Democracy, Personal Freedom, and Islamic State Fighters

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Abstract

Never before in modern history have foreign fighters gathered at the speed and scale as they have in the territory of the Islamic State (IS). While some argue that many of IS foreign fighters appear to have joined as a reaction to persistent and obstinate local conditions of autocracy, discrimination, and oppression, a considerable number of foreign fighters also come from developed countries enjoying high levels of democracy and personal freedom. Even after the demise of Islamic State in 2017, the IS foreign fighter phenomenon remains a source of severe security risk globally as those who have been involved in terrorist operations on the ground may continue their fight as "returnees" against targets in their homeland. This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on the outflow of IS foreign fighters to Syria, as well as their flow back home as returnees. While the effect of democracy appears to be insignificant, our cross-country regressions show that countries which a higher level of personal freedom (i) had a significantly larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS, and (ii) receive a significantly larger percentage share of returning foreign fighter. Our results are robust across different model specifications and account for possible collinearity concerns.

Keywords:　　　　　Democracy, Freedom, Terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters.

JEL Classification:　D74　Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions
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1. Introduction

Never before in modern history have foreign fighters (FF) gathered at the speed and scale as they have in the territory of the Islamic State (IS) (Hegghammer, 2013; Lang & Al Wari, 2016). European Commission's Radicalisation Awareness Network (2017) estimates that over 40,000 foreigners have joined IS from more than 110 countries both before and after the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014. The majority of foreign fighters come from Arab states, mostly from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. Barrett (2017) argues that many of IS foreign recruits appear to have joined as a reaction to persistent and obstinate local conditions of autocracy, discrimination, and oppression. Nevertheless, a considerable number of foreign fighters also come from developed countries enjoying high levels of democracy and personal freedom, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (The Soufan Group, 2015).

Even after the demise of Islamic State in 2017, the IS foreign fighter phenomenon remains a source of severe security risks to the sender countries. Expat fighters who have supported military, paramilitary, and terrorist operations on the ground may continue their fight as "returnees" against targets in their homeland. A study by the Soufan Center and the Global Strategy Network estimates that around 5,600 fighters have already returned to their home countries (Barrett, 2017). Almost 30 percent of the 5,000 European Union citizens who fought alongside the IS in Syria had returned home (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017). A study by Hegghammer shows that between 1990 and 2010, one in nine Western foreign fighters' returnees subsequently became domestic terrorists (Hegghammer, 2013). Hegghammer asserts that "Syria will prolong the problem of jihadi terrorism in Europe by 20 years" and that attacks by foreign fighter returnees are "almost inevitable." (Gardner, 2013). A recent Pew survey (2017) finds that the fear of an attack by IS ranked first in global concerns, just above climate change.

Former French Interior Minister Manuel Valls labeled the IS fighters returnees issue a "ticking time bomb" (Lynch, 2013). This bomb eventually struck Europe on May 24 2014, when a French IS fighter returnee, Mehdi Nemmouche, shot and killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. Nemmouche had spent a year fighting in Syria with IS linked militants before returning to Europe (BBC, 2014). Another Frenchman who had joined IS in Syria, Ibrahim Boudina, returned to France in January 2014 and was consequently arrested while allegedly planning an attack involving high

explosives on several domestic targets (Cruickshank, 2014). Most importantly, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Belgian mastermind behind the deadly November 2015 Paris attacks, is known to have spent time fighting along the ranks of IS in Syria in 2013 (RT France, 2015). Lister (2015, p. 2) states that there were many other alleged plots linked to returned foreign fighters that have been detected and foiled in several western countries.

A debate is currently ongoing in much of the world, especially in Europe, on how to balance between personal freedom and national security. In her speech to parliament few days after Charlie Hebdo attack, German chancellor Angela Merkel called for enforcing additional security measures against terrorism, stating that her government must "without a doubt constantly honor the balance between security and freedom" (Somaskanda, 2015). Yet, Burkhard Lischka, the home affairs spokesman for Germany's Social Democrats, refused her suggestion, stating that "the last thing we need right now is a significant curtailment of freedom and civil liberties in favor of a supposedly higher level of security," he said. "Then the terrorists would have already achieved one of their goals." (Somaskanda, 2015). The EU has recently adopted new counter-terrorism measures, including adopting EU-wide rules for the collection of airline passenger data and enhancing external border checks. However, these counter-terrorism measures have often been slowed down by national sovereignty concerns, law enforcement barriers to sharing sensitive information, and personal freedom protection[4]. Certain governments have gone further and removed the citizenship of dual nationals fighting abroad in order to prevent their return (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016).

Interestingly, it seems that many around the world are willing to forgo some freedoms in return of better security measurements against terrorism. A survey released in December 2015 showed that 56% of Americans were more concerned that the government's anti-terror policies have not gone far enough to fight terrorism, compared with 28% who were concerned with losing personal freedom and civil liberties in the process (Pew Research Center, 2015). Another survey conducted by the market research

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[4] For example, addressing the legal challenge posed by IS returnees in the Netherlands, Van Ginkel and Minks (2018) argue that terrorism provisions in the Dutch Criminal Code are unable to handle such threat. The authors note that the criminal charge of "inciting to terrorism" (article 131, paragraph 2 Dutch Criminal Code) has no clear legal threshold or boundaries. It could thus be argued that this behavior is considered "within the realm of the rights to freedom of speech or religion" (2018, p. 67). For more on this, see Boutin (2016).

group infratest dimap in 2015 revealed that 91 percent of Germans support the enforcement of additional security measures, ranging from increased police presence to identity checks (2015).

This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on Islamic State fighter's flow from and back to their home countries. Regarding foreign fighters flow to IS territory, we expect the prevalence of democratic institutions in a certain society to reduce the number of foreign fighters joining IS in Syria and Iraq. Democratic societies provide multiple channels to express dissent without the threat of government retaliation and allow for change through non-violent means. Hence, groups in democratic societies are more likely to pursue nonviolent alternatives to further their interest rather than the costly affiliation with terrorist groups such as IS. Thus, we expect democracies to have less outflow of foreign fighters than repressive ones.

On the contrary, we argue that personal freedom may increase the amount of outflow of Islamic radicals to join IS in Syria and Iraq. Free societies, as compared to repressive ones, allow more freedom of speech, association and movement, becoming less able to prevent terrorist group mobilization and as a result are more likely to experience radicalism and Islamic State recruitment. Regarding the return of foreign fighters back to their home countries, using a rational choice model, we argue that the ability to return home after joining IS is a major factor that is considered by IS fighters. Democracy and respect for personal freedom in a certain society may decrease the cost of returning for members of extremist groups, as fighters are less likely to return to countries where they could face harsher legal consequences for their terrorist activities. In that sense, for a given radical person, the cost of returning from IS will be less in societies that respect democratic institutions and personal freedom than in autocratic societies with low level of personal freedom. Building on this argument, we thus hypothesize that the prevalence of both democracy and personal freedom in a certain society have a positive effect on the number of radical fighters returning from IS territory.

Our results show that, while democracy has no effect on IS recruitment outflow, countries which a higher degree of personal freedom significantly have a larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million populations) to join IS. The different findings on democracy and personal freedom suggest that while the level of democracy per se does not affect joining IS, the prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic institution does. As for the inflow (returnees), we initially find that democracy has a

significant positive effect on the number of IS returnees. However, democracy loses significance when personal freedom is added, showing a positive and statistically significant effect. This suggests that the initially identified positive effect of democracy on IS returnees is primarily driven by prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic institution. Our results support the hypothesis that countries with a higher degree of personal freedom send and receive more IS fighters.

Our study contributes to different strands of literature. First, we are first to empirically explore the link between democratic institutions and IS foreign fighters. While democracy and other related institutions (e.g. political freedom) have been controlled for in the few empirical studies on IS fighters (Abdel Jelil, Bhatia, Brockmeyer, Do, & Joubert, 2018; Benmelech & Klor, 2018; Gouda & Marktanner, 2018a; 2018b; Pokalova, 2018), no study has so far focused mainly on the (dis)incentives created by democratic environment on radical Islamists aiming to join IS. Second, a multitude of studies has dealt with the challenges posed by IS returnees to their home countries (Barrett, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017; Reed & Pohl, 2017; Renard & Coolsaet, 2018; United Nations Security Council, 2018). Yet, no empirical study has so far empirically investigated the factors affecting IS foreign members to return back home. Our study is the first to explore the determinants of IS returnees inflow to their home countries. Finally, we contribute to the empirical literature on terrorism in general as we explore how respect for personal freedom affects the in- and outflow of IS fighters. Literature on determinants of terrorism has dealt with a multitude of rights and freedoms including political freedom (Abadie, 2006; Brooks, 2009), political rights (Gaibulloev, Piazza, & Sandler, 2017; Li, 2005), rule of law (Choi, 2010), freedom of press (Melnick & Eldor, 2010; Rohner & Frey, 2007) and human rights (Piazza, 2017; Walsh & Piazza, 2010). Personal freedom, as demonstrated by freedom of association, of movement, and of religion has hardly been studied with relation to terrorism. Our study is the first to focus on the link between personal freedom and IS fighters, or terrorism in general.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews the relevant literature; we describe our theory and hypotheses in Section three; Section four presents our data and empirical strategy. A discussion of our empirical findings follows in Section five; and we conclude with a summary of our main results and outlook in Section six.

2. Literature review

No study has so far been conducted on the effect of personal freedom on the flow of Islamic state fighters. Democracy, as well as some of its sub-component institutions including political rights and civil liberties, have been controlled for in the few empirical studies examining the phenomenon of Islamic foreign fighters. Interestingly, the results are found to be contradicting. While Benmelech and Klor (2018) find some evidence that most IS foreign fighters come from recognized democracies with very high political rights, Thomas (2015) and Abdel Jelil et al. (2018) show that civil liberties and political rights are negatively associated with IS foreign enrollment. This finding resonates with Krueger (2006) that shows that countries with a large Muslim population, close proximity to Baghdad, and low level of civil liberties or political rights are likely to have more of their citizens join the Iraqi insurgency. Other studies find no relation between democratic institutions and IS recruitment (Gouda & Marktanner, 2018b). Pokalova (2018) shows that more IS foreign fighters come from countries with higher Human Development Index levels, unemployment rates, and percentages of youth. However, the author finds political freedom to be insignificant. Using the Polity score as a proxy for both democracy and political rights, Gouda and Marktanner (2018a) find no significant relationship between this variable and the numbers of foreign fighters joining IS.

According to Choi (2010), existing studies on the relationship between democracy and terrorism are generally categorized into three strains: (1) the first examines the overall impact of democracy on terrorism; (2) the second investigates the effect of different sub-features of democratic institutions on terrorism; and (3) the third focuses on the relationship between democracy and specific subtypes of terrorist events. Regarding the first strain, two theoretical schools of thought study the relationship between democracy and terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Eyerman, 1998). The "strategic" school argues that democratic governments seeking to protect civil liberties and political freedoms are limited in their ability to monitor and detain terrorism suspects, are prohibited from making extensive police sweeps to catch terrorists, and must afford alleged terrorists access to a lawyer and a public trial (Dreher, Gassebner, & Siemers, 2010; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Gearty, 2007). Using Freedom House rankings, Gause (2005) shows that ''free'' countries experience approximately twice as many terrorist attacks as countries that are ''not free''. The implication is that democratic states are generally more vulnerable to terrorist attacks (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2008a; Schmid, 1992).

The "political access" school argues that democracy alleviate grievances by insuring better electoral access and peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms. Democratic societies protecting personal freedom, as well as political and human rights, have non-violent alternatives to express dissent and resolve conflicts. As conflicts are solved by using non-violent means, there is a lower probability of resorting to violence or terrorism to solve conflicts. Consequently, terrorism results when these legal means of political expression are inhibited (Brooks, 2009; Ross, 1993; Schwarzmantel, 2010; Windsor, 2003). The logic that terrorism emerges from autocratic regimes has made its way into policy circles, especially in USA. ''[T]he best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance kindled in free societies'', George W. Bush (2005) remarked during a speech to the National Defense University.

Generally speaking, most empirical studies dealing with the first group find a positive relationship between democracy and terrorism in support of the strategic school (Campos & Gassebner, 2013; Chenoweth, 2010; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Li & Schaub, 2004; Piazza, 2007). A small number of articles show a negative relationship, supportive of the political access school (Crenshaw, 1981; Eyerman, 1998; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010; Li, 2005; Shahrouri, 2010). Other articles find no significant relationship (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008b; Savun & Phillips, 2009). A handful of articles uncover an inverted U-shaped relationship in which some intermediate regime type in between autocracy and democracy displayed the greatest amount of terrorism (Abadie, 2006; Chenoweth, 2013; Gaibulloev, Piazza, & Sandler, 2017). Consequently, it could be argued that findings in the empirical literature about the relationship between democracy in general and terrorism are mixed and generally inconclusive.

The second strand of literature points to the possibility that democracy might concurrently attract and discourage acts of terrorism (Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; Schmid, 1992). By arguing that some features of democratic institutions encourage terrorist activities while others discourage them, this second strand of literature proposes a mixed effect of democratic sub-features on terrorist incidents. Thus, many studies examine the effect of individual features of democratic regimes on terrorism by avoiding aggregating all the distinctive features of democracy into a single composite index. For example, Melnick and Eldor (2010) and Rohner and Frey (2007) find that freedom of the press, allows terrorists and their supporters to publicize their grievances. Choi (2010) shows that maintaining a sound rule of law notably reduces the likelihood of any type of terrorist events. Testas (2004) finds that

political repression is a positive determinant of terrorism in Muslim-majority countries. Li (2005) disaggregates democracy into two basic characteristics— democratic participation and constraints on the executive, arguing that these characteristics should affect terrorism in different ways. Citizens in a democracy are less likely to resort to terrorism since their grievances could be amended through legitimate political channels. Nevertheless, more constraints on the executive branch increase terrorism by limiting the government's ability to take effective and aggressive counter-terrorism measures.

While the first and second strands of literature study the effect of democracy on the aggregate number of terrorist events, the third strand delves into specific subtypes of terrorist attacks. For example, considerable literature exists on the relationship between democratic institutions and suicide terrorism (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Santifort-Jordan & Sandler, 2014; Pape, 2003; Wade & Reiter, 2007). Others study the relationship between democratic institutions and assassinations (Mandala, 2017). Ivanova and Sandier (2006) shows that democratic regimes are more likely to be vulnerable to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism due to easy access to the necessary knowledge for obtaining such weaponry through institutions of higher learning.

Our study is linked to all three aforementioned strands of literature. More specifically, we intersect with the first group when investigating the effect of democracy in general on IS fighters flow to and from their home countries. We are further linked to the second strand, as we examine the effect of a specific democratic institution, namely personal freedom, on flows of IS fighters. Finally, we are linked to the third strand since we examine a specific type of terrorism, as demonstrated by joining the IS terrorist organization.

3. Theoretical arguments

According to Schneider et al. (2015), rational-choice models are the preferred theory of most economic analyses of terrorism (e.g. (Caplan, 2006; Enders & Sandler, 2002; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, & Klemmensen, 2006). Based on the rational model of crime (Becker, 1968), terrorists are considered rational actors who try to maximize their utility, given the benefits, and (opportunity) costs of terrorism, where the utility from terrorism is usually associated with achieving certain political and/or economic goals (Enders & Sandler, 2002). Caplan (2006) provides a comprehensive analysis of terrorist rationality and finds that terrorists act more or less rational, so that "the rational choice model of

terrorism is not that far from the truth [and] the Beckerian analysis of crime remains useful" (Caplan, 2006, p. 101). With this in mind, we apply rational choice model on two types of decisions taken by an Islamist radical; first, the outflow of IS potential fighters to join IS in Syria. Second, the inflow (return) of fighters back to their home countries after they had joined IS ranks.

3.1. Outflow of IS fighters

Applying this concept to the outflow of IS fighters, a radical foreigner would join IS in Syria only when his benefit exceeds the cost of this action. Benefits of becoming a member in a terrorist organization are numerous, including achieving a sense of community, status, providing a means of vengeance for past humiliations (Schaefer, 2007), as well as martyrdom (Abrahms, 2008). Costs include foregone utility from opportunities associated with non-terrorist activity, such as wages or similar material rewards linked to participation in the ordinary economic life in home country. Moreover, a potential IS terrorist's calculus of costs includes physical costs coming from apprehension possibility and penalty for terrorist offenses (Schneider, Brück, & Meierrieks, 2015).

While there is no consensus on the relationship between democracy and terrorism in general, we argue that democracy reduces incentives of an Islamist to join IS abroad. In nondemocratic societies, the lack of opportunities for political participation prompts political grievances and dissatisfaction among dissenters, motivating incentives to join terrorism organizations or to become a terrorist (Crenshaw, 1981). In contrast, democracies allows dissenters to express their policy preferences and seek amends (Ross 1993). Different social groups, including Islamic political movements, are able to participate in the political process to further their interest through peaceful means, such as voting and forming political parties (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001). Since democracy lowers the cost of achieving political goals through legal means, Islamists seeking to make Islam play a bigger role in public life should find membership of an illegal terrorist organization less attractive.

Li (2005) points out to another transmission channel between democracy and membership of terrorist organization. As wide democratic participation increases political efficacy of citizens, transnational terrorist groups will be less successful in recruiting new members in democracies than in autocracies. In other words, when citizens have grievances against certain foreign events, greater political participation in democracies allows them to exert significant influence on their own government so

that they can seek favorable policy changes more successfully. Thus, joining a terrorist group such as Islamic State and attacking foreign targets become less appealing options. It should also be noted that the Syrian civil war started as pro-democracy protests in March 2011. Protesters inspired by the Arab Spring demanded the resignation of president Bashar al-Assad. As a result, we expect that individuals coming from autocracies to be more sympathetic to Syrian rebels. Such individuals might then be more likely to become foreign fighters

Hypothesis 1: Democracy has a negative effect on the flow of IS fighters to Syria.

On the contrary, we argue that personal freedom has a positive effect on IS recruitment. Liberal-democratic freedoms of movement and association, coupled with legal restraints on security forces and due-process safeguards, make it easier for potential terrorists to establish and join terrorist groups. Crenshaw (1981) notes, "[T]errorists view the context as permissive, making terrorism a viable option" (1981, p. 383). In his testimony shortly after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. attorney-general John Ashcroft testified to a Senate committee that "terrorists exploit our openness [and] our judicial process". Ashcroft added that "terrorists are told how to use America's freedom as a weapon against us" (2001). Consequently, we argue that free societies, as compared to repressive ones, decrease a potential terrorist's cost of joining Islamic State in Syria, thus allowing greater IS recruitment and mobilization.

Hypothesis 2: Personal freedom has a positive effect on the flow of IS fighters to Syria.

3.2. Inflow of IS fighters

The inflow of battle-hardened returnees after IS demise in late 2017 have "sparked public anxiety and sown fears in many countries that open societies have become the favored targets for both homegrown and foreign terrorists" (Magen, 2018, p. 111). A number of counter terrorism measures which aim to thwart IS returnees threat have been planned and enforced in many countries. These measures, including travel bans, impose significant restrictions on many fundamental freedoms and rights, including freedom of movement, freedom of association, the right to liberty, and the right to private and family life (Boutin, 2016, p. 21). Nevertheless, democracies, as compared to autocracies, allow more freedom of movement and association and, in general, uphold rule of law. Even with the introduction of new counter-terrorism measures against IS returnees in specific, democratic states may be less able to prevent terrorist group mobilization and as a result more likely to experience more IS returnees.

Using a rational choice model, we argue that the ability to return home after joining IS is a major factor that is considered by IS fighters. Democracy and respect for personal freedom in a certain society may decrease the cost of returning for members of extremist groups, as fighters are less likely to return to countries where they could face harsher legal consequences for their terrorist activities. In that sense, for a given radical person, the cost of returning from IS will be less in societies that respect democratic institutions and personal freedom than in autocratic societies with low level of personal freedom. Building on this argument, we thus hypothesize that the prevalence of both democracy and personal freedom in a certain society have a positive effect on the number of radical fighters returning from IS territory.

Hypothesis 3: Democracy has a positive effect on the inflow of IS fighters back home.

Hypothesis 4: Personal freedom has a positive effect on the inflow of IS fighters back home.

4. Estimation Strategy and Data

We empirically investigate the effect of democracy and personal freedom on (1) the amount of FFs joining IS (outflow of IS fighters), and (2) percentage share of returnees (IS fighter's that return back to their home countries). Our models can be summarized as follows

$$FFperMill_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democracy_i + \beta_2 PersonalFreedomIndex_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$RetperFF_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democracy_i + \beta_2 PersonalFreedomIndex_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where i = country i

"Foreign fighters per million population" (FFperMill) in country i is our dependent variable in Model (1) while "returnees as a percentage of foreign fighters" (RetperFF) is our dependent variable in Model (2). We use a Tobit model as both dependent variables left-censored. This is the case in Model (1) as some countries have sent zero FFs and in Model (2) as some FFs sending countries have received zero returnees, as described above. However, both dependent variables are continuous for the non-zero observations.[5] X is a vector of control variables, which are described later. Regional dummies are only included when they are jointly significant.

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[5] We run our regression using the open source software model "gretl," whose accompanying manual also provides a technical description of the Tobit estimator.

We developed a cross-country dataset to test our hypotheses. Our dependent variables on Foreign Fighters (FFs) outflows to IS territory and FF returnees (FF that return back to their home countries) are collected from two reports published the Soufan group (The Soufan Group, 2015; Barrett, 2017). Table A.1 in Appendix A describes our data and sources. Figure 1 shows the absolute number of FFs per region and Figure 2 shows the distribution of FFs by region. The majority of foreign fighters (more than 90%) come from three regions, namely Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (40%), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) (29%), and Western Europe (WE) (22%).[6]

While one half of the 68 FF sending countries have not received any returnees, the other half shows a strong variation in terms of the percentage share of returned FFs.[7] Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows the percentage share of returnees per FFs. Finland, Algeria and the United Kingdom received the highest share of returnees (50-54%), followed by Denmark (46%), Turkey (40%), Sweden (35%), Norway (33%), Germany (33%) and Austria (30%).

Figure 1: Number of Foreign Fighters per Region

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017).

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[6] Foreign Fighters come from 68 different countries, including 12 (out of 21) MENA countries, 17 (out of 29) EECA countries, 16 (out of 29) WE countries in WE, 9 (out of 37) EAP countries, 5 (out of 8) SA countries, 2 (out of 3) NAM countries, 4 (out of 48) SSA countries, and 3 (out of 42) LAC countries.

[7] We dropped Afghanistan from our sample because as there is an error in recordings of FFs in- and outflows.

Figure 2: Regional distribution of Foreign Fighters

Pie chart showing regional distribution of Foreign Fighters:
- MENA 40.1%
- EECA 28.9%
- WE 22.0%
- EAP 3.8%
- SA 3.0%
- NAM 0.9%
- SSA 0.7%
- LAC 0.5%

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017).

As a measure of a country's level of democracy, we use the polity IV project's polity score, developed by Marshall et al. (2016) and published by the Center for Systemic Peace. Polity score ranges from – 10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). MENA countries show the lowest polity group average of -2.66, while NAM and WE countries show the highest averages of 10 and 9.7, respectively. To capture the level of personal freedom, we use the 2017 Personal Freedom Index (PFI) by Ian Vásquez and Tanja Porcnik (2017), published by Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. The PFI is part of the Human Freedom Index and accounts for rule of law, security and safety and specific personal freedoms such as freedoms of movement, religion, association, expression, information, identity and relationships[8]. It includes data on 159 countries and takes a continuous score that ranges from 0 to 10, where countries with more personal freedom receive higher ratings (Vasquez & Porcnik, 2017). Again, WE and NAM show the highest average PFI score of 9.0, whereas the MENA shows the lowest average PFI score of 5.5 for the period 2011-2015.

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[8] While other freedom indicators use a positive liberty approach, the Human Freedom Index applies an approach of negative liberty. According to Berlin (1969), positive liberty refers to the possession of the capacity to act upon one's free will. On the contrary, negative liberty is defined as freedom from external restraint on one's actions. Vásquez and Porcnik (2017) argue that the concept of positive freedom suffers from subjectivity, since it is "more likely to mean different things to different people and thus cannot be measured independent of the goals that conflicting ideologies or groups might identify with freedom" (2017, p. 12). Consequently, positive freedom may has considerably different meanings for an evangelist, a Marxist, an Islamist, and so on. On the other hand, negative liberty "comes in only one flavor— the lack of constraint imposed on the individual" (McMahon, 2012, p. 10). As part of Human Freedom Index, PFI is thus an attempt to measure the degree to which the negative freedoms of individuals are respected in the countries observed. These freedoms include freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and so on.

In our cross-country analysis, we control for a country's GDP per capita to rule out that estimated effects of democracy or personal freedom are only reflecting the effect of a country's level of economic advancement. We alternatively use the Human Development Index for robustness checks. Our findings are not changed. Moreover, we account for the Muslim share of population and the geographic proximity by controlling for the distance between a country's capital and Damascus. To account for further potential sources of grievances, we control for (i) income inequality using the Gini coefficient, (ii) religious and language fractionalization which could fuel radicalization, (iii) (the logarithm of) youth unemployment, and (iv) an Interaction term of Muslim population share and youth unemployment, following Gouda and Marktanner (2018a). Regional dummies control for non-observable regional fixed effects.

Table A.1 describes the variables that we use for our empirical analysis, their abbreviations and sources. It also indicates if any variable has been transformed by taking the logarithm to improve distributional characteristics. Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for our variables based on our full estimation sample of 141 countries, which is restricted by the availability of independent variables. In the descriptive statistics, we additionally distinguish between FF sending countries and countries that did not send any FFs. A first look at the descriptive statistics shows that FF sending countries on average have a higher level of democracy, personal freedom and GDP per capita. However, as there are a number of differences between the two groups of countries and as the number of FF strongly vary among FF sending countries, a more rigorous empirical analysis is needed to analyze the effects of democracy and personal freedom on IS fighters' decisions. Moreover, the unsurprising strong correlation between our two main variables of interest, polity and PFI (r=0.7), as well as their strong correlation with GDP per capita, as shown in Table A.3, requires special attention to collinearity concern while conducting our empirical analysis.

5. Results
5.1. Outflow of IS fighters

Table 1 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications of Model (1) on IS fighters' outflow. Due to the high correlation between democracy and personal freedom, we start in column (I) by estimating the impact of democracy (but not PFI) on FFperMill, while controlling for GDP per capita (lny), income inequality (Gini), youth unemployment (lnyuer), the Muslim population

percentage share (Muslim) distance to Damascus (Dist), and regional dummies. The regional dummies are jointly significant in all model specifications of Table 1. Democracy does not show any significant effect on the fraction of a country's population that join IS. In column (II), we include our personal freedom variable PFI, which shows a positive and significant effect on FFperMill, whereas the effect of democracy remains insignificant. In column (III), we further control for religious and language fractionalization and in column (IV), we additionally account for the interaction term of the Muslim population share with youth unemployment, following results of Gouda and Marktanner (2018).

Table 1: Tobit Regression Results: Determinants of IS fighters' outflow (Dependent Variable = Foreign Fighters per million population)

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
PFI		21.93	25.18	26.71
		(12.53)*	(12.26)**	(12.18)**
Polity	0.78	-0.51	-1.16	-0.82
	(1.66)	(2.13)	(2.07)	(2.07)
lny	6.60	-1.41	-9.88	-7.43
	(8.18)	(8.81)	(8.94)	(8.84)
Gini	0.14	0.39	0.18	0.42
	(1.23)	(1.3)	(1.26)	(1.25)
lnyuer	5.20	3.18	1.85	-15.74
	(12.00)	(11.92)	(11.5)	(12.92)
Muslim	0.83	1.03	1.22	0.38
	(0.28)***	(0.31)***	(0.3)***	(0.38)
Dist	-0.0004	0.002	0.003	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Relig			105.37	62.98
			(35.19)***	(36.57)*
Lang			-53	-78.69
			(29.9)*	(30.88)**
lnMUSxYUER				17.48
				(5.6)***
EAP	-20.07	3.48	-5.88	3.71
	(39.44)	(40.34)	(38.27)	(37.76)
EECA	-4.00	0.28	-25.63	7.26
	(26.25)	(25.43)	(26.22)	(28.28)
LAC	-56.62	-24.59	-25.05	-8.18
	(47.12)	(49.61)	(46.89)	(46.38)
SA	-34.18	-6.5	-10.14	4.66
	(42.59)	(44.7)	(42.77)	(42.72)
SSA	-106.17	-90.45	-107.73	-86.27
	(43.70)**	(43.91)**	(44.68)**	(44.18)*
MENA	21.35	60.26	58.57	71.21
	(33.65)	(36.02)*	(34.19)*	(33.91)**
const	-96.76	-194.03	-140.06	-186.28
	(95.26)	(116.96)*	(111.13)	(113.44)
N	141	134	130	130
Left-censored	86	81	77	77
Log-likelihood	-333.5	-318.19	-312.08	-306.48

Standard errors in parentheses, *=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1%.

While democracy remains insignificant across all model specifications, PFI shows a positive and statistically significant effect on FFperMill across all model specifications. The significance level of the PFI coefficient increases from 10% in column (I) to 5% when allowing for more controls in columns (II) and (III). Our results show that countries which a higher degree of personal freedom significantly had a larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS. The different findings on democracy and personal freedom suggest that while the level of democracy per se does not affect joining IS, the prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic institution does.

Regarding the magnitude of the effect of personal freedom on FFperMill, the marginal effect of PFI on FFperMill needs to be computed.[9] Based on the regression results in column (IV), we calculate the marginal effect of PFI on FFperMill as

$$\frac{\partial FFperMill}{\partial PFI} = 6.14$$

Accordingly, a one-point increase in PFI increases the number of foreign fighters per million population by, on average, 6.14 persons per million population.

As to the control variables, the Muslim population share in a country shows an unsurprising positive and statistically significant effect on the fraction of population joining IS. While the effect on youth unemployment is individually insignificant, the interaction term of the Muslim population share with youth unemployment is positive and significant at the 1% level, supporting earlier findings by Gouda and Marktanner (2018). Furthermore, religious fractionalization has a positive and statistically significant effect supporting the argument that religious fractionalization might fuel religious radicalization. On the contrary, language fractionalization does not fuel Islamic radicalization. In fact, the variable shows a negative and significant effect on FFpermill which might be the result of higher cultural openness. Regional dummies capture unobservable regional characteristics and show a positive and significant effect of the MENA dummy and a negative and significant effect of the SSA dummy (as compared to the reference group of North America and Western Europe). The GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient do not show any significant effect on FFpermill.

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[9] This is because regression coefficients in Tobit models cannot be readily interpreted as marginal effects as in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models. Tobit regression coefficients capture a combination of an independent variable's marginal effect on whether a certain observation is non-zero and its marginal effect on non-zero observations.

The strong correlation of PFI with Polity (0.7) and with GDP per capita (0.7), as shown in Table A.3, suggests that further analysis is needed to rule out collinearity concerns. In an additional analysis, we re-estimate Model 1, while replacing PFI by the unexplained residual from an OLS regression of PFI against GDP per capita (lny) and polity score.[10] This orthogonalizing procedure of PFI presents a tougher test on the hypothesis regarding the effect of PFI on FFperMill as it attributes to each lny and polity their shared covariance with PFI and thus biases against finding a significant effect of personal freedom. Yet, even after orthogonalizing PFI, it remains positive and significant across all model specifications. Results are reported in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix.

Despite showing now a positive sign in most specifications, the effect of democracy and GDP per capita remain insignificant across all specifications. The results confirm the robustness of our results on the positive effect of personal freedom. Even when unexplained by the level of democracy or GDP per capita, PFI remains positive, statistically significant and of similar magnitude as in Table 1. The new calculated marginal effect based of orthogonalized PFI (based on column III of Table A.5) equals 5.9 and is only minimally smaller than the corresponding calculated marginal effect based on unorthogonalized PFI from column IV of Table 1. This implies that the identified positive impact of a country's level of personal freedom on the fraction of its population that joins IS is not driven by the country's level of democracy or economic advancement.

5.2. Inflow of IS fighters

Table 2 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications of Model 2, which investigates the effect of personal freedom and democracy on the percentage share of IS foreign fighters that return to their home countries (RETperFF). The analysis is naturally limited to 68 FF sending countries only as explained in section four. The sample size is further limited by available data on our main variables of interest and control variables. Table A.6 provides descriptive statistics based on our used estimation sample.

In column (I), we investigate the effect of democracy on the percentage of FF returnees, while controlling for GDP per capita (lny), the Muslim population share (Muslim) and distance to Damascus (Dist). We do not include regional dummies as, differently from Model 1, they are jointly insignificant

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[10] This has the purpose of obtaining a measure of PFI that is independent of GDP per capita and polity. See Li (2005) for a similar approach. Using a Tobit regression instead of OLS shows similar results.

across all specifications of Model 2. Democracy shows a positive and statistically significant effect on RetperFF in column (I), however, the effect of democracy becomes insignificant when PFI is included in column (II). On the contrary, PFI shows a positive and statistically significant effect at the 5% level.. This suggests that the initially identified positive effect of democracy on FF returnees in column (I) is primarily driven by prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic institution. Our results support our hypothesis that countries which a higher degree of personal freedom significantly receive a larger percentage of IS fighters back.

Table 2: Tobit Regression Results: Determinants of IS fighters' inflows (returned IS fighters as percentage share of fighters)

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)
PFI		8.64 (4.31)**	7.76 (4.69)*	8.42 (4.37)*	8.02 (3.39)**	8.51 (3.59)**	9.02 (3.45)***
Polity	2.58 (0.67)***	1.24 (0.86)	1.09 (0.82)	1.22 (0.87)	0.81 0.67)	0.7 (0.62)	0.69 (0.67)
lny	10.53 (2.79)***	6.51 (3.17)**	8.27 (3.52)**	6.57 (3.25)**	5.02 (2.48)**	6.18 (2.69)**	5.22 (2.49)**
Muslim	0.41 (0.13)***	0.47 (0.13)***	0.45 (0.14)***	0.48 (0.16)***	0.38 (0.10)***	0.38 (0.11)***	0.25 (0.13)*
Dist	-0.0020 (0.0009)**	-0.0018 (0.0009)**	- 0.0012 (0.0010)	0.0018 (0.0010)*	-0.0013 (0.0007)**	- 0.0011 (0.0008)	-0.0009 (0.0007)
Gini			-0.48 (0.47)			-0.21 (0.35)	
Relig			-11.5 (13.29)			-9.1 (10.04)	
Lang			16.3 (12.83)			17.83 (9.73)*	
Lnyuer				1.77 (5.53)			-3.80 (4.51)
lnMUSxYUER				-0.47 (3.00)			-3.91 (2.71)
Outlier					37.1 (8.61)***	36.7 (7.8)***	42.72 (9.33)***
const	-113.37 (31.48)***	-135.35 (34.26)***	-129.71 (44.72)***	-137.11 (40.54)***	-113.49 (26.95)***	-122.91 (34.22)***	-129.08 (32.34)***
N	59	57	53	57	57	53	57
Left-censored	28	26	23	26	26	23	26
Log-likelihood	-150.47	-147.93	-138.78	-147.88	-140.56	-130.33	-139.45

Standard errors in parentheses, *=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1%.

As to the control variables, results show that countries which a higher GDP per capita, with a higher Muslim population share and with a shorter distance from Damascus significantly receive more

returnees. Moreover, our main results remain robust when allowing for more control variables. In column (II) we further control for the social heterogeneity factors religious fractionalization, language fractionalization and income inequality (Gini), which further reduces our sample size from 57 to 53 countries. None of these three variables, however, is significant. Neither are jointly significant ($F(3,44)$ = 1.17), which is why we drop these three variables again in column (IV). In column (IV), we control for labor market variables by adding youth unemployment (lnyuer) and its interaction term with Muslim population share with youth unemployment, which do not show any significant effect.

A look at a Box and Whisker plot (Figure B.2 in Appendix B) confirms at least the presence of three outliers for our dependent variable RetperFF. The three outlier countries are Algeria, Finland, and the United Kingdom. In columns (V) to (VII), we replicate the strategy of columns (II) to (IV) while including an outlier dummy. The effect of personal freedom remains positive and statistically significant while the effect of democracy remains insignificant in all model specifications.

Calculating the marginal effect of PFI on RetperFF - based on our preferred parsimonious model specification in column (II) - yields

$$\frac{\partial RetperFF}{\P\partial PFI} = 5.05$$

This implies that a one-point increase in PFI increases the percentage share of returnees by, on average, 5.1 percentage points.

In a further step, we investigate whether the results are possibly driven by strong collinearity. Similar to our procedure for Model 1, we re-estimate Model 2, while replacing PFI by the unexplained residual from an OLS regression of PFI against GDP per capita (lny) and polity score. Results are reported in Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A. Only when fully attributing the shared covariance between PFI and polity to the polity variable, the effect of the latter becomes positive and statistically significant (Table A.8). Yet, despite the tougher test on the effect of PFI after its orthogonolization, the effect of PFI residuals (unexplained by both polity and lny) remains statistically significant and positive. Its marginal effect on RetperFF is only marginally smaller than our computations based on Table 2 (4.8 compared to 5.1 above). To sum up, our additional analysis confirms that a higher level of personal freedom increases the number of returnees among IS fighters and that any positive effect of democracy on the number of returnees is primarily driven by personal freedom as a democratic institution.

6. Conclusion and Policy Implications

This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on the outflow of IS foreign fighters to Syria, as well as their flow back home as returnees. Our cross-country regressions show that countries which a higher level of personal freedom (i) had a significantly larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS, and (ii) receive a significantly larger percentage share of returning foreign fighter. Such relationship may represent a true dilemma for many governments around the world, especially in democracies. On the one hand democratic governments are bound by constitution and democratic values to protect civil liberties. On the other hand, many governments around the world are faced with the phenomenon of Islamic State recruitment and returnees. Karl Popper expressed this dilemma, "the Paradox of Tolerance" several decades ago writing, "unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them." (Popper, 1966, p. 265). We believe that governments facing foreign fighters' phenomenon should devote resources to understand the radical Islamists scene, learning to dialogue with its members and to not undermine the intolerant minority among them.

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Table A.1: Data and Sources

Variables	Description	Source
Dependent Variables		
FFperMill	Foreign fighters per million population	Soufan (2015, p. 7) and Soufan (Barrett, 2017, p. 12). Soufan (2015) reports official and non-official counts, and Soufan (2017) revised 2015 counts. Some numbers are reported as ranges (for example, "100-200"), others with a "~", "+", "<" or ">" sign (for example, "~90," "104+," <10," or ">165"). Whenever available, we took Soufan (2017) data. If Soufan (2017) data was unavailable, we took available official count data from Soufan (2015). If neither Soufan (2017) nor official counts in Soufan (2015) data was available, we took the unofficial count in Soufan (2015). For numbers given with ranges, we took the midpoint of the range. Data provided with "~", "+", "<" or ">"signs were reported by ignoring the signs. Population data are 2011-2015 averages from the World Bank Development Indicator Database (WDI).
RetperFF	Returned Foreign Fighters per Foreign Fighters (%)	Calculated from Soufan (2017)
Main independent variables		
PFI	Personal Freedom Index. 2011-2015 average.	Cato Institute (Vasquez & Porcnik, 2017)
Polity	Polity2 score. A value which ranges between negative ten and positive ten. Values between negative ten and negative six indicate autocracies, values between negative five and positive five anocracies, and values between positive six and positive ten democracies.	Center for Systemic Peace
Control Variables		
lny	GDP per capita (constant $2010), 2011-2015 averages, logarithm	World Bank Development Indicators Database
Dist	Distance of Expat Jihadist's Home Country's Capital to Damascus	Mayer, Thierry, and Soledad Zignago. "Notes on CEPII's distances measures: The GeoDist database" (2011). dist_cepii.dta dataset
Gini	Index of income inequality. Latest available observation.	United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database (WIID).
lnyuer	Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate), 2011-2015 average, logarithm	World Bank Development Indicators Database

Table A.1: Data and Sources (Contd.)

Muslim	Muslim population percentage share. 2010 observation.	Association of Religion Data Archives (www.thearda.com/)
lnMUSxYUER	Interaction term of In(Muslim × yuer +1), logarithm	
Lang	Language Fractionalization Index,	Alesina et al (2003)
Relig	Religious Fractionalization Index	Alesina et al (2003)
Regional Dummies	EAP=East Asia and the Pacific, EECA=Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA=Middle East and North Africa, NAM= North America SA=South Asia, SSA=Sub Saharan Africa WE= Western Europe	The World Bank. We further split Europe and Central Asia into WE and EECA.
For robustness checks		
HDI	Human Development Index. 2011-2015 average.	United Nations Development Programme

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of full estimation sample of Model 1

Variable	Sample	n	Mean	Median	Min	Max	S.D.	IQR
FFperMill	All	134	13.47	0.00	0.00	350.16	44.76	3.75
	FFCtry=1	53	34.05	7.08	0.01	350.16	66.40	29.82
	FFCtry=0	81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Polity	All	134	5.14	7.00	-10.00	10.00	5.25	6.20
	FFCtry=1	53	5.93	8.40	-10.00	10.00	5.53	5.90
	FFCtry=0	81	4.62	6.00	-9.00	10.00	5.02	7.60
PFI	All	134	7.17	7.13	3.57	9.48	1.33	2.15
	FFCtry=1	53	7.58	7.39	4.67	9.48	1.43	2.89
	FFCtry=0	81	6.90	6.77	3.57	9.22	1.19	1.62
y	All	134	13,692	4,531	233	105,800	19,991	12,822
	FFCtry=1	53	24,396	11,490	409	89,068	24,010	42,412
	FFCtry=0	81	6,689	2,985	233	105,800	12,810	7,937
Gini	All	134	39.37	38.36	23.70	60.80	8.78	13.72
	FFCtry=1	53	35.87	35.20	23.90	60.80	8.04	10.99
	FFCtry=0	81	41.66	42.18	23.70	60.79	8.54	14.10
yuer	All	134	17.26	14.87	0.39	53.36	12.21	14.95
	FFCtry=1	53	18.53	15.26	0.39	52.28	12.38	14.53
	FFCtry=0	81	16.42	11.71	0.52	53.36	12.11	15.53
Muslim	All	134	22.27	4.00	0.00	99.00	33.30	28.00
	FFCtry=1	53	28.70	6.00	0.00	99.00	36.91	58.00
	FFCtry=0	81	18.06	2.00	0.00	99.00	30.22	20.00
Dist	All	134	5,780.50	4,820.50	85.94	16,286.00	3,778.70	4,839.90
	FFCtry=1	53	4,628.30	3,395.30	85.94	16,286.00	3,643.80	4,826.40
	FFCtry=0	81	6,534.40	5,740.70	328.73	15,900.00	3,695.00	6,143.70
Lang	All	~~134~~130	0.40	0.39	0.00	0.92	0.29	0.53
	FFCtry=1	53	0.32	0.25	0.01	0.87	0.25	0.43
	FFCtry=0	77~~81~~	0.46	0.46	0.00	0.92	0.30	0.59
Relig	All	134	0.44	0.46	0.00	0.86	0.24	0.43
	FFCtry=1	53	0.43	0.45	0.00	0.86	0.25	0.43
	FFCtry=0	81	0.44	0.50	0.00	0.82	0.23	0.44
HDI	All	134	0.70	0.73	0.34	0.95	0.16	0.27
	FFCtry=1	53	0.79	0.79	0.51	0.95	0.12	0.18
	FFCtry=0	81	0.63	0.63	0.34	0.89	0.15	0.25
lnMUSxYUER	All	134	3.68	3.91	0.00	8.21	2.63	5.80
	FFCtry=1	53	4.77	4.63	0.00	8.21	2.11	3.07
	FFCtry=0	81	2.97	3.02	0.00	7.90	2.70	5.21

Notes: (i) Descriptive statistics are based on our full estimation sample (which corresponds to the regressions in Table 1). (ii) FFCtry=1 are FF sending countries. FFCtry=0 are countries that did not send any FF.

Table A.3: Correlation Matrix (based on full estimation sample of Model 1)

	lnFFperMill	RetperFF100	Polity	PFI	lny	Gini	lnyuer	Muslim	Dist	Lang	Relig	lnMUSxYUER	HDI
lnFFperMill	1												
RetperFF100	0.58	1											
Polity	0.02	0.21	1										
PFI	0.15	0.36	0.70	1									
lny	0.33	0.45	0.42	0.70	1								
Gini	-0.39	-0.35	-0.17	-0.33	-0.29	1							
lnyuer	0.19	0.14	0.28	0.25	0.33	0.03	1						
Muslim	0.34	0.09	-0.39	-0.53	-0.34	-0.14	-0.03	1					
Dist	-0.39	-0.25	0.14	0.04	-0.03	0.51	-0.17	-0.35	1				
Lang	-0.23	-0.19	-0.27	-0.35	-0.46	0.18	-0.26	0.21	-0.15	1			
Relig	-0.09	-0.14	0.05	0.08	-0.04	0.21	0.03	-0.33	0.06	0.27	1		
lnMUSxYUER	0.44	0.18	-0.28	-0.34	-0.19	-0.19	0.17	0.74	-0.51	0.34	-0.04	1	
HDI	0.39	0.44	0.43	0.7	0.95	-0.37	0.35	-0.34	-0.04	-0.53	-0.07	-0.2	1

Table A.4: Orthogonalization of PFI in Equation (1) with regard to lny and polity

(Dependent variable: PFI)

	coefficient	std. error	t-ratio	p-value	
const	3.071	0.367	8.379	<0.001	***
lny	0.392	0.0435	9.025	<0.001	***
Polity	0.143	0.012	12.43	<0.001	***

N=144

R2=0.70

*** significant at <1%.

Table A.5 Tobit Regression Results using Residuals from Orthogonalization in Table A.4 (PFIres)

	(I)	(II)	(III)
PFIres	21.93 (12.513)*	25.18 (12.263)**	26.72 (12.185)**
Polity	2.63 (1.9)	2.44 (1.82)	3.01 (1.83)
lny	7.19 (8.19)	-0.01 (8.00)	3.05 (8.08)
Gini	0.39 (1.3)	0.18 (1.26)	0.42 (1.25)
lnyuer	3.18 (11.92)	1.85 (11.5)	-15.74 (12.92)
Muslim	1.03 (0.31)***	1.22 (0.3)***	0.38 (0.38)
Dist	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Relig		105.37 (35.19)***	62.98 (36.57)*
Lang		-53 (29.9)*	-78.69 (30.88)**
lnMUSxYUER			17.48 (5.6)***
EAP	3.48 (40.34)	-5.88 (38.27)	3.71 (37.76)
EECA	0.28 (25.43)	-25.63 (26.22)	7.26 (28.28)
LAC	-24.59 (49.61)	-25.05 (46.89)	-8.18 (46.38)
SA	-6.5 (44.7)	-10.14 (42.77)	4.66 (42.72)
SSA	-90.45 (43.91)**	-107.73 (44.68)**	-86.27 (44.18)*
MENA	60.26 (36.02)*	58.57 (34.19)*	71.21 (33.91)**
const	-126.68 (98.78)	-62.72 (93.97)	-104.23 (95.96)
N	134	130	130
Left-censored	81	77	77
Log-likelihood	-318.19	-312.08	-306.48

Standard errors in parentheses, *=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1%.

Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics of Estimation Sample of Model 2 (Dependent variable=RetperFF)

Variable	n	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	IQ range
FFperMill	59	36.84	8.60	0.01	350.16	45.62
RetperFF	59	12.02	5.43	0.00	53.75	23.30
Polity	59	4.61	8.00	-10.00	10.00	10.00
PFI	57	7.40	7.35	4.32	9.48	2.93
y	59	23,810	11,490	409	89,068	41,144
Gini	55	35.77	35.20	23.90	60.80	11.07
yuer	59	18.70	15.56	0.39	52.28	15.58
Muslim	59	33.34	10.00	0.00	99.00	74.00
Dist	59	4,359	3,226	86	16,286	4,623
Lang	59	0.32	0.25	0.01	0.87	0.41
Relig	59	0.42	0.42	0.00	0.86	0.44
lnMUSxYUER	59	4.98	4.90	0.00	8.21	3.41
HDI	59	0.79	0.79	0.51	0.95	0.20

Table A.7: Orthogonalization of PFI in Equation (2) with regard to lny and polity

	coefficient	std. error	t-ratio	p-value	
const	2.17	0.70	3.12	0.00	***
lny	0.47	0.07	6.24	0.00	***
Polity	0.17	0.02	9.99	0.00	***
N	59				
R2	0.75				

*** significant at <1%.

Table A.8 Tobit Regression Results using Residuals from Orthogonalization in Table A.7 (PFIres)

	(I)	(II)	(III)
const	-116.62(31.12)***	-112.88(40.23)***	-118.86(37.77)***
PFIres	8.64(4.31)**	7.76(4.69)*	8.42(4.37)*
Polity	2.69(0.7)***	2.39(0.79)***	2.62(0.72)***
lny	10.54(2.71)***	11.9(3.05)***	10.5(2.82)***
Muslim	0.47(0.13)***	0.45(0.14)***	0.48(0.16)***
Dist	-0.0018(0.0009)**	-0.0012(0.001)	-0.0018(0.001)*
Relig		-11.5(13.29)	
Lang		16.3(12.83)	
Gini		-0.48(0.47)	
lnyuer			1.77(5.53)
lnMUSxYUER			-0.47(3.00)
n	57	53	57
Left-censored	26	23	26
Log-Likelihood	-147.93	-138.78	-147.88

Appendix B: Figures

Figure B.1: Returned foreign fighters per foreign fighters (%) by country (with at least one returned fighter)

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017).

Note: Only FF sending countries that received at least one returned fighter are included in the list. The following 34 foreign fighter sending countries did not receive any returned fighters back according to Soufan (2017): Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.

Figure B.2: Box and Whisker Plot (Sample: IS Foreign Fighter Sending Countries only)

RetperFF100