ethnic groups. The more separate (autonomous) these groups perceive themselves from the rest of the country, the less likely they are to consider themselves part of the nation.

The argument above could be made even more specific by stipulating the precise mechanism

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countries. Miguel’s (2004) comparison of Kenya and Tanzania makes this point clearly, exploiting variation in public goods provision and collective action across broadly similar areas of the two countries to argue that the higher degree of collective action observed in Tanzania is due to the nation-building policies of that government. Kenya, with a roughly similar degree of decentralization in local governance, produces markedly lower degree of collective action in ethnically heterogeneous areas due to the absence of concerted efforts by the central government to reduce the salience of ethnic and tribal identities.

<sup>19</sup> Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010), analyzing Afrobarometer data from over 35,000 respondents in several surveys in 10 African countries finds that ethnic identities become more salient by exposure to political competition. The closer a survey is done to a competitive Presidential election, the more likely are respondents to identify ethnically.

<sup>20</sup> Interestingly, no study I know has considered if inclusion increases the national identification of included minorities while decreasing the national identification of majority groups, who pay “heterogeneity costs” due to power-sharing.

connecting P-S institutions to identities.<sup>21</sup> Yet even without a fully specified model, it is worth exploring available data to see if there is any preliminary evidence in support of this argument. If there is, then we will have identified an important pathway –social identities— underlying the connection between P-S and democratic consolidation.

To test this argument, we need cross-country, over-time data on national identification as well as data on political and institutional changes that are consistent with the two types of P-S that we are exploring here (dispersive or inclusive power-sharing). While it is possible to use one of the sources of data reviewed above to capture P-S, cross-country data on national identification are harder to come by (Ray 2018 is the closest antecedent to such a study). The Afrobarometer surveys constitute a possible source of data.<sup>22</sup> These surveys ask explicit questions about the strength of national identification relative to ethnic identification.<sup>23</sup> National identification is weaker in African countries than in Europe, North America, or other parts of the world. Tanzania is an outlier with extremely high levels of national identification (88% of the population say they would choose to identify as Tanzanian first and foremost). Nigeria is at the opposite extreme, with just 17% of the population indicating that they identify nationally. Out of 16 countries included in the 2008 wave of the Afrobarometer survey, only 2 have more than 60% of the population identifying nationally (Tanzania at 88% and South Africa at 64%).

Cross-country analyses show that national identification is stronger in more economically advanced countries and among people who are more educated and are part of the formal economy (Robinson 2014). Politically dominant groups (usually national majorities) are more likely to identify nationally, though ethnic homogeneity is negatively associated with national identification.

The extant literature has not explored differences in national identification as a function of regime characteristics. I provide a first cut at this question based on joint work with Nils-Christian Bormann. Merging data on inclusion and changes to groups' power-status over time with the Afrobarometer survey data, we explore whether there are statistically significant differences between the level of national identification of powerless and discriminated groups as compared to “senior” or “junior partners” in government. We expect to find such differences consistent with results showing a correlation between ethnic exclusion and violent conflict. Cederman's (2010) study of the effects of political exclusion on ethnic conflict, the key mechanism is that excluded groups are more likely to mount ethno-nationalist challenges to the state, which would indicate that they do not consider themselves part of the nation. Our analysis assesses an implied mechanism underlying theories of exclusion and ethnic conflict. In the appendix (see Figure 2) there is some

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<sup>21</sup> The mechanisms underlying these effects on identification should be clarified. If, for example, social identification is assumed to be influenced by the degree of every day contact between different groups, then the prediction outlined above would seem reasonable. If, however, group identification is heavily influenced by leaders' rhetoric or specific policies, then it is not clear that we should expect to find a difference in social identification when we compare inclusive and dispersive regimes.

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.afrobarometer.org/data> [Accessed March 4, 2018].

<sup>23</sup> The main question used by other studies to explore determinants of national identification is: “Suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a [respondent's ethnic group, choosing among a list of groups pre-determined by Afrobarometer]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?”

evidence that discriminated groups identify nationally to a lesser extent than dominant groups, but we do not find any significant differences in national identification between powerless groups on the one hand and included groups (“junior partner” or “senior partner”). This surprising null result is informative and should be explored further.<sup>24</sup> One limitation of this analysis is that it relies on data from a small number of surveys in conflict countries;<sup>25</sup> also small is the number of countries that have experienced changes in P-S institutions over time, especially among the sample of post-conflict countries covered in the Afrobarometer surveys.

One possible reason for the lack of an association between inclusion and national identification in the set of countries included in the Afrobarometer survey is time: according to democratic theory, democracy can induce attachment to the state, but this is a long-run process. Attachment to the state and a corresponding weakening of other, competing identities occurs when democracy becomes “predictable” for citizens (Przeworski 1991). A similar, though more nuanced, argument is made by Kevin Russell (2015), who sees identities and interests co-evolving over time as institutions help citizens’ expectations about the future converge to a common standard. When citizens can rely on the state to plan their future, their attachment to the rule of law and other state institutions grows, but this process takes hold over a long period of time with citizens constantly updating their beliefs that the state is committed to strengthening national identity. An empirical observation that follows from this discussion is that transitions to democratic power-sharing should induce an increase in national identification but only over the long term. While the political inclusion of ethnic groups can potentially reduce conflict in the short term, we should not expect an immediate change in national identification. This analysis could be expanded by considering separately the effects of inclusive vs dispersive institutions while also addressing the earlier argument about long-term vs short-term effects. Next, I turn to the differences between dispersive and inclusive institutions with respect to war recurrence.

## **4.2. War recurrence**

Looking deeper into the causes of democratic breakdown, Graham et al (2017) note that the primary reason in post-conflict states is conflict recurrence, either in the form of new separatist conflict, or a coup. Thus, to properly understand the dynamics of democratic stability in post-conflict states, we need to understand post-conflict risk of war recurrence, which is what we turn to next.

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<sup>24</sup> It is possible that the EPR-based classification of groups into the different inclusion categories (e.g. “junior partner” or “powerless”) is too coarse for our purposes. Take Nigeria, for example, where there is an agreement between the Christian South and Muslim North to alternate the presidency. EPR codes both Muslim and Christian groups as Senior Partners because of that arrangement. Yet the identity of the President might matter in shaping their co-ethnics national identification. There is an uptick in national identification for the Muslim Hausa in 2008 when there was a Muslim President in Nigeria relative to 2005 and 2012/13 when Christians held the office. The Yoruba, two thirds of whom are Christians and one third Muslim, show a similar, albeit weaker, pattern.

<sup>25</sup> I also note that only about half of respondents in Afrobarometer surveys are matched to ethnic groups that are included in the EPR dataset, which is our source of data on inclusion. The EPR dataset only codes “politically relevant” groups. An alternative approach would be to focus only on dispersive power-sharing, which could be coded for all individuals’ ethnic group affiliations in the Afrobarometer surveys. This would entail additional coding of cases as there is currently no available dataset that codes regional autonomy or other forms of dispersive power-sharing for all ethnic groups in Africa.



The main motivation for the use of power-sharing institutions is that they should reduce the severity of the commitment problem faced by former combatants during the implementation phase of a peace settlement (Mattes and Savun 2009). Some authors question this argument and argue that P-S cannot eliminate the commitment problem (Fearon and Laitin 2008). Focusing on military power-sharing (integrating combatants in the military after civil war), Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) argue that these agreements are unlikely to resolve the commitment problem because they do not provide credible security guarantees; they are instead used mostly as a way to provide employment to former rebels. A “middle” position holds that P-S is effective if it arises from victories (either by the rebels or the incumbent government); by contrast P-S that is the result of a negotiated settlement will be more unstable (Mukherjee 2006).

The advantages and disadvantages of power-sharing institutions with respect to their ability to contain ethnic or nationalist conflict have been debated heavily and there is no consensus opinion in the literature. Two types of P-S institutions have been considered explicitly with respect to their potential to reduce post-conflict risk of a return to violence: inclusive and dispersive power-sharing.

Dispersive P-S usually takes the form of autonomy agreements. An autonomy settlement may be provisionally defined as one that grants a distinct form of territorial self-government short of sovereign independence to a named population. Do such agreements produce long-term territorial stability, thereby reducing the incidence of secession, as many have argued? Or, by contrast, are autonomy agreements, especially asymmetrical autonomy agreements, the mechanism through which proto-states emerge that later bid for secession?

According to many scholars, autonomy agreements in multi-ethnic –especially multi-national—states are bound to fail. Ethno-federalism has “a terrible track record” (Snyder 2000, 327) and ethno-federal institutions are seen as prone to conflict and break down along ethnic lines (Bunce 1999; Brubaker 1995; Roeder 2007). Among others, Philip Roeder has argued the latter position (Roeder 2007). In early work on this topic inspired by the collapse of Yugoslavia and its descent to war, Valery Bunce (1999) wrote that multi-ethnic federations will fail because by virtue of granting ethnic groups and their leaders the symbols and institutions of statehood, they enhance their appetite for independence.

By contrast, other scholars have suggested that autonomy, defined as ‘internal self-determination,’ should be promoted by the international community as the best way of reconciling self-determination and the territorial integrity of existing member-states of the UN.<sup>26</sup> There have been multiple studies of the effects of autonomy, described under multiple headings: partially independent states, federacies, national autonomy, territorial autonomy, and asymmetric autonomy, to name the most prominent.<sup>27</sup> A cautious defense of multi-national federations is developed in McGarry and O’Leary (2009). They argue that part of the reason that ethno-federalism has a bad track record is that “failed federations were forced together ... [so] there was no possibility of

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<sup>26</sup> Buchanan, Alan E 2007 (2004) ch. 9.

<sup>27</sup> See e.g., Rezvani 2014, Stepan 2013, Nimni 2005, Weller and Nobbs 2010, Weller, et al. 2008.

genuine dialogue” among the parties (McGarry and O’Leary 2009, p. 9). They also point out (p. 15) that, if ethno-federalism was not perceived as a valuable –even necessary—political system, then it would not have been used by Leninist centralists in the USSR and Yugoslavia. Thus, they turn the question of “why did ethno-federalism in USSR and Yugoslavia collapse?” on its head and they ask “why did it last as long as it did?” and “how was it able to unify ethnic groups and nations that were in the midst of civil war?”<sup>28</sup>

Another argument that McGarry and O’Leary (2009, 9) make to explain the failure of ethno-federalism is that many such states are federal in name only and in fact collapse is a result of an effort to re-centralize.<sup>29</sup> Their evidence comes mainly from a qualitative review of a few historical case-studies, including in-depth knowledge of the case of the Iraqi Kurds (O’Leary 018). Other studies use cross- country data on “lost autonomy” to show that there is a positive correlation between ethnic groups whose autonomy status has been downgraded and the risk of violent conflict between those groups and the state (Sambanis and Zinn 2006; Siroki and Cuffe 2016; Germann and Sambanis 2020).<sup>30</sup> Using expanded data on self-determination movements across the world as well as new data on revocations of autonomy status, Germann and Sambanis (2020) show that “lost autonomy” is indeed correlated with conflict escalation, but both violent and non-violent forms of conflict could result from efforts to regain autonomy. Germann and Sambanis (2020) point to the need to focus more closely on the process of conflict escalation to explain why some conflicts over self-determination remain non-violent while others turn violent. Lost autonomy as coded by Germann and Sambanis (2020) occurs in about 11% of all cases of violent claims for self-determination and 27% of all non-violent claims for self-determination. In fact, very few groups (2.7% of 14,745 group-years in their dataset) that have not lost autonomy make violent claims (Germann and Sambanis 2020).

In the appendix (Table 2), we replicate the analysis in Germann and Sambanis (2020) to show the consistently positive association between lost autonomy and conflict over self-determination. This analysis uses data on self-determination movements from 1945-2012. Most of these movements are non-violent, yet most of the quantitative literature has focused on violent separatist conflicts and less is known about the correlates of non-violent separatist movements. Table 2 shows clearly that lost autonomy (which includes historical losses of autonomy) and autonomy downgrades are positively and significantly correlated with the onset of non-violent conflict over self-determination while controlling for other variables that have been shown to affect demands for autonomy, as well

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<sup>28</sup> Although this argument is compelling, the acknowledgement that successful ethno-federalism should be consent-based begs the question of whether it is the appropriate system to use in the aftermath of ethnic war?

<sup>29</sup> They bring up the example of Nigeria, which “is so centralized that it has been described as a ‘hollow federation.’”

<sup>30</sup> There could be different mechanisms underlying the association between lost autonomy and conflict outbreaks.

Siroky and Cuffe (2015) focus on recent losses of autonomy and argue that groups that have lost autonomy recently are more likely to be politically mobilized with established group leaders and are therefore in a better position to mount a violent challenge against the state. Sambanis and Zinn (2006) draw on the social movements literature to argue that lost autonomy is a form of indiscriminate repression that can radicalize moderates and induce them to support the use of violence. Germann and Sambanis (2020) look not just at recent cases of lost autonomy, but also historical autonomy that has been lost during the de-colonization period and argue that lost autonomy represents status decline that can generate resentment and support ethno-nationalist claims to regain autonomy.

as region and country fixed effects. In further analyses, Germann and Sambanis (2020) use a two-step model that analyzes conflict escalation from non-violence to violence and find that violent escalation is strongly correlated with ethnic exclusion from power. Recent autonomy losses are also associated with violent escalation and they conclude that “unless autonomy downgrades are reversed, conflicts are hard to resolve and recurrence is likely even after a period of little or no violence” (p. 20). This analysis, therefore, suggests that reneging on prior dispersive power-sharing arrangements is a risk factor for conflict recurrence.

*Prima facie* support in favor of the argument that efforts to re-centralize explain the onset of violent ethnic conflict is also provided by Cederman et al (2015) who use data from the Ethnic Power Relations database to study the consequences of “downgrading” ethnic groups. Their study is based on an innovative new dataset that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups in each country and codes access to power over time for all those groups for the period since 1945. The dataset, mentioned previously in the section on “measurement” of power-sharing focuses on measures of “inclusion” of ethnic groups. Cederman et al (2015) analyze the effects of including ethnic groups in central government as well as the effects of granting autonomy concessions or both. They find a negative correlation between inclusion and ethnic war onset (where war is defined as the onset of an internal conflict producing 25 or more deaths). A similar result is shown with respect to autonomy (Table 3 in Cederman et al, 2015; page 362). These results are produced by models using different configurations of the data by Cederman and his co-authors,<sup>31</sup> thereby questioning a previous literature that offered ‘supply-side’ explanations of ethnic insurgency (studies that sought to explain the incidence of insurgencies by reference to lootable opportunities, rough terrain, and state weakness). These two literatures had rivalrous policy implications. For Cederman et al granting regional autonomy increases the likelihood of peace, but there are catches: autonomy must be granted early, and is best combined with inclusive power-sharing arrangements in the central or federal government.<sup>32</sup> By contrast, Fearon and Laitin (2003) place greater emphasis on strengthening/centralizing state power and achieving impartial government.

Despite these interesting new results, the debate on the effects of autonomy arrangements or inclusion is far from settled. One open question concerns the timing of autonomy concessions – are they effective only if granted prior to the conflict turning violent or can they be used as a way to end ethnic civil wars? The most developed set of quantitative tests of this question to date are due to Cederman and co-authors, drawing on the EPR dataset. Thus, in what follows we build on their study to explore some of the conditional effects of inclusion as a conflict resolution strategy.

#### **4.2.1. Exploring the Conditional Effects of Dispersive Power-sharing**

One of the first papers to consider the effects of regional autonomy in different political contexts was Brancati (2006), who argued that decentralization concessions can have a direct positive effect by reducing conflict via appeasing groups’ desire for self-governance, but also an indirect negative effect by empower regional elites and spurring the growth of regional parties. The assumption here

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<sup>31</sup> Cederman, et al. 2013, Cederman, et al. 2010, Wimmer, et al. 2009.

<sup>32</sup> Cederman, et al. 2015; see also McGarry and O’Leary 2009.

is that regional elites will want to claim more resources for themselves and will therefore utilize the apparatus of sub-national state institutions to heighten ethnic differences and mobilize support for ethnic conflict in pursuit of their own individual agendas. That argument pushes us to consider institutional strategies to limit elites' power not only at the national level, but also at the regional (sub-national) level.<sup>33</sup> Among others, Mattes and Savun (2009) argue that P-S institutions can be effective in constraining actors' ability to renege on their prior commitments, thereby decreasing the insecurity felt by regional elites. Graham et al (2017) note that not all P-S institutions have the same positive effect on peace and that constraining P-S has such an effect, particularly in post-conflict societies (Gates et al 2016).<sup>34</sup> In their analysis, constraining institutions activate the "protection mechanism" – protecting individuals, not elites, from abuses of power. We could synthesize the work reviewed above to consider whether there exist P-S institutions that are effective in protecting regional/sub-national elites from an erosion of their power at the hands of the center; and if so, we could consider whether these institutions are effective in reducing elite-driven demands for secession and conflict among regionally autonomous ethnic groups.

Dispersive institutions such as autonomy arrangements empower and co-opt regional elites. The logic behind creating such institutions is that they can give regional elites incentives not to challenge the existing order (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Magaloni 2008), but the elites are not constrained from discriminating against weaker, smaller groups or repressing their political rivals (Gates et al 2016, 518). It follows that the internal ethnic makeup of autonomous regions is an important variable that could influence how well these arrangements work in practice as is the degree of intra-group political competition. This conjecture could be explored further using a comparative case-study approach but the cases should be chosen carefully to account for the confounding effect of other variables, including the degree of intra-group elite competition and other institutional features of autonomy arrangements. Such factors could combine with autonomy concessions to produce different degrees of risk for incumbent regimes. Thus, arguments such as Walter's that are based on the logic of restricting autonomy concessions so as to cultivate a reputation for strength would have to be modified to account for institutional differences across countries. For example, institutional arrangements that encourage cross-ethnic voting could be effective in reducing ethnic conflict and might translate into lower risk of separatism by regional parties or provincial majorities.<sup>35</sup> It follows that granting more autonomy in such situations is less likely to be perceived as a sign of the state's weakness. Similarly, if the intra-group political competition is high, regional elites should be less likely to organize a challenge against the state and they will have more incentives to improve relations between provincial majority and minority populations (cf. Wilkinson's 2004 study of electoral ethnic violence in India).

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<sup>33</sup> An example is Cammett and Malesky (2012), who consider the impact of different electoral rules. They find that closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems promote stability by reducing the salience of 'greed' and "grievance" motives for civil war. Close-list PR strengthens parties and adds checks on the executive while reducing incentives for personalistic voting.

<sup>34</sup> Types of constraining institutions that they consider include judicial review; military legislator ban; freedom of religion.

<sup>35</sup> On the use of electoral institutions and constitutional design to address this issue, see Horowitz (1985; chapters 14-15).

#### **4.2.2. Effects of Power-sharing in the Shadow of External Intervention**

We now turn to an analysis of how external intervention in civil war shapes the impact of power-sharing. This analysis draws on joint work with Nils Bormann and Mark Toukan and departs from the observation that the success or failure of any negotiated settlement often requires external intervention to provide assurances to the former combatants, address spoiler problems, and provide resources and technical capacities for peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). While the effect of impartial multilateral intervention on postwar peace-building has been analyzed extensively, much less is known about how the specter of partial intervention affects the stability of post-war power-sharing. That is the key question addressed by Bormann, Toukan, and Sambanis (2019).

The international environment is a neglected factor influencing the success or failure of autonomy arrangements after civil war. In general, the great powers, today's P5 of the UN Security Council, the BRICS, or the G7, disown secession as a threat to regional or global stability. Yet it is not hard to find examples of hypocrisy in their conduct since 1945, or 1991. France and the UK, for instance, adopted different postures toward Biafra's attempted secession from Nigeria. Today's Russian Federation opposes the secession of Kosovo/Kosova and Chechnya, but recognizes the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, and oversaw, through force and the ballot box, the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its subsequent annexation into the Russian Federation. The United States and the EU's policy positions on these subjects are the exact opposite of Russia's: they backed the secession of Kosova/Kosova while supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine. Elsewhere, South Africa, like many African states, opposes secession on the African continent, but South African diplomats supported South Sudan's departure from Sudan, as did Sudan's neighbors (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania). Turkey opposes secession in Iraq and Syria but upholds the (so-called) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Recognizing the influence that great powers, regional hegemony, or meddling neighbors exert on the implementation and function of dispersive power-sharing, we note the conspicuous absence of any systematic research on the legacies of external intervention in civil war. Bormann, Toukan and Sambanis (2019) test whether the shadow of intervention (i.e. expectations created by the behavior of external actors during the previous war) affects the stability of territorial autonomy arrangements. Specifically, pro-rebel intervention provides groups with an "outside option" that makes the government hostage to external interference the more extensive is the inclusion of former rebels. Separatist conflict is also more likely in the presence of external support for rebels who are granted concessions in the form of dispersive power-sharing.

To test this hypothesis, Bormann, Toukan, and Sambanis begin by replicating key results from Cederman et al (2015), which show that territorial autonomy concessions only have a pacifying effect if they are offered prior to the conflict turning violent. Focusing on postwar cases only and dropping observations of group-years where there has been no war, we can explore this argument with reference to the correlation between territorial autonomy agreements and war recurrence. We drop cases where inclusion and autonomy were granted prior to the civil war since those cases

cannot inform our discussion of power-sharing as a strategy to end wars and prevent their recurrence.<sup>36</sup> Table 3 in the appendix reproduces the results of the analysis in Bormann, Toukan, and Sambanis (their Table 1). Column 1 replicates Model 1 in Table 3 of Cederman et al (2015), showing that inclusive power-sharing has a significant conflict-reducing effect, while autonomy concessions do not. Column 2 breaks down these P-S institutions into pre-conflict and post-conflict and recodes some of the Cederman et al (2015) data to properly assign pre-conflict and post-conflict cases of power-sharing. When some coding data in Cederman et al (2015) are corrected, we find that inclusive P-S helps reduce conflict risk no matter when these P-S institutions are established, though only pre-conflict autonomy has a significant association to conflict and the association is *positive* (increasing conflict risk).

Bormann et al take this model as a starting point and add variables measuring interventionism in the previous war (identifying all cases where there was any type of intervention during the last two years of a civil war). They distinguish between pro-rebel and pro-government intervention and interact intervention history with the inclusion and autonomy variables. They retain all other covariates from the original study (group size, federal systems, population size, per capita income, etc). Their findings suggest that intervention history conditions the association between P-S and war recurrence.

Specifically, controlling for intervention history, Bormann et al find that the negative association between inclusive P-S and conflict risk remains strong while the coefficient of post-conflict autonomy depends on whether autonomy was pre- or post-conflict and whether there was intervention in the previous war. In cases with a history of intervention, regional autonomy for the rebels was associated with a higher risk of conflict resumption (see the coefficient of the interaction term between autonomy and intervention history in model 3). Yet inclusion also has the same positive coefficient, so we further disaggregate in model 4 the type of intervention – whether it is pro-rebel or pro-government. We find that the association between intervention and conflict resumption is pointing in the opposite direction depending on whether it is pro-government or pro-rebel (column 4). While the interactive effect between intervention and inclusive P-S is not robust to small specification changes in the model, we see (model 4) that the association between territorial autonomy and war risk is the opposite depending on whether intervention occurred on the side of the government (decreasing risk of war recurrence) or on the side of the rebels (increasing risk of war recurrence). In model 5, we see that the direct correlation of post-conflict autonomy with conflict recurrence is *negative* whereas the interaction between post-conflict autonomy and intervention history has a negative coefficient and this effect is clearly due to pro-rebel interventions (model 6). Seen from the prism of the bargaining model, this would suggest that the presence of an external backer for rebels makes them less likely to be satisfied with the level of inclusion or autonomy that the government is willing to offer. Such “outside options” may make the postwar peace fragile, subject to unexpected changes in the power balance between

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<sup>36</sup> War recurrence data is from the ACD dataset. Recurrence is defined as the onset of a new round of conflict with 25 deaths or more per year. This is as in Cederman et al (2015).

former rebels and government or to domestic political developments in the external sponsor that could lead the sponsor to become more interventionist.

These results are informative, though they are not conclusive. The mechanisms underlying these correlations are not yet clear. Is a history of pro-rebel interventions de-stabilizing because it makes elites among rebel groups likely to make ever-increasing demands which the center cannot keep accommodating? Or is the center less likely to believe that former rebels' commitment to power-sharing is credible in light of their "outside options" provided by external backers? In either case, any exogenous change to the power balance between the government and former rebels could trigger mutual suspicion that could undermine the stability of power-sharing in the absence of mechanisms to make such agreements self-enforcing.

To identify the mechanisms underlying those correlations, comparative case studies will be very useful. Bormann et al (2019) describe an approach to case-study design that provides process-tracing of different mechanisms while also exploring "out of sample" cases (i.e. cases that are not included in the quantitative analysis either because they occurred outside of the time period corresponding to the quantitative analysis or because the case was miscoded such that it was mistakenly excluded from analysis). Such cases do not contribute to the analysis of quantitative data and are therefore eligible for inclusion in the qualitative analysis design, which can explore whether the purported mechanisms underlie the intervention-autonomy instability nexus.

## **5. Conclusion**

This paper has provided a review of the literature on power-sharing after civil war by identifying sources of ambiguity in the measurement of the concept of power-sharing; by identifying key correlates of power-sharing institutions; and by exploring open questions in the literature. Of particular relevance to the post conflict transition of MENA countries that have suffered from civil wars is the discussion of the consequences of power-sharing in section 4, where we have addressed the impact of power-sharing on post-conflict democratization as well as its impact on the risk of war recurrence. We have shown that the literature is equivocal on these important questions as results of landmark publications on the topic are sensitive to small changes in the underlying data and measurement. We have also considered fruitful ways to enrich the literature on power-sharing by considering the mechanism of social identification as one potential pathway through which power-sharing can affect political preferences. We explored whether minority groups that are included in a government coalition are more likely to identify nationally and suggested this as a question worthy of further exploration. We also considered the role of external intervention in shaping post-conflict trajectories in countries with and without power-sharing. Our results suggest that intervention on behalf of rebel groups weakens the positive effect of inclusive or dispersive power-sharing institutions.

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
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**Appendix Figure 1: Global Patterns of Onset and Prevalence of Civil War by 5-year Period; 1945-2012**



### **Appendix Table 1: Replication of Graham, Miller, and Strøm (2017)**

Graham, Miller, and Strøm (2017) analyze the effects of three types of power-sharing agreements – constraining, dispersive, and inclusive – on democratic survival. They find that only “constraining” power-sharing has consistently positive effects on democratic survival and that, in the subset of countries that have experienced “civil war,” inclusive power-sharing after civil war also promotes democratic survival, whereas dispersive power-sharing has a negative effect. This analysis depends on identifying and coding all periods of internal armed conflict and in this replication we focus on whether the results are sensitive to the coding of countries as “post-conflict” or not. Specifically, they use the UCDP/PRIO dataset definition of conflict, which includes all countries that have experienced conflict that has caused at least 1,000 cumulative deaths according to the UCDP/PRIO dataset.

Given significant ambiguities in the coding of civil war – an issue that is discussed in depth in Sambanis (2004)—we replicate their analysis using different conflict data. We draw data from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). We focus on Table 4 in the Graham, Miller, and Strøm article, specifically on how switching data sources changes results for the interaction term between the post-conflict indicator with each type of power-sharing institution. Results are shown below, in a Table reproducing results published in Sambanis and SchulhoferWohl (2019). There is a marked change in the estimated effect of dispersive power-sharing when we use different data on conflicts. The coefficient goes from negative to positive and significant using their three preferred model specifications. The magnitude of the effect of inclusive power-sharing also increases substantially and the effect of constraining power-sharing attenuates and is not statistically significant in model 3. Thus, we find that both inclusive and dispersive power-sharing can help promote democratic survival.


**Table 1: Replication of Graham, Miller, and Strøm (2017)**

|  | (1)                     | (2)                     | (3)                      | (4)                     | (5)                      | (6)                     |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
|  | Table 4 Model 1         |                         | Table 4 Model 2          |                         | Table 4 Model 3          |                         |
|  | ACD                     | SSW                     | ACD                      | SSW                     | ACD                      | SSW                     |
| <b>Inclusive Powersharing</b>              | -0.0648<br>(0.0771)     | -0.0311<br>(0.0863)     | -0.0534<br>(0.0933)      | -0.00145<br>(0.111)     | -0.145<br>(0.102)        | -0.0529<br>(0.124)      |
| <b>Dispersive Powersharing</b>             | -0.0128<br>(0.0941)     | -0.0423<br>(0.0955)     | -0.0669<br>(0.0966)      | -0.0810<br>(0.0981)     | -0.0841<br>(0.102)       | -0.0971<br>(0.104)      |
| <b>Constraining Powersharing</b>           | 0.397***<br>(0.0839)    | 0.363***<br>(0.0818)    | 0.323***<br>(0.0925)     | 0.294***<br>(0.0894)    | 0.353***<br>(0.0973)     | 0.336***<br>(0.0952)    |
| <b>Post-Civil War (10 Years)</b>           | 0.593***<br>(0.175)     | 4.814***<br>(0.651)     | 0.736***<br>(0.196)      | 4.799***<br>(0.671)     | 0.797***<br>(0.198)      | 5.481***<br>(0.707)     |
| <b>Inclusive x Post-Civil War</b>          | 2.113***<br>(0.450)     | 18.80***<br>(2.033)     | 2.249***<br>(0.599)      | 18.98***<br>(2.134)     | 2.403***<br>(0.628)      | 22.25***<br>(2.360)     |
| <b>Dispersive x Post-Civil War</b>         | -0.440***<br>(0.162)    | 1.447**<br>(0.682)      | -0.452***<br>(0.166)     | 1.358**<br>(0.671)      | -0.489***<br>(0.166)     | 1.367**<br>(0.694)      |
| <b>Constraining x Post-Civil War</b>       | 0.250<br>(0.162)        | 0.577**<br>(0.243)      | 0.309*<br>(0.172)        | 0.493**<br>(0.246)      | 0.383**<br>(0.184)       | 0.424*<br>(0.253)       |
| Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization         | -0.489*<br>(0.264)      | -0.517*<br>(0.275)      | -0.538*<br>(0.280)       | -0.581**<br>(0.290)     | -0.375<br>(0.285)        | -0.420<br>(0.293)       |
| Regional Polity                            | 0.0990***<br>(0.0173)   | 0.104***<br>(0.0183)    | 0.0981***<br>(0.0182)    | 0.101***<br>(0.0190)    | 0.0913***<br>(0.0189)    | 0.0944***<br>(0.0197)   |
| GDP/capita (logged)                        | 0.597***<br>(0.0789)    | 0.547***<br>(0.0805)    | 0.516***<br>(0.0958)     | 0.470***<br>(0.0926)    | 0.486***<br>(0.0938)     | 0.441***<br>(0.0907)    |
| GDP Growth                                 | 0.00859<br>(0.0105)     | 0.00834<br>(0.0102)     | 0.00789<br>(0.00966)     | 0.00790<br>(0.00948)    | 0.00618<br>(0.0112)      | 0.00564<br>(0.0112)     |
| Fuel Dependence                            | -0.0110*<br>(0.00586)   | -0.0206***<br>(0.00555) | -0.0113**<br>(0.00557)   | -0.0200***<br>(0.00526) | -0.0130**<br>(0.00569)   | -0.0214***<br>(0.00530) |
| Population (logged)                        | -0.0640<br>(0.0420)     | -0.0380<br>(0.0413)     | 0.0114<br>(0.0455)       | 0.0282<br>(0.0453)      | 0.00895<br>(0.0456)      | 0.0241<br>(0.0447)      |
| Past Democratic Breakdown                  | -0.211***<br>(0.0598)   | -0.224***<br>(0.0614)   | -0.197***<br>(0.0628)    | -0.203***<br>(0.0643)   | -0.182***<br>(0.0670)    | -0.185***<br>(0.0676)   |
| Democracy Age                              | -0.00468**<br>(0.00234) | -0.00185<br>(0.00292)   | -0.00783***<br>(0.00273) | -0.00504<br>(0.00316)   | -0.00843***<br>(0.00259) | -0.00582**<br>(0.00273) |
| Freedom House                              |                         |                         | 2.017***<br>(0.411)      | 1.710***<br>(0.396)     | 1.861***<br>(0.424)      | 1.460***<br>(0.415)     |
| Horizontal Constraints                     |                         |                         | -0.177<br>(0.398)        | -0.0496<br>(0.392)      | -0.157<br>(0.422)        | -0.0817<br>(0.415)      |
| Recent Regular Turnover                    |                         |                         |                          |                         | 0.342***<br>(0.126)      | 0.278**<br>(0.128)      |
| Recent Irregular Turnover                  |                         |                         |                          |                         | -0.576***<br>(0.183)     | -0.518***<br>(0.177)    |
| Polity                                     |                         |                         |                          |                         | 0.0360<br>(0.0273)       | 0.0371<br>(0.0278)      |
| Disruption                                 |                         |                         |                          |                         | 1.021<br>(0.756)         | 0.607<br>(0.807)        |
| Constant                                   | -2.578***<br>(0.844)    | -2.384***<br>(0.867)    | -4.401***<br>(1.019)     | -3.915***<br>(1.024)    | -4.434***<br>(1.040)     | -3.835***<br>(1.028)    |
| Years of Powersharing<br>Cubic Polynomials | Y                       | Y                       | Y                        | Y                       | Y                        | Y                       |
| Observations                               | 2,181                   | 2,181                   | 2,137                    | 2,137                   | 2,124                    | 2,124                   |

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Figure 2: Strength of National vs Ethnic Identification by Power Status**

Note: Afrobarometer data on national identification merged with EPR data on ethnic exclusion



**Appendix Table 2: Multinomial logit regressions of conflict on lost autonomy and exclusion**

|  | (1)                  | (2)                  | (3)                  | (4)                 | (5)                 |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Ethnic grievances:</i>              |                      |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| Exclusion                              | 0.987**<br>(0.314)   | 0.960**<br>(0.304)   | 0.694*<br>(0.313)    | 0.004+<br>(0.002)   | 0.004<br>(0.003)    |
| Lost autonomy                          | 1.098**<br>(0.354)   | 1.024**<br>(0.341)   | 0.806**<br>(0.282)   | 0.012***<br>(0.002) | 0.013***<br>(0.004) |
| Autonomy downgrade                     |                      | 2.064***<br>(0.454)  | 1.920***<br>(0.487)  | 0.065*<br>(0.027)   | 0.074*<br>(0.032)   |
| <i>Group-level controls:</i>           |                      |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| Regional concentration                 | 1.562***<br>(0.372)  | 1.554***<br>(0.367)  |                      | 0.009**<br>(0.003)  |                     |
| Relative group size                    | 0.536<br>(0.668)     | 0.390<br>(0.677)     | -0.479<br>(0.823)    | -0.007<br>(0.005)   | -0.010<br>(0.008)   |
| Separatist kin <sub>t-1</sub>          | 0.555**<br>(0.202)   | 0.587**<br>(0.200)   | 0.634**<br>(0.234)   | 0.008*<br>(0.003)   | 0.007*<br>(0.004)   |
| Regional autonomy                      | 0.210<br>(0.298)     | 0.319<br>(0.278)     | 0.140<br>(0.347)     | 0.003<br>(0.005)    | 0.005<br>(0.006)    |
| Hydrocarbon reserves <sub>t-1</sub>    |                      |                      | 0.667*<br>(0.276)    |                     | 0.004<br>(0.003)    |
| Mountainous terrain                    |                      |                      | 0.211<br>(0.356)     |                     | -0.002<br>(0.004)   |
| Noncontiguity                          |                      |                      | 1.938**<br>(0.746)   |                     | 0.021<br>(0.021)    |
| <i>Country-level controls:</i>         |                      |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| ln(GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub> )     | 0.454*<br>(0.215)    | 0.441*<br>(0.218)    | 0.368<br>(0.242)     | 0.007<br>(0.004)    | 0.009+<br>(0.005)   |
| ln(country population <sub>t-1</sub> ) | 0.339**<br>(0.108)   | 0.314**<br>(0.107)   | 0.286*<br>(0.111)    | -0.005<br>(0.007)   | -0.009<br>(0.009)   |
| Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>               | -1.068<br>(0.749)    | -1.049<br>(0.714)    | -1.785*<br>(0.784)   | -0.021*<br>(0.010)  | -0.020<br>(0.013)   |
| Federal state <sub>t-1</sub>           | 0.526<br>(0.371)     | 0.512<br>(0.355)     | 0.607+<br>(0.328)    | 0.003<br>(0.011)    | 0.001<br>(0.014)    |
| Number of rel. groups                  | -0.034***<br>(0.007) | -0.033***<br>(0.007) | -0.033***<br>(0.007) | -0.000<br>(0.001)   | -0.000<br>(0.001)   |
| <i>Systemic conditions:</i>            |                      |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| Cold War                               | -0.037<br>(0.326)    | -0.062<br>(0.334)    | -0.312<br>(0.364)    | 0.000<br>(0.004)    | -0.002<br>(0.005)   |
| Region FEs                             | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                  | No                  | No                  |
| Country FEs                            | No                   | No                   | No                   | Yes                 | Yes                 |
| Only concentrated groups               | No                   | No                   | Yes                  | No                  | Yes                 |
| No. of groups                          | 686                  | 686                  | 528                  | 686                 | 528                 |
| No. of countries                       | 140                  | 140                  | 121                  | 140                 | 121                 |
| Observations                           | 23612                | 23612                | 18169                | 23612               | 18169               |

*Note:* Models 1–3 include region dummies (not shown) and are estimated with logit regression. Models 4 and 5 include country dummies (not shown) and are estimated with OLS. All models include controls for time dependence and a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .



**Table 3: Reproducing results from Bormann, Toukan, Sambanis (2019) on the effect of territorial autonomy on post-conflict risk of war recurrence**

|                                   | <i>Dependent variable:</i> |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                                   | (1)                        | (2)                | (3)                | (4)                | (5)                | (6)                |
| Inclusion                         | -1.47***<br>(0.44)         |                    | -2.86***<br>(0.31) | -1.95***<br>(0.58) |                    |                    |
| Autonomy                          | 0.20<br>(0.29)             |                    | -0.69<br>(0.47)    | -0.34<br>(0.44)    |                    |                    |
| Prior Inclusion                   |                            | -1.94***<br>(0.30) |                    |                    | -1.46***<br>(0.40) | -1.64***<br>(0.49) |
| Prior Autonomy                    |                            | 0.85**<br>(0.35)   |                    |                    | 0.62<br>(0.39)     | 1.11***<br>(0.42)  |
| PC Inclusion                      |                            | -1.27**<br>(0.53)  |                    |                    | -2.70***<br>(0.29) | -1.73***<br>(0.60) |
| PC Autonomy                       |                            | 0.15<br>(0.30)     |                    |                    | -1.17**<br>(0.53)  | -0.78<br>(0.49)    |
| Intervention history              |                            |                    | -0.41<br>(0.33)    |                    | -0.39<br>(0.33)    |                    |
| Gov. intervention                 |                            |                    |                    | 0.39<br>(0.33)     |                    | 0.33<br>(0.32)     |
| Rebel intervention                |                            |                    |                    | -0.63<br>(0.38)    |                    | -0.57<br>(0.37)    |
| Relative group size               | 0.99<br>(2.43)             | 1.02<br>(2.38)     | 0.01<br>(2.75)     | 1.18<br>(2.66)     | -0.48<br>(2.85)    | 1.04<br>(2.70)     |
| Relative group size sq.           | -4.12<br>(3.09)            | -4.16<br>(3.05)    | -3.11<br>(3.63)    | -5.28<br>(3.72)    | -2.40<br>(3.72)    | -5.22<br>(3.72)    |
| Number of excl. groups            | -0.02**<br>(0.01)          | -0.02*<br>(0.01)   | -0.01<br>(0.02)    | -0.01<br>(0.02)    | -0.002<br>(0.02)   | -0.001<br>(0.02)   |
| Federal                           | -0.34<br>(0.33)            | -0.34<br>(0.34)    | -0.22<br>(0.32)    | -0.12<br>(0.31)    | -0.20<br>(0.31)    | -0.16<br>(0.31)    |
| Log gdp lag                       | 0.07<br>(0.10)             | 0.08<br>(0.10)     | 0.10<br>(0.12)     | 0.20<br>(0.14)     | 0.12<br>(0.13)     | 0.23<br>(0.14)     |
| Log population                    | 0.25***<br>(0.10)          | 0.25***<br>(0.09)  | 0.23**<br>(0.09)   | 0.12<br>(0.09)     | 0.22**<br>(0.09)   | 0.14<br>(0.09)     |
| Ongoing conflict                  | 0.57*<br>(0.34)            | 0.55<br>(0.34)     | 0.33<br>(0.37)     | 0.30<br>(0.38)     | 0.26<br>(0.37)     | 0.26<br>(0.37)     |
| Peace years                       | -0.15***<br>(0.06)         | -0.15***<br>(0.06) | -0.19***<br>(0.05) | -0.18***<br>(0.05) | -0.18***<br>(0.05) | -0.16***<br>(0.05) |
| Autonomy X intervention hist.     |                            |                    | 1.48**<br>(0.59)   |                    |                    |                    |
| Inclusion X intervention hist.    |                            |                    | 1.84***<br>(0.53)  |                    |                    |                    |
| Autonomy X gov. intervention      |                            |                    |                    | -0.98**<br>(0.48)  |                    |                    |
| Inclusion X gov. intervention     |                            |                    |                    | -0.13<br>(1.01)    |                    |                    |
| Autonomy X reb. intervention      |                            |                    |                    | 2.60***<br>(0.87)  |                    |                    |
| Inclusion X reb. intervention     |                            |                    |                    | 0.34<br>(0.97)     |                    |                    |
| PC Inclusion X intervention hist. |                            |                    |                    |                    | 2.15***<br>(0.64)  |                    |
| PC Autonomy X intervention hist.  |                            |                    |                    |                    | 2.00***<br>(0.69)  |                    |
| PC Inclusion X gov. intervention  |                            |                    |                    |                    |                    | -0.21<br>(1.31)    |
| PC Autonomy X gov. intervention   |                            |                    |                    |                    |                    | -0.77<br>(0.54)    |
| PC Inclusion X reb. intervention  |                            |                    |                    |                    |                    | 0.76<br>(1.25)     |
| PC Autonomy X reb. intervention   |                            |                    |                    |                    |                    | 2.92***<br>(0.83)  |
| Constant                          | -5.22***<br>(1.37)         | -5.23***<br>(1.35) | -4.64***<br>(1.25) | -4.66***<br>(1.25) | -4.84***<br>(1.33) | -5.13***<br>(1.17) |
| Observations                      | 1,989                      | 1,989              | 1,694              | 1,694              | 1,694              | 1,694              |
| Log Likelihood                    | -218.88                    | -218.66            | -182.14            | -180.05            | -180.95            | -179.40            |
| Akaike Inf. Crit.                 | 465.76                     | 469.32             | 398.27             | 400.10             | 399.91             | 402.80             |

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard errors clustered on country.