

# How Muslims understand Democracy?

## An Empirical Investigation

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### Abstract

This study examines how Muslims understand democracy and its essential components. We hypothesize that, although Muslims tend to value democracy as high as non-Muslims, Muslims have a unique understanding of procedural, as well as substantive components of democracy. Muslims' understanding of democracy stems from historical, and current, socioeconomic experiences. Employing several waves of World Values Survey (WVS), our descriptive statistics suggest that Muslims highly value democracy. Nevertheless, Muslims do not have a substantial reservation against the interference of the army or religious authorities in the governing process. On the other hand, they view some procedural aspects of democracy, such as gender equality, as less essential than their non-Muslim counterparts. We use an ordered logit regression model to understand the determinants of preferences for democracy and its components, controlling for both individual and macro level variables. Our results show that the determinants of Muslims' attitudes towards democracy and its components, are very similar to those of non-Muslims facing similar socioeconomic circumstances or coming from the same cultural and historical backgrounds.

**Keywords:** *Democracy, Islam, Muslim, Religiosity, World Values Survey*

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## **Introduction**

Scholars have long theorized about what democracy specifically entails. So far, there is no consensus among political scientists on how to define democracy (Knutsen, 2011, p. 46). In fact, many scholars argue that democracy is essentially a contested concept (Collier, Hidalgo, & Maciuceanu, 2006, p. 222; Crick, 2002, p. 1; Gallie, 1956; Kurki, 2010, p. 362). According to Shapiro (1996), political theory hypothesizes that democracy consists of two essential components: procedural (rule-centered) and substantive (outcome-centered). Procedural democracy institutes a certain set of rules and procedures needed to produce an electorally-legitimated government. This includes the rights to civil liberties, the right to vote and hold office, the right to exercise freedom of speech, majority rules, minority rights, and other elements that establishes democratic rule. This is also at times referred to as ‘working democracy’ (Dahl, 1998).

Procedural democracy is usually defined in a ‘minimalist’ way. For example, Schumpeter (1976) defines democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1976, p. 269). More recently, Przeworski et al. (2000, p. 15) define democracy simply as a political regime in which “those who govern are selected through contested elections”.

Substantive democracy can be seen as the fruit of procedural democracy. The substantive view assesses democracy on the basis of substance of government policies. The direct material gains citizens make by taking part in a democratic political process is substantive democracy. Social justice, safe working conditions, fair access to opportunity, education, healthcare are all seen as the desired distributive outcome of a genuine democratic political process (Nozick, 1977).

Definitions of substantive democracy tends to be more maximalist, as does Diamond (1999) who argues that competitive, multiparty elections are not sufficient for liberal democracy. In fact, Diamond (2004) argues that democracy consists of four key elements: (a) A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; (b) The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; (c) Protection of the human rights of all citizens, and (d) A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.

In a recent study, Diamond and Morlino (2005, pp. x-xxx) propose a set of different components of democracy. They distinguish between five procedural dimensions of democratic quality and

two substantive ones. Their five procedural dimensions are 1) rule of law, 2) participation, 3) competition, 4) vertical accountability and 5) horizontal accountability. The two substantive dimensions are 6) political equality and 7) civil and political freedoms. The authors also include 8) responsiveness as a link between the procedural and substantive dimensions.

The fact that scholars differ in their definitions of democracy demonstrates the challenge of adopting one-size-fits-all conceptualizations to represent mass views of democracy (Canache, 2012). For the past two decades, an increasing number of public opinion surveys have been conducted to investigate different conceptions of democracy among the public (Baviskar & Malone, 2004; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Camp, 2001; Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1997; Shin & Cho, 2010; Welzel, 2011). According to Norris (1999), most people around the world claim that they would prefer a democratic political system. Muslims are no exception. According to Pew Research Center (2012; 2013), Muslims around the world express broad support for democracy.

Even if the level of support for democracy is comparable among Muslims and non-Muslims (Norris & Inglehart, 2002), there can be considerable differences in the specific understandings of democracy held by people from different religions and societies. For instance, while most democratic Western countries acknowledge that state and religion should be separated, the majority of Arabs consider democracy compatible with Islamic law (Grant & Tessler, 2002). Moreover, 56% of Arab respondents agreed that religious authorities should exert a significant influence over government decisions, while 44% disagreed (Jamal & Tessler, 2008). Interestingly, there is hardly any study investigating how Muslims understand democracy, as well as its most defining components.

This study examines how Muslims understand democracy and its essential components. We hypothesize that, although Muslims tend to value democracy as high as non-Muslims, Muslims have a unique understanding of procedural and substantive components of democracy, that stems from both their historical, and current, socioeconomic experiences. Employing several waves of World Values Survey, our descriptive statistics suggest that while Muslims highly value democracy, and believe they don't have enough of it, their notion of democracy is distinct from that of non-Muslims. Muslims tend to associate democracy with its perceived outcomes, and do not have a substantial reservation against the interference of the army or religious authorities in

the governing process. On the other hand, they view procedural aspects of democracy, such as elections, civil rights and gender equality, as less essential than their non-Muslim counterparts.

Based on the principles of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), we propose that a Muslims' attitudes toward democracy are associated with their existing social, political and economic circumstances as well as their historical and cultural contexts. Consequently, we control for macro, as well as individual level determinants of the preference for democracy. Using an ordered logit regression model, our results show that the determinants of Muslims' attitudes towards democracy and its components, are very similar to those of non-Muslims facing similar socioeconomic circumstances or coming from the same cultural and historical backgrounds.

Moreover, we find that, while religiosity among both Muslims and non-Muslims, is positively correlated with higher preference for democracy, it is also positively correlated with preference for the intervention of the military and religious authorities in political decision-making. This result suggests that religious individuals (of all religions) prefer a unique kind of democracy, where democratic procedures are clearly followed yet with considerable intervention from the army and religious authorities in the political process "when necessary". Contrary to expectations, one difference that stands out is that the more religious Muslims are significantly more likely to support gender equality, while the more religious non-Muslims are significantly less likely to support it.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the relevant literature. We present our data and methodology in section three. A discussion of our empirical findings follows in section four. We conclude with a summary of our main results in section five.

## **Literature review**

The past three decades have been marked by a scholarly debate regarding the relationship between Islam and democracy. Many scholars have argued that Islam and democracy should not be considered mutually exclusive (Beinin & Stork, 1997; Entelis, 1997; Esposito & Voll, 1996; Kramer, 1993). Others stress perceived areas of incompatibility, suggesting that Islam acts as a hindrance to democratic forms of government and/or democratic values and ideals (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1984; 1991; 1996). Adding another dimension to this relationship, Rowley and Smith (2009) point out to what they refer to as Islam's democracy paradox: the fact that Muslim-

majority countries tend to be less democratic, while both individual Muslims and individuals in Muslim-majority countries have high support for democracy. This paradox has been observed by other scholars (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Rose, 2002).

A considerable body of empirical studies finds that even when other variables are controlled for, a statistically significant negative relationship between Islam and democracy still holds (Barro, 1999; Fish, 2002; Potrafke, 2012; 2013; Hanusch, 2013). It is noticeably that the majority of these studies use country-level aggregate data. Some studies, however, have attempted to empirically examine the relationship between Islam and democracy at the level of the individual (see, for example, (Abdel Fattah, 2004; Ciftci, 2010; 2012; Shafiq, 2010).

Using data from the World Values Survey from 1995 to 1997, Hofmann (2004, p. 653) examine whether intermediate micro-level links between factors proposed by scholars to influence, or be associated with, support for democracy function the same way in the Muslim and Christian populations of eight countries, namely, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Russia, and Turkey. The author finds that the sources and patterns of democratic support are not found to systematically differ between Muslim and Christian respondents in the countries investigated. In fact, levels of support for democracy as an ideal are generally higher among Muslim respondents than Eastern Orthodox respondents. However, the model reveals that religion plays a fairly minimal role in shaping individuals' attitudes concerning democracy.

While there is a considerable body of literature investigating the determinants of Muslims' support for democracy, there is hardly any empirical study on how Muslims understand democracy. Norris (2013) is closely related to our study. Using three waves of WVS data in the period 1995-2007, collected from 83 countries, including twenty Muslim-plurality societies, Norris (2013) investigates public preference for four regime types, namely religious autocracy, religious democracy, secular autocracy, and secular democracy. Using country macro-level analysis, the results show that the publics of Muslim-plurality societies displayed diverse preferences; for instance, while countries like Morocco and Tanzania favored secular democracy, others such as Albania and Indonesia proved slightly less supportive of democracy although equally secular, and still others, such as Algeria, displayed significant preference towards religious autocracy.

Moreover, using individual micro-level analysis, Norris finds that Muslims display significantly less approval than non-Muslims for democratic values and rejection of autocratic rule, secularism, and thus have lesser preference for secular democracy. Similar patterns can be observed for the strength of religiosity, with the more faithful less approving secular democracy as well. By contrast, living in a Muslim-plurality society proves negative but not statistically significant. Norris concludes by stating that regime preferences are shaped both by the type of religion as well as by the strength of religiosity and these effects operate mainly at micro-level.

De Regt (2013) and Doherty and Mecellem (2016) are also closely related to our study, yet they focus on Arabs preference for democracy, and not Muslims per se. As for the former, the author uses a series of descriptive statistics and bi-variate regressions for country-level data to examine how Arabs understand democracy. Utilizing the fourth wave of WVS, which includes only four Arab countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, the study finds that Arabs tend to have some sort of a populist notion of democracy, in which a prosperous economy and severe punishment for criminals are perceived as the most important elements of democracy. While Arabs perceive free elections as another important component of democracy, they attach less value to such procedural aspects of democracy as civil rights, liberties, and gender equality. Moreover, Arabs believe that political influence on the part of the army and religious leaders is compatible with democracy.

Using a more rigorous methodology to examine how individuals in the Arab world conceive of both procedural and substantive concepts of democracy, Doherty and Mecellem (2016) applies multivariate regression analysis to data of first wave of the Arab Barometer Survey (2006-2008), which was collected from four populations, namely Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. The authors find that that many individuals in the Arab world conceive of democracy “in terms that are poorly aligned with dominant scholarly definitions of democracy” (Doherty & Mecellem, 2016, p. 23). In other words, many people in the region see democracy primarily as a means to substantive economic ends rather than as a set of rules and procedural arrangements, which according to the authors, may negatively affect the prospects of democratic development that started with Arab Spring in 2011.

Unlike literature investigating Muslims’ preference for democracy, our study compares between the determinants of Muslims and non-Muslims’ preference for democracy and its key aspects. There are two reasons for our research design; first, it is clear that no clear consensus has been

reached in studies investigating the link between Islam and democracy. Therefore, we can't explain with a considerable certainty the lack of democracy in Muslim-majority countries. Consequently, a new and different approach is needed to investigate such relationship. Second, and most importantly, in most of the empirical studies on Islam and democracy, it is implicitly assumed that Islam has one certain fixed nature surpassing nationality, ethnicity, geography, as well as economic and political factors, which is simply not true. Islam has a multitude of schools of jurisprudence and has been formulated in many different ways across time and space. Moreover, Islamic Shari'a is believed to be highly flexible and dependent on the circumstances through which it is applied. Thus, it becomes imperative to investigate the determinants that may turn Muslims to be favorable, as well as inimical to democracy.

### **Methodology and Data**

To assess how Muslims view different components of democracy, we use data from the World Values Survey's latest three waves, namely waves 4, 5, and 6 (hereinafter WVS4-6). The WVS is a large scale opinion poll survey carried out by the World Values Survey Association in order to examine people's values and beliefs regarding a variety of social, cultural and political issues. Our chosen waves of WVS was carried out between 1999 and 2014, spanning 92 countries and over 229,000 individuals. The samples in each country are nationally representative. Country surveys use a common questionnaire with variables on beliefs, values, economic development, democratization, religion, gender equality, social capital, and subjective well-being. WVS6 covers the largest number of Muslim-majority countries, with respect to other WVS waves. Our total sample includes 31 Muslim majority countries with total respondents of over 75,000 individuals; 63, 678 are Muslims (Shia or Sunni), 92% of whom reside in Muslim-majority countries.

To assess individuals' preference for democracy, we consider the question asking how desirable different government systems are, including democracy. Respondents are asked to rank their preference on a scale of four degrees, ranging from (4) very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad, and (1) very bad:

*“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”*

*E114. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections*

*E115. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country*

*E116. Having the army rule*

*E117. Having a democratic political system<sup>3</sup>*

Figure 1 plots the average response value of these questions for Muslims and non-Muslims in the surveys. The difference in the average scores for all these questions is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Responses to the last two questions are particularly interesting and point to inconsistencies in Muslims’ views regarding political system preference. Muslims rate army rule as fairly good, while non-Muslims rate it as fairly bad on average. Conversely, for the last question that asks about the desirability of democracy as a system of government, Muslims’ average score is significantly higher indicating that they are *more likely* to rank it as “very good” than non-Muslims.

WVS5-6 also include one more question that directly ask respondents to rate the desirability of living in a democratic country, on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 meaning it is “not at all important” and 10 meaning “absolutely important”: *E235. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?”* It also asks respondents whether they believe they currently live in a democracy: *“E236. And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”* Figure 2 shows that Muslims are very similar to non-Muslims in their view of the importance of living in a country governed democratically. Muslims are however less likely to answer that they currently live in a country that is governed democratically. The mean score for these two questions are statistically significantly different when comparing Muslims to non-Muslims. These results imply that Muslims highly value democracy- almost as much as non-Muslims, and believe that they don’t have much of it

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<sup>3</sup> Please note that we are using WVS question numbers as indicated in the WVS integrated documentation.



currently. Conversely, they are more supportive of army rule on average than non-Muslims as explained above.

With such high desire for democracy among Muslims, it becomes imperative to better analyze what exactly Muslims envision when they consider the terms “democracy” or “democratic system of government”. Fortunately, WVS4-6 contain questions that ask more fully about several important components of democracy as understood by the respondents:

*Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. (1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy”; 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”)*

*E224. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. (WVS5-6)*

*E225. Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws. (WVS5-6)*

*E226. People choose their leaders in free elections. (WVS5-6)*

*E227. People receive state aid for unemployment. (WVS5-6)*

*E228. The army takes over when government is incompetent. (WVS5-6)*

*E229. Civil rights protect people from state oppression. (WVS5-6)*

*E233A. The state makes people’s incomes equal. (WVS6)*

*E233B. People obey their rulers. (WVS6)*

*E233. Women have the same rights as men. (WVS5-6)*

Following Norris (2011) and de Regt (2013), we split these questions into three broad categories that reflect varying understanding or strands of democracy. The first strand focuses on ***procedural aspects of democracy***, such as free elections, civil rights and gender equality. Figure 3a graphs the mean scores of these variables for Muslims and non-Muslims. It appears that there are wide differences (statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level) between the two groups in all of these variables. The gender equality aspect in particular stands out with the average for Muslims being lower than non-Muslims by 0.8 points. Civil rights and elections also fare significantly lower for Muslims as aspects of democracy. In WVS5 an additional question on the whether people should be able to change the laws in referendums was also asked: “E232: *People can change the laws in referendums*”. As depicted in figure 3a, it could be seen that the means score for this question was significantly higher for Muslims.

Substantive aspects of democracy are associated with the outcome of a democratic system, in the form of more economic equality and state intervention to ensure this equality through taxation and

to provide support for the needy. For simplicity, it is termed in this study as “*substantive democracy*”, given its emphasis on the perceived results of democracy. The surveys contain questions that ask about the state’s role in ensuring income equality through taxation and providing aid to help the unemployed. Figure 3b plots these results of these survey questions and interestingly we now see much higher mean scores for Muslims than non-Muslims (again significantly higher at the 0.05 level) for all three variables. In WVS5, two questions were asked on the importance of the economy prospering “*E230: The economy is prospering*”, and criminals being severely punished “*E231: Criminals are severely punished.*” Again, Muslims have significantly higher means scores for both questions.

A third aspect of democracy emphasizes the role of religious authorities, the army and obedience to the ruler. These notions are sometimes termed “*authoritarian democracy*”, in that they stem from a willingness to accept the authority of a single entity (e.g. the ruler) or group (religious scholars/the army) that supersedes that of elected officials and lawmakers. Results in Figure 3c imply that Muslims have a higher mean score for all of these variables, especially regarding religious authority. The difference between Muslims and non-Muslims is statistically significant, and is the highest among all the questions that ask about the three aspects of democracy. For example, it is twice as much as the difference in the mean score for the gender equality question.

To gain further insight into the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in their perceptions of democracy, we repeated the analysis in Figures 3a-3c for individuals who responded with an 8 or above on question “*E235: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?*” These individuals who responded with an 8 or above could be considered “highly democratic” and it is instructive to see if the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims for such individuals persist.

The results are in Figures 4A-4C. All of these differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level and suggest that our conclusions from the previous section are confirmed even for those highly democratic individuals. We see that Muslims have significantly lower preference for procedural notions of democracy, and significantly higher preference for substantive and authoritarian notions of democracy than non-Muslims. In most cases the differences are actually *larger* than for the full sample.

These statistics suggest that while Muslims highly value democracy, and believe they don't have enough of it, their notion of democracy is distinct from that of non-Muslims. Muslims tend to associate democracy with its perceived outcomes, and do not have a substantial reservation against the interference of specific entities such as the army or religious authorities in the governing process. On the other hand, they view procedural aspects of democracy, such as elections, civil rights and gender equality, which are considered of immense importance in Western discourse, as less essential than their non-Muslim counterparts. These conclusions hold even for "highly democratic" Muslims.

The analysis so far has focused solely on the average scores of respondents distinguishing between Muslims and non-Muslims. Clearly, a person's notion of democracy, as well as of its various components, will however be affected by both her own personal characteristics and the characteristics of the economy and society in which she resides. The analysis in the previous section does not take into account various aspects such as gender, education level, age, occupation of the respondent into consideration and we can expect that each of these personal characteristics would have an important impact on the perceptions and understanding of democracy that the individual has. Additionally, many economy wide variables such as the average income level or average education level in the economy can also have a significant impact on people's perceptions.

People are more likely to understand what they know and have experienced firsthand. Given the significant prevalence of involvements of the army, as well as of religious authority, in governments in most Muslim majority countries, it is not surprising that Muslims have fewer qualms about the role of those groups in political decision making. At the same time, there have been only few successful democratic experiments in these Muslim majority countries in the recent past which does not give individuals much faith in the procedural aspects of democracy as an essential component that they need to care about. To the majority of those individuals, democracy is largely desirable because of what they perceive as its positive expected outcome on their wellbeing. Consequently, Muslims value substantive aspects of democracy, significantly higher than procedural democracy.

## Empirical Model: Micro and Macro Determinants of Preference for Democracy and its Components

To be able to unravel the differences in values and beliefs regarding democracy and its components we must control for the differences in individual (micro-level) characteristics as well as the differences in the social, economic and political environment (macro-level) of their relevant societies. To capture the micro-macro interaction we turn to regression analysis to better understand how Muslims differ from non-Muslims in their understanding of democracy, after controlling for individual characteristics such as education, occupation, gender, age, and so on, as well as socio-economic and political characteristics such as GDP per capita, unemployment rate, literacy rate, female labor force participation rate, importance of oil exports, colonial history, quality of governance, level of democracy, and so on.

Since the responses to the questions of interest in our data have a natural ordering, with a higher score implying that the respondent believes a particular component of democracy is “more essential” as a characteristic of democracy, we use an ordered logit regression model. In this model  $j$  represents the response category ( $j = 1, \dots, 10$  for the democracy components/preference variables). It is assumed that individual preferences are based on a latent variable that is defined as a linear function of the explanatory variables.

$$y_i^* = \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2m} + \epsilon_i$$

$$y_i = j \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_{j-1} < y_i^* < \mu_j;$$

$$\text{where } j = 0, 1, 2, \dots, 10 \text{ and } \mu_{-1} = -\infty; \mu_j = \infty$$

where,  $X_{1i}$  is vector containing our individual level controls,  $X_{2m}$  is the vector containing country-level controls;  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  are parameter vectors to be estimated;  $\epsilon_i$  is an iid stochastic error term that is logistic distributed and  $\mu_j$  are the threshold parameters to be estimated with the  $\beta$  parameter vectors. The probability of choosing response category  $j$  is defined as

$$\Pr(y_i = j) = \Lambda(\mu_j - \beta_1 X_{1i} - \beta_2 X_{2m}) - \Lambda(\mu_{j-1} - \beta_1 X_{1i} - \beta_2 X_{2m})$$

where  $\Lambda$  is the cdf of the logistic distribution. The regression parameters  $\beta$  and threshold parameters  $\mu$  are then obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood.

Individual-level control variables included in  $X_{1i}$  include age, age squared (to account for the possibility that the preference for democracy/its components follows a curvilinear relationship), dummies that represent individual levels of education (secondary and above=1), marital status (married or in a relationship=1), employed, gender (male), as well as number of children and a variable that represents the average for several measures of religiosity<sup>4</sup>. I also include a variable that controls for how interested in politics the respondent is, according to their own assessment. To control for income-related differences, we include an ordinal variable which is a subjective, self-reported assessment of the respondent's poverty status.

Country level controls that might influence an individual's preferences for democracy include measures of the overall standard of living in the economy whether measured by monetary or nonmonetary measures, as well as how open the economy is, and how dependent on oil it might be. We control for the country's GDP per capita as a measure of average wellbeing. Average number of years of schooling and life expectancy at birth are used as measures of non-monetary wellbeing. We control for the export to GDP ratio as a measure of how open the economy is, the share of oil in total exports as an indicator of its dependence on a single natural resource, and the economy wide unemployment rate. We also control for a number of other institutional variables that might affect views of democracy, most notably the country's colonial history which might influence its formal and informal institutions, controlled for with a set of appropriate dummies. We also include an indicator for quality of democracy since this would have a direct impact on a person's perception of what democracy entails, and the corruption perception index since this is likely to affect the person's desire for change. Finally, we include a series of regional dummies and religious majority dummies to account for other socio-cultural aspects unique to each religious and each cultural heritage. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, while Table A1 in the appendix lists the data sources for the macro level variables.

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<sup>4</sup> The religiosity variable is the average response on three survey questions: F028. Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days? F028B. Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray? and F063. How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means "very important" and 1 means "not at all important." We chose to take the average of these three questions to get a more nuanced sense of how religious the person is in practice- in terms of actions such as attending religious services or praying-rather than their self-proclaimed religiosity level as in question F034, that asks: Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are: 1 A religious person 2 Not a religious person 3 An atheist.

## Results

Results of the ordered logit regressions are in Tables 2 through 5. We use the aforementioned questions in WVS4-6 that gauge first the preference for democracy as a governing system, and second the preference for the various aspects of democracy: procedural, substantive and authoritarian to see how these preferences differ by individual and country characteristics. Table 2 presents results for the preference for democracy variable (see notes at the bottom of figure 2 for details) separately for Muslims and non-Muslims.

For Muslims, age, having a secondary degree or higher, being interested in politics and being religious all have a positive and significant effect on the preference for a democratic system of government. However, being unemployed has a significantly negative impact on this preference. Several country wide variables also were found to have a significant impact on the preference for democracy: GDP per capita, unemployment rate, control of corruption, having been a British colony, living in a more democratic country, living in a predominantly Catholic or Muslim nation, and living in Europe and Central Asia or the MENA region all have a positive and significant impact. On the other hand, the higher the share of oil in exports, residing in South Asia, and respondents in the latest wave of the survey are more likely to have lower preference for democracy. The coefficient on WVS6 could be partly driven by the undesirable results that ensued after the Arab Spring since most of the nations that had regime change ended up in an economically and ( as in the case of Libya and Syria) worse overall condition. Note that this is also significantly negative for non-Muslims as well

Comparing Muslims to non-Muslims, and focusing only on the differences, for non-Muslims being male and being married have a positive and significant impact (these were insignificant for Muslims). Being income poor (as self-proclaimed in the survey) has a negative and significant impact (was insignificant for Muslims). For country variables, a few variables reverse signs compared to Muslims' regression: GDP per capita, residing in a predominant Catholic or Orthodox country have negative and significant impacts while life expectancy, oil exports, having been a French colony and living in Latin America have positive and significant impact. These sign reversals are in some cases puzzling, especially GDP per capita and oil exports. This result however may refer to the negative relationship between democracy and economic development,

which has been tackled in a considerable body of literature in economics and political science<sup>5</sup>. Age and life expectancy, having positive effects, suggests that there might be a threshold effect with these variables having insignificant or negative impact up to a point but then after that is surpassed they start to have a positive impact.

Turning now to decomposing democracy into its components for which we have data, we present results for the procedural aspects of democracy: importance of elections, civil right, gender equality and changing laws in referendums in Table 3. Age, education, interest in politics, religiosity at the individual level, GDP per capita, control of corruption, level of democracy living in a predominant Protestant, Muslim or Orthodox nation, in Latin America, Europe and Central Asia or the MENA region all have a positive and significant effect on Muslims' preferences for procedural aspects of democracy. Being income poor, higher average years of schooling for the country, higher life expectancy, having been a British or French colony, living in Sub Saharan Africa all have a negative impact. When gender equality is the dependent variable, we also notice that being male has a negative and significant coefficient for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Interestingly, in predominantly Muslim nations Muslims have a supportive attitude towards gender equality while non-Muslims have a significantly negative one. Having higher oil share of exports has a significant negative coefficient for Muslims' preference for gender equality question and referendums, the former, lending support to the hypothesis of Ross (2013) that there might indeed be an "oil curse" especially for females outcomes.<sup>6</sup>

Table 4 presents the substantive aspects of democracy regressions. Some of the results that stand out: Individuals who are more educated are less likely to support redistributive efforts, both Muslims and non-Muslims, which is expected given the likelihood that these are the more well off individuals. More religious Muslims support taxing the rich, and providing unemployment aid, a prospering economy and to have criminals severely punished, however they do not support having the state equalize incomes completely. In countries where oil is a higher percentage of exports there is less support for redistribution, among both Muslims and non-Muslims.

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<sup>5</sup> For more, see Barro (1997) and Gerring et al. (2005)

<sup>6</sup> For the elections question in the first two columns of the table, both Muslims and non-Muslims have a positive and significant coefficient of the share of oil exports variable.

Table 5 presents results for the authoritarian aspects of democracy. In general, Muslims and non-Muslims are more likely to reject army rule, religious authorities interpreting the law and obeying the ruler, if they are males, the higher their education levels, age, the economy wide education level and life expectancy, the higher the average oil export share, control of corruption and the higher the level of democracy they currently enjoy. Both Muslims and non-Muslims have higher preference for authoritarian democracy when they have more children, maybe as a sense of safety and security, when they are more religious, the higher the GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, having had a British colonial legacy and when they live in a predominantly Catholic, Muslim or Orthodox nation. The higher the share of oil in exports and the mean years of schooling the lower the preference for authoritarian democracy for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Notice that there are few differences between Muslims and non-Muslims when we control for the independent variables. For example, the religiosity and the average oil exports of the economy have positive and significant coefficients for both, for these three dependent variables.<sup>7</sup>

### **Summary and Conclusion**

The cross-national multi-level analysis presented here demonstrates that Muslims have a significantly different preference of democracy and its components than non-Muslims. Our descriptive statistics show that Muslims tend to associate democracy with its perceived outcomes, and do not have a substantial reservation against the interference of specific entities such the army or religious authorities in the governing process. Conversely, they view procedural aspects of democracy, such as elections, civil rights and gender equality, which are considered of immense importance in Western discourse, as less essential than their non-Muslim counterparts.

The determinants of Muslims' attitudes towards democracy and its components, are in many cases very similar to those of non-Muslims, as our regression analysis has shown. We summarize some of the most important similarities and differences below, with respect to each variable in the model.

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<sup>7</sup> Tables A2 to A4 in the appendix show results for the same dependent variables, limiting the sample to individuals who highly value democracy (E235>8). Results are very similar and will not be discussed further here. These results are shown for completion.



**Individual variables:**

*Age:* While older non-Muslim respondents valued democracy and its components highly, age was insignificant in all of the Muslim regressions, except procedural democracy where it had a positive impact.

*Gender:* Muslim males had similar views to Muslim females except on gender equality, army rule and religious authority. In the case of gender equality, being male is associated with a lower preference for gender equality. Interestingly, this negative preference for gender equality is significant for all males in the sample, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Non-Muslim males are also more likely to have a lower preference for substantive aspects of democracy—there was no significant difference between Muslim males and females on these aspects. With regard to army rule and religious authority, Muslim males have a significantly lower preference for these than their female counterparts. All males were also more likely to support the notion of obeying rulers; than females.

*Education:* Higher education is associated with a positive preference for democracy and its procedural components, but negatively associated with its substantive and authoritarian aspects, as expected. Muslims and non-Muslims are largely similar in this respect.

*Marital status and children:* For Muslims, being married does not significantly affect their democracy preferences. Married non-Muslims have significantly higher preference for democracy compared to singles, but significantly lower preference for substantive and authoritarian aspects of democracy. Having children is mostly insignificant for Muslims, except for obeying rulers (positive) and gender equality (negative). Interestingly, non-Muslims with children are more likely to support the authoritarian aspects of democracy.

*Unemployment and poverty:* being unemployed is largely associated with a negative view of democracy and its components, with the exception of unemployment aid and a prospering economy, under the substantive components, which is not surprising. This is true for both Muslims and non-Muslims. The self-declared poverty status is also largely associated with a negative view of democracy and its procedural components for both Muslims and non-Muslims. For substantive aspects, the association is positive when it is significant. Conversely, poor Muslims have no significant preference for authoritarian aspects, while for non-Muslims this is positive and significant.

*Interest in politics:* Interest in politics is associated with a positive preference for democracy, but there are some differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in the preference for democracy's components. Most notably, Muslims who are interested in politics are more likely to support army rule, non-Muslims who are interested in politics however have a clear negative preference for all authoritarian aspects of democracy.

*Religiosity:* While religiosity is positively correlated with higher preference for democracy and procedural democracy, it is also positively correlated with authoritarian democracy and this is true for both Muslims and non-Muslims. This result suggests that religious individuals may seek a unique kind of democracy, where democratic procedures are clearly followed yet with a considerable intervention from the army and religious authorities in the political process "when necessary". Contrary to expectations, one difference that stands out is that the more religious Muslims are significantly more likely to support gender equality, while the more religious non-Muslims are significantly *less* likely to support it. Another notable finding is that religiosity among Muslims is *not* significantly associated with the preference for equality of incomes, even though it is positively associated with all other substantive aspects of democracy, that encourage taxing the rich, state provision of unemployment aid, allowing the economy to prosper and severely punishing criminals, while for religious non-Muslims there is a significant *negative* preference for taxing the rich for example. The finding that more religious Muslims may not value complete income equality can be understood in the context of the fact that Islamic Shari'a does not have a clear and decisive economic mandate<sup>8</sup>.

### **Macroeconomics variables:**

*Economic wellbeing:* Income per capita is associated with higher preference for democracy for Muslims, but lower preference for non-Muslims. It is however associated with greater support for democracy's components including authoritarian aspects, for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Other aspects of wellbeing such as economy wide health (life expectancy) and education levels are associated with a lower preference for democracy for Muslims but a higher one for non-Muslims. When examining the impact of these measures on procedural, substantive and authoritarian aspects of democracy however, they are largely associated with lower preference for all components, and there is no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims.

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<sup>8</sup> For the indecisiveness of Islamic law on this issue, see Gouda (2013)

*Unemployment:* The higher the unemployment rate in an economy, the higher the preference for democracy and all its components for Muslims. For non-Muslims, higher unemployment is associated with lower preference for gender equality and a higher preference for substantive and authoritarian aspects of democracy.

*Share of oil exports:* The share of oil exports seems to have a negative impact on several aspects of democracy, including authoritarian, however there is no apparent difference between Muslims and non-Muslims, except for gender equality where Muslims have a significantly lower preference the higher their oil exports. Nevertheless, the coefficients are considerably small.

*Corruption:* The higher the perception of the degree of control of corruption in a country, the higher the preference for procedural and substantive aspects of democracy, and the lower the preference for authoritarian aspects. Again there is no apparent difference between Muslims and non-Muslims. It seems that in countries where corruption is perceived to be low people have stronger preference for the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy since they feel their participation will count and the redistribution will in fact be fair, and simultaneously, that there is less need for the army or religious authority to interfere.

*Level of democracy:* Not surprisingly, there is a positive association between level of democracy and preference for democracy and its procedural components, and negative association with preference for its substantive and authoritarian components. There is no apparent difference between Muslims and non-Muslims once again.

*Colonial heritage, religious majority and region:* Both British and French colonial heritage have a positive effect on the preference for democracy, but less clear effect on preference for its components. For Muslims the effects of both colonial heritages are mostly negative on procedural and substantive aspects and positive on authoritarian aspects (except religious authority), for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Living in a predominantly Muslim country is associated with higher preference for most aspects of democracy including gender equality, but also for authoritarian aspects. Especially noteworthy is the positive and significant preference for gender equality for Muslims in Muslim majority nations. Living in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia is largely associated with a negative preference for democracy and its components, including authoritarian aspects such as army rule and religious authority.

*WVS6:* In almost all regressions the coefficient on WVS6 is negative and significant implying that responses to these same questions were always lower in the most recent WVS. It appears that

worldwide, among Muslims and Non-Muslims there is a growing trend of lower preference for democracy and its components. This is not surprising given the unsavory outcomes that have plagued unsuccessful efforts at regime change in the MENA region. These efforts have not only been unsuccessful at truly bringing democratic change to the region, but have also been associated with outright destruction and war (Syria, Libya, Yemen) and economic decline (Egypt) in the region. WVS 6 was in fact conducted between 2010 and 2014, so right around the time of the first regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt in late 2010, early 2011. Even outside the MENA countries, the rise of far right and nationalist movements to power all over Europe and the USA are also indications that individuals all over the world are having declining faith in type of democratic regimes that have governed since the end of World War Two. Voters in these countries are increasingly exhibiting greater preference for nationalist movements that do not always embrace the values of democracy and pluralism.

In this paper we have attempted to understand how Muslims view democracy and how this view has been shaped by their unique individual, cultural, social and economic experiences. Some have argued that Muslims have a unique view of democracy that stems from the incompatibility of Islam as a religion and key democratic concepts. Anderson (2004) writes, “[w]ith regard to Islam it was argued that reliance on a fixed religious text and quasi-legal ordinances, the emphasis on divine sovereignty, and the supposed lack of distinction between the religious and the political realm, all worked against democratic development” (2004, p. 197). Yet, our results here have shown that while Muslims’ view of democracy largely favors the substantive aspects that emphasize the perceived outcomes that such democracy is deemed to bring about, the historical experiences and current economic, social and political environments that Muslims live in have a significant impact on their views. In particular, contrary to conventional views, we found that neither religiosity nor living in a Muslim-majority country were associated with negative views of democracy, but with the opposite. In fact religious Muslims were more likely to support gender equality while religious non-Muslims were less likely to support it. Moreover, religious individuals across the board showed support for authoritarian notions: army rule, religious authority interpreting laws, and obeying rulers, not just Muslims. Similar conclusions were drawn for everyone living in Muslim-majority countries, regardless of their religion.

Muslim-majority countries' historical experiences have been negatively impacted by the West, and as such it is not surprising that Muslims have developed negative feelings towards Western values, just like many in Africa and Asia who have had similar negative experiences. Western imperialism, exploitation, political interference, and the West's direct or indirect (actual or perceived) involvement in regional wars led to an entrenched feeling of distrust, fear, and insecurity among many towards the West, including Muslims. Because democracy is generally thought of as a product of the West, many have been reluctant to accept Western democracy (Huntington, 1996, p. 211). Esposito and Voll (1996) argue that Muslims do not want a Western imposed democracy and prefer to build their own version of a democratic system which would speak to their issues and concerns rather than to Western interests.

The results in this paper suggest that policy makers and international organizations working to promote democracy in Muslim majority countries need to emphasize the substantive aspects of democracy. Our results strongly imply that Muslims favor democracy when they feel it can improve their living conditions. The challenge is not to merely point to its potential, but to find and promote practical mechanisms through which these outcomes can be delivered. Muslims, and many others around the world, have been living in so-called "democracies" that have included elements such as elections or a parliament, but these have merely been facades for brutal authoritarian regimes that have neither achieved prosperity nor truly provided democratic representation. It is therefore not surprising that Muslims' views of democracy have been shaped by these less than ideal experiences.

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
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
Figure 1: Political System Preference for Muslims and Non-Muslims



Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS4-6 based on the question: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good (1), fairly good (2), fairly bad (3) or very bad (4) way of governing this country?”


- E114. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
- E115. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
- E116. Having the army rule
- E117. Having a democratic political system

Figure 2: Importance and State of Democracy



Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS4-6 based on the questions: 1. “E235. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”, 2. “E236. And how democratically is this country being governed today? using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”

Figure 3a: Mean Scores of “Procedural Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and Non-Muslims



Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS4-6 based on the question: “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. (1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy”; 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”)


E226. People choose their leaders in free elections.

E229. Civil rights protect people from state oppression.

E233. Women have the same rights as men.

E232: People can change the laws in referendums. (WVS5 only)

Figure 3b: Mean Scores of “Substantive Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and Non-Muslims




Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS4-6 based on the question: “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. (1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy”; 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”)

E224. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.

- E227. People receive state aid for unemployment.
- E233A. The state makes people's incomes equal.
- E230: The economy is prospering. (WVS5 only)
- E231: Criminals are severely punished. (WVS5 only)


Figure 3C: Mean Scores of “Authoritarian Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and Non-Muslims



Source: Authors' calculations from WVS4-6 based on the question: “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. (1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy”; 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”)

- E233B. People obey their rulers.
- E228. The army takes over when government is incompetent.
- E225. Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.

Figure 4a: Mean Scores of “Procedural Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and non-Muslims who highly value democracy; whose response for E235 > 8.



Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS4-6 based on the question: “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. (1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy”; 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”)

E226. People choose their leaders in free elections.


E229. Civil rights protect people from state oppression.

E233. Women have the same rights as men.

E232: People can change the laws in referendums. (WVS5 only)

Limiting the sample to respondents who highly value democracy; i.e., those who selected 8 or higher for question E235: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”

Figure 4b: Mean Scores of “Substantive Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and non-Muslims, who highly value democracy; whose response for E235 > 8.



Source: Authors' calculations from WVS4-6 based on the question: "Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. (1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy"; 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy")

E224. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.

E227. People receive state aid for unemployment.

E233A. The state makes people's incomes equal.


E230: The economy is prospering. (WVS5 only)

E231: Criminals are severely punished. (WVS5 only)

Limiting the sample to respondents who highly value democracy; i.e., those who selected 8 or higher for question

E235: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what position would you choose?"

Figure 4C: Mean Scores of "Authoritarian Democracy" Variables, for Muslims and non-Muslims who highly value democracy; whose response for E235 > 8.



Source: Authors' calculations from WVS4-6 based on the question: "Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. (1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy"; 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy")

E233B. People obey their rulers.

E228. The army takes over when government is incompetent.

E225. Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.

Limiting the sample to respondents who highly value democracy; i.e., those who selected 8 or higher for question

E235: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what position would you choose?"

Table 1: Sample Statistics of Variables used in the Regressions

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>Individual micro-level variables</b>					
Muslim	221,380	0.29	0.45	0	1
Age	228,785	41	16	15	99
Age squared	228,785	1,940	1,504	225	9,801
male	229,277	0.48	0.5	0	1
Secondary & above	229,277	0.57	0.49	0	1
married	229,277	0.63	0.48	0	1
Number of children	155,864	2.8	1.7	1	8
unemployed	229,277	0.098	0.3	0	1
Interested in politics	229,277	0.45	0.5	0	1
religiosity	226,275	6.2	2.4	1	10
Income poor	229,277	0.11	0.31	0	1
<b>Country macro-level variables</b>					
GDP per capita	216,105	20,165	17,906	1,240	130,990
Avg. Oil Exp Shr 05-14	219,109	23	30	0.013	97
Mean years of schooling (UNDP 2014)	220,420	8.8	2.7	1.3	13
Life expectancy at birth, 2014 (UNDP 2014)	220,420	73	7.5	53	84
Unemployment (% of total labor force), 2012	219,417	8.7	6.1	0.5	31
Control of Corruption 2012 (WGI 2014)	222,885	0.061	1	-1.4	2.3
Level of Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)	216,880	6.8	2.9	0	10
British colony	229,277	0.28	0.45	0	1
French colony	229,277	0.062	0.24	0	1
Predominant Protestant nation dummy	221,825	0.17	0.37	0	1
Predominant Catholic nation dummy	221,825	0.26	0.44	0	1
Predominant Muslim nation dummy	222,825	0.34	0.47	0	1
Predominant Orthodox nation dummy	221,825	0.098	0.3	0	1
EastAsiaPa~c	229,277	0.16	0.37	0	1
EuropCentA~a	229,277	0.27	0.45	0	1
LatinAmCarib	229,277	0.14	0.34	0	1
MENA	229,277	0.18	0.39	0	1
NorthAmerica	229,277	0.038	0.19	0	1
SouthAsia	229,277	0.045	0.21	0	1
SubSaharan~a	229,277	0.13	0.34	0	1

Table 2: Regressions for importance of democracy question (E235), Muslims and non-Muslims

	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Age	0.013* (0.006)	0.017*** (0.003)
Age squared	0 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Male	0.027 (0.027)	0.057*** (0.014)
Secondary & above	0.260*** (0.03)	0.252*** (0.016)
Married	-0.024 (0.046)	0.063*** (0.018)
Number of children	0.007 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.006)
Unemployed	-0.259*** (0.056)	-0.106*** (0.026)
Interested in politics	0.135*** (0.027)	0.388*** (0.014)
Religiosity	0.111*** (0.009)	0.040*** (0.003)
Income poor	-0.02 (0.038)	-0.146*** (0.022)
Ln GDP per capita	0.113* (0.047)	-0.470*** (0.023)
Avg. Oil Export Share	-0.003** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Mean years of schooling	-0.019 (0.012)	0.01 (0.009)
Life expectancy at birth	-0.01 (0.009)	0.058*** (0.004)
Unemployment	0.019** (0.007)	0.008*** (0.002)
Control of Corruption	0.107* (0.053)	0.093*** (0.017)
British colony	0.354*** (0.059)	0.379*** (0.038)
French colony	0.097 (0.077)	0.274*** (0.052)
Level of Democracy	0.038*** (0.01)	0.031*** (0.005)
Predom. Protestant nation	-0.008	0.258***



	(0.171)	(0.037)
Predom. Catholic nation	0.799***	-0.181***
	(0.135)	(0.037)
Predom. Muslim nation	0.217**	0.009
	(0.081)	(0.045)
Predom. Orthodox nation	-0.204	-0.325***
	(0.115)	(0.045)
EuropCentAsia	0.692***	0.399***
	(0.061)	(0.031)
LatinAmCarib	-0.282	0.444***
	(0.266)	(0.039)
MENA	0.545***	-0.033
	(0.102)	(0.096)
NorthAmerica	-0.212	0.336***
	(0.453)	(0.045)
SouthAsia	-0.369***	-1.449***
	(0.097)	(0.08)
SubSaharanAfrica	-0.152	0.021
	(0.121)	(0.073)
WVS6	-0.432***	-0.175***
	(0.036)	(0.016)
N	21157	72461

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\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Procedural Aspects of Democracy

	Elections		Civil Rights		Gender Equality		Referendums	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Age	0.017** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.013* (0.005)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.011* (0.005)	0.008** (0.003)	0.016* (0.008)	0.025*** (0.004)
Age squared	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Male	-0.021 (0.026)	0.059*** (0.015)	-0.031 (0.026)	0.041** (0.014)	-0.513*** (0.026)	-0.146*** (0.015)	0.043 (0.038)	0.051* (0.021)
Secondary & above	0.227*** (0.028)	0.156*** (0.016)	0.176*** (0.028)	0.153*** (0.016)	0.166*** (0.027)	0.143*** (0.016)	0.142*** (0.041)	0.006 (0.023)
Married	-0.106* (0.046)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.027 (0.045)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.057 (0.044)	0.015 (0.019)	0.043 (0.065)	-0.012 (0.026)
Number of children	0.004 (0.008)	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.01 (0.006)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.01 (0.006)	-0.035** (0.011)	-0.030*** (0.008)
Unemployed	-0.011 (0.055)	-0.140*** (0.026)	-0.047 (0.054)	-0.096*** (0.026)	-0.042 (0.054)	-0.079** (0.027)	0.057 (0.076)	0.078* (0.038)
Interested in politics	-0.027 (0.026)	0.193*** (0.015)	0.044 (0.025)	0.169*** (0.014)	0.071** (0.025)	0.141*** (0.015)	0.148*** (0.037)	0.159*** (0.021)
Religiosity	0.061*** (0.009)	0.002 (0.004)	0.061*** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.003)	0.038*** (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)	0.021 (0.012)	0.002 (0.005)
Income poor	-0.02 (0.038)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.03 (0.038)	-0.187*** (0.022)	0.021 (0.037)	-0.174*** (0.022)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Ln GDP per capita	0.187*** (0.047)	-0.229*** (0.024)	0.294*** (0.047)	0.151*** (0.023)	0.044 (0.047)	-0.084*** (0.024)	-0.067 (0.211)	-0.053 (0.038)
Avg. Oil Export Share	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)
Mean yrs of schooling	-0.141*** (0.011)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.072*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.222*** (0.038)	0.165*** (0.013)

Life expectancy at birth	-0.062*** (0.009)	0.011** (0.004)	-0.079*** (0.009)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.051*** (0.008)	0.012** (0.004)	-0.204*** (0.039)	0.039*** (0.006)
Unemployment	0.01 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.007 (0.015)	0.018*** (0.003)
Control of Corruption	0.430*** (0.054)	0.176*** (0.018)	0.345*** (0.052)	0.067*** (0.018)	0.464*** (0.051)	0.041* (0.019)	1.163*** (0.282)	0.186*** (0.028)
British colony	-0.055 (0.053)	0.140*** (0.038)	-0.387*** (0.052)	-0.326*** (0.037)	-0.624*** (0.051)	-0.238*** (0.038)	-0.021 (0.148)	-0.579*** (0.058)
French colony	-0.221** (0.074)	0.644*** (0.053)	-0.025 (0.073)	0.763*** (0.052)	-0.261*** (0.072)	0.501*** (0.053)	-1.629*** (0.232)	1.345*** (0.066)
Level of Democracy	0.046*** (0.010)	0.027*** (0.005)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.005)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.024*** (0.005)	-0.070** (0.022)	-0.118*** (0.009)
Predom. Protestant nation	0.464** (0.173)	0.337*** (0.037)	0.622*** (0.165)	0.300*** (0.037)	-0.038 (0.174)	0.232*** (0.038)	-0.081 (0.388)	-0.342*** (0.059)
Predom. Catholic nation	0.185 (0.129)	-0.224*** (0.037)	0.868*** (0.127)	0.137*** (0.037)	-0.464*** (0.127)	-0.049 (0.038)	-0.965** (0.320)	-0.033 (0.059)
Predom. Muslim nation	0.350*** (0.082)	0.069 (0.045)	0.739*** (0.083)	0.078 (0.044)	0.202* (0.081)	-0.255*** (0.045)	-0.042 (0.196)	0.322*** (0.064)
Predom. Orthodox nation	0.596*** (0.114)	0.319*** (0.046)	0.877*** (0.114)	0.422*** (0.045)	0.515*** (0.114)	-0.079 (0.046)	0.787** (0.268)	0.718*** (0.071)
EuropCentAsia	0.228*** (0.060)	0.558*** (0.031)	-0.245*** (0.059)	0.487*** (0.030)	0.287*** (0.058)	0.670*** (0.032)	1.341*** (0.186)	0.027 (0.049)
LatinAmCarib	0.721** (0.257)	0.575*** (0.040)	-0.607* (0.243)	0.087* (0.039)	1.760*** (0.250)	0.436*** (0.041)	1.275*** (0.385)	0.532*** (0.067)
MENA	0.462*** (0.103)	-0.285** (0.096)	-0.139 (0.102)	-0.270** (0.095)	0.436*** (0.101)	-0.127 (0.094)	1.474*** (0.209)	1.531*** (0.169)
NorthAmerica	-0.134 (0.462)	0.362*** (0.045)	-0.882 (0.454)	0.08 (0.043)	0.481 (0.511)	0.355*** (0.046)	2.100*** (0.575)	-0.863*** (0.075)
SouthAsia	0.078 (0.095)	-0.165* (0.080)	-0.013 (0.093)	0.326*** (0.080)	0.607*** (0.093)	-0.173* (0.081)	-0.955** (0.349)	2.376*** (0.128)

SubSaharanAfrica	-0.785***	-0.125	-1.363***	-0.237**	-0.151	-0.008	-1.977***	1.155***
	(0.123)	(0.075)	(0.121)	(0.074)	(0.117)	(0.077)	(0.504)	(0.128)
WVS6	-0.619***	-0.328***	-0.625***	-0.365***	-0.408***	-0.425***	0	0
	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.017)	(.)	(.)
N	22744	71199	22141	68997	22879	71618	11374	32658

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4: Substantive Aspects of Democracy

	Tax the rich		Unemployment aid		Equal Incomes		Economy Prospering		Criminals Punished	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Age	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.003)	0 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.016* (0.008)	-0.005 (0.004)	0 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.004)
Age squared	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Male	-0.069** (0.025)	-0.052*** (0.014)	0.004 (0.025)	-0.099*** (0.014)	0.003 (0.036)	-0.069*** (0.019)	0.008 (0.038)	0.034 (0.021)	0.031 (0.038)	0.02 (0.021)
Secondary & above	0.016 (0.027)	-0.130*** (0.015)	-0.139*** (0.027)	-0.112*** (0.015)	-0.097* (0.039)	-0.214*** (0.021)	0.07 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.040)	-0.103*** (0.022)
Married	-0.128** (0.044)	-0.066*** (0.017)	0.046 (0.043)	-0.061*** (0.017)	-0.043 (0.061)	-0.119*** (0.023)	0.058 (0.065)	0.024 (0.026)	0.048 (0.064)	0.007 (0.026)
Number of children	0.011 (0.008)	0.004 (0.005)	0.011 (0.008)	0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.011)	0.014 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.008)
Unemployed	-0.078 (0.053)	-0.026 (0.026)	0.069 (0.053)	0.136*** (0.026)	-0.048 (0.080)	-0.016 (0.036)	0.214** (0.077)	-0.031 (0.038)	0.058 (0.076)	-0.03 (0.037)
Interested in politics	-0.122*** (0.024)	-0.054*** (0.014)	-0.03 (0.024)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.035)	-0.172*** (0.019)	0.013 (0.037)	-0.039 (0.021)	0.056 (0.037)	-0.100*** (0.021)
Religiosity	0.032*** (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.003)	0.039*** (0.008)	-0.008* (0.003)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.005)	0.108*** (0.012)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.119*** (0.012)	0.012* (0.005)
Income poor	0.111** (0.037)	0.051* (0.021)	0.091* (0.037)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.005 (0.038)	0.094*** (0.022)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Ln GDP per capita	0.442*** (0.046)	0.085*** (0.023)	0.441*** (0.046)	0.267*** (0.023)	0.402*** (0.056)	0.596*** (0.033)	-0.984*** (0.229)	0.116** (0.037)	-1.158*** (0.218)	0.023 (0.037)
Avg. Oil Export Share	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Mean years of schooling	-0.054***	0.107***	-0.111***	-0.064***	-0.164***	-0.112***	-0.024	0.301***	0.201***	0.316***

	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.012)	(0.038)	(0.012)
Life expectancy at birth	-0.080***	0.016***	-0.020*	-0.041***	-0.072***	-0.061***	-0.302***	0.041***	-0.067	0.044***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.006)
Unemployment	-0.039***	0.012***	0.034***	0.026***	0.025*	0.003	0.079***	0.004	0.045**	-0.010***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Control of Corruption	0.132**	-0.222***	0.167**	0.065***	0.082	-0.343***	1.271***	-0.443***	-0.248	-0.347***
	(0.051)	(0.017)	(0.051)	(0.017)	(0.065)	(0.024)	(0.287)	(0.028)	(0.277)	(0.028)
British colony	-0.015	-0.178***	0.035	-0.404***	-0.017	-0.432***	-0.573***	-0.141*	0.281	0.294***
	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.101)	(0.051)	(0.148)	(0.058)	(0.145)	(0.057)
French colony	-0.871***	0.397***	0.478***	0.233***	0.677***	-0.519	-2.130***	0.937***	0.208	1.233***
	(0.071)	(0.051)	(0.071)	(0.051)	(0.135)	(0.276)	(0.232)	(0.062)	(0.229)	(0.063)
Level of Democracy	0.006	-0.086***	-0.122***	-0.040***	-0.071***	-0.097***	0.021	-0.186***	0.118***	-0.164***
	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.008)
Predom. Protestant nation	0.439**	0.063	0.159	-0.170***	0.383	0.094	-1.107**	-0.261***	-0.388	-0.420***
	(0.158)	(0.035)	(0.161)	(0.035)	(0.218)	(0.049)	(0.377)	(0.057)	(0.382)	(0.057)
Predom. Catholic nation	0.313*	-0.091**	0.145	-0.308***	0.574**	0.167***	-1.182***	0.164**	0.303	0.047
	(0.124)	(0.035)	(0.127)	(0.035)	(0.185)	(0.048)	(0.319)	(0.058)	(0.321)	(0.057)
Predom. Muslim nation	0.659***	0.091*	-0.13	-0.207***	0.354**	0.123	-0.506**	0.256***	-0.580**	-0.03
	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.044)	(0.111)	(0.068)	(0.194)	(0.063)	(0.194)	(0.063)
Predom. Orthodox nation	0.178	-0.318***	-0.033	0.397***	0.380*	0.019	-0.375	0.789***	-1.625***	0.220**
	(0.111)	(0.043)	(0.110)	(0.043)	(0.166)	(0.061)	(0.266)	(0.069)	(0.264)	(0.069)
EuropCentAsia	0.072	0.058*	1.329***	0.358***	0.246*	0.483***	0.065	-0.097*	0.622***	0.056
	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.058)	(0.029)	(0.110)	(0.040)	(0.187)	(0.048)	(0.184)	(0.048)
LatinAmCarib	-0.560*	-0.305***	0.29	0.058	-1.885***	-0.001	0.226	0.318***	-1.280**	-0.021
	(0.230)	(0.038)	(0.235)	(0.038)	(0.324)	(0.050)	(0.390)	(0.065)	(0.403)	(0.065)
MENA	0.902***	-0.387***	0.415***	-0.398***	-0.843***	-0.158	0.075	1.074***	0.344	0.762***
	(0.099)	(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.166)	(0.257)	(0.207)	(0.171)	(0.205)	(0.163)
NorthAmerica	-0.232	-0.589***	1.293**	-0.135**	0.174	-0.879***	0.329	-0.366***	-0.295	-0.431***
	(0.440)	(0.041)	(0.433)	(0.042)	(1.439)	(0.058)	(0.540)	(0.072)	(0.525)	(0.073)
SouthAsia	0.623***	1.282***	1.587***	0.190*	-0.668***	-0.453***	-2.685***	2.514***	-1.374***	2.185***

	(0.093)	(0.078)	(0.092)	(0.078)	(0.124)	(0.110)	(0.351)	(0.128)	(0.345)	(0.125)
SubSaharanAfrica	-1.113***	0.271***	0.166	-0.552***	-1.717***	-0.137	-5.672***	1.646***	-2.055***	1.671***
	(0.118)	(0.072)	(0.118)	(0.073)	(0.172)	(0.101)	(0.527)	(0.126)	(0.505)	(0.127)
WVS6	-0.368***	-0.316***	-0.190***	-0.326***	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
N	22651	70205	22726	70799	10795	36559	11776	33504	11856	33903

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Note:"Economy Prospering" and "Punish Criminals" questions only asked in WVS5, "Equal incomes" questions only asked in WVS6.

Table 5: Authoritarian Aspects of Democracy

	Army Rule		Religious Authority		Obey Rulers	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Age	0.004 (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.003)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.010** (0.004)
Age squared	0 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Male	-0.069** (0.025)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.133*** (0.025)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.073* (0.036)	0.111*** (0.019)
Secondary & above	0.011 (0.027)	-0.264*** (0.016)	-0.103*** (0.027)	-0.281*** (0.016)	-0.037 (0.040)	-0.235*** (0.021)
Married	0.034 (0.044)	-0.039* (0.018)	-0.033 (0.043)	-0.048** (0.018)	-0.062 (0.062)	-0.02 (0.023)
Number of children	0.002 (0.008)	0.034*** (0.006)	0.008 (0.008)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.023* (0.011)	0.042*** (0.008)
Unemployed	0.067 (0.053)	0.102*** (0.026)	-0.021 (0.053)	0.01 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.080)	-0.083* (0.035)
Interested in politics	0.048* (0.025)	-0.129*** (0.015)	-0.048* (0.024)	-0.137*** (0.014)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.152*** (0.019)
Religiosity	0.038*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.003)	0.094*** (0.008)	0.144*** (0.004)	0.038** (0.012)	0.029*** (0.005)
Income poor	0.028 (0.037)	0.156*** (0.021)	-0.023 (0.037)	0.211*** (0.022)	0.054 (0.038)	0.004 (0.022)
Ln GDP per capita	0.272*** (0.047)	0.276*** (0.023)	0.359*** (0.046)	-0.174*** (0.023)	-0.079 (0.057)	-0.178*** (0.033)
Avg. Oil Export Share	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Mean years of schooling	-0.061*** (0.012)	-0.089*** (0.009)	-0.105*** (0.011)	-0.020* (0.009)	0.146*** (0.016)	-0.117*** (0.013)
Life expectancy at birth	0.007 (0.009)	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.077*** (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.004)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.044*** (0.005)
Unemployment	0.067*** (0.007)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.017* (0.007)	0.037*** (0.002)	0.075*** (0.011)	0.034*** (0.002)
Control of Corruption	-0.542*** (0.052)	-0.288*** (0.018)	-0.098 (0.052)	-0.128*** (0.018)	0.163* (0.064)	0.080*** (0.024)
British colony	0.378*** (0.050)	0.032 (0.037)	0.199*** (0.051)	0.602*** (0.037)	-0.313** (0.102)	0.442*** (0.051)
French colony	-0.11 (0.073)	0.166** (0.052)	-0.829*** (0.072)	1.322*** (0.054)	-0.058 (0.135)	0.194 (0.273)
Level of Democracy	-0.091*** (0.010)	-0.144*** (0.005)	-0.057*** (0.010)	-0.075*** (0.005)	-0.061** (0.019)	-0.032*** (0.006)
Predom. Protestant nation	0.026	0.683***	0.588***	0.337***	-1.444***	-0.140**



	(0.181)	(0.038)	(0.166)	(0.037)	(0.225)	(0.051)
Predom. Catholic nation	1.118***	0.636***	0.497***	0.310***	-0.079	0.335***
	(0.147)	(0.038)	(0.128)	(0.037)	(0.189)	(0.049)
Predom. Muslim nation	0.332***	0.074	0.431***	-0.160***	0.734***	0.273***
	(0.081)	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.044)	(0.110)	(0.068)
Predom. Orthodox nation	0.106	0.562***	0.053	0.088	1.050***	0.684***
	(0.115)	(0.045)	(0.112)	(0.045)	(0.167)	(0.061)
EuropCentAsia	-0.491***	-0.462***	-0.651***	-0.450***	-1.747***	-0.640***
	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.113)	(0.040)
LatinAmCarib	-1.307***	-0.303***	-0.977***	-0.387***	-0.342	-0.463***
	(0.259)	(0.039)	(0.238)	(0.039)	(0.337)	(0.050)
MENA	-0.703***	0.092	0.12	-0.727***	-1.403***	-0.636*
	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.167)	(0.255)
NorthAmerica	-0.431	0.355***	-0.375	-0.089*	-0.254	0.415***
	(0.455)	(0.043)	(0.431)	(0.043)	(1.449)	(0.057)
SouthAsia	-0.034	0.231**	-0.179	-0.967***	-0.670***	-1.723***
	(0.093)	(0.077)	(0.092)	(0.078)	(0.124)	(0.110)
SubSaharanAfrica	-0.285*	-0.633***	-1.420***	-1.221***	-0.843***	-1.012***
	(0.119)	(0.073)	(0.119)	(0.073)	(0.173)	(0.103)
WVS6	-0.144***	-0.069***	-0.106**	-0.109***	0	0
	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(.)	(.)
N	21785	67007	22033	67507	10775	36210

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

## Appendix

Table A1: Macro variables data sources

Variable	Source	Year
Ln GDP per capita	World Development Indicators 2016	2012
Avg. Oil Export Share	World Development Indicators 2016	Average Annual share 2005 to 2014
Mean years of schooling	Norris (2015), based on UNDP 2014	2014
Life expectancy at birth	Norris (2015), based on UNDP 2014	2014
Unemployment (% of total labor force)	Norris (2015), based on UNDP 2014	2012
Control of Corruption	Teorell et al.(2017)	2012
Colonial Heritage Indicator Variables	Teorell et al.(2017)	
Level of Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)	Teorell et al.(2017)	
Predominant Religion Indicator Variables	Norris (2015)	
Regional Indicator Variables	Norris (2015)	

Table A2: Procedural Aspects of Democracy (E235&gt;8 imp of democracy high)

	Elections		Civil Rights		Gender Equality		Referendums	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Age	0.016 (0.008)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.008)	0.025*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.004)	0.022 (0.012)	0.022*** (0.005)
Age squared	0 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Male	-0.021 (0.039)	0.050* (0.020)	-0.063 (0.037)	0.019 (0.019)	-0.572*** (0.037)	-0.185*** (0.021)	0.015 (0.055)	0.039 (0.027)
Secondary & above	0.172*** (0.042)	0.060** (0.022)	0.159*** (0.039)	0.109*** (0.021)	0.132*** (0.039)	0.083*** (0.023)	0.120* (0.059)	-0.119*** (0.030)
Married	-0.122 (0.067)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.063)	-0.051* (0.023)	-0.073 (0.063)	-0.015 (0.026)	0.023 (0.091)	-0.084* (0.034)
Number of children	0.013 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.011)	0 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.010)
Unemployed	-0.082 (0.086)	-0.146*** (0.038)	-0.085 (0.081)	-0.107** (0.036)	-0.008 (0.083)	-0.088* (0.039)	-0.072 (0.118)	0.059 (0.052)
Interested in politics	-0.078* (0.037)	0.175*** (0.020)	-0.033 (0.035)	0.143*** (0.019)	0.088* (0.035)	0.098*** (0.021)	0.151** (0.053)	0.082** (0.027)
Religiosity	0.030* (0.013)	-0.024*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.012)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.046*** (0.005)	0.016 (0.020)	-0.023*** (0.006)
Income poor	0 (0.055)	-0.154*** (0.032)	-0.003 (0.054)	-0.124*** (0.030)	0.066 (0.053)	-0.075* (0.032)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Ln GDP per capita	0.319*** (0.067)	-0.135*** (0.034)	0.275*** (0.065)	0.330*** (0.032)	0.093 (0.066)	0.056 (0.034)	-0.679* (0.346)	-0.135** (0.050)
Avg. Oil Export Share	0.002 (0.001)	0 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.001)
Mean yrs of schooling	-0.181*** (0.016)	-0.033** (0.012)	-0.070*** (0.015)	-0.027* (0.011)	-0.029 (0.015)	-0.055*** (0.013)	-0.079 (0.058)	0.180*** (0.017)

Life expectancy at birth	-0.083*** (0.013)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.091*** (0.012)	-0.052*** (0.005)	-0.047*** (0.012)	-0.013* (0.005)	-0.11 (0.060)	0.007 (0.008)
Unemployment	-0.002 (0.010)	0 (0.002)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.013*** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.016 (0.025)	0.029*** (0.003)
Control of Corruption	0.300*** (0.082)	0.284*** (0.025)	0.428*** (0.078)	0.165*** (0.023)	0.245** (0.077)	0.114*** (0.026)	0.186 (0.417)	0.336*** (0.037)
British colony	-0.012 (0.088)	0.172** (0.054)	-0.560*** (0.083)	-0.333*** (0.050)	-0.470*** (0.082)	-0.255*** (0.053)	1.037*** (0.312)	-0.702*** (0.076)
French colony	-0.133 (0.114)	0.871*** (0.072)	0.035 (0.109)	1.050*** (0.069)	-0.002 (0.109)	0.682*** (0.075)	-0.274 (0.451)	1.485*** (0.090)
Level of Democracy	0.079*** (0.016)	0.047*** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.101*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.035*** (0.007)	-0.079** (0.029)	-0.089*** (0.012)
Predom. Protestant nation	0.826*** (0.245)	0.458*** (0.051)	0.537* (0.224)	0.371*** (0.048)	0.207 (0.246)	0.215*** (0.052)	1.001 (0.542)	-0.558*** (0.077)
Predom. Catholic nation	0.116 (0.183)	-0.074 (0.051)	0.794*** (0.176)	0.377*** (0.048)	-0.554** (0.179)	0.093 (0.053)	0.31 (0.474)	0.026 (0.076)
Predom. Muslim nation	0.263* (0.129)	0.312*** (0.063)	0.817*** (0.124)	0.265*** (0.060)	-0.2 (0.124)	-0.223*** (0.062)	0.298 (0.246)	0.605*** (0.090)
Predom. Orthodox nation	0.970*** (0.175)	0.648*** (0.063)	1.136*** (0.168)	0.747*** (0.058)	0.413* (0.175)	0.127* (0.064)	0.734 (0.398)	0.759*** (0.089)
EuropCentAsia	-0.187* (0.088)	0.312*** (0.041)	-0.653*** (0.085)	0.231*** (0.037)	0.159 (0.084)	0.474*** (0.042)	2.296*** (0.335)	-0.335*** (0.060)
LatinAmCarib	0.472 (0.377)	0.369*** (0.054)	-0.501 (0.317)	-0.109* (0.051)	1.155** (0.351)	0.210*** (0.056)	-0.835 (0.609)	0.296*** (0.087)
MENA	0.335* (0.158)	-0.279* (0.129)	-0.400** (0.151)	-0.432*** (0.123)	0.136 (0.152)	-0.068 (0.127)	0.624 (0.347)	1.204*** (0.215)
NorthAmerica	0.083 (0.641)	0.403*** (0.060)	-1.141 (0.585)	-0.065 (0.053)	0.444 (0.693)	0.284*** (0.061)	3.255*** (0.694)	-1.342*** (0.090)
SouthAsia	-0.195 (0.150)	-0.354** (0.121)	-0.303* (0.140)	0.733*** (0.118)	0.296* (0.142)	-0.104 (0.124)	-0.522 (0.500)	2.130*** (0.182)

SubSaharanAfrica	-1.303***	-0.726***	-1.805***	-0.775***	-0.532**	-0.434***	-1.749**	0.395*
	(0.181)	(0.104)	(0.174)	(0.098)	(0.170)	(0.107)	(0.626)	(0.173)
WVS6	-0.565***	-0.202***	-0.565***	-0.287***	-0.548***	-0.359***	0	0
	(0.051)	(0.022)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.023)	(.)	(.)
N	12232	43174	11931	42075	12256	43307	6162	21073

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3: Substantive Aspects of Democracy

	Tax the rich		Unemployment aid		Equal Incomes		Economy Prospering		Criminals Punished	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Age	-0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.01 (0.011)	0.003 (0.005)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.011* (0.005)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.005)
Age squared	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Male	-0.063 (0.036)	-0.071*** (0.018)	0.011 (0.035)	-0.117*** (0.018)	-0.017 (0.049)	-0.082** (0.026)	0.022 (0.056)	0.006 (0.026)	0.009 (0.055)	0.014 (0.026)
Secondary & above	-0.094* (0.038)	-0.179*** (0.020)	-0.194*** (0.037)	-0.223*** (0.020)	-0.101 (0.055)	-0.281*** (0.028)	-0.002 (0.060)	-0.105*** (0.029)	-0.046 (0.058)	-0.193*** (0.029)
Married	-0.148* (0.061)	-0.074*** (0.022)	0.01 (0.060)	-0.077*** (0.023)	-0.054 (0.087)	-0.149*** (0.031)	0.034 (0.091)	-0.008 (0.033)	0.026 (0.089)	0.004 (0.033)
Number of children	0.006 (0.011)	0.003 (0.007)	0.025* (0.011)	0.004 (0.007)	0.003 (0.015)	0.017 (0.011)	0.004 (0.017)	0 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.010)
Unemployed	-0.073 (0.080)	-0.011 (0.035)	0.079 (0.080)	0.199*** (0.036)	-0.014 (0.119)	0.009 (0.050)	0.259* (0.123)	0.02 (0.051)	0.061 (0.117)	-0.05 (0.051)
Interested in politics	-0.115*** (0.034)	-0.039* (0.018)	-0.051 (0.034)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.137** (0.049)	-0.186*** (0.026)	-0.023 (0.054)	-0.120*** (0.027)	0.024 (0.052)	-0.166*** (0.027)
Religiosity	0.001 (0.012)	-0.022*** (0.004)	0.021 (0.012)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.01 (0.006)	0.101*** (0.019)	0.002 (0.006)	0.109*** (0.019)	-0.002 (0.006)
Income poor	0.162** (0.053)	0.152*** (0.029)	0.061 (0.053)	0.059* (0.030)	0.037 (0.054)	0.111*** (0.031)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Ln GDP per capita	0.334*** (0.063)	0.133*** (0.030)	0.491*** (0.064)	0.390*** (0.031)	0.446*** (0.079)	0.583*** (0.044)	-1.572*** (0.394)	0.059 (0.050)	-0.751* (0.346)	-0.07 (0.049)
Avg. Oil Export Share	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	0.012* (0.005)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.009*** (0.001)
Mean years of schooling	-0.031* (0.011)	0.090*** (0.011)	-0.088*** (0.011)	-0.091*** (0.011)	-0.206*** (0.011)	-0.063*** (0.011)	0.11 (0.011)	0.299*** (0.011)	0.243*** (0.011)	0.326*** (0.011)

	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.061)	(0.016)	(0.057)	(0.016)
Life expectancy at birth	-0.074***	0.013**	-0.030*	-0.062***	-0.086***	-0.062***	-0.195**	0.009	-0.089	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.061)	(0.008)	(0.059)	(0.008)
Unemployment	-0.037***	0.012***	0.027**	0.032***	-0.012	0.004	0.095***	0.013***	0.024	-0.007*
	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.003)
Control of Corruption	0.026	-0.245***	0.209**	0.113***	-0.033	-0.347***	0.687	-0.420***	-0.337	-0.350***
	(0.074)	(0.022)	(0.075)	(0.022)	(0.094)	(0.031)	(0.415)	(0.035)	(0.406)	(0.035)
British colony	0.051	-0.150**	-0.274***	-0.441***	-0.264	-0.510***	0.107	-0.123	0.05	0.390***
	(0.080)	(0.047)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.150)	(0.067)	(0.325)	(0.076)	(0.313)	(0.075)
French colony	-0.880***	0.617***	0.269**	0.462***	0.472*	-0.495	-1.163*	1.023***	0.114	1.360***
	(0.105)	(0.064)	(0.104)	(0.065)	(0.202)	(0.357)	(0.474)	(0.083)	(0.456)	(0.085)
Level of Democracy	0.032*	-0.088***	-0.130***	-0.046***	-0.05	-0.134***	0.041	-0.157***	0.115***	-0.132***
	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.011)
Predom. Protestant nation	0.375	0.093*	-0.299	-0.236***	-0.146	0.147*	-0.422	-0.277***	-0.152	-0.366***
	(0.214)	(0.045)	(0.216)	(0.046)	(0.301)	(0.063)	(0.518)	(0.074)	(0.525)	(0.074)
Predom. Catholic nation	0.232	0.019	-0.685***	-0.228***	-0.119	0.374***	-0.243	0.330***	0.564	0.300***
	(0.173)	(0.045)	(0.173)	(0.046)	(0.268)	(0.064)	(0.472)	(0.073)	(0.473)	(0.073)
Predom. Muslim nation	0.627***	0.226***	-0.493***	-0.111	-0.281	0.230*	0.036	0.422***	-0.286	0.112
	(0.121)	(0.058)	(0.119)	(0.058)	(0.176)	(0.091)	(0.242)	(0.087)	(0.241)	(0.087)
Predom. Orthodox nation	0.314	-0.268***	-0.07	0.639***	0.412	0.189*	-0.279	0.941***	-1.064**	0.258**
	(0.163)	(0.055)	(0.160)	(0.056)	(0.268)	(0.079)	(0.402)	(0.087)	(0.387)	(0.087)
EuropCentAsia	-0.176*	0.025	1.300***	0.189***	0.091	0.360***	0.015	-0.441***	0.016	-0.248***
	(0.080)	(0.035)	(0.080)	(0.035)	(0.150)	(0.049)	(0.341)	(0.057)	(0.324)	(0.058)
LatinAmCarib	-0.765*	-0.399***	1.416***	-0.109*	-1.979***	0.095	-1.258*	-0.018	-1.483*	-0.514***
	(0.308)	(0.049)	(0.310)	(0.049)	(0.450)	(0.065)	(0.616)	(0.085)	(0.636)	(0.085)
MENA	0.913***	-0.430***	0.760***	-0.644***	-0.550*	0.177	-0.995**	0.584**	0.348	0.139
	(0.144)	(0.120)	(0.144)	(0.118)	(0.255)	(0.326)	(0.359)	(0.215)	(0.335)	(0.203)
NorthAmerica	-0.074	-0.664***	2.026***	-0.291***	0	-1.090***	-0.182	-0.715***	-0.738	-0.786***
	(0.552)	(0.049)	(0.551)	(0.051)	(.)	(0.073)	(0.688)	(0.086)	(0.635)	(0.087)
SouthAsia	1.004***	1.474***	2.161***	0.213	-1.317***	0.309	-2.002***	2.568***	-1.105*	1.832***

	(0.150)	(0.113)	(0.141)	(0.115)	(0.181)	(0.165)	(0.515)	(0.185)	(0.473)	(0.181)
SubSaharanAfrica	-1.101***	0.224*	0.558***	-0.838***	-1.821***	0.155	-5.435***	0.761***	-1.701**	0.742***
	(0.166)	(0.095)	(0.167)	(0.096)	(0.247)	(0.135)	(0.667)	(0.171)	(0.626)	(0.171)
WVS6	-0.334***	-0.290***	0.046	-0.247***	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0.047)	(0.019)	(0.046)	(0.020)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
N	12113	42439	12182	42779	5790	21045	6330	21450	6390	21626

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Note:"Economy\_Prospiring" and "Punish\_Criminals" questions only asked in WVS4, "Equal incomes" questions only asked in WVS6; all others asked in WVS5 and



Table A4: Authoritarian Aspects of Democracy

	Army Rule		Religious Authority		Obey Rulers	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Age	0.009 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)	0 (0.008)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.012* (0.005)
Age squared	0 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Male	-0.132*** (0.035)	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.180*** (0.035)	-0.012 (0.019)	0.114* (0.049)	0.139*** (0.026)
Secondary & above	-0.062 (0.037)	-0.259*** (0.021)	-0.158*** (0.037)	-0.249*** (0.021)	-0.159** (0.055)	-0.275*** (0.029)
Married	0.029 (0.060)	-0.052* (0.024)	-0.058 (0.060)	-0.032 (0.024)	-0.023 (0.088)	-0.031 (0.031)
Number of children	-0.013 (0.011)	0.042*** (0.008)	0.004 (0.011)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.006 (0.015)	0.040*** (0.011)
Unemployed	-0.033 (0.079)	0.109** (0.036)	-0.107 (0.080)	0.019 (0.036)	-0.15 (0.120)	-0.093 (0.050)
Interested in politics	-0.036 (0.034)	-0.135*** (0.019)	-0.094** (0.034)	-0.140*** (0.019)	-0.101* (0.049)	-0.171*** (0.026)
Religiosity	0.052*** (0.012)	0.064*** (0.005)	0.096*** (0.012)	0.158*** (0.005)	0.01 (0.017)	0.032*** (0.006)
Income poor	0.038 (0.053)	0.189*** (0.030)	0.066 (0.053)	0.259*** (0.030)	0.092 (0.054)	0.018 (0.031)
Ln GDP per capita	0.196** (0.065)	0.238*** (0.031)	0.151* (0.063)	-0.274*** (0.031)	-0.145 (0.079)	-0.099* (0.043)
Avg. Oil Export Share	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Mean years of schooling	-0.032* (0.015)	-0.087*** (0.011)	-0.106*** (0.015)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.161*** (0.023)	-0.158*** (0.016)
Life expectancy at birth	0.025* (0.012)	-0.039*** (0.005)	-0.030* (0.012)	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.070*** (0.006)
Unemployment	0.072*** (0.010)	0.002 (0.002)	0.041*** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.002)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.034*** (0.003)
Control of Corruption	-0.723*** (0.077)	-0.303*** (0.023)	-0.358*** (0.076)	-0.172*** (0.023)	0.250** (0.092)	0.192*** (0.031)
British colony	0.529*** (0.079)	-0.005 (0.049)	0.800*** (0.080)	0.661*** (0.049)	-0.603*** (0.151)	0.335*** (0.066)
French colony	-0.077 (0.108)	0.298*** (0.065)	-0.465*** (0.106)	1.748*** (0.069)	-0.085 (0.198)	0.552 (0.343)
Level of Democracy	-0.105*** (0.015)	-0.158*** (0.007)	-0.044** (0.015)	-0.076*** (0.007)	-0.121*** (0.029)	-0.051*** (0.008)
Predom. Protestant nation	-0.153	0.812***	0.630**	0.487***	-1.681***	0.095

	(0.264)	(0.052)	(0.226)	(0.050)	(0.318)	(0.066)
Predom. Catholic nation	1.278***	0.731***	0.925***	0.446***	-0.783**	0.724***
	(0.209)	(0.052)	(0.176)	(0.049)	(0.281)	(0.066)
Predom. Muslim nation	0.341**	-0.094	0.227	-0.188**	0.589***	0.582***
	(0.123)	(0.058)	(0.122)	(0.059)	(0.175)	(0.092)
Predom. Orthodox nation	0.06	0.537***	-0.627***	0.073	1.590***	1.097***
	(0.169)	(0.060)	(0.165)	(0.058)	(0.274)	(0.080)
EuropCentAsia	-0.510***	-0.426***	-0.580***	-0.401***	-2.511***	-0.902***
	(0.081)	(0.038)	(0.081)	(0.038)	(0.157)	(0.050)
LatinAmCarib	-1.357***	-0.363***	-2.048***	-0.414***	0.025	-0.664***
	(0.346)	(0.052)	(0.312)	(0.051)	(0.476)	(0.066)
MENA	-0.847***	0.304**	-0.437**	-0.750***	-2.001***	-0.889**
	(0.150)	(0.113)	(0.147)	(0.119)	(0.256)	(0.313)
NorthAmerica	-0.104	0.324***	-0.799	-0.079	0	0.263***
	(0.573)	(0.053)	(0.548)	(0.054)	(.)	(0.071)
SouthAsia	-0.370**	0.198	-0.632***	-0.974***	-1.043***	-1.456***
	(0.137)	(0.112)	(0.138)	(0.113)	(0.181)	(0.163)
SubSaharanAfrica	-0.203	-0.824***	-1.541***	-1.221***	-1.321***	-1.168***
	(0.167)	(0.097)	(0.169)	(0.097)	(0.250)	(0.137)
WVS6	-0.163***	-0.084***	-0.392***	-0.195***	0	0
	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(.)	(.)
N	11672	40810	11827	41096	5765	20872

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.