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THE TENACITY OF THE ARAB SPRING  
IN PEOPLE'S PERCEPTIONS:  
TRENDS IN VALUES AMONG EGYPTIANS

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Working Paper No. 1179

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## Abstract

This paper assesses three perspectives on the Arab Spring: (i) a movement toward liberal democracy, (ii) Islamic awakening, and (iii) a failed movement signifying autocratic recidivism. This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing changes in the political values of Egyptians in comparison with similar changes in Tunisia and Turkey, using survey data from Egypt since 2011 and two waves of a panel survey from the three countries between 2011 and 2016. On a macro level, it suggests that the 2011 upheavals represent the ushering in of a new cultural episode in Egypt, reflecting the decline of political Islam, the rise of secular values, and little support for a strongman rule. Given that similar changes in values have also occurred in Tunisia and Turkey, this paper argues that the events of 2011 point to a major shift in values across the three countries. On the micro level, this paper explains variation in attitude toward secular politics among Egyptians, by first constructing a secular-politics index. Then, using the Ordinary Least Square technique, it shows that those more favorable toward secular politics were: (i) more likely to have a higher socioeconomic status, (ii) Christians, (iii) male, (iv) younger, and (v) from the urban areas; (vi) more supportive of gender equality, (vii) more tolerant of other religions, (viii) more likely to define themselves primarily as Egyptian rather than Muslim, (ix) more supportive of secular politics in 2011; (x) more politically engaged; (xi) more likely to rely on domestic TV as an information source, (xii) more likely to believe in the decline of unlawful arrest between 2011 and 2016, (xiii) more likely to believe that the government acted democratically; (xiv) less concerned with Western cultural invasion, and (xv) more favorable toward Americans.

**JEL Classifications:** J10, A13, A14

**Keywords:** Arab Spring, values, trend in values, secular politics, religious tolerance, gender equality, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey

## ملخص

تقوم هذه الورقة بإجراء تقييم لثلاث وجهات نظر حول الربيع العربي بوصفها: (1) حركة نحو ديمقراطية ليبرالية، (2) صحوة إسلامية، (3) حركة فاشلة تدل على العودة الأوتوقراطية. تساهم هذه الورقة في هذا النقاش من خلال تحليل التغيرات في القيم السياسية لدى المصريين مقارنة بالتغيرات المماثلة في تونس وتركيا، وذلك باستخدام بيانات المسوح من مصر منذ عام 2011 وموجات من مسوح رأى فرق من الدول الثلاث بين عامي 2011 و2016. على المستوى الكلي، يشير التقرير إلى أن اضطرابات عام 2011 تمثل بداية نشوء حدث ثقافي جديد في مصر، وتعكس انحدار الإسلام السياسي، وصعود القيم العلمانية، وقلة الدعم لحكم الرجل القوي. وبالنظر إلى حدوث تغيرات مماثلة في القيم في تونس وتركيا، فإن هذه الورقة تقول إن أحداث عام 2011 تشير إلى حدوث تحول كبير في القيم عبر البلدان الثلاثة. على المستوى الجزئي، تشرح هذه الورقة التباين في الموقف تجاه السياسة العلمانية بين المصريين، أولاً من خلال بناء مؤشر السياسة العلمانية. وبعد ذلك، باستخدام أسلوب مربع الأقلية العادية الذي يظهر أن أولئك الأكثر تفضيلاً للسياسة العلمانية كانوا: (1) أكثر احتمالاً أن يكون لهم وضع اجتماعي-اقتصادي أعلى، (2) مسيحيين، (3) ذكور، (4) أصغر سناً (5) من المناطق الحضرية، (6) أكثر مساندة للمساواة بين الجنسين (7) أكثر تسامحاً مع الأديان الأخرى، (8) من المرجح أن يعرفوا أنفسهم في المقام الأول على أنهم مصريين أكثر منهم إسلاميين، (9) أكثر دعماً للسياسة العلمانية في عام 2011؛ (10) أكثر انخراطاً من الناحية السياسية، (xi) من المرجح أن يعتمدوا على التلفزيون المحلي كمصدر للمعلومات، (xii) من المرجح أن تؤمن بتراجع الاعتقالات غير القانونية بين عامي 2011 و 2016، (13) أكثر احتمالاً للاعتقاد بأن الحكومة تصرف بشكل ديمقراطي. (14) أقل اهتماماً بالغزو الثقافي الغربي، و (15) أكثر ميلاً تجاه الأميركيين.

## **The Tenacity of the Arab Spring in People's Perceptions: Trends in Values Among Egyptians**

The revolutionary movements in the Arab world sparked by the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor on December 17, 2010, produced major political changes in a significant number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa. It led to the overthrow of the ruling regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and to a civil war in Syria. Nonetheless, except for Tunisia's transition to democracy, none of these countries managed to realize the goals of these movements: freedom and economic prosperity. In Egypt, the worsening economic conditions coupled with the authoritarian and exclusivist presidency of Muslim Brother Mohamed Morsi (June 30, 2012-July 3, 2013) produced mass demonstrations throughout the country demanding his resignation. Emboldened by popular opposition to what appeared to be an impending religious dictatorship, the military intervened and removed Morsi from office. But, Egyptian army chief turned elected president in 2014, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has thus far showed little interest in instituting democracy and rule of law, tolerating dissent, and pursuing inclusionary policy. Moreover, his government has been facing considerable difficulties to curb the political violence launched by the followers of al-Qaeda, the ISIL, and other terror groups in the country. Nor is it clear whether he would be able to renew and reconstitute the tradition of praetorian rule practiced by the former regime. Yemen's prospect for political stability and transparent government also gave way to sectarian strife between the Shia Houthis in the north, backed by Iran's Islamic regime, and the forces connected to the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, on the one hand, and the Sunni groups who were loyal to the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, militarily supported by a Saudi-led coalition of Persian Gulf Arab states, on the other. Similarly, Libya's transition to a stable functioning government has been hampered by the presence of armed militia that has divided the country into semi-autonomous regions. Of the revolutionary movements, the most tragic outcome is the situation in Syria, where the initial peaceful protests against the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad turned deadly and the country was thrown into a vicious cycle of violence between the regime forces, supported by Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the one hand, and a plethora of armed groups that ranged from a moderate opposition to Sunni extremism, on the other. This conflict has thus far caused a loss of more than 500,000 lives and created millions of refugees and displaced people. Further complicating the political situation in the region is the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Daesh in Arabic acronym for the group), one of the most horrific terror groups in recent memory, which managed to occupy a substantial portion of the Syrian and Iraqi territories.

In the popular perception, these developments appear to have turned the euphoria of the Arab Spring into despair, and prompted many to conclude that life under the former repressive regimes in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen was more bearable than it is under the worsening economic conditions and the chaos of the recurrent political violence of the present. Summarizing the perception that the movements of the Arab Spring have failed is an Al Jazeera headline on Tunisia: "Was the Arab Spring worth dying for?"<sup>1</sup> In fact, it would be hard to imagine anything constructive currently coming out of the dire situations in Libya, Yemen, and more significantly, Syria. The objective facts on the ground are thus far away from the prospect of freedom and economic prosperity that the Arab Spring had promised among both the enthusiastic participants and disinterested observers.

This paper, however, argues that these tragic events did not seem to have predisposed Egyptians to take refuge in the institution of patriarchy, and develop overly hostile attitudes toward outsiders and xenophobic orientations. On the contrary, it claims that Egyptians are still

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<sup>1</sup>Thessa Lageman, "Mohamed Bouazizi: Was the Arab Spring worth dying for?" *Al Jazeera*, January 3, 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/mohamed-bouazizi-arab-spring-worth-dying-151228093743375.html>, retrieved March 22, 2017.

holding on to the seminal ideas secular politics and religious tolerance that motivated and galvanized their collective participation in the upheavals that toppled President Hosni Mubarak.

### **The Significance of Values In Historical Change**

The Arab Spring has been variously defined, and its causes and processes the subject of wide speculations and considerable analyses from a variety of perspectives. The number of articles, books, and commentaries published on the subject is extensive.<sup>2</sup> Some authors, for example, focused on the role of social media in mobilizing and galvanizing the public against the incumbent authoritarian regimes (e.g., Howard and Hussain 2013; Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheaffer 2013; Bruns, Highfield and Bruggess. 2017; Moaddel 2017b). Others pointed to cross-national variation in the dynamics, pattern of emergence, and outcomes of the Arab Spring (e.g., Anderson 2011; Brownlee, Jason, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015), and finally, a third group used values survey data to analyze the attitudes and attributes of the people who participated in the Arab Spring movements (Hoffman and Jamal 2014; Moaddel 2017b; Tessler 2017).

This paper first discusses the three narratives on the characteristics of the movements that transpired in Arab countries in 2011: liberal democracy, Islamic awakening, and authoritarian recidivism. It then describes changes in Egyptian perceptions of the goals of the Arab Spring, their assessment of the performance and trustworthiness of the ruling regime and the public officials, and their perception of the existing economic inequality in their society and class differences. Next, it evaluates the ramification of these changes for the validity of the three narratives. Finally, comparing Egypt with Tunisia and Turkey, this paper shows that similar changes have also occurred in the latter two countries, bringing further evidence to bear in support of the view the 2011 upheavals might have marked the ushering in a new cultural episode in the Middle East and North Africa.

### **Liberal-Democratic Narrative**

The liberal-democratic narrative portrays Arab Spring as the movement of the people, the youth in particular, mobilized against their authoritarian regimes, demanding freedom and economic prosperity (Wright 2011; Knickmeyer 2011). For one author, the Arab Spring constituted the third wave in a series of Arab awakening movements that began in the first quarter of the twentieth century (Ajami 2012). For another, it has little to do with religion and nationalism, but rather reflects “classic political demands of liberty, democracy and economic justice” (Zubaida 2011). It is also argued that “the Arab Spring was not an Islamic Spring. That initial surge in early 2011 was not about religion but was an expression of anger over elite corruption, economic inequalities, widespread injustice and geriatric leaders who were out of touch with reality” (Noueihed and Warren 2012:304).

### **Islamic Awakening**

Pointing to the success of Muslim fundamentalists in the post-2011 elections, the Islamic activists and Muslim extremists as well as the ideologues of the Islamic Republic of Iran advanced the narrative of Islamic awakening. The latter particularly hailed the 2011 uprisings as the continuation of the Islamic awakening that started with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. These events, for them, reflected another instance of the people’s turn to religion and Islamization process that challenged Western hegemony (Parchami 2012; Mohseni 2013). While such arguments may reflect a teleological-cum-Islamic fundamentalist reading of the 2011 events and thus have little scholarly significance, a group of scholars considered how the religion contributed to the resources and mobilization potentials of the public against the state. For them, Islam played a role in the Arab Spring not because people became aware of the importance of their religious beliefs, but rather, religious symbols and rituals facilitated the

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<sup>2</sup>Using the Google’s search engine for materials that include the expression “Arab Spring” provided over 58,000 references on July 5, 2017.

movements; mobilization became possible as a result of people's congregations on Fridays in the mosques (Lynch 2012; Ardic 2012). For Hoffman and Jamal (2014), on the other hand, it is individual piety not communal practice, such as mosque attendance, that is linked to participation. Their analysis of survey data from Egypt and Tunisia indicated a link between Quran reading and the likelihood of participation in protest. For them, this relationship is not a function of support for political Islam. Rather, Quran readers displayed a higher sensitivity to inequalities and were more supportive of democracy than nonreaders.

### **Autocratic Recidivism**

Except for Tunisia, the Arab Spring did not lead to the democratization of politics. One line of argument for this failure relates to the "hijacking" of the Arab revolts by the followers of political Islam. It is argued that Islamists managed to win elections not because they had the support of the majority of the public, but because they were better organized. In contrast, the liberals and secularists were disorganized and divided. It is also claimed that the Islamic fundamentalists benefited from free elections because only a minority of the population bothered to vote. "In Arab countries," says Bradley (2012:12), "only between 20 and 40 percent of the population votes in local and national elections. And that pattern looks set to continue. In Egypt's first free election, in March 2011, for a referendum on a new constitution, only 41 percent of eligible voters made their way to the polling booths. In Tunisia, when the initial deadline for voter registration passed in mid-August 2011, only 16 percent of the country's eligible voters had made the effort." Therefore, "it is by no means impossible for the Islamists to secure a majority from the minority" (*ibid.*:12). In fact, by the end of 2011, the religious parties "had exploited those early revolutionary gains to emerge triumphant from elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco" (Noueihed and Warren 2012:304). Muslim extremists also gained power through violent intimidations. Thus, the phrase "'Arab Spring' touted as... an unambiguous leap forward for the Arabs... is self-delusional" (Bradley 2012:8). The rise of religious authoritarian parties in turn provided a favorable context for the reassertion of authoritarianism by the military in places like Egypt.

Beyond political Islam, the reassertion of authoritarianism is related to the inability of the civil society to sustain the movement for transition to democracy. Nowak, Gelfand, Borkowski, and Kruglanski (2017) have introduced a new construct of autocratic recidivism to explain why some countries return to autocracy after autocratic regimes are overthrown through concerted efforts. They observed that throughout the past century a similar scenario repeating itself in different parts of the world: autocratic regimes were first brought down by a popular uprising, followed by a short period of political openness, where diverse contenders for power freely competed for the control of the government. In many cases, these attempts at establishing democracy fail and the government is replaced either by the formation of a similar autocratic government, or a brand new and even more repressive regime—a phenomenon they term "autocratic recidivism." They argue that the capacity to synchronize actions is critical for efficient functioning of society. The society makes effective transition to democracy when meso-level institutions are capable of providing the conditions that allow societies to achieve and maintain synchronization. A lack of such intermediate institutions means the failure of synchronization, which can result in frustration of basic needs. This in turn facilitates the return to autocracy. Their computer-simulation model suggests reasons for why some nations will return to another autocracy versus total chaos and civil war, as in the case of Egypt and Syria, respectively.

### **Changes in Values and the Arab Spring**

There is evidence in support of all the three narratives. In appearance and slogans, the movements that toppled the regime of President Hosni Mubarak had clear democratic features. A large number of Egyptians also favored political Islam. The results of the 2011 parliamentary elections showed that the Islamic parties tied to the Muslim Brothers won 37.5% of the votes,

the largest portion, followed by the Islamic Bloc led by al-Nour Party with 27.8%. Another indication of the popularity of political Islam were results of the 2012 presidential elections in which the Muslim Brothers' candidate Mohamed Morsi narrowly defeated his secular rival, Ahmed Shafik. Finally, the tendency toward authoritarianism was reflected in the Egyptians' favorable reception of the military overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi. Furthermore, empirical evidence also showed that people with stronger liberal orientations and those who espoused firmer fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes more extensively participated in the 2011 movements (Moaddel 2017b). These findings, however, do not indicate the direction in value orientations of the Egyptian public. It is thus important to assess whether the trend in values is toward political Islam, liberal values, or authoritarianism. To explain trends, it is important to understand historically significant issues. How such issues are resolved and gained support among a significant section of the public provide clues about the direction, depth, and breadth of trends in values. For sure, the Egyptians' participation in the protest movement against the government in 2011 might have been driven by the perceptions of the prevalence of corruption in the government, a low level of trust in governmental officials, heightened repression, democratic deficiency, the government's failure to deliver on its promises, expanding class differences, concerns about the scarcity of jobs, and a lack of adequate housing and affordable healthcare (Anderson 2011; Bradley 2012; Moaddel 2017b).

Generally and in a broader historical context, however, discussions and debates over the mundane problems of social life among intellectual leaders and the public at large have hardly settled around the provision of the necessary infrastructures and technical expertise to address and resolve them. As is often the case in virtually all Middle Eastern and North African countries, these problems are developed and subsumed into such broader cultural issues as the form and function of the government, the role of religion in politics, the basis of identity, the social status of women, and the relationship with outsiders, particularly Western governments. For example, debates about jobs beg the question of whether women, immigrants, and religious and ethnic minorities have the same right to a job as men, non-immigrants, and members of religious and ethnic majorities, respectively—hence, the issues of gender equality, ingroup-outgroup relations, and religious and ethnic sectarianism and tolerance. Disputes about unemployment may raise a broader question about the conditions for job creation, where some may suggest heavy state interventions in the economy, at one extreme, while others recommend giving tax incentives to the rich to promote investment, at the other. Debates about development tend to lead to a wider discussion on whether religion was responsible for the low level of development of one's country, hence, the need for secular politics, or colonialism, hence, the significance of national solidarity against foreign interventions. Finally, the discussion about the most effective way of promoting peace, social harmony, and prosperity may raise questions about the type of government that is most effective in realizing these goals. Is the national territorial government most effective in bringing about these positive changes for the nation? Or, does a pan-Arab (or pan-Kurdish or Turkish) nationalist model or an Islamic state provide a better alternative? Not just in Egypt or other Middle Eastern and North African countries, these issues are present in virtually all countries, even though their depth and breadth vary considerably across nations (Moaddel 2005).

In the contemporary Middle East and North Africa, these issues have, by and large, been the invariant features of ideological debates, religious disputations, and political conflicts that have transpired in the contemporary period. How people understood and debated, either publically or underground, these issues, and how these issues were resolved into a new set of ideas contributed to the making of collective opinions and the political movements that sought to realize the new ideas. Nonetheless, they hardly appear by themselves as merely issues that are needed to be resolved. They are also framed by diverse individuals and groups, who are contending for the cultural control of the society. These contenders employ “metaphors, catch-



phrases, and other condensing symbols that frame the issue in a particular fashion” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987:143), and we know that frames structure issues and “define what the problem is and how to think about it; often they suggest what, if anything, should be done to remedy it” (Kinder 1998:172). The one who successfully frames an issue musters considerable political influence (Schattschneider 1960).

We contend that the type of framing that is popularly accepted in turn depends on the skills of the framers (e.g., political activists, opinion leaders, columnists, and commentators) to sell their interpretations of the nature of the issues, their causes and processes, and how to resolve them. More fundamentally, however, how issues are framed is a function of what ideological discourses are dominant in the society and what set of values are accorded priorities in the public perceptions. For example, the framers would have limited capability to define an issue successfully and rally the public to action. For example, they may be less successful in shaping public opinion if they use religious categories to define issues at the time when secularism is on the rise. Alternatively, politicians would face considerable difficulties in framing issues in secular terms during the period of rising religious fervor and fundamentalist movements. In such a period, a resolution of an issue framed in religious terms may be far more successful in gaining public support than if it was expressed in terms of a secular discourse. The arrangement of social forces in any given historical context structures the type of ideological discourses that are dominant and the type of framing that has a better chance of shaping public opinion and mobilizing the public for political engagement. When this arrangement changes as a result of the outbreak of major events (including a rapid decline in the economic conditions or a sharp increase in productivity and economic productivity, a new technological invention that cause changes in social relations, revolutionary upheavals or rebellions like the movements in 2011, or a military coup), people’s mode and style of political expressions also change; a new cultural episode thus succeeds and replaces the old one. We conceptualize history as a succession of cultural episodes.

### **Cultural Episodes in Contemporary Egypt and the Arab Spring**

Therefore, one way to understand and comprehend Egypt’s contemporary history is to conceptualize this history as a succession of different cultural episodes. The succession of the cultural episodes began with the rise of liberal territorial nationalism, which started with the British occupation of the country in 1882 and began to decline in the 1930s; pan-Arab nationalism that became the official ideology of the state in the mid-twentieth century and ended following the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel; and Islamic fundamentalism that became a dominant oppositional discourse from the late sixties until 2011. From this perspective, the revolt of 2011 may represent the ushering in a new cultural episode in the country.

#### **Liberal Nationalism**

During the heyday of territorial nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, significant issues were defined in opposition to the broader framework of the British occupation, on the one hand, and to the historical domination of the country by the Ottomans and whether religious rule is a desirable form of politics for Egypt, on the other. In this cultural episode, Egyptians defined their identity and addressed the issues of economic development, the maldistribution of resources, form of government, and the status of women in terms of liberal territorial nationalist ideology (Ahmed 1960; Safran 1961; Vatikiotis 1965; Quraishi 1967; Marsot 1968, 1977; Wendell 1972; Schölch 1981; Hourani 1983; Cole 1993; Reid 1998).

In Egyptian territorial-nationalist discourse, political sovereignty belongs to the people who inhabit the land of Egypt. Connections to this land, rather than being a Muslim or an Arab, define membership in the political community. The nation is the source of legitimacy, religious and political functions are differentiated, and being an Egyptian defines the identity of

belonging to the country's political community. To appreciate the significance of liberal-nationalist ideology in shaping identity, it may be sufficient to consider the manner in which Mustafa Kamil (1874–1908), a prominent harbinger of Egyptian nationalism, glorified Egypt in a language suffused with a strong feeling of affection. For him, it was not language or religion, but the feeling of belonging to the land of Egypt that was the most potent unifying force among Egyptians:

Nationalism is a sentiment before which all nations and all communities bow because it is the feeling of the worth and dignity of man, of the bounty of God and His care, of the meaning of existence itself. . . .

Nationalism is the food which the body and soul of Egypt need before any other food. . . . It is the mainspring of all miracles and the principle of all progress . . . it is the blood in the veins of nations and the life of all living things. . . .

Nationalism is the noblest tie for men and the solid foundation upon which great and mighty kingdoms are built. . . . Life is merely transitory and it has no honor without nationalism and without work for the welfare of the fatherland and its children. . . . Fatherland, O fatherland: To you my love and my heart. To you my life and my existence. To you my blood and my soul. To you my mind and my speech. . . . You, you, O Egypt are life itself, and there is no life but in you (cited in Safran 1961:87).

### ***Pan-Arab Nationalism***

Beginning in the late 1930s, ideology of liberal nationalism was challenged by the followers of pan-Arab nationalism and the Islamic fundamentalism of the Muslim Brothers. Economic difficulties and exclusionary policies of the nationalist government undermined its legitimacy and undercut the effectiveness of liberal-nationalist politicians to frame issues. Arab nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists were united only by their common hostility to constitutional monarchy and parliamentary politics, a factor underpinning their cooperation in the 1952 coup that overthrew the constitutional monarchy. Otherwise, they were ideological rivals, seriously competing for the intellectual control of Egypt. The former were secular political activists, forcefully promoting the idea of Arab unity. The discourse of pan-Arab nationalism, articulated by Iraqi and Syrian intellectual leaders, rested on the belief that the Arab-speaking people of the various provinces of the former Ottoman Empire constituted as one people and thus belonged to a single Arab nation. They were thus hard at work in promoting the Arab identity in that the Arab-speaking publics in different Arab countries were all Arabs above all—above being Muslims, Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, or any other (Zeine 1983; Cleveland 1971; Dawn 1973, 1988; Khalidi et al, 1991; Dawisha 2003).

Attachments to Arab identity, rather than to the territory of Egypt or Islam, defined the criterion for membership in the political community. As harbingers of pan-Arab nationalism, Sati' al-Husri (1880–1968) and Darwish al-Miqdadi (1879-1968) forcefully argued in support of the notion that the Arab constituted one single eternal nation. For them, only the followers of imperialism and regionalism would deny the existence of this nation. According to al-Husri,

There is left no room to doubt that the division of the Arab provinces into several states took place because of the bargaining and ambitions of the foreign states, and not according to the views and interests of the people of the countries. So, too, were the borders of these states determined by the wishes and agreements of the foreign powers, and not according to the natural demands of the situation or the requirements of indigenous interests. . . . Is it possible for us to consider, for example, the people of Syria as forming a true nation, different from the people of Iraq and Lebanon? Never, gentlemen. All that I have explained indicates clearly that the differences we now see between the people of these states are temporary and superficial.

We must always assert that the Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Jordanians, Hejazis, and Yemenis all belong to one nation, the Arab nation (cited in Cleveland 1971:130).

For pan-Arab ideologues, Arabs are one singular indivisible people. They believed in the naturalness of the Arab nation, where its different provinces formed parts of an organic whole, having historical permanency. In textbooks designed for use in the schools of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, the Arab homeland is portrayed as a natural geographical unit, consisting of the “Arab Island”—a living body where “the head” was the Fertile Crescent, “the heart” central Arabia, and “the extremities” the Arabian coastlands from the Gulf of Aqaba to “the Gulf of Basra.” This “Island” was “the cradle of the Arabs and their fortress” (Dawn 1988:69).

Geography, however, is of secondary importance. The people, not territory, are the decisive element, as they are the creator of the homeland. All lands inhabited by Arabs are Arab lands. For Muhammad Izzat Darwaza (1888–1984), “the lands of Syria, Iraq, and Palestine were always Arab because they were filled with Arabs” (Dawn 1988: 70). For Miqdadi also, the Arab homeland is the territory inhabited by Arabs, which expanded as Arabs expanded into Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Arabs inhabiting the homeland was accomplished in remote antiquity. Arabic was the most advanced amongst the ancient Semitic languages. The ancient pre-Islamic Arabs, however, were only a small part of the glorious Arab history (Dawn 1988:70).

The Europeans, the Greeks, Turks, and Iranians are portrayed as enemies of Arabs. The textbooks reinforced the belief that borrowing from outsiders, particularly Persians and Westerners had been nearly fatal to the ancient Arabs. The Persians are depicted as being filled with hatred of Arabs, and having a fanatical desire for revenge for the loss of their sovereignty and glory (Dawn 1988: 75).

### **Islamic Fundamentalism**

As the adopted and professed ideology of the military junta that overthrew the constitutional monarchy in 1952, pan-Arab nationalism shaped the overall framework of state policies. The Muslim Brothers, excluded from gaining access to major positions of power in the post-coup period, found themselves increasingly at odds with the post-coup military regime. Although officially banned from political activities since 1954, they were tolerated as an illegal oppositional group. A series of factors, however, contributed to the decline in popular support, particular among educated Egyptians, for the pan-Arab nationalist regime. Among these factors were state authoritarianism, failure to realize a unified Arab state across the region, the defeat of the Arab army in the 1967 war with Israel, and economic decline in the post-war period. The decline of pan-Arab nationalism created a favorable subjective context for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a dominant oppositional discourse.

The rise of religious extremism in Egypt paralleled and in fact reflected the totalitarianism of the military regime. This extremism most notably reflected in the political discourse of Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), a secular intellectual-turned Islamic activist. Qutb did not simply criticize the secularism of the state; he questioned the very Islamic nature of the existing order. For him, the conditions in Egypt was similar to the pre-Islamic conditions in Arabia where people lived under the state of ignorance (*jahiliyya*). By implication, it was thus incumbent on the faithful to rebel against it. An even more extremist and militant version of religious nationalism was formulated by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–1982). In his view, the current rulers of Muslim countries were all apostates and should be overthrown in order to establish a truly Islamic state (Akhavi 1992:94–95). Faraj was the head of the Cairo branch of the *Tanzim al-jihad* (Jihad Organization) that assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat. Building on Sayyid Qutb’s argument, Faraj proclaimed that “the establishment of an Islamic State is an obligation for the Muslims.... The laws by which the Muslims are ruled today are the laws of Unbelief; they are actually codes of law that were made by infidels who then subjected the Muslims to

these (codes)...” (cited in Sageman 2004:15). These ideas formed the foundations of such radical organizations as *Jamaat Islamiyyat*, Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda, justifying the use of terror for the realization of their ostensibly Islamic objectives.

In Islamic fundamentalism, Islam is considered as the basis of legitimacy and the source of legislation; it negates secular politics and instead advances the idea of the unity of religion and politics in an Islamic government, promotes religious centrism and intolerance of other faiths, endorses male supremacy and restricts women’s involvements in the public sphere, and rejects Western culture as decadent. The view of Egyptian Sayyid Qutb on the Islamic conception of political sovereignty displays a clear contrast with conception in territorial nationalism and pan-Arab nationalism. Sayyid Qutb questioned pan-Arab nationalism and other forms of nationalism first for being tyrannical, reasoning that “there was no sense in liberating the land from a Byzantine or a Persian tyrant in order to put it in the hands of an Arab tyrant. Any tyrant is a tyrant” (cited in Sivan 1985: 30). In a later text, he flatly rejected pan-Arabism as a concept incompatible with Islam:

The homeland (watan) a Muslim should cherish and defend is not a mere piece of land; the collective identity he is known by is not that of a regime. . . . Neither is the banner he should glory in and die for that of a nation (qawn). . . . His jihad is solely geared to protect the religion of Allah and His Shari’a and to save the Abode of Islam and no other territory. . . . Any land that combats the Faith, hampers Muslims from practicing their religion, or does not apply the Shari’a, becomes ipso facto part of the Abode of War (Dar al-Harb). It should be combated even if one’s own kith and kin, national group, capital and commerce are to be found there. . . . A Muslim’s homeland is any land governed by the laws of Islam. Islam is the only identity worthy of man. . . . Any other group identity . . . is a jahili identity of the type humanity has known during its periods of spiritual decadence (cited in Sivan 1985: 31).

### ***The Arab Spring***

Led primarily by an opposition movement that was liberal and secular opposition and with the objective of freedom and economic prosperity, the 2011 movement overthrew the Mubarak regime, the emaciated vestige of self-proclaimed revolutionary regime that seized power in the fifties. Although the Muslim Brothers did not play a leading role in the ouster of their archenemy, Mubarak’s departure paved the way for the organization to capture state power when their candidate, Mohamed Morsi, succeeded in winning the presidency in the June 2012 elections. Hands held fall apart drop the catch, however. Morsi’s electoral victory was made possible by a slim margin; he received 51.7% of the vote cast, and only 52% of the eligible electorates participated in the elections—that is, less than 27% of the eligible voters. Mustering the support of only slightly over a quarter of these voters was not a sufficiently strong mandate for the implementation of an Islamization program, demand for extrajudicial authority to rule by decree, and attempts to quell the opposition in an authoritarian manner. An impending religious authoritarian rule coupled with worsening economic conditions generated widespread opposition to the Morsi government and prompted the military to intervene and remove Morsi from power in July 2013 (Tabaar 2013). The military’s seizure of power happened in the same way it did in 1952; riding successfully on a strong wave of popular discontents against the ruling regime. In the pre-1952 period, Egyptians were fed up by the ineffectiveness of the parliament, the self-serving members of the dominant classes (e.g., the landowners and merchants) who had considerable political influence, rigged elections, and corruption in high places (Mitchell 1969).

In 1952, the Muslim Brothers helped the military seize power, but after the coup, military leaders showed little interest in sharing power with their ally. Furthermore, the military not only held on to power in an exclusivist manner, but also expanded its power base by dissolving

all the political parties and nationalizing the properties of first foreign companies, and then the economically dominant classes. At least part of the post-coup military regime's success in implementing all these measures was due to the availability of pan-Arab nationalist ideology that served as a social cement connecting its leader Jamal Abdul Nassir to his popular base. In 2013, the military seized power with the help of mostly secular opposition who were alarmed by Morsi's authoritarian proclivity, efforts toward establishing an Islamic government, and inability to seriously address the country's economic problems. Following the seizure of power, the military again showed little interest in democratization.

But the 2013 coup, or the July Revolution as the regime would like to call it, occurred under different circumstances. Both the contending ideologies of pan-Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism were discredited. There was no alternative revolutionary ideology that the military regime could rely on in order to mobilize the public and solidify power. The regime's success may thus be a function of the extent to which it is able to maintain political stability and promote economic development and prosperity. However, the overall framework of politics, as this paper attempts to demonstrate, is informed by an increase in support for secular politics and a decline in unfavorable attitudes toward the West.

This paper present data to support four conclusions. (1) the upheavals of 2011 and the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak signify the ushering in of a new cultural episode in Egypt. (2) This cultural episode is characterized by fairly strong critical attitudes toward the government and governmental officials and the popularity of secular politics for an increasing large section of the Egyptian public. This secularism appears to be less hostile toward Western culture and style of government, and is associated with a higher level of religious tolerance. (3) A low support for gender equality, however, is a major impediment toward the development of liberal democracy. (4) Similar changes in sociopolitical and cultural values appeared to be transpiring among Tunisians and Turkish publics as well, reinforcing the claim that the events of 2011 represented a major shift in people's value orientations.

### **Data**

Two sets of data were used to assess changes in values among Egyptians. One set is the longitudinal survey data that was collected before 2011 (available at [www.mevs.org](http://www.mevs.org)). The other set was from two waves of panel surveys carried out in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey. In Egypt, the first wave of the survey was conducted in the summer of 2011, producing a nationally representative sample of 3,496 completed interviews. The sample was drawn using a multi-stage area probability sampling frame based on Census data from CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics). The second wave was carried out in summer and fall of 2016. Of the original 3,496 respondents, 2,430 were re-interviewed, about 70% of the 2011 respondents. Egyptian Research and Training Center in Cairo, Egypt, carried out the first wave. El-Zanaty and Associates, 6th of October, Egypt, carried out the second wave. In Tunisia, the first wave was carried out in the spring of 2013, using a nationally representative sample of 3,070 adults. The sample was selected using a multi-stage probability sampling frame based on Census data from the Institute for National Statistics. In the second, 2,391 or 78% of the 2013 respondents were re-interviewed in 2015. Elka Consulting in Tunis, Tunisia, carried out both waves. Finally, in Turkey, the first wave was conducted in the spring of 2013. It interviewed a nationally representative sample of 3,019 adults, using multi-stage area probability sampling frame based on voter registry. In the second wave, 1,682 respondents were re-interviewed in winter-summer of 2016, or 56% of the 2013 respondents. Frekans in Istanbul, Turkey, conducted both waves of the panel surveys.

### **Changes in Perception on the Goals of the Arab Spring**

To assess which narrative is significant in the Egyptian perceptions, respondents were probed concerning the goal of the Arab Spring in both the 2011 and 2016 surveys. Table 1 reports only

the findings from the panel of the same respondents between two surveys. As shown, in both surveys the highest percentage of the respondents considered the goal of the upheaval was for freedom and democracy, 58.5% in 2011 and 42.9% in 2016, while those mentioned equality and economic prosperity were 25.5% and 34.6%, respectively. Only a small minority thought that it was to establish an Islamic government, 8.3% and 4.6%, and even a smaller percentage mentioned movement for Arab unity, 2.9% and .6%, or to counter Western influence 2% and 1.5%, in 2011 and 2016, respectively. Considering changes in the responses between the two surveys, those who mentioned democracy, Islamic government, countering Western influence, and Arab unity declined by 27%, 45%, 25%, and 79% respectively, but the decline in those who said Islamic government and Arab unity was much higher than those who mentioned democracy. On the other hand, those mentioning economic equality and prosperity or Western conspiracy as the goal of the movement increased by 36% and 638%, respectively.


The dramatic increase in the percentage of those who said they did not know about the goal(s) of the Arab Spring (1733%) may be indicative of either uncertainty in their mind about what transpired in the country more than five years after the first interview, or of the fact that they simply forgot their initial response about the goal of the movement. The sharp increase in the percentage of those who said that it was part of a Western conspiracy may reflect a search for a scapegoat for the movements' failure to deliver a better life as well as the intensification of economic difficulties after the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak.

**Table 1**  
**Concerning political upheavals in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and other places in the Middle East, which of the following is the most important purpose of them?**


	2011 %	2016 %	Change %
National movement or freedom & democracy	58.5	42.9	-27
Religious movements to establish Islamic government	8.3	4.6	-45
Movements to counter Western influence	2	1.5	-25
Movements for economic equality & prosperity	25.5	34.6	36
These movements as Western conspiracy	2.1	15.5	638
Movements for the unity of Arab countries	2.9	0.6	-79
NA/DK	0.6	11	1733
Total	2,430	2,430	

### **Egyptian Critical Attitudes toward the Government and Inequality**

The above findings show that the majority of respondents in 2016 believed that the goal of the movement that toppled Hosni Mubarak was either democracy or economic prosperity (together 77.5%). Egyptians, however, were not quite content with the current government. Considering 2012 and 2014 elections as an indicator of political process, Egyptians generally consider this process to be fair. Figure 1 reports Egyptians' assessments of these two elections; the first elected Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brothers as the president, and the second General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Accordingly, more Egyptians considered the 2012 elections as "completely fair" or "fair with minor problems" (40%) than those who said that it was "fair but with major problems" or "not fair at all" (24%). However, 35% of the respondents expressed that they did not know whether it was fair or unfair. On the other hand, a much higher percentage, 60%, thought that the 2014 elections were "completely fair" or "fair with minor problems," while 14% thought otherwise, and 24% expressed "don't know."



The favorable attitudes toward the 2014 elections do not appear to have conferred much legitimacy to the government officials. A large percentage of the respondents not only believed in the persistence of corruptions in high places but also considered that this problem had gotten worse in the past five years. According to Figure 2, for 36% of the respondents, acts of corruption are either “very common” among government officials, and for 49% it is “common.” Only a very small minority thought otherwise.



On what changed for the better, what remained the same or got worse, Egyptians expressed that they were freer at the time of the survey in 2016 than they were before June 30, 2013, when the military overthrew the government of Mohamed Morsi. At the same time, they perceived that unlawful arrests, corruption in politics and government, and the gap between the rich and the poor expanded ever since. According to Table 2, 24% and 29% reported that in 2016 they had “much more” or “somewhat more” freedom “to join any organization” or “to express their thoughts and opinions,” respectively, than they did before. Those who responded “much less” or “somewhat less than before” were 19% and 21%, respectively. However, the largest percentage of the respondents said that these freedoms were “much the same” as before, 39% and 36%, respectively.


On the other hand, higher percentages of the respondents believed that in 2016 “unlawful arrests” and “corruption in politics and government” were “much more” or “somewhat more than before” than those reporting otherwise; 31% and 41% versus 12% and 7%, respectively.

Again, the largest percentages consisted of those respondents who indicated these events had remained much the same as before. Egyptians, however, were most critical of the maldistribution of economic resources in their country: fully 69% indicated that in 2016 the “difference between the rich and the poor” was “much more” or “somewhat more than before.” Only 1% said otherwise, and 26% said “much the same” as before.

**Table 2**  
**Percent expressing whether the followings occur much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less often than they did before the June 30 Revolution of 2013**

	Freedom to Join organizations	Freedom to express opinions	Unlawful arrests	Corruption in politics & government	Difference b/w rich & poor
Much more than before	7%	10%	15%	20%	49%
Somewhat more than before	17%	19%	16%	21%	20%
Much the same	39%	36%	34%	40%	26%
Somewhat less than before	10%	12%	9%	6%	1%
Much less than before	9%	9%	3%	1%	0%
Don't know	18%	13%	22%	10%	3%

The Egyptians’ critical attitudes toward the government and class differences reflected in the lower marks they gave to the overall government performance and democratic governance between the two surveys. Figure 3 shows their average ratings of how democratic Egypt is being governed, with 1 being “completely undemocratic” and 10 “completely democratic,” and government performance, with 1 being “very bad” and 10 “very good.” As this figure shows, In 2011 Egyptians on average gave the scores of 5.45 and 5.67 in rating democratic governance and government performance, respectively. In 2016, these averages fell to 4.08 and 4.53, respectively, a significant decline. These declining averages indicate that Egyptians are not happy with either the state of democracy in their country, nor with the government performance.



### Changes in Values among Egyptians


The decline of pan-Arab nationalism in the late sixties was associated with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and violent extremism. Currently, there are serious indications that the events




of the Arab Spring represented a turning point in people’s value orientation, signifying the decline in support for political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, and the increasing popularity of secular values. These changes are reflected in the differences in the measures of secular politics, religious tolerance, national identity, gender equality, and ingroup solidarity and hostility toward outsiders between the two surveys.

**Secular politics versus Islamic government**


Several attitudinal measures monitored changes in support for secular politics and Islamic government. Two questions directly ask respondents’ preference for secular politics: Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that Egypt would be a better place (1) if religion and politics were separated, and (2) if the country’s government was similar to Western (American or European) governments. The first question was repeated in five surveys that were carried out between 2007 and 2016, and the results are reported in Figure 4. According to this figure, in 2007, only 44% or a minority of respondents either “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that Egypt would be a better place if religion and politics were separated. This percentage consistently went up to 54% in summer 2011, 57% in the fall, 80% in 2014, and 83% in 2016 (note that the summer 2011 and 2016 data are from the panel surveys). On the desirability of the separation of religion and politics, the wide support among Egyptians is remarkable.



Supports for Western-type governments have also increased substantially among Egyptians. According to Figure 5, in 2007 only 30% of Egyptians “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that Egypt would be a better place if its government were similar to Western governments. This value increased to 35% in 2011 and 55% in 2016. These changes are noteworthy as they indicate that after experiencing military rule under the rubric of Arab nationalism and later showing support for Islamic government, Egyptians have now recognized the significance and utility of secular politics.




There is also a concomitant decline in support for political interference of religious leaders and for people with strong religious views to hold public office. According to Figure 6, the percentage of the respondents who strongly agreed that religious leaders should not influence politics increased from 32% in 2001 to 34% in 2011, and 45% in 2016. On the other hand, those who strongly agreed that it would be better if people with strong religious views held public office dropped dramatically from 51% in 2001 to 28% in 2011, and to 23% in 2016. Insofar as politics is concerned, the influence of religious leaders or religiosity of politicians does not matter as much as it did in the past. This change may be interpreted as an expanding subjective orientation among Egyptians toward secular politicians.




Among four types of political systems: the military rule, the rule by a strong head of the state who does not bother with elections and parliament (strongman rule), Islamic government, and democracy, Egyptians consistently supported the democratic form of government. However, there has been some decline in support for democracy and an increase in support for a


strongman rule. According to Figure 7, those who said that it was “very good” or “fairly good” to have the army rule declined from 72% in 2011 to 47% in 2016. Those who said the same about Islamic government also declined from 58% in 2011 to 30% in 2016. This latter finding again indicates an increase in support for secular politics. While there is a minority support for both types of government, in a comparative perspective, it appears that there is a higher support for a military rule than there is for an Islamic government in 2016, 47% versus 30%, respectively. Using these figures as proxy measures of the extents of support for two political rivals in Egypt, the military versus the Muslim Brothers, the latter appears to be the loser in a popularity context.



Similarly, the support for the sharia has also declined during the survey period. According to Figure 8, the percentage of the respondents who said that it was “very important” for a good government to implement only the sharia declined consistently from 46% in 2001 to 27% in 2011 and 22% in 2016. Those who said that it was “very important” for a good government to make laws according to people’s wishes fluctuated considerably between 2001 and 2016; it went up from 27% in 2001 to 65% in 2011, but dropped sharply to 22% in 2016.



Part of this decline may reflect an increase in support for a strongman rule. Figure 9 shows that those who said that it was “very good” or “fairly good” to have a strong ruler who does not bother with parliament and elections went up from 7% in 2001 to 13% in 2011, and 25% in 2016. This change may reflect the respondents’ concerns with the chaotic conditions produced as a result of political transition. However, supports for a democratic form of government have remained consistently high among Egyptians between 2001 and 2016; at least 96% of the respondents expressed that it was “very good” or “fairly good” to have a democratic political system. It is, however, noteworthy that those who were strongly favored democracy—that is, those who said that it was “very good” to have a democratic form of government—declined significantly between the last two surveys from 84% in 2011 to 59% in 2016.




In sum, the available data on measures of attitudes toward secular politics, Western form of government, Islamic government, the interference of religious leaders and religiosity of politicians, and the significance of implementing the sharia indicate that support for secular politics has increased considerably, and for religious government decreased.

### **Identity and national pride**

The trend toward liberal political values has historically been associated with the recognition of one’s territorial nation as the primary basis of identity of belonging. We know that territorial nationalism in Algeria and Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed, in part, in opposition to French and British occupation of these countries, respectively (Moaddel 2005). Foreign occupation, however, is only one factor that provokes the rise of nationalism and attachment to national territory. People also develop the sense of national territorial belonging in opposition to a religious identity, when this identity is imposed on them from above by an authoritarian religious state—Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example. National identity may also become popular within the context of a collective struggle against a secular authoritarian state. The shift in the basis of identity of belonging from predominantly Islam to Egypt among Egyptians after the 2011 upheavals appears to reflect the latter process.

To measure identity, respondents were asked whether they defined themselves as (1) Egyptian, above all, (2) Muslim or Christian, above all, (3) Arab, above all, or (4) other. As shown in Figure 10, the percentage of those who defined themselves as Egyptian above all was very


small compared to those defining themselves as Muslim or Christian above all before 2011. Only 9% and 12% defined themselves as Egyptian above all in 2001 and 2007, respectively, compared to 78% and 84% who defined themselves as Muslim or Christian above all in the two surveys, respectively. These figures, however, changed dramatically following the mass nationwide demonstrations that toppled President Hosni Mubarak. As shown, the percentage of those defining themselves as Egyptian jumped to 52% in summer 2011, 56% in fall 2011, 61% in 2014, and 43% in 2016. The corresponding figures for those who defined themselves as Muslim (or Christian) above all were 45%, 46%, 37%, and 54%.



Although Figure 10 shows a decline in national identity and the rise of Islamic or Christian identity between 2011 and 2016, the change does not imply a concomitant increase in identification with a broader worldwide religious community. As Figure 11 shows, the percentage of Egyptian respondents who saw themselves as the citizens of Egypt rather than of the world, religious or Arab community has increased from 61.6% to 76.4%, while those who saw themselves as citizens of Islamic umma or worldwide Christian community decreased from 35.1% in 2011 to 19.1% in 2016.


For sure, it would be hard to know exactly when the shift in the primary basis of identity from Islam to Egypt had occurred between 2007 and 2011. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to consider this change as a significant outcome of Egyptians' participation in massive collective struggle in 2011 against their authoritarian government. The mechanism triggering the nationalist awareness might have operated in the moments of their partaking in, communicating with one another about, or simply observing the continuous and intense confrontations with the all-powerful and omnipresent repressive regime. This awareness was thus a consequence of the movement being under the diffused leadership of secular and nationalist forces rather than Muslim activists, carrying Egyptian flags instead of religious symbols and artifacts, demanding democracy and social justice instead of chanting that Islam was the solution. Egyptians, therefore, might have realized that being Egyptian was far more important to them than any other identity. In doing so, they reasserted their ownership of the country and expropriated the prerogative of the authoritarian ruler to represent himself as the sole spokesperson for the nation. This change in identity indeed resonated well with the famous nationalist slogan against the British colonial rule almost a century earlier that "Egypt is for the Egyptians." Considering that identification with the nation further expanded in the subsequent surveys in fall 2011 and 2014 are also indicative of the trend toward territorial nationalism. The drop in national identity

in 2016, on the other hand, may reflect Egyptians' dismay with the reconstitution of pre-2011 authoritarian regime under the presidency of General el-Sisi.



Another remarkable aspect of change is a significant drop in the feeling of national pride between 2011 and 2016. According to Figure 12, over 80% of the respondents expressed that they were very proud of being Egyptians between 2001 and 2011. This figure dropped to 62% in 2016. The decline in the feeling of national pride is associated with a decline in national identity between 2011 and 2016. Nonetheless, the decline in the former does not necessarily indicate a decline in people's patriotic feelings. Moreover, because national pride has often been associated with conservatism and is negatively linked to liberal values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Moaddel 2017a), this decline may in fact be an indication of the rise of the spirit of self-criticism that is necessary for understanding the indigenous sources of underdevelopment and to devise an effective strategy for economic development.


The ideologies of pan-Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism rested on the belief that the machination of outsiders, the West in particular, was the real cause of the backwardness of the country, while glorifying the indigenous culture and people. Such a self-congratulatory approach promoted by both pan-Arab nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist ideologues contributed to the heightening of national pride. It does, however, very little in the way of encouraging critical attitudes and bold criticisms of one's culture in order to uncover the indigenous sources of backwardness and effectively address and resolve the problem of economic development. Thus, the decline in the feeling of national pride may be an indication of the weakening of the subjective impediments of a true national emancipation not just from foreign domination, but also from the yoke of a conservative and restraining indigenous culture. Finally, in the specific context of Egypt, however, the decline in the feeling of national pride may also echo the perception of the failure of the 2011 national movement to bring about freedom and economic prosperity.



### Suspicion of outsiders versus religious tolerance


Hostility toward the West has been the hallmark of both pan-Arab nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist movements. The latter, in particular, promoted the view that there have been conspiracies against Muslims and often admonished its audience against emulating what they considered the decadent culture of the West. These perceptions reflected in attitudes against outsiders, including the Western culture, and religious intolerance.

To assess attitudes toward the West, respondents were asked how important was Western cultural invasion, and the results are reported in Figure 13. Accordingly, the percentage of Egyptians who considered Western cultural invasion to be a “very important” or “important” problem declined steadily between 2001 and 2016; from 20% and 69% in 2001, to 17% and 66% in 2011, and to 22% and 41% in 2016, respectively. Despite being subjected to anti-West propaganda by the harbingers of pan-Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism for many decades, more Egyptians have begun to rethink their assessment of Western culture and consider the menace of Western culture a less important issue.



Consistent with these changes was a significant increase in the level of religious tolerance among Egyptians, as is reported in Figure 14. Accordingly, tolerance of criticisms of one’s

faith has increased: the percentages of respondents who strongly disagreed or disagreed that “criticisms of our religion should not be tolerated” increased from 7% and 15% (22% combined) in 2011 to 12% and 13% (25% combined) in 2016, respectively. So did those who strongly disagreed or disagreed that “criticism of religious leaders should not be tolerated” from 8% and 25% (33% combined) in 2011 to 17% and 21% (38% combined) in 2016, respectively. Tolerance of other faiths, or what may be called inter-faith tolerance, has increased even more precipitously. The percentages of those who strongly disagreed or disagreed that “other religions should not have the same rights as mine” increased from 28% and 41% (69% combined) in 2011 to 61% and 22% (83% combined) in 2016, respectively. Those who felt the same about “our children should not be taught about other religions at school” increased, respectively, from 19% and 35% (54% combined) in 2011 to 35% and 28% (63% combined) in 2016, and about “the followers of other faiths should not be allowed to practice their religion” increased, respectively, from 42% and 42% (84% combined) in 2011 to 68% and 22% (90% combined) in 2016.




### Gender Equality


Support for patriarchy and gender inequality has been strong among Egyptians. This support may be a major impediment to the development of liberal democracy in the country. Nonetheless, there has been some decline in unfavorable attitudes toward women since 2001, when the first survey was carried out in the country. Several questions tap into such attitudes. These questions probe respondents’ orientations toward women in several domains of social life, including politics, the family, and education.

The first asks respondents whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” that men make better political leaders than women do. As reported in Figure 15, the findings show that those who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with this statement were 32% and 49%, respectively, in 2001, and did not change much in the following years as shown by findings from the subsequent surveys. These figures were 23% and 59% in summer 2011, 28% and 60% in fall 2011, 37% and 42% in 2014, and 25% and 52% in 2016—more or less the same in sixteen years.







Egyptians have also expressed a strong inegalitarian view of gender relations in the family. In response to whether they “agreed strongly,” “agreed,” “disagreed,” or “disagreed strongly” that a wife must always obey her husband, 32% agreed and 46% agreed strongly in 2001. These figures increased to 25% and 70% in summer 2011, 23% and 73% in fall 2011, 12% and 87% in 2014, and 35% and 55% in 2016 (Figure 16).



Attitudes toward polygamy have turned drastically in favor of men between 2001 and 2016. In 2001, only 8% and 2% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that it was acceptable for a man to have more than one wife. These figures jumped to 20% and 8% in 2011 and 25% and 22% in 2016, as shown in Figure 17.




The only area in which Egyptians' attitudes have shifted toward gender equality is in the domain of education, where the majority of respondents disagreed with inequality of opportunity for university education between men and women. In response to the question whether they "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," or "strongly disagree" that university education is more important for boys than it is for girls, 15% said they agreed and 13% strongly agreed in 2001. These figures increased to 14% and 21% in summer 2011, 11% and 25% in fall 2011, 18% and 27% in 2014, but dropped dramatically to 11% and 12% in 2016, respectively (Figure 18).



To more effectively assess the extent of change in attitudes toward gender equality, the mean responses to the three questions were constructed. These questions were: Do you (1) "strongly agree," (2) "agree," (3) "disagree," or (4) "strongly disagree" that (I) university education is

more important for boys than it is for girls, (II) a wife must always obey her husband, and (III) men make better political leaders than women do. These means were then averaged to create a gender-equality index, and the results are shown in Figure 19. These values range between 1 and 4, and higher values indicate stronger disagreement with gender inequality, which implies stronger support for gender equality. According to this figure, between 2001 and 2016, on education and political leadership attitudes have changed toward gender equality, from the average of 3.0 and 3.2 to 1.3 and 1.8, respectively. Supports for a wife’s obedience to her husband have decreased, as this average dropped from 1.8 to 1.6. The gender-equality index as a whole showed a modest increase from 2.0 to 2.2 in this period. This index, however, stayed far below the median of 2.5—showing Egyptians to be 50/50 divided between those for and against gender equality—in all the survey years. This means that Egyptians have been predominantly in favor of patriarchy and the institution of male supremacy.



To recap, findings from cross-sectional surveys carried out before 2011 upheavals and two waves of panel surveys conducted in the country between 2011 and 2016 support a shift in values among Egyptians toward secular politics, national identity, and religious tolerant. Favorable attitudes toward gender equality are, however, quite weak among Egyptians.

### Predictors of Secular Politics Among Egyptians

Attitude toward secular politics is among the most important changes occurred in the value orientations of Egyptians in the last decade. To assess the factors that are linked to this political attitude, this paper focuses on the 2016 panel data and constructs a *secular-politics index* by combining answers to four questions: (a) Do you (4) “strongly agree,” (3) “agree,” (2) “disagree,” or (1) “strongly disagree” that your country would be a better place if religion and politics were separated; (b) if its government was similar to Western governments; (c) would it be (1) “very good,” (2) “fairly good,” (3) “fairly bad,” or (4) “very bad” for your country to have an Islamic government where religious authorities have absolute power [for Muslim respondents], a Christian government where religious authorities have absolute power [for Christian respondents];” (d) Is it (1) “very important,” (2) “important,” (3) “somewhat important,” (4) “least important,” or (5) “not at all important” for a good government to implement only the sharia (for Muslims) or only the laws inspired by Christian values (for Christians). Answers to this question were recoded to range between 1 and 4, with 1

representing less support for secular politics and 4 representing stronger support for secular politics.

Next, this paper assesses the significance of four sets of factors in predicting attitude toward secular politics. These are demographics, adherence to liberal values, individual efficacy, attitude toward the government, and orientation toward Western culture.

### **Demographics**

Pertinent demographic factors that may be linked to attitude toward secular politics include socioeconomic status, gender, place of residence, religious affiliations, and age. A single socioeconomic-status index is used as an average of education coded in nine categories ranging from no formal education (1) to university degree (9), and household income coded in approximate deciles—with (1) as the lowest decile and (10) as the highest. *Gender*, *rural area*, *religion*, and *youth bulge* are included as dummy variables; male (=1, 0=female), Christian (=1, Muslim=0), rural (=1, 0=otherwise), and youth bulge (18-29=1, 30+=0).

### **Liberal Values**

Secular politics is associated with other components of liberalism such that a stronger attitude toward secular politics is linked to stronger supports for liberal values. More specifically, secular-politics index is positively linked to such measures of liberal values as national identity and attitude toward gender equality, expressive individualism, and religious tolerance.

National identity is measured as a dummy variable: Respondents were asked whether they defined themselves as Egyptian above all, Muslim above all, Arab above all, or other. Those who considered themselves as Muslim were coded as '0'. Other responses were coded as 1 (those who responded as Arab or other were less than 3%).

Expressive individualism: two indicators are used to measure expressive individualism. One measures the extent to which respondents consider love as the basis for marriage rather than parental approval. A dummy variable is constructed where love is coded as 1 and parental approval as 0. The other measures attitude toward women's right to dress as they wish: Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that it is up to a woman to dress as she wishes. Those who consider love as a more important basis for marriage or believe that it is up to women to dress as they please are more favorable toward expressive individualism.

To measure attitudes toward women, a gender-equality index is constructed. This index is the average of responses to five questions: "Do you (1) "strongly agree," (2) "agree," (3) "disagree," or (4) "strongly disagree" that (a) it is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife, (b) a wife must always obey her husband, (c) men make better political leaders, (d) university education is more important for boys, and (e) when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job? This index varies between 1 and 4. A higher value on this index indicates stronger support for gender equality.

Finally, a religious-tolerance index is made by averaging responses to four questions: do you (1) "strongly agree," (2) "agree," (3) "disagree," or (4) "strongly disagree" that (a) our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions, (b) the followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine, (c) criticism of Islam should not be tolerated, and (d) criticism of Muslim religious leaders should not be tolerated (ranging from 1, low level of tolerance, to 4, high level). A higher value on this index indicates higher religious tolerance.

### **Personal Efficacy**

Efficacious individuals are those who are self-actualized and consider themselves to be autonomous. Findings indicate that they are also politically active. Individuals may be more favorable toward secular politics than less efficacious individuals. Two indicators measure this

construct. One is the extent to which the respondents believe in *free will* versus fate. Respondents were asked to choose a number on the scale of one to 10, where '10' means that "people shape their fate themselves," and '1' indicates that "everything in life is determined by fate." The other is a measure of political engagement. Respondents were asked if they had signed petitions (4) "a lot," (3) "sometimes," (2) "rarely," or (1) "not at all."

### **Attitudes toward the Government**

Considering that the current secular government is in response to the Islamism of the Muslim Brothers, it is important to assess the extent to which a favorable attitude toward secular politics is linked to favorable attitudes toward what government's conduct, and expressions. To assess these linkages, three indicators are used. One is reliance on *domestic TV* as a source of information, whether it is (4) "a great deal," (3) "some," (2) "not very much," or (1) "none at all." Given that domestic TV is under the government control, reliance on it may be a crude measure of having favorable attitudes toward what the government says. The second measures changes in the repressive activities of the state. Respondents were asked compared to five years ago, the frequency of *arbitrary arrests* was (1) "much more than before," (2) "more than before," (3) "about the same," (4) "less than before," or (5) "much less than before." Finally, they were also asked about on the scale of 1 to 10 how *democratic* the country is run, '1' being totally undemocratic and '10' totally democratic. Higher values on any of these measures indicate more favorable attitudes toward the government.

### **Orientations toward Western Culture and the United States**

In contemporary Egypt, attitude toward secular politics has been linked to attitude toward the Western culture and the United States. Liberal political groups have been favorably oriented toward the West, while the followers of political Islam have engaged in a strong campaign against Western culture, portraying it as decadent, and admonishing the public against emulating Western lifestyle. The more Western culture is discredited, the stronger will be the support for Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam. Two indicators are used to assess Egyptian orientations toward the West. One measures whether respondents consider Western cultural invasion to be (4) "a very serious problem," (3) "a serious problem," (2) "a least serious problem," (1) "not at all a problem." The other probes respondents to rate on the scale of 1 to 10 the morality of the people of the United States, where 1 is "morally decadent" and 10 is "highly moral." A higher value on either of these two measures indicate more favorable orientations toward the West and the United States.

### **Analysis and Results**

The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model is used to estimate the relationships between secular-politics index and its predictors. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for individual-level variables, and Table 4 reports the correlation matrix, showing the correlation coefficients between all the variables included in the analysis. As shown in Table 4, all the predictors are significantly correlated with the dependent variable, the absolute values of the correlation coefficients range from 0.071, with perception of free will, and .268, with rating of the morality of the citizens of the United States.

**Table 3**  
**Descriptive statistics of the Variables**

	Min	Max	Mean	S. D.
Secular-politics index-2016	1.00	4.00	2.72	0.66
Secular-politics index-2011	1.00	2.00	1.60	0.49
Socioeconomic Status	1.00	9.50	4.39	1.79
Christian	0.00	1.00	0.12	0.33
Youth	0.00	1.00	0.18	0.38
Gender: Male (1), Female (2)	1.00	2.00	1.49	0.50
Urban (1), Rural (2)	1.00	2.00	1.60	0.49
National identity	0.00	1.00	0.46	0.50
Gender-Index	1.00	4.00	2.18	0.55
Basis for marriage	1.00	2.00	1.28	0.45
Dress as she wishes	1.00	4.00	1.70	0.90
Religious-tolerance index	1.00	4.00	2.60	0.74
Prayer	1.00	9.00	8.05	1.65
Belief in free will vs. fate	1.00	10.00	4.03	2.31
Sign petitions	1.00	4.00	1.10	0.37
TV as information source	1.00	4.00	2.83	0.98
Unlawful arrest	1.00	5.00	2.60	1.05
Democratic governance	1.00	10.00	4.53	2.01
Western cultural invasion	1.00	5.00	3.87	1.15
Morality of Americans	1.00	10.00	3.79	2.48

**Table 4**  
**Correlation coefficients between fundamentalism and its predictors**

Secular-politics index-2016																			
Christian	.244 <sup>b</sup>																		
Socioeconomic status	.210 <sup>b</sup>	.118 <sup>b</sup>																	
Youth bulge	.090 <sup>b</sup>	.054	.147 <sup>b</sup>																
Gender	-.125 <sup>b</sup>	-.083 <sup>b</sup>	-.105 <sup>b</sup>	.013															
Rural (2), Urban (1)	-.102 <sup>b</sup>	.056	-.132 <sup>b</sup>	.049	-.016														
Secular-politics index-2011	.176 <sup>b</sup>	.361 <sup>b</sup>	.144 <sup>b</sup>	-.019	-.126 <sup>b</sup>	-.071 <sup>a</sup>													
National identity	.240 <sup>b</sup>	.147 <sup>b</sup>	.043	-.042	-.042	-.004	.101 <sup>b</sup>												
Gender-equality index	.134 <sup>b</sup>	.096 <sup>b</sup>	.107 <sup>b</sup>	.034	.212 <sup>b</sup>	-.150 <sup>b</sup>	.024	.060 <sup>a</sup>											
Basis for marriage	.159 <sup>b</sup>	.133 <sup>b</sup>	.165 <sup>b</sup>	.211 <sup>b</sup>	-.065 <sup>a</sup>	-.012	.035	-.001	.053										
Dress as she wishes	.102 <sup>b</sup>	.242 <sup>b</sup>	.120 <sup>b</sup>	.038	.118 <sup>b</sup>	-.025	.049	.130 <sup>b</sup>	.092 <sup>b</sup>	.074 <sup>a</sup>									
Religious-tolerance index	.298 <sup>b</sup>	.076 <sup>a</sup>	.194 <sup>b</sup>	.062 <sup>a</sup>	-.111 <sup>b</sup>	-.071 <sup>a</sup>	.020	.050	-.002	.201 <sup>b</sup>	-.020								
Prayer	-.130 <sup>b</sup>	-.376 <sup>b</sup>	-.010	-.146 <sup>b</sup>	.059 <sup>a</sup>	-.012	-.166 <sup>b</sup>	-.116 <sup>b</sup>	-.026	-.073 <sup>a</sup>	-.133 <sup>b</sup>	-.046							
Free will vs. fate	.071 <sup>a</sup>	.033	.185 <sup>b</sup>	.007	-.053	.066 <sup>a</sup>	.065 <sup>a</sup>	.083 <sup>b</sup>	-.005	.036	.065 <sup>a</sup>	.070 <sup>a</sup>	-.092 <sup>b</sup>						
Sign petitions	.092 <sup>b</sup>	-.053	.113 <sup>b</sup>	-.020	-.117 <sup>b</sup>	-.030	.059 <sup>a</sup>	-.003	.016	.037	-.045	.024	.034	.004					
TV as information source	.143 <sup>b</sup>	.001	-.001	-.049	.022	.093 <sup>b</sup>	.028	.089 <sup>b</sup>	-.018	.089 <sup>b</sup>	.020	.051	-.018	.138 <sup>b</sup>	-.036				
Unlawful arrests	.214 <sup>b</sup>	.097 <sup>b</sup>	.068 <sup>a</sup>	-.024	-.050	-.005	.084 <sup>b</sup>	.155 <sup>b</sup>	.048	.042	.105 <sup>b</sup>	.083 <sup>b</sup>	.004	.070 <sup>a</sup>	.052	.181 <sup>b</sup>			
Democratic governance	.152 <sup>b</sup>	.058	.059 <sup>a</sup>	-.038	-.010	.055	.070 <sup>a</sup>	.195 <sup>b</sup>	-.068 <sup>a</sup>	-.053	.092 <sup>b</sup>	-.012	.032	.143 <sup>b</sup>	.064 <sup>a</sup>	.140 <sup>b</sup>	.363 <sup>b</sup>		
Western cultural invasion	-.107 <sup>b</sup>	-.108 <sup>b</sup>	-.006	-.060 <sup>a</sup>	.012	.056	-.022	-.062 <sup>a</sup>	-.090 <sup>b</sup>	-.020	-.122 <sup>b</sup>	-.034	.102 <sup>b</sup>	-.019	.110 <sup>b</sup>	.067 <sup>a</sup>	.119 <sup>b</sup>	.049	
Morality of Americans	.268 <sup>b</sup>	.228 <sup>b</sup>	.244 <sup>b</sup>	.116 <sup>b</sup>	-.141 <sup>b</sup>	-.013	.152 <sup>b</sup>	.000	.035	.141 <sup>b</sup>	.113 <sup>b</sup>	.166 <sup>b</sup>	-.185 <sup>b</sup>	.209 <sup>b</sup>	.050	.097 <sup>b</sup>	.020	.112	-.080 <sup>b</sup>

Table 5 reports the results of multiple-regression estimates (standardized) of the predictors of the attitudes toward secular politics among Egyptians. The estimates show strong main effects, with  $F$ -values of 23.30 and adjusted  $R^2$  of .271.

**Demographics.** Socioeconomic status, religion, age, gender, and place of residence are all significantly linked to secular-politics index ( $\beta = .055, .107, .053, -.063, -.071$ , respectively). That is, people of a higher socioeconomic status, Christian, the youth, men, and urban residents are more supportive of secular politics than people of a lower socioeconomic status, Muslim, the old, women, and rural residents.

**Liberal Values.** Other components of liberal values are also linked to the dependent variable. People who had more favorable attitude toward secular politics in 2011 were also supportive of secular politics, although this linkage is weak ( $\beta = .051$ ). More strongly linked to secular-politics index are measures of national identity, gender equality, and religious tolerance are ( $\beta = .160, .092, .208$ , respectively). Thus, respondents who identify primarily with Egypt, not Islam, more strongly favor gender equality, and display a higher level of religious tolerance espouse more favorable attitudes toward secular politics. Measures of expressive individualism, basis for marriage and attitudes toward women's right to dress as she wishes, and religiosity have no significant link with attitudes toward secular politics.

**Personal efficacy.** The belief in free will or in the individual's ability to shape his or her destiny has no significant link with secular-politics index. However, the frequency of signing petitions, as a measure of political engagement, is significantly connected to attitudes toward secular politics ( $\beta = .069$ ).

**Attitudes toward the Government.** All the three measures related to orientations toward the government are significantly linked to secular-politics index. Reliance on domestic TV as a source of information, perception concerning the frequency of unlawful arrests, and assessment of democratic performance are all positively linked to the dependent variables ( $\beta = .096, .112$ , and  $.058$ , respectively). In other words, the more Egyptians rely on domestic TV as the source of information, the stronger their perception that there are fewer unlawful arrests now than it was before, and the higher their rating of democratic governance of their country, the more favorable are their attitudes toward secular politics.

Orientations toward the West and the U.S. Concerns about Western cultural invasion and the rating of the morality of American citizens are linked to secular-politics index ( $\beta = -.079, .141$ ). The less Egyptians are concerned about the influence of Western culture on their society and the higher their rating of the morality of the American public, the stronger their attitudes are toward secular politics. Considering the size of beta coefficient, Egyptians' rating of the morality of the American public is among the top most important predictors of secular politics, the other two being national identity and religious tolerance. See Table 5 for the results of the multiple regression estimates.

To recap, the analysis of the predictors of attitudes toward secular politics provided support for several lines of arguments. Stronger attitude toward secular politics is linked to (1) a higher socioeconomic status, being Christian, being male, younger, and living in an urban area; (2) upholding similar attitudes in the past and adhering to the liberal values of gender equality, and religious tolerance, and identifying with the nation rather than religion; (3) being engaged in politics; (4) displaying favorable attitudes toward the government; and (5) holding favorable attitudes toward the West and American people.

Therefore, in addition to such known correlates of secular politics as socioeconomic status, adherence to liberal values, and religious tolerance, the fate of secular politics among Egyptians appears to be linked to favorable attitudes toward the secular government and Western culture. How well the secular government performs economically and democratically, and the extent to which Egyptians maintain favorable attitude toward the West and consider American people moral are all connected to favorable attitude toward secular politics.



**Table 5**  
**Multiple regression estimates of secular politics**

	<b>Beta</b>
<b>Demographics</b>	
Socioeconomic Status	0.055 <sup>b</sup>
Female	-0.062 <sup>b</sup>
Youth	0.053 <sup>b</sup>
Rural	-0.071 <sup>c</sup>
Christian	0.107 <sup>d</sup>
<b>Liberal values</b>	
Secular-politics Index-2011	0.051 <sup>a</sup>
National Identity	0.160 <sup>d</sup>
Gender-equality index	0.092 <sup>d</sup>
Love as the basis for marriage	0.038
Woman dresses as she wishes	0.002
Religious Tolerance Index	0.208 <sup>d</sup>
Prayer	-0.008
<b>Personal Efficacy</b>	
Free will vs. fate	-0.036
Sign petitions	0.069 <sup>c</sup>
<b>Attitudes toward the Government</b>	
Reliance on TV	0.096 <sup>d</sup>
Unlawful arrest	0.112 <sup>d</sup>
Democratic governance	0.058 <sup>b</sup>
<b>Attitudes toward the West</b>	
Western cultural invasion	-0.079 <sup>b</sup>
Morality level: The U.S.	0.141 <sup>d</sup>
R <sup>2</sup> & R <sup>2</sup> <sub>adj</sub>	.28 & .27
Df/Df	19/1139,
F-ratio	23.296 <sup>d</sup>
a < .10, b < .05, c < .01, d < .001.	

### **Egypt In A Comparative Perspective**

Findings from cross-sectional and panel surveys supported the view that the events of 2011 marked a major shift in value orientations among Egyptians toward secular politics, religious tolerance, and Western culture. As will be shown below, findings from two waves of panel survey carried out in Tunisia and Turkey indicate that similar changes have also transpired among the citizens of the two countries. Tunisia is where the movement of the Arab Spring started. Turkey, on the other hand, is not an Arab country, but share considerable cultural characteristics and historical experience with Arab countries in the modern period. The similarities in values change between Turkey and the two Arab countries may be indicative that what has transpired in Egypt represents a broader shift in values across the countries in the Middle East and North Africa.


### **Secular Politics**

Similar measures of secular politics used in Egyptian surveys are also available for Tunisia and Turkey: attitude toward the separation of religion and politics, Western-style government, and the implementation of the sharia as the characteristic of a good government.

First, on the separation of religion and politics, Figure 20 shows that the percentages who “agreed strongly” or “agreed” increased among Egyptians from 33% and 27% in 2011 to 45% and 27% in 2016. These percentages, however, did not increase among Tunisian and Turkish respondents between the two waves of the panel survey. Combining “strongly agree” and “agree,” these percentages remained at 68-69% in both waves in Tunisia and Turkey. In the second wave of the panel survey, a higher percentage of Egyptians, however, than Tunisian or Turkish respondents strongly agreed or agreed with separation of religion and politics—72% Egyptians versus 68% Tunisians and 67% Turkish.

Nevertheless, it can be said that the support for this measure is quite high across the three countries, and the great majority of the public do not prefer a system in which religion and politics intermingle.


**Figure 20**  
**COUNTRY will be a better society if religion and politics were separated**



The second question probes respondents whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” that their country would be a better place if its government were similar to Western governments. The percentages of the respondents who “strongly agreed” or “agreed” increased across the three countries between the two waves of the panel surveys. As shown in Figure 21, among Egyptians, those who “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that their country would be a better place if religion and politics were separated increased substantially from 15% and 18% in 2011 to 20% and 26% in 2015. The percentage of those who had the same opinion also increased from 23% and 22% in 2013 to 27% and 24% in 2015, respectively, in Tunisia, and from 9% and 28% in 2013 to 15% and 30% in 2016, respectively, in Turkey.


As this figure indicates, across the three countries, a higher percentage of respondents preferred a Western-type government for their country in the second wave of the surveys. This shift in values is remarkable in that it not only indicates an increase in support for secular politics, but a greater appreciation for Western type government.

**Figure 21**  
**COUNTRY will be a better society if its government was similar to Western governments.**



Finally, there has been considerable decline in support for the sharia between the two waves across the three countries. Respondents were asked whether it was “very important,” “important,” “not important,” or “not at all important” for a good government to implement only the laws of the sharia. Among Egyptians, the percentages who said it was “very important” or “important” dropped from 27% and 25%, respectively, in 2011 to 19% and 25%, respectively, in 2016. This decline among Tunisians was from 12% and 14% in 2013 to 10% and 8% in 2015, respectively, but there were no significant changes among Turkish respondents, from 5% and 13% in 2013 to 6% and 13% in 2016. However, it should be noted that the percentages of “don’t know” responses have increased considerably across the countries between the two surveys; from 2% to 12% among Egyptian, 3% to 7% among Tunisian, and 7% to 12% among Turkish respondents.


**Figure 22**  
**A good government should implement only the laws of the shari'a**



### National versus Religious Identity and National Prides

Figure 23 displays changes in the respondents’ self-definition of the basis of their identity across the three countries. Among Egyptians, the percentage of the respondents who defined themselves as Egyptian above all dropped from 52% in 2011 to 43% in 2016, while those defining themselves as Muslim increased from 46% to 54%, respectively. Among Tunisian and Turkish respondents, on the other hand, this change was toward wider identification with the nation rather than religion. Among Tunisian respondents, 30% defined themselves as Tunisians above all in 2013, while in 2015 this percentage increased to 37%, and those defining themselves as Muslims above all dropped from 59% to 52%, respectively. Among Turkish respondents, the percentage of those identifying with the nation increased from 44% in 2013 to 53% in 2016, but those with religion dropped from 39% to 36%, respectively.


As shown in Figure 23, considering a longer time horizon, there has been a significant increase in support for national identity and a commensurate decline in religious identity among Egyptians since 2001. The point of this comparison, however, is to show that it is not only in Egypt that a shift in attitudes toward liberal nationalist values has occurred. Tunisia and Turkey have also experienced similar changes.



Concerning national pride, there is a degree of inconsistency across the three countries. According to Figure 24, the percentage of the respondents who said that they were “very proud” to be citizens of their countries declined among Egyptians from 88% to 62% between 2011 and 2016, and among Turkish respondents from 80% to 69% between 2013 and 2016, but it increased among Tunisians from 77% and 84% between 2013 and 2015.

We know that people in more liberal-democratic countries tend to express a weaker feeling of national pride (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), and the decline in national pride among Egyptian and Turkish respondents is consistent with a shift in their views toward liberal values. This decline may also indicate Egyptian and Turkish dismay with the rise of political authoritarianism in their countries, following the military overthrow of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, and Turkish Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarian behavior. The rise of national pride in Tunisia, on the other


hand, may indicate the heightened feelings of nationalism as a result of the country's steady transition to democracy.



### **Western Culture**


Concerns about Western interventions into the domestic affairs of their country have been the hallmark of Pan-Arab nationalists, Turkish nationalists, and Islamic fundamentalists. The latter's dislike of Western culture was not merely a reflection of their alarmist attitudes toward what they believed to be Western machination; fundamentalists reject Western culture because they believe that it is decadent.

Parallel to changes toward liberal values has been a decline in the percentage of the people who considered Western cultural invasion to be a "very important" problem. As shown in Figure 25, among Egyptians those who thought this invasion to be a "very important" problem declined from 66% and 41%, among Tunisians from 41% to 40% (no significant change), and among Turkish from 50% to 29% between the two waves.



### Religious Tolerance


Tolerance of religions other than one's own is considered sine qua non for the development of stable liberal democracy. Using the five indicators mentioned in Figure 14, a religious-tolerance index is constructed to compare religious tolerance across the three countries. This index ranges from 1 (high level of religious intolerance) to 4 (high level of religious tolerance). As Figure 26 shows, the value of this index has significantly increased across the three countries between the two waves of the panel surveys: from 2.25 to 2.6 in Egypt, 2.72 to 2.92 in Tunisia, and 2.43 to 2.70 in Turkey.



### Gender Equality

A measure of gender-equality index is constructed as an average of responses to five questions measuring attitudes toward gender equality in the family, politics, labor market, and university

education. The value of this index varies between 1, indicating strong support for gender inequality, and 4, indicating strong support against gender inequality. A higher value on this measure indicates stronger support for gender equality. As Figure 27 shows, the value of the index has increased across the three countries between the two waves of the panel survey from 2.08 to 2.18 among Egyptian, from 2.48 to 2.52 among Tunisian, and from 2.71 to 2.77 among Turkish respondents.



### Summary

To recap, a great majority of Egyptians believed that the revolutionary movement that toppled President Hosni Mubarak was for freedom and economic prosperity, even though a lower percentage among them thought so in 2016 than they did in 2011, and that a much larger percentage of the respondents expressed that these movements were a Western conspiracy or simply did not know what their goals were in 2016 than they did in 2011. Furthermore, while Egyptians overwhelmingly agreed that the 2014 elections were fair, a large majority believes in the prevalence of corruption among government officials. They also perceived that their freedoms have expanded since the overthrow of the former regime. At the same time, they pointed to an increase in number of unlawful arrests, heightened corruption in politics and government, and expansions in the gap between the rich and the poor. Consistent with these views is the decline in their ratings of democratic governance and government performance, which have fallen below average between the two surveys.

The regression estimates of the predictors of attitude toward secular politics showed that the construct is positively linked to a higher socioeconomic status; being Christian, young, and male; and living in urban areas; national identity, greater religious tolerance, and favorable attitudes toward the government, Western culture, and American citizens. Finally, similar changes toward secular politics, religious tolerance, and Western culture have also occurred in Tunisia and Turkey.



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**Egypt Questionnaire**  
**Changes in Political Engagement and Belief Formation in Egypt**  
**Draft Questionnaire**  
 August 2016  
 Questionnaire ID, four digit \_\_\_\_\_

**INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWER: THIS INTRODUCTION MUST BE READ TO EACH RESPONDENT BEFORE BEGINNING THE INTERVIEW:**

My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am from El-Zanaty & Associates. We are carrying out research in Egypt on what people value in life. This research will interview a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Egypt. Your home address was selected randomly as part of a representative sample of the people living in Egypt in 2011, and we are recontacting you now to request your participation in a second interview.

We are so grateful for your cooperation in 2011. Now, we are again seeking your permission to ask your opinion on topics such as development, beliefs about families, politics, media use, corruption, and various other attributes of individual and family life. For example, we might ask you how optimistic you feel these days, or about how important you think democracy is when discussing attributes of a good government. Please be assured that there is no right or wrong answer to any of these questions. Your help is extremely important because it will contribute to a better understanding of what people around the world believe and want out of life.

Your answers will be kept completely confidential. Your identifying information will be kept in a separate, secure location from your survey responses and will be linked only by an arbitrary identification number. We believe there is no risk to you for taking part in this study. Any answers you give will be combined with the responses of all other participants. This means that no one will be able to trace the identities of any of our individual participants. The results of this research will be used for academic purposes only and will be disseminated in scholarly journals and presentations. This research may be indirectly beneficial to you because it contributes to the development of the social sciences and to public policy in Egypt.

Like last time, this interview will take about an hour or so and I want to assure you that it is completely voluntary and confidential.

We may contact you in the future about an opportunity to participate in a follow-up discussion about some of the same topics raised in the questions I'll be asking you today. Again, participation in any subsequent interview would be completely voluntary and confidential.

By verbally stating "I agree," you are indicating that you are at least 18 years of age, you have had this consent form read to you, your questions have been answered, and you voluntarily agree to participate. If you agree, please state "I agree."

If you want to know more about the study, you can call Dr. Fatma El-Zanaty at El-Zanaty & Associates, [002-0238241464](tel:002-0238241464).

**Section A1**

V1\_A.

**EXACT TIME NOW (CODE USING 24 HOUR CLOCK):** \_\_\_\_\_

How are you? Thank you so much for your time and for agreeing to share with us your views and experiences. I would like to begin by asking a few questions about changes that have occurred in your life since the last time we talked, around June 2011.

v1.	Since June 2011, have there been any changes in your family? Have you: <b>(READ OUT AND CODE ONE ONLY)</b> : 1. Married 2. Separated 3. Divorced 4. Been widowed 5. Not married 7. No change 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)
v2.	Have there been any births in your immediate family since June 2011? 1. Yes 5. No → Skip to v4 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)
v3.	<b>(IF YES IN V2)</b> Congratulations! Who in the family had a baby? <b>(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)</b> 1. Female respondent or respondent's wife 2. Respondent's brother/sister/brother-in-law/sister-in-law 3. Respondent's child 4. Other (Please specify) _____
v4.	Since June 2011, have you been enrolled in any educational program, even for just a short time? <b>[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT NEEDS CLARIFICATION, INTERVIEWER SHOULD SAY: "AN EDUCATION PROGRAM THAT CAN RESULT IN AN ADVANTAGE OR ADVANCEMENT IN THE WORKFORCE"]</b> 1. Yes 5. No 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)
v5.	Since June 2011, have you quit school? 1. Yes 5. No 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)

v6.	Since June 2011, have you lost your job? [Note to interviewer: If respondent says “retired”, then code this item as “5”, “No”.] 1. Yes 5. No 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)
v7.	Since June 2011, have you started a new job? 1. Yes 5. No 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)
v8.	Since June 2011, have you experienced bankruptcy? 1. Yes 5. No 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)

**Section A2**

Thank you so much for sharing this information. A lot of things have happened in Egypt since June 2011 as well. Now I would like to talk about some of those events.

v9. What was the most important event that occurred in Egypt since the last time we talked? **(NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: PLEASE SPECIFY)**  
Please Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

**INTERVIEWERS: DO NOT READ THESE ITEMS TO THE RESPONDENTS. THIS IS A PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION. PROBE RESPONDENTS IF THEY CANNOT RECALL ANY EVENT.)**

1. The election of Morsi to presidency
2. Constitutional referendum
3. Attacks on Copts
4. Morsi deposed
5. Election of al-Sisi to the presidency
6. Muslim Brothers gathering at Raba Square
7. Arrest and detainment of Muslim Brothers
8. Parliamentary elections 2012
9. Dissolution of 2012 Parliament
10. 30 June Revolution
11. Economic instability
12. Trials of previous political leaders
13. Bombing of Russian airline out of Sharm el-Sheikh
14. Port Said Massacre
15. Opening of the Suez Canal
16. Italian student killed in Egypt
17. Corruption cases
18. One million Fadden project
19. OTHER (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_
98. DK
99. NR

Now, I am going to read you a list of events **in Egypt** since June 2011. For each event, I would like you to tell me first, if you have heard of it. Then, if you have heard of it, please tell me whether you thought the event was very significant, somewhat significant, not very significant, or not at all significant. [SHOWCARD 1]

**[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT CHOSE AN EVENT IN V9 THAT IS ALSO LISTED IN V10 – V22\_5, DO NOT ASK ABOUT THAT EVENT AGAIN. CODE THAT EVENT AS “7”, NOT APPLICABLE, AND CONTINUE TO THE NEXT EVENT.]**

	Very significant	Somewhat significant	Not very significant	Not at all significant	Not heard of event	NA	DK	NR
v10. Election of Morsi to presidency	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v11. Constitutional referendum	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v12. Attacks on Coptic Christians	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v13. Morsi deposed	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v14. Election of al-Sisi to presidency	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v15. Muslim Brothers gathering at Raba Square	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v16. Arrest and detainment of the Muslim Brothers	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v17. Parliamentary elections 2012	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v18. The dissolution of 2012 Parliament	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v19. 30 June Revolution	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v20. Economic instability	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v21. Trials of previous political leaders	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v22. Bombing of Russian airline out of Sharm el-Sheikh	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V22_1. Port Said Massacre	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V22_2. Opening of Suez Canal	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V22_3. Italian student killed in Egypt	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V22_4. Corruption cases	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V22_5. One million Fadden project	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9

v23. I am going to give you a card that lists the events I just asked you about. Among those you have heard of, which would you say seems to you most important? [SHOWCARD 2]

**[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT VOLUNTEERS THE SAME EVENT AS IN V9, AND IT IS NOT LISTED ON THE CARD, ACCEPT THE RESPONSE. CODE THE RESPONSE "19" AND SPECIFY THE EVENT.]**

1. The election of Morsi to presidency
2. Constitutional referendum
3. Attacks on Copts
4. Morsi deposed
5. Election of al-Sisi to the presidency
6. Muslim Brothers gathering at Raba Square
7. Arrest and detainment of Muslim Brothers
8. Parliamentary elections 2012
9. Dissolution of 2012 Parliament
10. 30 June Revolution
11. Economic instability
12. Trials of previous political leaders
13. Bombing of Russian airline out of Sharm el-Sheikh
14. Port Said Massacre
15. Opening of the Suez Canal
16. Italian student killed in Egypt
17. Corruption cases
18. One million Fadden project
19. OTHER (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_
98. DK
99. NR

v24. How much were you emotionally affected by the [EVENT CODED IN V23]? A great deal, some, not very much, or not at all?  
**[PROCESSING NOTE: IF RESPONDENT ANSWERED 'DK/NR' TO V23, V24 IS AUTOMATICALLY SKIPPED.]**

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v25. To what extent did the event change your perspective?  
**[PROCESSING NOTE: IF RESPONDENT ANSWERED 'DK/NR' TO V23, V24 IS AUTOMATICALLY SKIPPED.]**

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

**Section A3**

A lot has also happened outside Egypt since June 2011.

v26. What was the most important event that occurred outside Egypt since the last time we talked in 2011? **(NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWERS: DO NOT READ THESE ITEMS TO THE RESPONDENTS. THIS IS A PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION. PROPE RESPONDENTS IF THEY CANNOT RECALL ANY EVENT.)**

1. ISIS attacks
2. Israeli-Palestinian conflict
3. Syrian civil war
4. Armed conflict in Libya
5. Iraqi civil war
6. Unrest in Lebanon due to Syria
7. National dialog in Libya
8. Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris
9. Yemen civil war
10. Nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S.
11. Terrorist attacks in Tunisia
12. Crisis in Greece
13. November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris
14. San Bernardino attacks in December 2015
15. Coup attempt in Turkey
16. EgyptAir crash (flight from Cairo to Paris), May 2016
17. Construction of El-Nahda Dam
18. Terrorist incidence in Germany, Summer 2016
19. OTHER (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

Now I am going to read you a list of events outside of Egypt since June 2011. For each event, I would like you to tell me first, if you have heard of it. Then, if you have heard of it, please tell me whether you thought the event was very significant, somewhat significant, not very significant, or not at all significant [SHOWCARD 3]

**[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT CHOSE AN EVENT IN V31 THAT IS ALSO LISTED IN V27-V40\_4, DO NOT ASK ABOUT THAT EVENT AGAIN. CODE THAT EVENT AS “7”, NOT APPLICABLE, AND CONTINUE TO THE NEXT EVENT.]**

(...very significant, somewhat significant, not very significant, or not at all significant e?)	Very significant	Somewhat significant	Not very significant	Not at all significant	Has not heard of event	Not app	DK	NR
v27. ISIS attacks	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v28. Israeli-Palestinian conflict	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v29. Syrian civil war	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v30. Armed conflict in Libya	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v31. Iraqi civil war	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v32. Unrest in Lebanon due to Syria	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v33. National dialog in Libya	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v34. Attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v35. Yemen civil war	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v36. Nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S.	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v37. Terrorist attacks in Tunisia	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v38. Crisis in Greece	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v39. November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
v40. San Bernardino attacks in December 2015	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V40_1. Coup attempt in Turkey	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V40_2. EgyptAir crash (flight from Cairo to Paris), May 2016	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V40_3. Construction of El-Nahda Dam	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9
V40_4. Terrorist incidence in Germany, Summer 2016	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9





(CODE FIVE ONLY)

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? (Please choose up to five) (Respondent Show Card 6)

	Selected	Not Selected	DK	NR
v47. Independence?	1	2	8	9
v48. Hard work?	1	2	8	9
v49. Feeling of responsibility?	1	2	8	9
v50. Imagination?	1	2	8	9
v51. Tolerance and respect for other people?	1	2	8	9
v52. Thrift?	1	2	8	9
v53. Determination, perseverance?	1	2	8	9
v54. Religious faith?	1	2	8	9
v55. Unselfishness?	1	2	8	9
v56. Obedience?	1	2	8	9

Next, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v57. It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v58. A wife must always obey her husband.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v59. On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	1	2	3	4	8	9
v60. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v61. It is up to a woman to dress whichever way she wants do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v62. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.	1	2	3	4	8	9

v63.	Which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just tell me number on the card. (Respondent Show Card 7)	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
								DK	NR

V63\_1. INTERVIEWER: WAS ANYONE ELSE BESIDES THE RESPONDENT PRESENT FOR ANY PORTION OF SECTION A4?

1. Yes
2. No

**Section B**

Thinking about what should change to make your country a better place to live, and please tell us if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following:

Egypt will be a better society:	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	DK	NR
v64. If religion and politics are separated.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v65. If its government was similar to Western governments.	1	2	3	4	8	9

v66. Among the following, which problems for your country do you consider very important (very serious), important, somewhat important, least important, or not important? (Show Card 8)

	Very important	Important	Somewhat important	Least important	Not important	DK	NR
Cultural invasion by the West	1	2	3	4	5	8	9



How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Agree Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v76.	Religious leaders should not interfere in politics. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v77.	It would be better for Egypt if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office. (Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	1	2	3	4	8	9
v78.	There are conspiracies against Muslims. (Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	1	2	3	4	8	9

Now, I would like to know your views about a good government. How important is each of the following traits for a good government?

		Very important	Important	Somewhat important	Least important	Not important	DK	NR
v79.	It should make laws according to the people's wishes	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v80.	It should implement only the laws of the shari' a/It should implement only laws inspired by Christian values	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

V80\_1. INTERVIEWER: WAS ANYONE ELSE BESIDES THE RESPONDENT PRESENT FOR ANY PORTION OF SECTION C?

1. Yes
2. No

#### Section D

The next set of questions is about religion. Please be assured they are in no way intended to reveal doubts about anyone's faith in their religion. These questions are being asked to people of different religions all over the world including Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and so on. We compare people's responses in different countries in order to understand the similarities and differences in their religious faiths. We appreciate everyone's generous contributions to our research. **(Respondent Show Card 11)**

	Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v81.	Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about Allah's severe punishment. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v82.	<b>Only</b> Islam [Christianity (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Judaism (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] provides comprehensive truth about Allah.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v83.	Non-Muslims [Non-Christians (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Non-Jews (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] should be <b>prohibited</b> from practicing their religion in Egypt.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v84.	Only the fear of Allah keeps people on the right path.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v85.	The Quran [Bible (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/the Torah (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] is true from beginning to end.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v86.	Only Islam [Christianity (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Judaism (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] gives a complete and unailing guide to human salvation and guidance. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v87.	Allah requires his slaves to repent (tobbah)	1	2	3	4	8	9
v88.	Only Muslims [Christians (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Jews (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] will go to heaven.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v89.	Our children should not be allowed to <b>learn</b> about other religions.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v90.	The followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v91.	Satan is behind any attempt to undermine belief in Allah. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9



- v105\_1. INTERVIEWER: WAS ANYONE ELSE BESIDES THE RESPONDENT PRESENT FOR ANY PORTION OF SECTION D?
1. Yes
  2. No

**Section D2**

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about politics. I'd like you to look at card 15. I'm going to read out some types of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all **since Summer 2011**.

**(Respondent Show Card 16)**

(...would you say a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all?)		A lot	Sometimes	Rarely	Not at all	DK	NR
v106.	Sign a petition? Have you signed a petition a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all since Summer 2011?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v107.	Attend a non-violent protest, march, or sit-in?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v108.	Attend a demonstration to support a political figure or party?						
v109.	Participate in a political activity in which there was the possibility of being arrested?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v110.	Participate in a political activity in which you feared for your personal safety?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v111.	Participate in a violent political activity that might lead to property damage or injury of others?	1	2	3	4	8	9

How effective do you think the following types of political action are? Please use a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means that the political activity is not at all effective in fulfilling its goal, and 4 means the political activity is extremely effective in fulfilling its goal.

**(Respondent Show Card 17)**

(...would you say it is not at all effective, somewhat effective, effective, or extremely effective?)		Not at all effective	Somewhat effective	Effective	Extremely effective	DK	NR
v112.	Sign a petition? Would you say it is not at all effective, somewhat effective, effective, or extremely effective?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v113.	Attend a non-violent protest, march, or sit-in?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v114.	Attend a demonstration to support a political figure or party?						
v115.	Engage in a violent political activity that might lead to property damage or injury of others?	1	2	3	4	8	9

v116.	<p>If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is the most important obligation for Egyptians?</p> <p><b>(Respondent Show Card 18)</b></p> <p><b>(INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWER: CIRCLE ONLY ONE CHOICE):</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Try hard to excel in science and technology</li> <li>2. Travel to other Muslim countries to fight the enemies of Islam</li> <li>3. Defend people's freedom of speech</li> <li>4. To apply Islamic shari'a in Egypt</li> <li>8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT)</li> <li>9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)</li> </ol>
-------	---

**Section D3**

- v117. Whom did you vote for in the run-off election for president in Egypt in 2012? \_\_\_\_\_
1. Mohamed Morsi
  2. Ahmed Shafik
  97. I did not participate in the elections [DO NOT READ OUT]
  98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
  99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

- v118. On the whole, how would you rate the fairness of the elections in 2012? Was it completely fair, fair but with minor problems, fair but with major problems, or not fair?
1. Completely fair
  2. Fair, but with minor problems
  3. Fair, with major problems
  4. Not fair
  8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
  9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

- v119. Whom did you vote for in the election for president in Egypt in 2014? \_\_\_\_\_
1. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
  2. Hamdeen Sabahi
  97. I did not participate in the elections [DO NOT READ OUT]
  98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
  99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

- v120. On the whole, how would you rate the fairness of the elections in 2014? Was it completely fair, fair but with minor problems, fair but with major problems, or not fair?
1. Completely fair
  2. Fair, but with minor problems
  3. Fair, with major problems
  4. Not fair
  8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
  9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

- v121. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, is corruption currently among government officials in Egypt very common, common, uncommon, or very uncommon?
1. Very common
  2. Common
  3. Uncommon
  4. Very uncommon
  8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
  9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

We would like you now to compare the present conditions in Egypt with those before the June 30 Revolution (in 2013). In each of the following areas, would you say that today things occur much more than before, somewhat more than before, about the same, somewhat less than before, or much less than before? <b>(Respondent Show Card 19)</b>								
(...would you say this occurs much more than before, somewhat more than before, is much the same, somewhat less than before, or much less than before?)		Much more than before	Somewhat more than before	Much the Same	Somewhat less than before	Much less than before	DK	NR
v122.	People's freedom to join any organization they want. Would you say this occurs much more than before, somewhat more than before, is much the same, somewhat less than before, or much less than before?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v123.	Peopledom to join anpublically express their thoughts and opinions	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v124.	Corruption in politics and government.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v125.	Unlawful arrest by the government.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v126.	The difference between the rich and the poor	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

**Section E**

v127. How much time do you usually spend watching television on an average per day?

- 0. I do not watch TV
- 1. Less than 1 hour per day
- 2. 1 - 2 hours per day
- 3. 2 - 3 hours per day
- 4. More than 3 hours per day
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v128. How much do you rely on domestic television as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?

- 1. A great deal
- 2. Some
- 3. Not very much
- 4. Not at all -----> Skip to V130
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V130
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V130

v129. Which domestic channel is the most reliable source of information for you? (PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION, DO NOT READ OUT RESPONSES)

- |                        |                          |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 101. ESC               | 122. Modern Sport        |
| 102. Channel One       | 123. El-Nas              |
| 103. Nile News         | 124. El-Majd             |
| 104. Movie Channels    | 125. C T.V               |
| 105. Channel Seven     | 126. El-Mahrosa          |
| 106. Channel Two       | 127. Al-Ahly             |
| 107. El-Hiah           | 128. ÇNile Life          |
| 108. Dream 1           | 129. Channel Three       |
| 109. None / No Channel | 130. Rotana              |
| 110. El-Mehwar         | 131. El-Masrawia         |
| 111. Nile TV           | 132. Melody              |
| 112. ÇEl-Hiah El-Hamra | 133. M B C 4             |
| 113. Al-Gazira         | 134. El-Tahrir           |
| 114. El-Arabia         | 135. El-Fraeen           |
| 116. Nile Sport        | 136. Modern              |
| 117. ON T.V            | 138. El-Hora             |
| 118. Dream 2           | 139. Libia               |
| 119. O T.V             | 140. Modern Hura         |
| 120. El-Rahma          | 197. Other: Specify_____ |
| 121. Fatafeet          |                          |

v130. How much do you rely on satellite television (foreign) as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?

- 1. A great deal
- 2. Some
- 3. Not very much
- 4. Not at all -----> Skip to V132
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V132
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V132

v131. Which satellite television channel (foreign) is the most reliable source of information for you? (PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION, DO NOT READ OUT RESPONSES)

- |                       |                         |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| 101. ON T.V           | 112. ÇEl-Hiah El-Zarkaa |
| 102. Al-Gazira        | 113. Euro News          |
| 103. BBC              | 114. ÐaÇÉ M T H         |
| 104. El-Hiah El-Hamra | 115. Rotana             |
| 105. El-Mehwar        | 116. El-Majd            |
| 106. El-Tahrir        | 117. El-Rahma           |
| 107. MBC2             | 118. Nile News          |
| 108. El-Tareka        | 119. Orbit              |
| 109. Al-Arabia        | 120. Nile Drama         |
| 110. C T.V            | 121. ESC                |
| 111. ElFraeen         | 122. El-Nas             |

- 123. Melody Aflam
- 124. Nile Sport
- 125. Dream
- 126. El-Hakika
- 127. C N N
- 128. O T.V
- 129. Abu Dhabi Drama
- 130. Iqraa
- 131. Action
- 132. Hala
- 134. Dubi
- 135. Panorama
- 136. Modern
- 138. Moga Comedy

- 139. ERU T.V
- 140. National Geographic Abu Dhabi
- 141. C T Z
- 142. Al-Ahly
- 143. El-Mostkla
- 144. El-Hura
- 145. L B C
- 146. ZEE Aflam
- 147. El-Mahba
- 148. El-Ray
- 149. C.B.C
- 150. El Karma
- 151. El-Hurria
- 197. Other: Specify\_\_\_\_\_

v132. How much do you rely on radio as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?

- 1. A great deal
- 2. Some
- 3. Not very much
- 4. Not at all -----> Skip to V134
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V134
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V134

v133. Which radio channel is the most reliable source of information for you? (PRE-CODED OPEN ENDED QUESTION, DO NOT READ OUT RESPONSES)

- 101. El-Quran
- 102. El-Pernamj El-Am
- 103. El-Sharq El-Awsat
- 104. Monte Carlo
- 105. Mahatet Misr
- 106. El-Qahira El-kobra
- 107. Ezaet El-Qahira
- 108. FM
- 109. El-Shbab and El-Riada

- 110. Soot El-Arab
- 111. ÇEzaet Shmal El-Saed
- 112. Ezaet London
- 113. Misr News
- 114. Mega FM
- 115. Radio Masr
- 116. El Aghaniy
- 117. Cairo Voice
- 197. Other: Specify\_\_\_\_\_

v134. How much do you rely on newspapers as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?

- 1. A great deal
- 2. Some
- 3. Not very much
- 4. Not at all -----> Skip to V136
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V136
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V136

v135. Which newspaper is the most reliable source of information for you? (PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION, DO NOT READ OUT RESPONSES)

- 101. El-Masry El-Youm
- 102. El-Akhbar El-Youm
- 103. Al-Ahram
- 104. El-Gomhoria
- 105. Gardt El-Ahly
- 106. El-Wafd
- 107. El-Dostour
- 108. El-Mesaa
- 109. El-Shrouq
- 110. El-Ahram El-Msaec
- 111. El-Nabaa
- 112. El-Qana
- 113. El-Waseet
- 114. El-Youm El-Sabee
- 116. El-Fajr
- 118. El-Esboa
- 119. Sport News
- 120. MglT El-Tawhed
- 121. Soot El-Oma

- 122. El-Hwadeth
- 197. Other: Specify\_\_\_\_\_



v136. How much do you rely on social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or at all?

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v137. Do you currently have a twitter account?

1. Yes
5. No -----> Skip to v148
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to v148
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to v148

v138. Item removed

v139. Item removed

v140. Item removed

v141. Does your twitter profile include information on the city or town you live in?

1. Yes
5. No
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

Think of your current use of twitter, generally speaking, how often do you use Twitter to: [Showcard 20]

... Daily, Several times a week, Once a week, Less than once a week, Never	Daily	Several times a week	Once a week	Less than once a week	Never	DK	NR
v142. Read tweets from people, organizations, and users you follow	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v143. Retweet messages from people, organizations, and users you follow	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v144. Tweet about you or your family	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v145. Tweet about politics	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v146. Tweet about religion	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v147. Tweet about other topics	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

v148. Do you currently have a Facebook account?

1. Yes
5. No -----> Skip to v162
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to v162
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to v162

Think of your current use of Facebook, generally speaking, how often do you use Facebook to: [Showcard 20]

... Daily, Several times a week, Once a week, Less than once a week, Never	Daily	Several times a week	Once a week	Less than once a week	Never	DK	NR
v149. Read updates from your Facebook friends or favorite pages	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v150. Read articles from your newsfeed	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v151. Post updates about you and your family	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v152. Post photos of you or your family	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v153. Post about religion	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v154. Post about other topics	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

v155.	Item removed						
v156.	Item removed						
v157.	Item removed						
v158.	Item removed						
v159.	Item removed						
v160.	Item removed						
v161.	Item removed						

v162. How much do you rely on the internet as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?

v163. How much do you rely on your family as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or at all?

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v164. How much do you rely on your friends and peers as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or at all?

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v165. How much do you rely on religious figures as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or at all?

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v167. How much do you rely on political leaders as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or at all?

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

**Section H**

We would like you to think about morality levels in countries around the world. **We will be talking about countries as different as Japan and Bangladesh.** Countries where people have the lowest morality levels are rated one and countries where people have the highest morality levels are rated ten. You can use both of those numbers for rating morality levels plus all of the numbers in between. **(Respondent Show Card 21)**

	Country	Low										High		DK	NR
v167.	The U.S? (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM:“1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99		
v168.	Egypt?  (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM:“1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99		
v169.	Russia? (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM:“1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99		
v170.	Now what about ISIS? (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM:“1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99		

v171. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out. **(Respondent Show Card 22)**

None at all									A great deal	DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

v172. To what extent are you optimistic/pessimistic about your future? Please use this scale where 1 means "Highly Pessimistic" and 10 means "Highly Optimistic" to indicate how you feel about your future. **(Respondent Show Card 23)**

Highly Pessimistic									Highly Optimistic	DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

Please tell us if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement:

		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v173.	In Egypt these days, life is unpredictable and dangerous.	1	2	3	4	8	8

v174. Some people believe that individuals can decide their own destiny, while others think that it is impossible to escape a predetermined fate. Please tell me which comes closest to your view on this scale on which 1 means “everything in life is determined by fate,” and 10 means that “people shape their fate themselves.” *(Code one number):* **(Respondent Show Card 24)**

Everything is determined by fate									People shape their fate themselves	DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

**Section K**

Next let’s talk about neighbors. Please tell me whether you would dislike or like each of these as your neighbor.

(...Do you dislike or like...as your neighbors?)	Don’t like	Like	DK	NR
v174. People with criminal record	1	2	8	9
v175. Sunnis	1	2	8	9
v176. Russians	1	2	8	9
v177. Americans	1	2	8	9
v178. French	1	2	8	9
v179. British	1	2	8	9
v180. Jews	1	2	8	9
v181. Christians	1	2	8	9
v182. Iranians	1	2	8	9
v183. Iraqis	1	2	8	9
v184. Saudis	1	2	8	9
v185. Syrians	1	2	8	9
v186. ISIL supporters	1	2	8	9

I am going to name a number of individuals, groups and institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much trust, in general, you have in them: is it a lot, some, only a little, or none at all? **(Respondent Show Card 25)**

(...do you have a lot of trust, some, only a little, or none at all?)		A lot	Some	Only a little	Not at all	DK	NR
v187.	Your relatives	1	2	3	4	8	9
v188.	Christians	1	2	3	4	8	9
v189.	Political parties	1	2	3	4	8	9
v190.	The government	1	2	3	4	8	9
v191.	President	1	2	3	4	8	9
v192.	Prime minister	1	2	3	4	8	9
v193.	Military	1	2	3	4	8	9
v194.	The press	1	2	3	4	8	9

v195. I would like to ask you a question about the political upheavals in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and other places in the Middle East that began to occur in 2011. Which of the following is the most important **purpose** of these movements? [NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: REFER RESPONDENT TO SHOW CARD AND ASK RESPONDENT TO FOLLOW THE LIST WHILE YOU READ]

- (Respondent Show Card 26)
1. National movement for freedom and democracy
  2. Religious movement for the establishment of an Islamic government
  3. Movements to counter Western influence
  4. Movements for economic equality and prosperity
  5. These movements are a Western conspiracy
  6. Movement of the Arab people for the unity of all Arab countries
  7. Other [PLEASE SPECIFY] \_\_\_\_\_
  8. DK
  9. NR

v196. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, please tell me which of these five statements comes closest to the way you feel. (Respondent Show Card 27)

1. I see myself as a citizen of the world
2. I see myself as a citizen of Egypt
3. I see myself as a citizen of the Islamic umma [world-wide Christian community (for Christian Respondents)]
4. I see myself as a citizen of the Arab community
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

Some countries may have active enemies or are in a state of war with other countries, while other countries are not in such a state. If Egypt were to have such enemies or war conditions, we would like to ask you how you think they should be dealt with. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v197. The only way to teach a lesson to our enemies is to threaten their lives and make them suffer. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v198. People should be ready for self-sacrifice to defend against the enemies of Egypt.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v199. Muslims must use violence against the enemies of Islam in Egypt.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v200. Egyptians are obligated to fight the influence of Western culture in their society.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v201. The Shi'is are a major threat to the Sunnis	1	2	3	4	8	9
v202. Our military personnel must gain religious education.	1	2	3	4	8	9

v203. How often have you ever had trouble with the police? Would you say quite a lot, a few times, or once or twice?

1. Quite a lot
2. A few times
3. Once or twice
4. Never
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

This set of questions asks about all kinds of attacks on different groups of people. I will read you a list and ask you if you strongly approve of the attacks, somewhat approve of them, somewhat disapprove of them, or strongly disapprove of them. (Respondent Show Card 28)

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly approve	Somewhat approve	Somewhat disapprove	Strongly disapprove	DK	NR
v204. Assaults on Egyptian security forces - do you strongly approve of them, somewhat approve of them, somewhat disapprove of them, or strongly disapprove of them?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v205. Suicide bomb attacks against civilians in Egypt?	1	2	3	4	8	9

v206. Attacks on civilian foreigners working in Egypt?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v207. Assaults on US military personnel in Iraq?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v208. Assaults on US civilians working for US companies in Europe?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v209. Assaults on US civilians working for US companies in Islamic countries?	1	2	3	4	8	9

### Section L

Now I would like to ask a few more questions about you and your family.

v210. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? **[IF STUDENT, CODE HIGHEST LEVEL HE/SHE EXPECTS TO COMPLETE. ALSO, FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, CODE 9]:**

1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without degree
9. University-level education, with degree (include post-graduate education)
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v211. Are you employed now including self-employment?

1. Yes
2. No → Skip to v215

v212. About how many hours do you work per day on your main job? **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME]** \_\_\_\_\_ Hours Per Day

v213. About how many days each week do you work at your main job? **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME]**

\_\_\_\_\_ Days Per Week → Skip to v217

v214. Why aren't you employed at the present time?

1. Lost Job/Laid off → Skip to vV217
2. Retired
3. Housewife
4. Student
5. Permanently Disabled
7. OTHER (SPECIFY): \_\_\_\_\_

v215. Have you ever done any work for pay including self-employment?

1. Yes
5. No → Skip to vV220

v216. What (is/was) your main profession – what type of work (do/did) you do? Please specify. **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME. YOU SHOULD ASK WHETHER R'S JOB REQUIRES A UNIVERSITY DEGREE OR TECHNICAL TRAINING. FOR COMPANY MANAGERS, YOU SHOULD ASK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE COMPANY AND THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES THAT THE RESPONDENT SUPERVISES]**

1. Legislators and senior officials
2. Corporate and general managers
3. Physical, engineering, life science, health, teaching, and other professionals
4. Associate professionals, with some formal training required but not university degree
5. Office clerks, customer service clerks, other service clerks (stores, restaurants, etc.)
6. Agricultural and fishery workers
7. Extraction (mining), building trades, metal, machinery and related trades workers
8. Handicraft and other craft and related trades workers (skilled craftsman)
9. Plant operators, machine operators and assemblers, other factory workers
10. Armed forces
11. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
98. DK
99. NR

v217. (Are/Were) you self-employed?

1. Yes
5. No

v218.(Are/Were) you working for the government or public organization, a private business or industry, or what?

1. Government or public organization
2. Private business or industry
3. Private non-profit organization **(IF VOLUNTEERED)**
7. OTHER (SPECIFY): \_\_\_\_\_

v219. Are you the chief wage earner in your household?

1. Yes →Skip to V223
5. No

v220. Is the chief wage earner in your household employed now?

1. Yes
5. No

v221. What (is/was) the main profession of the chief wage earner in your household – what type of work (does/did) the chief wage earner do? Please specify. **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME. YOU SHOULD ASK WHETHER R'S JOB REQUIRES A UNIVERSITY DEGREE OR TECHNICAL TRAINING. FOR COMPANY MANAGERS, YOU SHOULD ASK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE COMPANY AND THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES THAT THE RESPONDENT SUPERVISES]**

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9. Plant operators, machine operators and assemblers, other factory workers
10. Armed forces
11. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
98. DK
99. NR

v222. Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19\_\_\_\_

**[ENTER ONLY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE YEAR: "19" IS ASSUMED]**

998. DK
999. NR

v223. This means you are \_\_\_ years old. Is that correct?

**(NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BIRTH YEAR AND AGE BY CONSULTING WITH RESPONDENT)**

v224. Sex of Respondent:

1. Male
2. Female

v225. Please remind me, are you currently **(READ OUT AND CODE ONE ONLY)**

1. Never been married →Skip to v233
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Separated
5. Widowed
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v226. Altogether, how many children have you had?

0. No child
1. 1 child
2. 2 children
3. 3 children
4. 4 children
5. 5 children
6. 6 children
7. 7 children
8. 8 or more children
96. Not applicable [DO NOT READ OUT]
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]

99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

**ALL FEMALES NOW SKIP TO V233. ASK V228 – V232 ONLY OF MALES WHO ARE CURRENTLY MARRIED (CODED “2” IN V226)**

v227. Is your wife employed now including self-employment? This includes any paid employment, whether at home or outside the home.

1. Yes
5. No → Skip to v231

v228. About how many hours does she work per day on her main job?

\_\_\_\_\_ Hours Per Day [IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME]

v229. About how many days each week does she work at her main job?

\_\_\_\_\_ Days Per Week → Skip to v232

v230. Has she ever done any work for pay, **including self-employment**?

1. Yes
5. No → Skip to v233

v231. What (is/was) her main profession – what type of work (does/did) she do? Please specify. [IF R MENTIONS THAT HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME. YOU SHOULD ASK WHETHER R'S JOB REQUIRES A UNIVERSITY DEGREE OR TECHNICAL TRAINING. FOR COMPANY MANAGERS, YOU SHOULD ASK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE COMPANY AND THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES THAT THE RESPONDENT SUPERVISES]

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6. Agricultural and fishery workers
7. Extraction (mining), building trades, metal, machinery and related trades workers
8. Handicraft and other craft and related trades workers (skilled craftsman)
9. Plant operators, machine operators and assemblers, other factory workers
10. Armed forces
11. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
98. DK
99. NR

v232. How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If "1" means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and "10" means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's financial situation? (Show Card 29)

Completely Dissatisfied					Completely Satisfied					DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

v233. During the past 12 months, did your family save money, just get by, spend some savings, or spend some savings and borrow money?

1. Save money
2. Just get by
3. Spent some savings
4. Spent savings and borrowed money
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v234. Please tell me which of the following best suits your household situation. (Show Card 30)

1. Unable to meet basic needs without assistance
2. Able to meet basic needs
3. Able to meet basic needs and have some non-essential goods
4. Able to meet basic needs and have many non-essential goods
5. Able to meet basic needs and have most anything we like
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v235. Compared to a year ago, would you say that your household's economic situation has:

1. Gotten worse
2. Stayed the same
3. Improved
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v236. Compared to other families in your community, do you think that your family's standard of living is:

1. Much lower than others
2. A little lower than others
3. About the same as others
4. A little higher than others
5. Much higher than others
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v237. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, or lower class?

1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class
5. Lower class
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v238. On this card is a scale of household incomes **per month**. We would like to know in what group your household is counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes that come in **per month**. Just give the number of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. **(Respondent Show Card 31)**


10	Country specific highest income range decile
9	Country specific income range 9 <sup>th</sup> decile
8	Country specific income range 8 <sup>th</sup> decile
7	Country specific income range 7 <sup>th</sup> decile
6	Country specific income range 6 <sup>th</sup> decile
5	Country specific income range 5 <sup>th</sup> decile
4	Country specific income range 4 <sup>th</sup> decile
3	Country specific income range 3 <sup>rd</sup> decile
2	Country specific income range 2 <sup>nd</sup> decile
1	Country specific lowest income range decile

98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]  
99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v239.	FEMALE RESPONDENTS: How do you generally dress when you go shopping in the market? Just tell me the number on the card. <b>(Respondent Show Card 32)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	98 DK	99 NR
	MALE RESPONDENTS, IF MARRIED: How does your wife generally dress when she goes shopping in the market? Just tell me the number on the card. <b>(Respondent Show Card 32)</b>								

v240. MALE RESPONDENTS: Which of these images indicates the type of beard you wear? Just tell me the number on the card. **(Respondent Show Card 33)**

FEMALE RESPONDENTS, IF MARRIED: Which of these images indicates the type of beard your husband wears? Just tell me the number on the card. **(Respondent Show Card 33)**



v241. Please forgive me for asking, and please accept my condolences for any loss that has occurred. Has any close family member (parent, child – including those not living at home) died since June 2011? (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)\_

1. No one died
2. Parent died
3. Spouse died
4. Brother or sister died
5. Child died
8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT)
9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)



v242. Has there been any other major loss or tragedy in your family, such as a serious accident, illness, economic loss, or anything else since June 2011? [OPEN-ENDED]

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Those are all of the questions I have for you today. Thank you very much for your kind help with our research.

- v243. Item removed
- v244. Item removed
- v245. Item removed
- v246. Item removed
- v247. Item removed

v248. **EXACT TIME NOW (CODE USING 24 HOUR CLOCK):** \_\_\_\_\_

v249. Total length of interview: \_\_\_\_ Minutes:

**Section M**

INTERVIEW CHARACTERISTICS AND SURVEY INFORMATION  
[COMPLETED BY INTERVIEWER AFTER THE END OF THE INTERVIEW]

v250. During the interview the respondent was...

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested

v251. Specify the language in which interview was conducted if **not in Arabic**: \_\_\_\_\_

v252. Where did the interview take place?

1. In the respondent's home
2. At the respondent's doorstep
3. At the respondent's place of work
4. Coffee shop
5. Other [PLEASE SPECIFY] \_\_\_\_\_

v253. Please choose the best statement that describes your seating arrangement relative to the Respondent during interview

1. Next to Respondent (facing the same way)
2. Next to Respondent (facing at a right angle)
3. Across from Respondent
4. Other seating arrangement

v254. Who was present during the interview? (Circle all that apply)

1. Father
2. Mother
3. Husband
4. Wife
5. Brother
6. Sister
7. Son >18 years old
8. Daughter >18 years old
9. Son 13-17 years old
10. Daughter 13-17 years old
11. Son 9-12 years old
12. Daughter 9-12 years old
13. Son 4-9 years old
14. Daughter 4-9 years old
15. Son under 4 years old
16. Daughter under 4 years old
17. Father in-law
18. Mother in-law
19. Aunt
20. Uncle
21. Male Neighbor
22. Female Neighbor
23. Male Friend

24. Female Friend
25. Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_
26. No one was present (Skip to V260)
27. Don't Know

v255. During how much of the interview were any of the people present?

1. All the interview
2. Most of the interview
3. Some of the interview
4. A short period of interview

v256. Item removed

v257. How did the presence of other persons affect the interview? (Circle all that apply)

1. Person/s joined the interview, and you had to stop the interview until they left
2. Person/s joined the interview, you and the Respondent answered their questions or explained that privacy was needed, and they left
3. Person/s stayed in the room, but they could not hear the interview
4. The person/s who was/were present could hear the questions and answers, but they are too young to understand the content of the interview
5. Person/s stayed in the room, and they could hear the interview but they didn't interfere or participate in the interview
6. Person/s stayed in the room, and helped the Respondent with his/her answers
7. Person/s stayed in the room, and imposed answers on the respondent
8. Person/s stayed in the room, which made the respondent conservative and not at ease
9. No one was present during any time of the interview (Skip to V260)
10. Other – Specify \_\_\_\_\_

v258. Which statement describes best the situation that lead to the presence of others during the interview?

1. Person/s was/were present in the same room and neither you or the Respondent asked them to leave
2. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you asked them to leave and they left
3. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you asked them to leave but they refused
4. Person/s was/were present in the same room and the Respondent asked them to leave and they left
5. Person/s was/were present in the same room and the Respondent asked them to leave but they refused
6. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you and the Respondent asked them to leave and they left
7. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you and the Respondent asked them to leave but they refused
8. Person/s was/were not present in the room and the Respondent invited them to stay and you did not mind
9. Person/s was/were not present in the room and the Respondent invited them to stay in spite of the fact that you asked for a private interview
10. Other – Specify \_\_\_\_\_

v259. If the respondent was female, please use Showcard 32 to record her veil status.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 DK	9 NR
							Not applicable (Respondent is male)	

v260. If the respondent was male, please Showcard 33 to indicate whether he has a beard, and if so, its style.

1	2	3	4	5	7	8 DK	9 NR
						Not applicable (Respondent is female)	


v261. If the respondent was male, did he have a darker mark on his forehead that is sometimes attributed to praying frequently?

1. Yes
5. No
7. Not applicable (Respondent is female)
8. DK
9. NR

v262. Did you observe any objects or books at the respondent's house that have religious meaning? (Circle all that apply)

1. Verses of Quran (frames, mirrors, etc.)
2. Quran (in book form)
3. Misbaha (prayer beads)
4. Picture frames or objects of religious place such as Makkah, Kaaba, etc.
5. Christian or Jewish religious objects
6. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
7. No objects observed
8. Unsure if objects observed were religious

v263. Any other interviewer observations

A large, empty rectangular box with a thin black border, intended for recording interviewer observations. It occupies the upper right portion of the page.