Shooting Down Trade: The Impact of Russian Sanctions on Turkish Exports and Exporters

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Motivation

- Economic sanctions have been used as a foreign policy tool to impose costs on the adversaries and induce behavioural changes.
- Sanctions can take many forms:
 - economic and trade sanctions
 - restrictions on bank activities or financial operations
 - travel bans
 - arms embargoes
- Recent examples include sanctions imposed on Iran, North Korea or Russia.

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This paper

- Context: Russian sanctions on Turkey (Jan 2016 Nov 2017)
- Asks: What is the impact of the unexpected sanctions on Turkish exports and exporters?
- Data: Turkish customs and firm data
- Empirical Approach:
 - Triple Difference (DDD) estimation strategy at product and firm-level
 - Exploit the natural experiment for identification

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Structure of the talk

- Literature
- Background
- Data
- Product-level analysis
- Firm-level analysis
- Conclusion

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Literature

- Effectiveness of trade policies such as economic sanctions, embargoes and boycotts (Eaton and Engers, 1999; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988; Hufbauer et al., 2008; Bapat et al., 2013; Michaels and Zhi, 2010)
- Recent literature using firm-level data to study the impact of sanctions on Russia (Crozet and Hinz, 2020; Miromanova, WP) or Iran (Haidar, 2017).

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What makes this context special?

- An embargo imposed unexpectedly and suddenly
 - as a result of a unexpected military conflict
 - announced in one week and imposed 5 weeks after the event
- imposed by a single country (Russia): many outside options for Turkey
- to a large exporting partner
- no reciprocity: trade effects arising only from Russian sanctions

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Background: Russian jet crisis



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Background: Russian embargo on Turkish exports

- 24/11/2015: Turkey shoots down a Russian aircraft
- 24/11/2015: President Putin calls it a "stab in the back"
- 26/11/2015: PM Medvedev announces a broad set of economic sanctions against Turkey as a retaliation
- 28/11/2015: President Putin approves a presidential decree that provides the legal ground for imposing economic embargos on Turkish goods and services
- 30/11/2015: Sanctions are announced
- 01/01/2016: Sanctions begin


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Background: Sanctions

- Banning of sale of charter holidays for Russians to Turkey
- Reduction of construction projects with Turkish firms
- Visa-free travel agreement suspended
- Embargo on the importation of 17 agricultural products from Turkey (e.g. vegetables, fruits, salt and poultry).
- Embargo on these products were gradually removed:
 - Period 1: 10/16 where 5 products are removed
 - Period 2: 03/17 where 5 products are removed
 - Period 3: 06/17 where 6 products are removed
 - Period 4: 11/17 where the last product (tomato) is removed

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Raw data: Turkish export flows to Russia




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Raw data: Turkish (cumulative) exports to Russia



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Data: Product-level analysis

UN COMTRADE

- Monthly export data for Turkey
- 6-digit HS classification
- 232 partner countries and 5306 products
- We eliminate all origin-destination-product triads for which we do not observe any trade over the sample period
- Sample: > 4 million observations

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Customs data (Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri):

- Transaction-level customs data for the complete universe of exporting firms
- Monthly exports at firm HS-8 product destination level

Annual Business Registers (Yıllık Sanayi ve Hizmet İstat.):

• Data on number of employees, gross fixed capital formation, production, wages and more

Sample: Firm-level data for the universe of exporting firms (perfect match)

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Empirical Analysis

- **Product-level analysis**: the impact of the embargo varies conditional on whether the product *faces embargo* and is *traded with Russia*
- **Firm-level analysis**: the impact of the embargo varies conditional on whether the firm *trades in embargoed goods* and *with Russia*.

	Russia	other countries
Embargoed product	Direct effect	Substitution effect
Non-embargoed product	Spillover effect	None

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• A Turkish firm exports poultry to Russia

Embargo

- Poultry (embargoed product) from Turkey are restricted: Direct effect
- Firm diverts its poultry exports to another country: Substitution effect
- Firm starts exporting another (non-embargoed product) to Russia: Positive spillover effect
- Firm cuts ties with Russia and stops exporting even products that are not sanctioneda: Negative spillover effect

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Empirical Strategy: Product-Level Analysis

$$\ln(\text{Trade})_{pkt} = \beta \text{Direct}_{pkt} + \gamma \text{Substitution}_{pkt} + \mu \text{Spillover}_{pkt}$$

$$\eta_{pk} + \lambda_{py} + \gamma_{ky} + \alpha m_{pt} + \vartheta_t + \varepsilon_{pkt}$$

$$(1)$$

$$Substitution_{pkt} = D_{p=embargoed} imes D_{k
eq Russia} imes D_{t=post-embargo}$$

③ Spillover effect: expect $\mu < 0$

 $Spillover_{pkt} = D_{p \neq embargoed} \times D_{k=Russia} \times D_{t=post-embargo}$

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Results: Product-Level Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	OLS	OLS	OLS	PPML	PPML	PPML
VARIABLES	OLS	OLS	OLS			
Direct	-13.789***	-13.419***	-13.608***	-13.811***	-13.747***	-14.957***
	(0.361)	(0.365)	(0.458)	(0.100)	(0.182)	(0.366)
Substitution	0.065	0.059	-0.075	0.054	0.054	-0.327
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.164)	(0.147)	(0.133)	(0.345)
Spillover	-0.396***	-0.124***	-0.127***	-0.286***	-0.269*	-0.250*
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.057)	(0.146)	(0.151)
Constant	9.840***	9.731***	9.736***	14.402***	14.321***	14.325***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Observations	4,142,580	4,142,565	4,142,032	4,142,580	4,142,565	4,142,032
R^2	0.711	0.713	0.717			
Psuedo R ²				0.908	0.912	0.917
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partner-product FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partner-year FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Product-year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Table: Total Trade: Specification Choice

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robust standard errors clustered at HS-6 product-level in parentheses.

All estimates also include total product import of each partner.

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What are these magnitudes?

Direct effect:

- Exports of sanctioned product decreased by 99.9% (100 × ($e^{14.957} 1$))
- A decline in trade around USD1.1 billion over 22 months

O Spillover effect:

- Non-sanctioned exports to Russia dropped by 28.4%
- A decline in trade around USD2.7 billion over 22 months

Total trade lost:

• 1.1 (29%) + 2.7 (71%) = USD3.8 billion

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Firm-Level Analysis: Micro-evidence

- Following the embargo: Firms can stay, exit or enter the market for the embargoed goods
- Trade can be affected at two margins:
 - extensive margin: Number of firms can change
 - intensive margin: Traded volumes can change

Do firms exit the markets of the embargoed products?

Firms may decide to exit the market following the embargo as exporting may be less attractive.

$$exit_{fk} = \underbrace{\beta D_{k=S}}_{embargo} + \vartheta_h + \eta_f + \varepsilon_{fk}$$
(2)

where:

- *exit* is a dummy variable: taking value 1 if a firm exports product *k* in 2015 and leaves that market in 2016.
- $D_{k=S}$: embargoed products
- ϑ_h : HS-2 level fixed-effect
- η_f: firm fixed-effect

Do firms exit the markets for the embargoed products?

Table: Esta destates

lable: Exit decision				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	exit	exit	exit	
Embargo	-0.001	0.017**	-0.007	
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	
Constant	0.051***	0.051***	0.050***	
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Observations	9629852	9629852	9625739	
HS-2 FE	No	Yes	Yes	
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Robust standard errors clustered by HS-2 in parentheses.

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Do surviving firms switch markets?

Firms may "survive" by switching markets (i.e., diverting trade from Russia to other countries).

$$switching_{fk} = \underbrace{\beta D_{k=S}}_{embargo} + \vartheta_h + \eta_f + \varepsilon_{fk}$$
(3)

where:

- *switching_{fk}* is a dummy variable: 1 if exporter *f* exported product *k* before the embargo and still continues during and after the embargo to Russia or to another market.
- $D_{k=S}$: embargoed products
- ϑ_h : HS-2 level fixed-effect
- η_f : firm fixed-effect

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Do surviving firms switch markets?

	(1) S to S	(2) S to NS
Embargo	-0.150** (0.067)	0.170** (0.075)
Constant	0.615*** (0.008)	0.119*** (0.007)
Observations HS-2 FE Firm FE	12402 Yes Yes	12402 Yes Yes

Table: Switching decision

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robust standard errors clustered by HS-6 in parentheses.

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Trade volumes: Intensive margin

- Beyond the number of firms operating in the market, the export volumes and their direction can also change.
- To capture the intensive margin, we restrict the sample to firms that are present in the market before and after the embargo.

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Empirical Strategy: Intensive Margin

$$In(Trade)_{fpkt} = \beta Direct_{pkt} + \gamma Substitution_{pkt} + \mu Spillover_{pkt}$$

$$\eta_{fpk} + \vartheta_t + \varepsilon_{fpkt}$$
(4)

③ Spillover effect: expect $\mu < 0$

 $Spillover_{pkt} = D_{p \neq embargoed} \times D_{k=Russia} \times D_{t=post-embargo}$

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Trade volumes: Intensive margin

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS	OLS	PPML	PPML
Direct	-11.403***	-11.396***	-15.206***	-15.200***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.298)	(0.297)
Substitution	0.082***	0.092***	0.146***	0.154***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Spillover	-0.076***	-0.068***	-0.062***	-0.055***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	9.694***	9.693***	13.642***	13.642***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3886218	3886218	3220450	3220450
R^2	0.953	0.953		
Psuedo R ²			0.917	0.917
Firm-product-partner FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Period FE	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table: Log of firm exports

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robust standard errors clustered by partnerxHS-6xID in parentheses. $\langle \Box \rangle \succ \langle \Box \rangle \Rightarrow \langle \Xi \rangle \Rightarrow \langle \Xi \rangle$

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Conclusions

- Large exogenous shock of embargo on exports and exporters
- Product-level: Negative effect on Turkish exports to Russia
 - Complete shut down of trade to Russia of the sanctioned products
 - Total trade loss: 29% is due to decrease in the export while the rest is due to negative spillovers
- Firm-level:
 - No (statistically significant) effect on firm-exits; firms seem to have adjusted by switching to other markets
 - Firms that remained in the market substituted their flows to other markets

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Next steps

- Add placebos?
- Explore trade diversion: 4 countries (Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhistan)
- Scarring effects in the longer run?

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Thank you for listening. cem.ozguzel@oecd.org

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