Who bears the burden of Universal Health Coverage?

An assessment of alternative financing policies using an overlapping-generations general equilibrium model

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Abstract

In their quest for Universal Health Coverage (UHC), many developing countries use alternative financing strategies including general revenues and budget transfers to expand health coverage to the whole population. Unless a policy adjustment is undertaken, future generations may foot the bill of the UHC. This raises the important policy questions of who bears the burden of the UHC and whether the UHC-fiscal stance is sustainable in the long-term. These two questions are addressed using an overlapping generations model within a general equilibrium framework (OLG-CGE) applied to Palestine. We assessed and compare alternative ways of financing the deficit-ridden UHC (viz. deferred-debt-finance, current and phased-manner finance) and their implications on intergenerational inequalities. Results show that in the absence of any policy adjustment, the implementation of UHC would explode the fiscal deficit and debt-GDP ratio. This indicates that the UHC-fiscal stance is rather unsustainable in the long-term, thus, calling for a policy adjustment to service the UHC-debt. Among the policies we examined, a current rather, than deferred, debt-finance through consumption taxation emerged to be preferred over other policies in terms of its implications for both fiscal sustainability and intergenerational inequality.

Keywords: Universal Health Coverage; Overlapping Generations; Computable General Equilibrium; Fiscal Sustainability; Intergenerational Inequality.

JEL codes: C15, C68, D64, H51, I13, I15

1. Introduction

The core function of the "*Universal Health Coverage*" (UHC) is to spread the financial burden of healthcare across the broader population (*risk-subsidies*) (Dye, Reeder, and Terry 2013). In their quest to reach UHC, many developing countries use alternative financing strategies including general revenues and budget transfers to expand health coverage to the whole population (Kutzin, Yip, and Cashin 2016; Lagomarsino et al. 2012). Unless, a fiscal consolidation policy is undertaken in the short-run, the parallel expansion of the coverage of both the population and healthcare costs may result in a sizeable budgetary deficit (Awawda and Abu-Zaineh 2017; Somanathan et al. 2014; Gottret and Schieber 2006). Shifting the UHC-debt burden to future generations, with at the same time subsidizing the healthcare of the current aged-population, may exacerbate *intergenerational* inequality. This raises the important policy questions on w*hether the UHC-fiscal stance is sustainable* and to what extent *the UHC-oriented reforms would result in intergenerational transfer* (i.e., *who bears the burden of the UHC*).

This paper addresses the above questions using an overlapping-generations in a computable general equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model (Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987). This allows to measure intergenerational inequalities in a given country while accounting for its particular demographic changes as well as the general equilibrium effect on its agents' decisions over time. The OLG-CGE model is calibrated and applied to Palestine, using nationally representative micro and macro data. Microsimulation is used to assess and compare alternative ways of financing the UHC-debt, *viz. deferred-debt-finance, current and phased-manner finance*, and their implications for fiscal sustainability and intergenerational inequalities.

The impact of fiscal consolidation policies on intergenerational inequality has been widely addressed in literature, both theoretically and empirically. As in the domain of public deficit and debt, the magnitude of the *intergenerational transfers* will depend, among other things, on the respective size of the generations (i.e. the relative shares of the young *vs.* the elderly) (Tovar and Urdinola 2014), the contracted level of the debt (i.e., level of reimbursement rates), and of course the correlation between individuals' age and health status (Grundy 2005; Auerbach, Gokhale, and

Kotlikoff 1994), which are expected to be substantially different in developing countries compared to developed countries.

Empirical evidence shows that intergenerational inequality would depend on the type and timing of fiscal consolidation. For instance, Tokuoka (2012) shows that, in general, a delayed policy adjustment would increase the burden for young future generations while reducing that for current generations. Balassone et al. (2008) assessed the impact of different budgetary strategies on fiscal sustainability and intergenerational inequality in the Europe while taking into account the increasing cost of population aging. Accordingly, an early tax adjustment may be preferred over phased-manner to avoid transferring the cost of aging population to future generations. Creedy and Guest (2008) analyzed the implications of alternative tax regimes applying to private pensions for intergenerational inequality and social welfare. Their results suggested that tax exemption of all private pension benefits may increase intergenerational inequality among the older and younger workers.

Intergenerational inequality has been assessed by either comparing consumption or utility across generations (e.g., Andersen and Gestsson 2016; Creedy and Guest 2008; Guest 2008) or by using a summary measure of income inequality such as Gini index (e.g., Van Kippersluis et al. (2009)). Unlike the common practice in the literature, this paper proposes two simple measures to assess UHC-ridden intergenerational inequality at each time period, *viz.* the *relative incremental burden* (*RIB*) of UHC across generations (young *vs.* elderly and current *vs.* future). These are defined as the ratios of the net incremental burden borne by each generation in the post- and pre-policy adjustment.

Methods and results reported in this paper can be useful to help inform policy design on the appropriate path towards implementing an equitable and sustainable UHC. The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) presents the method, simulation scenarios and the datasets used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 discusses the main findings and concludes.

2. Methods and Material

We apply an OLG model within a CGE framework (OLG-CGE) to investigate the potential impact of UHC-reform on intergenerational inequalities in Palestine. The OLG-CGE allows taking into account the mutual influence between macro units (aggregate economic implications) and

micro units (distributional effects) (Wickens 2012). It also allows taking into account heterogeneity across individuals by disaggregating them according to a variant of characteristics which include, amongst other, age, gender, employment status and socioeconomic status. The model is first calibrated at the initial steady-state (baseline equilibrium of 2015). We, then, apply different policy scenarios with the aim of assessing the impact of UHC on intra- and inter-generational inequalities and to find the optimal financing-mix that guarantee an equitable and sustainable UHC. The macroeconomic impact of UHC-reform is, first, examined within the SDGs timespan (2015-2030). The UHC impact on intergenerational inequality is then examined within a wider timespan following 2030.

2.1 Model Setup

2.1.1 Time and demographics

The OLG model involves three generations: (i) children and adolescents aging from 0 to 19 years (4 cohorts), (ii) young aging from 20 to 59 years (8 cohorts), and (iii) the elderly ageing 60 years and above (5 cohorts). The available demographic data are five-years interval data, where there are J age cohorts such that $j = 1,2,...,17$, i.e., $j =\{(0-4), (5-9),…(80-84)\}$ years. We assume no child labor, children and adolescents totally depend on their parents, thus, play no role in the model. The solely influence this generation has on the model is through the value of their aggregate consumption expenditures, which varies according to their relative size in the demographic profile. We further assume that young supply labor and elderly are retired.

We consider a discrete time model with a 5-year period. At each period, a new cohort is born while elderly are allowed to live until the age of 84 and in-between groups become one period older. Each agent lives with uncertainty that is captured by the survival rate. The probability that an agent belonging to the jth age group survives to the next period (i.e., enter the $(j + 1)^{th}$ age group) is q_{j+1}, where $q_{>17}$ is zero. The size of each age group at time t is denoted by $N_{j,t}$ where the total size of population is $N_t = \sum_{j=1}^{17} N_{j,t}$.

We employ the cohort-component method to project the population (Smith, Tayman, and Swanson 2006). This involves replicating the population at each time period according to the following Markov process. The size of each age group $j = 2,...,17$ is calculated as $N_{j,t} = q_{j,t}N_{j-1,t-1}$, where $q_{j,t}$ is the corresponding survival rate. Since investment in health is expected to improve the survival rate (Halliday et al. 2017), we assume, following Olshansky, Carnes, and Désesquelles (2001), that the survival rate is *partially endogenous* to the expansion in health

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insurance coverage – but not to each of its financing strategies. Accordingly, $q_{j,t} = q_{j,t-1}(1 + p_j)$ where p_j is extrapolated based on historical census of the population (PCBS 2017). The survival rate of the first period is calibrated on the baseline data such that $q_{j,1} = (\eta_{j,t_0}/\eta_{j-1,t_0-1})(1 + n_{t_0})$, where η_{j,t_0} is the share of group j in the population and n_{t_0} is the population growth rate.

The size of the new born cohort is $N_{1,t} = f \sum_{j=4}^{10} N_j^{female}$, where f is the fertility rate – assumed to be constant – calculated as the size of the new born cohort divided by the size of women in the reproductive age and N_j^{female} is the female size in age group j. The population growth rate at period t is thus measured as $n_t = (N_t/N_{t-1}) - 1$. Figure 1 shows the actual decomposition of the Palestinian population living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the baseline 2015 and the projections for each generation for the next 45 years. As shown, the share of the elderly, which is relatively small at the baseline would almost double by 2060 while the share of young would remain almost the same[1].

Figure 1: Projections of the Palestinain population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2015-2060

2.1.2 Agents' Preferences

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[1] Other possible scenarios of the projections of the population is to assume a constant growth rate which equals to the growth rate at the baseline. In our case, the growth rate of 2015 is 15.5% which is greater than the growth rate obtained under the scenario of constant fertility. A constant growth rate of 15.5% results in a larger share of children over years.

The young maximize their intertemporal discounted utility along their life cycle. At each time period t, each individual in group j decides over a set of choices, $c_{j,t}^y = \{l_{j,t}, x_{j,t}, h_{j,t}, s_{j+1,t+1}\}$, where l_t is labor supply, x_t is consumption expenditure of non-health goods and services, h_t is healthcare expenditure, and s_{t+1} is savings. They earn labor income and pay income and consumption taxes, τ_t^l and τ_t^c, in addition to health insurance premiums, π_t, and pension contributions, τ_t^{Ph}. The young program is thus,

$$\max_{c_{j,t}^y} \sum_{t=t_0, j=j_0}^{T} \beta^t \, q_{j,t} U(l_{j,t}, x_{j,t}, h_{j,t}) \tag{1}$$

subject to the resource constraint

$$\left(1 - \tau_t^l - \tau_t^{Ph} - (1 - \psi_t)\pi_t\right) w_t l_{j,t} \Gamma(5 \leq j \leq 12) + (1 + r)s_{j,t} + (1$$
$$- \pi_t) IP_{j,t} \Gamma(13 \leq j \leq 17) = (1 + \tau_t^c)(x_{j,t} + x_t^c \Gamma(5 \leq j \leq 12))$$
$$+ \left(1 - (1 - \kappa_t)(1 - o_t)\right)(h_{j,t} + h_t^c \Gamma(5 \leq j \leq 12)) + s_{j+1,t+1} \tag{2}$$

where $\beta \in [0,1]$ is the time preference rate, $\psi_t \in [0,1]$ is the fraction of the health insurance premium paid at the level of employer, κ_t is the copayment rate, o_t is the out-of-pocket payments rate, w_t is the wage rate, r is the interest rate, x_t^c and h_t^c are the children expenditure on consumption of non-health goods and services and healthcare, respectively. The index function, $\Gamma(\cdot)$, takes one if the condition between parentheses is satisfied, zero otherwise. The specification chosen for the utility function is,

$$U(l_{j,t}, x_{j,t}, h_{j,t}) = \log\left(x_{j,t}^{1-\alpha_j} h_{j,t}^{\alpha_j} - \mu_j l_{j,t}^2\right) \tag{3}$$

where α_j is the expenditure shares of h for group, j. Individuals gain disutility from labor, where μ_j is a labor distribution parameter measuring the relative weight of labor in the utility function[2]. Unlike the common practice where μ is assumed constant (e.g., Bassetto 2008; Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987), μ_j is calibrated here on the baseline data and is allowed to vary across age-gender groups.

Once elderly, individuals receive retirement pension income, $IP_{j,t} = \left(\tau_t^{Ph} + \tau_t^{PG}\right)(T^l/T^r)\,\overline{w_t l_{12,t}}$, where $\overline{w_t l_{12,t}}$ is the corresponding average labor income of the 12th age group, τ_t^{PG} is the

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[2] Large values of the labor distribution parameter mean less labor a household will supply, zero values mean no time is allocated to leisure where labor supply is fixed.

government contribution rate to the pension system, T^l is the number of working years and T^r is the number of years an individual is expected to live in retirement.

The first order conditions of young for the life cycle $[j_0, 12]$ are,

$$x_{j+1,t+1} - \left(\frac{x_{j+1,t+1}}{h_{j+1,t+1}}\right)^{\alpha_{j+1}} \mu_{j+1} l_{j+1,t+1}^2$$

$$= \beta(1+r)\frac{(1+\tau_t^c)}{(1+\tau_{t+1}^c)}\frac{q_{j+1,t+1}}{q_{j,t}}\frac{(1-\alpha_{j+1})}{(1-\alpha_j)}\left(x_{j,t} - \left(\frac{x_{j,t}}{h_{j,t}}\right)^{\alpha_j}\mu_j l_{j,t}^2\right) \tag{4}$$

$$\frac{(1-\alpha_j)}{\alpha_j}\frac{h_{j,t}}{x_{j,t}} = \frac{(1+\tau_t^c)}{\left(1-(1-o_t)(1-\kappa_t)\right)} \tag{5}$$

$$l_{j,t} = \frac{\left(1-\tau_t^l-\tau_t^{Ph}-(1-\psi_t)\pi_t\right)}{(1+\tau_t^c)}\frac{(1-\alpha_j)}{2\mu_j}\left(\frac{h_{j,t}}{x_{j,t}}\right)^{\alpha_j}w_t \tag{6}$$

Elderly decide over the set $c_{j,t}^o = \{x_{j,t}, h_{j,t}, s_{j+1,t+1}\}$. Accordingly, their optimization problem is,

$$\max_{c_{j,t}^o} \sum_{t=13}^{17} \beta^t q_{j,t} U(x_{j,t}, h_{j,t}) \tag{7}$$

subject to the resource constraint

$$(1+r)s_{j,t} + (1-\pi_t)IP_{j,t} = (1+\tau_t^c)x_{j,t} + (1-(1-\kappa_t)(1-o_t))h_{j,t} + s_{j+1,t+1} \tag{8}$$

where $U(x_{j,t}, h_{j,t}) = U(x_{j,t}) + U(h_{j,t})$. The specification of each utility function is, $U(x_{j,t}) = \log x_{j,t}$ and $U(h_{j,t}) = ah_{j,t} + bh_{j,t}^2$ such that $a > 0, b < 0$.[3] The first order conditions of elderly for life cycle of $[j_0 > 12, 17]$ are,

$$x_{j+1,t+1} = \beta(1+r)\frac{q_{j+1,t+1}}{q_{j,t}}\frac{(1+\tau_t^c)}{(1+\tau_{t+1}^c)}x_{j,t} \tag{9}$$

$$2bh_{j,t} + a = \frac{\left(1-(1-o_t)(1-\kappa_t)\right)}{(1+\tau_t^c)x_{j,t}} \tag{10}$$

2.1.3 Technology

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[3] We choose this functional formula of the utility function of health expenditure based on two facts: (1) utility is a nonlinear function of health status (with $a > 0$ and $b < 0$) (Khwaja 2010) and (2) health expenditure and health status are positively related. Accordingly, since there is no available information on health status, we assume that utility is a function of health expenditure and that the marginal utility of health expenditure is not always positive which is captured by the negative sign of the coefficient of the quadratic term.

The production sector is represented by a single competitive firm that produces a single good with constant return to scale according the following Cobb-Douglas function

$$Q_t = T_t K_t^{\gamma} L_t^{1-\gamma} \tag{11}$$

The firm optimization problem is given by,

$$\max_{K,L} \ T_t K_t^{\gamma} L_t^{1-\gamma} - [1 + r_t + \tau_t^k + \delta_t]K_t - \frac{(1 + \psi_t \pi_t)w_t L_t}{(1 + tr_t^L)} \tag{12}$$

where τ_t^k is tax on capital, K, L is total demand for labor, δ_t is the depreciation rate, tr_t^L is transaction cost of labor, Q_t is aggregate output, T_t is technology parameter and γ is the shares of K of total output. The set of inputs' prices $\{w_t, r_t\}$ of the competitive equilibrium at period t is,

$$\{w_t = [(1 - \gamma)(1 + tr_t^L)T_t k_t^{\gamma}]/(1 + \psi_t \pi_t), \qquad r_t = \gamma T_t k_t^{\gamma - 1} - (1 + \tau_t^k + \delta_t)\} \tag{13}$$

We assume that the interest rate on capital equals to the international interest rate. We can, therefore, rewrite the marginal product of capital to obtain the capital-to-labor ratio at each time period, $k_t = \left((1 + r + \tau_t^k + \delta_t)/\gamma T_t\right)^{1/(1-\gamma)}$, where $k_t = K_t/L_t$, and capital accumulation is given by: $K_{t+1} = I_t + (1 - \delta_t)K_t$, I_t is aggregate investment.

2.1.4 Government

The government is assumed to have no optimization program. At each time period, the government raises revenues, R_t, from proportional taxes on consumption, income, capital and labor, transfers from abroad, Tr_t^G, and revenues of the health insurance account, R_t^{HI}. Thus,

$$R_t = \tau_t^c C_t + \tau_t^k K_t + (\tau_t^l + \tau_t^{Ph})w_t L_t^S + OT_t + Tr_t^G + R_t^{HI} \tag{14}$$

where C_t is the aggregate consumption and L_t^S is the aggregate labor supply. Government revenues from the insurance account are given by,

$$R_t^{HI} = \sum_{j=5}^{17} N_{j,t}\big[\pi_t w_t \bar{l}_{j,t}\Gamma(5 \leq j \leq 12) + \pi_t IP_{j,t}\Gamma(13 \leq j \leq 17)$$
$$+ (1 - (1 - \kappa_t)(1 - o_t))\bar{h}_{j,t}\big] + \big(1 - (1 - \kappa_t)(1 - o_t)\big)H_t^c \tag{15}$$

where $\bar{h}_{j,t}$ is the average health expenditure of the jth age group and $H_t^c = \sum_{j=1}^{4} N_{j,t}\bar{h}_t^c$.

Thus, R_t^{HI} is total contributions paid as premiums from income in addition to the share of health expenditure paid as copayment and out-of-pocket payments. The government is assumed to

be the single provider of healthcare. It spends on public consumption, C_t^G, public investment, I_t^G, the UHC program, G_t^{HI} and the pension system, P_t. Total government expenditure G is thus given by,

$$G_t = C_t^G + I_t^G + G_t^{HI} + P_t \tag{16}$$

where

$$G_t^{HI} = \sum_{j=1}^{17} N_{j,t}(1 - \kappa_t)(1 - o_t)\bar{h}_{j,t} \tag{17}$$

and

$$P_t = \sum_{j=13}^{17} N_{j,t} IP_{j,t} \tag{18}$$

Lastly, the government debt (B) is given as,

$$B_t - (1 + r)B_{t-1} = G_t - R_t \tag{19}$$

2.1.5 Foreign trade

For completeness, we add the foreign sector account assuming no particular objective function to be optimized where the balance of payment is given by,

$$M_t - E_t = TR_t + (1 + r)S_t^{ROW} \tag{20}$$

where M_t is the total value of imports, E_t is the total value of exports, TR_t is the transfers from the rest of the world and S_t^{ROW} is foreign savings.

2.1.6 Aggregation: OLG within CGE

Total weighted consumption, C_t, at each time period is given by

$$C_t = \sum_{j=1}^{17} \sum_{k=1}^{3} Pr_k N_{j,t}(\bar{x}_{j,t} + (1 - (1 - \kappa_t)(1 - o_t))\bar{h}_{j,t}) \tag{21}$$

where $\bar{x}_{j,t}$ is the average consumption expenditure on non-health goods and services of the jth age group and Pr_k is the share of the population according to their health insurance status (insured, uninsured, newly insured). Total labor supply, L_t^S, is given by

$$L_t^S = \sum_{j=5}^{12} (1 - u_t)N_{j,t}\bar{l}_{j,t} \tag{22}$$

where u_t is the unemployment rate and $\bar{l}_{j,t}$ is the average labor supplied by group j. Total private savings, S_t^h, is given by

$$S_t^h = \sum_{j=5}^{17} N_{j,t} \bar{s}_{j,t} \tag{23}$$

where $\bar{s}_{j,t}$ is the average saving for group j.

2.1.7 Competitive equilibrium and market clearing Equations

The competitive equilibrium at each time period is the set of endogenous variables $\{x_t, h_t, l_t, \ S_{t+1}, K_t, L_t\}$ and labor price $\{w_t\}$ given the foreign budget constraint while allowing for change in government budget deficit. The equilibrium requires that : (*i*) aggregate demand for labor equals total labor supply, $L_t = L_t^S$; (*ii*) the value of capital equals total savings, $K_t = S_t^h + I_t^G - (B_t - (1 + r)B_{t-1}) + S_t^{ROW}$, and (*iii*) aggregate supply equals aggregate demand, $GDP_t = C_t + G_t + I_t^F + (E_t - M_t)$.

2.2 Calibration and settings

The main source of micro-data is the 2011 Palestinian Expenditures and Consumption Survey (PECS-2011) (PCBS 2012a). Macro data are obtained from the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM-2011) (PCBS 2012b). To solve the model, the values of parameters are either calibrated on the benchmark data, or equal their real values or set to similar values as in the literature. The values of all parameters are summarized in Table 1. Demographic parameters for the baseline are calculated using demographic surveys of the period 2010-2015. Survival rate, q_j, is calculated using life tables. It is decreasing with age with value equals to 65% for elderly of the last age group. As per the parameters capturing agents' preferences, β is set at 0.985 following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), while α_j and μ_j are calibrated in the model and both follow U-shaped pattern with values higher for female for α_j and values higher for male for μ_j. All technology parameters are calibrated to replicate the baseline data, where T equals to 3.34, γ equals 25% reflecting a labor-intensive economy and δ equals to 43%.

The parameters of the current GHI are calculated based on health reports and surveys published by the Ministry of Health. We assume that the ratio of private health expenditures to public health expenditures is one-to-one, thus the individuals pay 50% of the total cost of healthcare. We decompose this into out-of-pocket payments (o_t =40%) and copayment (κ_t =15%). As for contribution rate, in reality, each employed individual pays 5% of her income in addition to an amount equals to $1.5 for each additional dependent. For the purpose of our

analysis, we assume that, on average, young pay a contribution rate equals to 6%, while elderly pay a lower rate which equals to 5%. Finally, the baseline coverage rate of the population is 65%. All policy parameters are set to their statutory values in 2015, with input taxes of $\tau_t^l = 5\%$ and $\tau_t^k = 6.7\%$, and consumption tax, τ_t^c, of 16%. The pension system contributions are, $\tau_t^{Ph} = 7\%$ and $\tau_t^{PG} = 9\%$. Lastly, the value of the unemployment rate equals 25.9%.

Table 1 : Values of the Model parameters in the baseline	
Parameter	Values
Demographics	
Population growth rate, n_{t_0}	0.156
Fertility rate, f	0.603
Survival rates, q_j	$\in [0.65, 0.99]$
Proportional change in the survival rate, p_j	$\in [7 \times 10^{-5}, 4 \times 10^{-3}]$
Population shares, η_{j,t_0}	$\in [0.005, 0.15]$
Households preferences	
Discount rate, β	0.985
Shares of healthcare expenditure, α_j	[0.028, 0.135]
Labor distribution parameter, μ_j	[0.00023, 0.0007]
Utility of elderly, a	$\in [8 \times 10^{-4}, 1.1 \times 10^{-3}]$
Utility of elderly, b	-1×10^{-6}
Technology	
Total factor productivity, T	3.34
Interest rate, r	0.2%
The capital share, γ	0.25
Depreciation rate, δ	0.43
UHC-oriented reform parameters	
Premium rate, π	5% and 6%
Copayment share, κ	15%
Out-of-pocket payment share, o	40%
Fraction of premium rate at the firm level, ψ	30%
Population coverage rate, Pr_k	65%
Policy parameters	
Income tax, τ_t^l	5%
Tax on capital, τ_t^k	6.7%
Tax on consumption, τ_t^c	16%
Employee contribution to the pension system, τ_t^{Ph}	0.07
Government contribution to the pension system, τ_t^{PG}	0.09
Unemployment rate, u_t	25.9%

We use Labor Force Survey (LFS-2015) to calculate wages, w_{t_0}. The LFS-2015 provides data on weekly work hours and monthly income by gender and economic activity. First, for each gender-

economic activity group, s, we calculate average daily working hours as average weekly working hours divided by the number of working days per week which are assumed to be equal to 6. Then we calculate wage per hour at the baseline, w_{s,t_0}, in USD as the average daily wage divided by average daily working hours. Using PECS, l_{j_0,t_0} is, then, calculated as the total income divided by w_{s,t_0}. Thus, l_{j_0,t_0} is the number of annual work hours. Then, the price of labor, w_{t_0}, is calculated as the weighted average of w_{s,t_0} over all young. As regards simulation scenarios, we assume that the aggregate wage, w_t, of the single firm is adjusted following changes in individuals behavior. Accordingly, we assume, for simplicity, that the wage of each group, $w_{s,t}$ is determined as $w_{s,t} = (1 + \%\Delta w_t)w_{s,t_0}$.

2.3 Measuring fiscal sustainability and intergenerational inequality

A variety of indicators has been proposed in the literature to assess debt (fiscal) sustainability, with little consensus on the optimal debt–GDP threshold (Pescatori, Sandri, and Simon 2014). For instance, the IMF and the World Bank suggest a framework where a country's debt-ceiling is determined by its institutional capacity (IMF and World Bank 2012). Accordingly, the debt-ceiling can reach 49%, 62% and 75% of GDP for low-capacity, medium-capacity and high-capacity countries, respectively. Adedeji et al. (2016) suggests a more *prudent debt-level* that is at least 10% lower than the *debt-ceiling* for low-income countries to account for adverse shocks and allow for some fiscal space. Given the limited institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority and the high exposure to adverse shocks; e.g., political instability (IMF 2016), we assess fiscal sustainability under alternate policy options using the *prudent debt-level* of 39% of GDP. Thus, if UHC generates additional debt, *the optimal policy adjustment* in terms of fiscal sustainability would be the one that generates adequate revenue to close the potential gap between the UHC-ridden debt and the *prudent debt-level* at a specific period of time.

However, such *policy adjustment* might not be deemed desirable in terms of intergenerational inequality. We therefore measure inequality across generations as the difference in the net UHC-burden borne by each generation at each time period. The net burden for generation g, b_t^g, is calculated for young and elderly, respectively, as,

$$b_t^y = [(h_t + h_t^c) + \pi_t w_t l_t + \Delta_t^y] - [(1 - \kappa_t)(1 - o_t)(h_t + h_t^c)] \tag{24}$$

$$b_t^O = [h_t + \pi_t I_t^P + \Delta_t^o] - [(1 - \kappa_t)(1 - o_t)h_t] \tag{25}$$

where Δ represents the amount of the UHC-costs transferred to future generations. We, then, define a simple measure – the *relative incremental burden* (RIB) of UHC – which compares the net burden borne by each generation (young *vs.* elderly and current *vs.* future) in the post- and pre-policy adjustment. The RIB is calculated for young-elderly and current-future generations, respectively, as

$$RIB_t^{yo} = \frac{b_{t,post}^y - b_{t,post}^o}{b_{t,pre}^y - b_{t,pre}^o} \quad \text{and} \quad RIB_t^{fc} = \frac{b_{t,post}^{y,f} - b_{t,post}^{y,c}}{b_{t,pre}^{y,f} - b_{t,pre}^{y,c}} \tag{26}$$

Thus, a value greater than one indicates that the policy under consideration tends to widen the gap in the UHC-financing burden across generations. While the two measures can be used to assess intergenerational inequalities, an important distinction is worth highlighting. The RIB_t^{yo} measures integrational transfers between young and elderly at a certain point of time, which may be considered as a measure of cross-subsidy stance of UHC. The RIB_t^{fc} captures the intergenerational transfers from current to future generations. A high value of RIB_t^{fc} means that the future young bear the bulk of the policy adjustment burden.

2.4 Simulation scenarios

Ensuring a fair UHC shall be considered in the context of fiscal sustainability. We therefore assess the impact of UHC on *intergenerational inequality* under alternative policy options that seek to restore fiscal sustainability within a specific timespan. The analysis involves two phases. The first is the "*UHC-implementation phase*" (2015-2020) during which the breadth and width of coverage are simultaneously expanded (from 65% to full coverage of population and from 50% to 70% of the total healthcare costs[4], respectively). Results from this microsimulation scenario are referred to as "S_1: *benchmark scenario*". The second phase is the "*post-UHC-implementation*", which spans over the first six periods following the *UHC-implementation* (2020-2045). During this *phase*, the following policy options are considered and compared to S_1. These include: (1) rising income taxes, first, in a proportional (S_2), and then, in a progressive manner (S_3); (2) rising insurance premiums, first, in a proportional (S_4), and then, a progressive manner (S_5), and (3) rising consumption tax (S_6). We then consider an *early policy adjustment* that involves evaluating the

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[4] In our model, the expansion of width is captured by a fall in the direct out-of-pocket payments share, o_t, from 40% to 17.65%.

effect of (1) both taxation and premiums policies in *a phased-manner* starting from the *UHC-implementation phase* (S_7 and S_8, respectively) and (2) a flat-rate increase in consumption taxes (S_9).

3.   Results: Impact of UHC on fiscal sustainability and intergenerational inequality

Results on the potential impact of UHC-reform on intergenerational inequalities are examined in the context of fiscal sustainability (Table 2).

As shown in Table 2, in the absence of any policy adjustment, the implementation of UHC (a parallel expansion of UHC breadth and width, *scenario S_1*) would have a sizeable impact on fiscal deficit (an increase by 134.4% and 37.3% in period 1 and period 7, respectively). As a result, the debt level would exceed the prudent debt-level by 13 points in period 7 (52.8% of GDP). Under such circumstances, the government may consider a policy adjustment through either debt finance (*deferred taxation*) or current taxation. We, therefore, consider first the impact of two alternative tax policies that are introduced in the *post-UHC implementation* phase (period 3) to finance the UHC-debt: a proportional increase in income tax rates from 5% to 10% (*scenario S_2*) and a progressive tax structure where tax rates increase with income quantiles as follows 6%, 8%, 10%, 11% and 12% (*scenario S_3*).[5]

As shown in Table 2, both tax policies can help close the gap between the UHC-ridden debt and the prudent debt-level in period 7 (a debt-GDP ratio of 39% and 38% under S_2 and S_3, respectively). As far as the distribution of UHC-financing burden is concerned, the net burden that is borne by the young generations is, as expected, always higher than that borne by the elderly, regardless of the policy option. As compared to S_1 (*no-policy adjustment*), the *relative incremental burden* of UHC would be five times higher under both policies ($RIB_{t=7}^{yo} = 5$). It is, therefore, interesting to assess the impact of debt-financing policies on inequalities across young generations. Results on the RIB_t^{fc} indicates that the *relative incremental burden* between future and current generation would be about seven times higher as compared to the benchmark.

The UHC-financing burden can alternatively be financed through an augmentation in insurance premiums, which are borne by the active young population. Such policy is, first,

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[5] The increase of 5% in the income tax is not arbitrary here. In fact, simulation results of different tax rates, which are not reported here for sake of space, shows that a 5% increase in tax would be adequate to restore fiscal sustainability within the timespan. The progressive income tax structure is thus chosen in a way such that additional total tax revenues equals revenues collected from the proportional tax. The same value is chosen for insurance premiums and consumption tax to allow comparison of different policies. Also of note, the choice of the timespan of 7 periods is not arbitrary as the impact of UHC on the fiscal deficit and debt starts to diminish at period 7.

examined in *scenarios* S_4, which involves a proportional increase in premiums from 6% to 11%. Then, a progressive premiums scheme (7%, 9%, 11%, 12% and 13% for income quintiles) is examined under S_5. Results, which are reported in Table 2 shows that, unlike income tax policies, an equivalent increase in insurance premiums is not adequate to restore the debt-GDP ratio to the prudent level (a debt-GDP ratio of 43%). As regards intergenerational inequality, similar trends to income tax policies are observed. However, smaller magnitudes are observed for the UHC *relative incremental burden* with the RIB^{yo} and RIB^{fc} being about four times and five times higher as compared to S_1. This indicates that future young generations would bear lower UHC-burden under premium policies as compared to income tax policies.

In scenario S_6, a flat-rate increase of 5% is applied to consumption tax. This policy would reduce the UHC-ridden debt to 42% in period 7 (3 points greater than the prudent level). Similar to tax and premium policies, the net burden that is borne by the future generations is higher than that borne by current generations ($RIB_{t=7}^{fc} = 4.3$). However, unlike scenarios S_2 to S_5 where the young bear the bulk of the burden, under scenario S_6, the UHC-debt burden is borne by both future young and elderly resulting in a $RIB_{t=7}^{yo}$ of 2.3.

The government may, alternatively, consider a *phased-manner* policy adjustment taking place in the first phase of UHC-implementation. We therefore examine in *scenarios* S_7 and S_8 the impact of a *time-varying rates* in income tax (from 6% in period 1 to 10% in periods 5 to 7) and in insurance premiums (from 7% in period 1 to 11% in periods 5 to 7). Results, which are reported in Table 2, shows that the impact of the early *phased-manner* polices are generally similar to that observed when *deferred-debt-finance* policies (S_2 to S_5) are adopted. For instance, when implemented in a *phased-manner*, income tax policy would reduce the debt-GDP ratio to 39.1% as compared to 43.5% under insurance premium policy. Similar effects can also be observed as regards intergenerational inequalities between young and elderly (with the $RIB_{t=7}^{yo}$ being five times in S_7 and four times in S_8 higher of that of the benchmark scenario). However, inequality across future and current generations would be lower under *scenarios* S_7 and S_8 as compared to *scenarios* S_2 to and S_5 ($RIB_{t=7}^{fc} = 3.0$ in S_7 and 2.8 in S_8).

		Benchmark	Deferred debt finance policy adjustment					Current/phased-manner policy adjustment		
		S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9
		UHC implementation	Proportional income tax	Progressive income tax	Proportional insurance premiums	Progressive insurance premiums	Flat-rate consumption tax	Phased-manner income tax	Phased-manner insurance premium	Flat-rate consumption tax
	Indicator									
Deficit	Period 1	134.284	…	…	…	…	…	-11.878	-7.388	-45.849
	Period 3	43.893	-45.175	-47.345	-28.329	-30.033	-37.690	-26.287	-16.299	-31.917
	Period 5	43.291	-35.704	-37.718	-22.278	-24.168	-27.739	-36.288	-22.715	-27.578
	Period 7	37.263	-32.135	-34.297	-19.920	-21.896	-24.992	-32.108	-19.914	-24.867
Debt-GDP ratio	Period 1	0.203	…	…	…	…	…	0.195	0.198	0.176
	Period 3	0.314	0.283	0.281	0.289	0.288	0.294	0.272	0.284	0.236
	Period 5	0.422	0.327	0.322	0.356	0.352	0.349	0.330	0.358	0.312
	Period 7	0.528	0.390	0.381	0.434	0.427	0.422	0.391	0.435	0.393
Young-Elderly RIB	Period 1	…	1	1	1	1	1	1.860	1.608	1.204
	Period 3	…	5.055	5.195	3.911	4.021	1.736	3.516	2.792	1.901
	Period 5	…	4.988	5.132	3.859	3.972	2.105	4.977	3.852	2.119
	Period 7	…	4.971	5.151	3.843	3.983	2.289	4.971	3.843	2.297
Future-Current RIB	Period 3	…	7.605	7.887	5.462	5.682	3.793	2.152	2.008	1.099
	Period 5	…	6.998	7.267	5.023	5.231	4.114	3.002	2.765	1.093
	Period 7	…	7.023	7.363	5.039	5.298	4.332	3.018	2.779	1.139

Table 2: Main results of deferred-finance policies and current or phased-manner policies as compared to the benchmark scenario

Notes: (1) Figures of the benchmark scenario are compared to the counterfactual scenario (no UHC) for each period.
(2) The values of the deficit of Scenarios 2-9 are compared with the benchmark scenario. Debt-GDP ratios are the expected values for each period.
(3) To calculate the future-current RIB, we choose the first period to be the reference period. Accordingly, the values of the future-current RIB are normalized to one under all scenarios.
(4) Three dots indicate that there is no change of the indicator under consideration as compared to the benchmark scenario.

Lastly, we consider the impact of a proportional increase of consumption tax by 5% undertaken in period 1 (*scenarios S_9*). Results of this scenario are reported in Table 2. Expectedly, the gap of the UHC burden between young and elderly and future and current generations would not significantly increase as compared to other scenarios (with a $RIB_{t=7}^{yo}$ of 2.3 and $RIB_{t=7}^{fc}$ of 1.1). As regards fiscal sustainability, such policy appears to reduce the debt-GDP ratio to 39.3% in period 7, which is comparable to that obtained for income tax adjustments but lower than that of premium adjustment policy.

4. Discussion

This paper has examined *ex-ante* the potential impact of UHC-reform on intergenerational inequalities in view of fiscal sustainability using the case of Palestine. The questions of *who bears the burden of the UHC* and w*hether the UHC-fiscal stance is sustainable* in the long-term has been addressed using an overlapping generations model within a general equilibrium framework (OLG-CGE). We assessed and compare alternative strategies of financing the deficit-ridden UHC (*viz. deferred-debt-finance, current finance* and *phased-manner finance*) and their implications on fiscal sustainability and intergenerational inequality. We ignored money-finance and bond-finance due to the absence of seigniorage in our context and only focused on fiscal policies (including income and consumption taxes and insurance premiums). Our results indicate that, in the absence of any policy adjustment, the implementation of UHC (even a gradual expansion in the breadth and width) would explode the fiscal deficit and debt-GDP ratio (an increase by 37% and 65%, respectively). This indicates that the *UHC-fiscal stance* is rather unsustainable in the long-term, thus, calling for a policy adjustment to service the UHC-debt.

If financed through *deferred-debt-finance policies*, the UHC-debt burden would fall on tomorrow's young generation. If, instead, the debt is financed through *current policy adjustments*, then the UHC-burden would fall on both today's and tomorrow's young generation unless the contractionary fiscal policy is released in the long-run (i.e., a temporary fiscal policy is used). The question of *which policy to choose* requires an *ex ante* evaluation of the potential impact in terms of the magnitude of the revenues generated to service the UHC-debt (the sustainability of the fiscal stance) and intergenerational inequality. Assessing the latter requires taking into account the policy impact on relative differences in net burden borne by young and elderly as well as current and future generations in the post- and pre-policy adjustment. This was captured by the *relative young-*

elderly and future-current incremental burden (RIB^{yo} and RIB^{fc}, respectively) with a value greater than one indicating higher intergenerational inequalities.

A number of interesting findings are worth discussing on light of the current debate on the sustainability of UHC reform and its implications on intergenerational transfers. Results on the first set of scenarios (*deferred-debt-finance*) show that income tax policy (whether proportional or progressive) may be preferred to other policies in terms of fiscal sustainability as it generates more revenues to service the UHC-debt, hence, restoring the debt-GDP ratio at the prudent level. Increasing insurance premiums provide an alternative way to mobilize additional resources. However, in our model, such policy appears to generate less revenues compared to other policies. This is expected as employers are assumed to bear 30% of insurance premiums, thus, higher insurance costs would negatively affect employment and, in turn, decreases revenues on labor income tax. Accordingly, intergenerational transfers (from current to future generations) – as captured by the RIB^{fc} – would be lower under such policy compared to income tax policies. As far as intergenerational transfers between young and elderly (i.e., cross-subsidy) is concerned, premium policies seem to be preferred over income tax as it is associated with a lower RIB^{yo}. Expectedly, implementing a consumption tax policy would spread the burden of the UHC-debt over the wider population of future young and elderly (a fairly smaller RIB^{yo} compared to other policies).

The *deferred-debt-finance* policies considered above imply that UHC-debt is repaid in the long-term by future generations. Such long-term borrowing involves intergenerational transfers, resulting in high values of RIB^{fc} ranging between 4 and 7. From a social equity perspective, some may therefore argue in favor of *current or phased-manner* policy adjustment rather than *deferred debt*. Examining an early implementation of the above policies in a phased-manner indicates that UHC-debt is spread over current and future generations (as reflected by lower values of the RIB^{fc} compared to those obtained under the *deferred-debt-finance* policies as shown in Table 2). By comparing *phased-manner* policies in terms of their implications for fiscal sustainability, both income taxation and premium policies would have similar impact on the debt-GDP ratio as that observed under *deferred-debt-finance*. By contrast, an early consumption taxation may be preferred over a *deferred consumption taxation* (as it decreases the debt-GDP ratio to 39% *vs.* 42%).

From an economic perspective, among the policy options we examined, the *current consumption taxation* policy emerged as the *best policy option* in terms of its impact on fiscal

sustainability and intergenerational inequalities. It has been argued that in the context of developing countries, altering *consumption tax* might be easier than income-base policies (income tax and premiums) (Tanzi and Zee 2000). This is because developing economies are characterized by a relatively high levels of informal employment (Schneider 2002), which may hinder the fiscal capacity to generate adequate resources from income-based policies (Ordóñez 2014; Tanzi and Zee 2000). However, from a policy perspective, the capacity of governments to raise additional revenues might be constrained in the short-term (Kutzin, Yip, and Cashin 2016; Gottret and Schieber 2006). Under such circumstances, *deferred-debt finance* may be preferred. A situation in which policy-makers may have to trade-off fiscal sustainability against intergenerational inequality.

Such trade-offs may be more problematic in the context of low- and middle-income countries because, as mentioned at the outset, the choice of the current and future health financing policy will also depend on the relative size of each generation. In our case, although the share of the elderly is projected to increase by 68% in 2050 as compared to 2015 (reaching 8.8% in 2050), the young generation will form the majority of the polling population (about 44% in 2050). A policy option under which the young generations footing the bill of UHC may thus not be a "*vote winner*" as the feasibility of a health financing mechanism also requires political acceptability.

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