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**DIASPORA NETWORKS AS A BRIDGE
BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS**

Ishac Diwan, Michele Tuccio and Jackline Wahba

Working Paper No. 1094

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Abstract

This paper explores the effect of international migration on the so-called clash of civilizations. Exploiting Gallup data on North Africa and the Middle East, we study the impact of having family members abroad on opinions about the relation between the Western and Muslim worlds. We find that households with migrants in Europe and North America have more positive attitudes towards the West than those with no migrants, or those with migrants in a Gulf country. We also show that in Tunisia having a migrant abroad has helped families go through the difficult post revolution period while keeping a positive and optimistic attitude towards the future, independently of their income level. Overall, our findings point at the important role of international migration as a bridge between civilizations, and as a catalyst for long-term peace and stability in troubled origin countries.

JEL Classifications: F2

Keywords: International migration; Diaspora; Cultural diffusion; Westernization; Arab, Middle East and North Africa.

ملخص

تستكشف هذه الورقة أثر الهجرة الدولية على ما يسمى صراع الحضارات. باستغلال بيانات غالوب في شمال أفريقيا والشرق الأوسط، ندرس تأثير وجود أفراد الأسرة في الخارج على الآراء حول العلاقة بين العالمين الغربي والإسلامي. ونجد أن الأسر التي لديها مهاجرين في أوروبا وأمريكا الشمالية لديها مواقف إيجابية تجاه الغرب أكثر من تلك التي ليس لديها مهاجرون، أو أولئك الذين لديهم مهاجرين في بلد خليجي. كما تبين لنا أن وجود مهاجر في الخارج قد ساعد العائلات التي تمر بمرحلة ما بعد الثورة الصعبة، مع الحفاظ على موقف إيجابي ومتفائل تجاه المستقبل، بغض النظر عن مستوى دخلها. وبصفة عامة، تشير نتائجنا إلى الدور الهام للهجرة الدولية كجسر بين الحضارات، وباعتبارها حافزا للسلام والاستقرار على المدى الطويل في البلدان الأصلية المضطربة.

1. Introduction

Is the world growing together or apart? Since the early 1990s, the debate about the clash of civilizations has not withered. In his seminal contribution Huntington (1993) hypothesizes that, with tensions between capitalist and communist countries falling, conflicts around the world would increasingly involve “civilizations” with different sense of identity, especially between the Muslim and Western worlds. Albeit criticized by many authors, including Sen (1999), Huntington’s hypothesis is back in the headlines today, with the rise of Muslim extremism and the spread of non-state actors, like the Islamic state or Al-Qaida, who espouse radical ideas and wage war against the West.¹

This paper contributes to the debate by examining whether international migration increases the civilizational cleavage or instead builds bridges between civilizations. We do this by looking at values and opinions related to civilizational conflict among individuals in the North Africa and Middle East (MENA) region, comparing families with no migrants abroad, to households with migrants in the West and in the Gulf region, in order to assess whether their values become more moderate or more extreme.

The values and opinions we are looking at are different from those analyzed so far in the literature. Previous research has demonstrated that immigrants’ values related to gender, work, fertility, or democracy, adjust rapidly to the destination country preferences (Reimers, 1985; Bleakley and Chin, 2010). It has also shown how these newly acquired social and political norms are transferred back home to migrants’ families and communities through visits, return, and the exchange of ideas (see Tuccio et al., 2016, for a review of the migration-induced transfer of norms literature).

In order to understand whether international migrants act as a bridge between civilizations, thereby improving the political relationship between countries, we exploit the Gallup/Silatech data. The dataset includes information on whether respondents’ have family members living abroad, and, in the affirmative, on their country of residency. It also includes values on a host of topics, including opinions and values related to the so-called conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds. The dataset is global, making it possible to contrast particular values held by families in MENA that have migrants abroad, with average values held in the migrants’ countries of destination, whether in the West or in the GCC.

The main part of the paper is devoted to a cross-country approach to examine whether the Arab diaspora abroad affects the opinions and values of the left behind families on the issue of the Muslim/West civilizational conflict. We distinguish between migrant networks in the West (Europe/North America), and in Gulf countries (GCC) and ask whether migrants transfer different values on the relationship between the Muslim and Western worlds, according to their destination.

We adopt an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to control for unobservable characteristics differentiating movers and stayers, as well as affecting the destination choice of movers. Such omitted variables could indeed simultaneously affect preferences and beliefs leading to biased estimations. In addition, we adopt a Difference-in Differences (DiD) approach to identify the impact of diaspora networks in Tunisia. Our results show that migrant networks in Europe and

¹ Sen (1999) argues that: “diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Western civilization is no exception. The practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. To read in this a historical commitment to democracy, and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions would be a great mistake.”

North America transmit a better understanding of Western societies and a desire for more peaceful relations between the Muslim and Western worlds. On the contrary, we find that individuals with migrants in the Gulf are not subjected to this positive effect. However, and conversely to common claim, we do not find that households with members in the Gulf have a more negative view of Muslim/West relations compared to households with no migrants.

We also examine how values related to the civilizational conflict may play out in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. We focus on the particular case study of Tunisia, which has a large diaspora to the West and has been recently through political unrest. We question the role of migration in supporting Tunisia's transition. Our hypothesis is that to the extent that households with members in the West are more in tune with Western values, they should be more supportive of a transition to democracy, even if achieved at high costs. We go beyond the financial impact of diaspora on their countries of origin and examine the effect of having immigrant network on the well-being of non-migrants, measured by their perception of suffering, optimism, social well-being, and civic engagement.² We find that indeed households with members abroad managed to keep a more positive outlook on the future during the chaotic period after 2011.

Hence, overall this paper's findings point at the important role of international migration as a bridge between civilizations, and as a catalyst for long-term peace and stability in troubled origin countries. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a brief background of the literature on migration and values as well as the conceptual framework behind our analysis. Section 3 describes the dataset we use. Section 4 discusses the benchmark empirical analysis, whilst Section 5 addresses the important issue of migration selectivity. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our cross-sectional results. Section 7 focuses on the case of Tunisia. Section 8 concludes with a summary and a discussion of policy implications.

2. Background and Conceptual Framework

Despite being completely overlooked in decades of migration research, the effect of the diaspora on the opinions of their families and communities back home has attracted great attention in the economic literature of the last few years. In particular, studies on the migration-induced transfer of norms mostly stemmed from the pioneering contribution by Spilimbergo (2009) on democracy and foreign education. Subsequent works on the impact of international migration on attitudes and preferences in origin countries have mostly looked at the transfer of fertility norms (Beine et al., 2013; Bertoli and Marchetta, 2015), gender norms (Tuccio and Wahba, 2015), and political norms (Batista and Vicente, 2011; Pfutze, 2012; Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Barsbai et al., 2016; Docquier et al., 2016; Tuccio et al., 2016).

Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that, through exposure to different values, international migration is a powerful way to modify both social and political norms in origin countries. However, there is to date no evidence on the extent to which international migration is correlated with values and opinions about the West. Although there is a sizeable literature on the attitudes of Western populations toward immigrants (see Mayda, 2006, and Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011, among others), our focus here is different on two fronts. First, we examine the opinions of families in the home countries rather than of the natives at destination, and secondly we study the entirely disregarded issue of the attitudes towards Muslim/West relationships.

²To our knowledge, Joarder et al. (2016) is the only economic study that looks at the relationship between international migration and wellbeing of those left behind, although it focuses on remittances rather than on a migration-induced transfer of norms and optimism.

In particular, the paper suggests two channels through which international migrants may reduce support to the extremist propaganda in MENA countries. First, diaspora networks in Western countries may transfer more tolerant social and political norms towards other nations to their families at origin, thereby acting as a bridge between civilizations. Second, migrant networks may help families back home cope with the negative effect of a transition to democracy.

We use the Gallup data, described in detail in the next section, to measure the state of relationship between Muslim and Western societies. Following previous analysis (Abu Dhabi Gallup, 2010), we distinguish between 3 dimensions of this relationship: (i) conflict avoidance; (ii) coexistence; and (iii) cooperation. Conflict avoidance captures views on whether violent conflict can be avoided between Muslim and Western countries, whether the two groups get along and whether the interaction is getting better or worse. Coexistence reflects the importance of the quality of the interaction, as well as opinions on commitment and respect of both parties. Cooperation focuses on whether interactions between the two civilizations are seen as a benefit or a threat. We hypothesize that migration can have informational effect and/or preference shifting effect with respect to those 3 dimensions.

Indeed, in the literature on migration and values, the main mechanism at play involves the adoption by migrants of the social norms of the countries in which they live, and the transmission of these norms back home. However, when it comes to views about the importance of good relations between the Muslim and Western worlds, more complex mechanisms may be at play. In particular, in addition to a preference shifting effect, there are also likely to be information effects. Living in the West, migrants can discover for example that the people they encounter in their new place of residence are more (less) willing to cooperate with the Muslim world compared to the prior beliefs they had developed in their home country. In addition, migrants can get more (less) attached to elements of Western culture, which would lead to an increased (reduced) preference for good relations.

A priori, the impact of migration on the civilizational cleavage is uncertain: MENA residents in the West can learn that the West is not interested in a good relation with the Muslim world, or they may get offended by the culture they observe, and can over-react by becoming anti-West.³ Alternatively migrants might discover that the West is keen on developing a good relation, or they may adopt the values of their host country, in which case, they could become ambassadors for closer relations between the West and their home countries.

In evaluating preferences of Arab families with and without migrants abroad, we will also draw comparisons based on the destination of the migrants, and in particular, whether they are in the West or in a Gulf country. First, there have been claims that exposure to Gulf culture can boost certain conservative values (such as those related to gender), and it would be important to check if this type of effects extends to opinions about relations with the Western world. Second, a comparison between migrants in the Gulf and in the West allows us to ensure that the effects we are measuring for migrants in the West are not just due to the type of value change fostered by migration itself, but rather, that it is due to the destination of this migration.

In order to gauge the implications of the analysis in a particular country context, we focus on the case of Tunisia. It is well known that migrants can support their families back home with financial transfers, and this by itself must have been an important source of support during the difficult transition. We ask whether diaspora support goes beyond financial support, and in

³ The notion that Muslim migrants to the West tend to become anti-West has been overblown by the visible presence of Islamist theoreticians and leaders in Europe to escape repression at home.

particular, whether the values migrants transmit help families back home deal better with the difficulties of transition. Our core hypothesis, which we do not test directly, is that families with migrants in the West are more likely to have a better appreciation of the future benefits of a more democratic order, and as a result, will be more optimistic for the future during the transition, thereby decreasing their propensity to support extremist movements that can derail the transition.

3. Data and Descriptive Statistics

Studying whether international migration fulfils the role of bridge between civilizations cannot be undertaken with traditional survey data. One would require not only cross-country information on household members currently living and working abroad, but also a large set of fully homogeneous and harmonized questions on social norms, attitudes, and preferences across countries. We exploit the unique Gallup World Poll Survey (GWPS), a still remarkably understudied survey conducted in over 150 countries using randomly selected, nationally representative samples.⁴ The GWPS typically surveys around 1,000 individuals in each location on a standard set of core questions plus a few supplemental variables that vary across regions. The standard questions we focus on include important information on the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds, which were asked during two of the GWPS waves around the world. We also make use of the regional extension produced by Silatech for the Middle East and North Africa region, which includes questions about the existence of family members abroad, and the identity of the country in which they live.

Although the Gallup-Silatech Survey is available for several years, we restrict the analysis to Wave 4.2 in 2009, as this is the only wave including information about having a household member currently residing abroad and his/her destination, and questions about the Muslim/West rift. We initially restrict the sample to 7 origin countries that are the main sources of migrants in the Arab world: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.⁵

We first focus on the following 5 questions included in the survey, which provide an overall picture of the attitudes of MENA citizens towards the West:

3.1 Conflict avoidance

- Do you think the interaction between the Muslim world and the Western world is getting better?
- Do you think violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided?
- (ii) Co-existence
- Is the quality of interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds important to you?
- Do you think the Western World is committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds?

3.2 Cooperation

- Do you approve the leadership of the USA?

⁴ Very few economic studies have exploited the Gallup World Poll Survey for migration-related research. Those that did looked at intentions to move rather than current migration. In particular, Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) show that migrations intentions are strongly affected by wealth constraints, whilst Docquier et al. (2014) looks at a larger set of cross-country determinants of potential migration. Docquier et al. (2015) uses the Gallup information on aspirations to migrate in order to estimate the efficiency gains from liberalizing labor mobility.

⁵ We weight the data using the sample weights provided in order to ensure a good match between the demographic characteristics of respondents and the whole population in each country.

We also construct a composite index of westernization by aggregating together these 5 variables. Three weighting techniques are used: we first use equal weights, thereby calculating the simple average of the 5 variables. We then follow a large strand of the economic literature and adopt Principal Component Analysis (PCA). As a robustness check, we also use Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), which has been often preferred for the case of binary and categorical variables, (see Tuccio and Wahba, 2015, and Tuccio et al., 2016, for a more detailed discussion on the construction of composite indicators on social and political norms). The indices are easy to interpret, as they have been normalized between 0, meaning no westernization, and 1, representing a perfect bridge between civilizations.⁶

The sample size of each of the 5 variables ranges from 6,029 to 4,281 observations, depending on the specification we use, and of the missing observations for particular variables. The sample size of the composite index is 3,671 observations. Balancing the sample size would lead us to lose up to 40 percent of observations in some of our regressions. As a robustness check, we have also dropped observations in a list-wise manner - our results are not affected.

In an ideal situation one would have liked to observe immigrants in the host country and measure their attitudes and how those compare to their households back home. However the sample of immigrants in host countries is very small and non-representative. Hence, we only examine attitudes in the two host regions of interest, namely the West and the GCC, and the opinions of MENA families without and with migrants in these regions (see Table 1).⁷

The Gallup polls, abstracting from the role of migrants, shows that a majority of residents in MENA, the Gulf, and in the West thinks that the quality of the relations between the Western and Muslim worlds are important to them, and that conflict is avoidable. Yet, one also sees some fault-lines. Majorities everywhere do not believe that the relation is good or improving. Majorities in MENA and in the Gulf blame the West: they do not believe that the West is committed to the relation - contrary to the West where a majority states that it is committed to a better relation. GCC and MENA citizens are less likely than the West to believe that conflict is avoidable and also are less supportive of the US leadership. On the whole, opinions in the MENA region and in the Gulf tend to be similar.

Looking at the attitudes of MENA households without or with migrants in the Gulf and in the West supports the notion of a transmission of values from destination to home communities (Figure 1). The comparison of means among the various groups is quite instructive of the various mechanisms that are likely to be at play.

There are 3 questions that are clearly related to preferences. The first concerns whether the conflict between Muslim and Western worlds is avoidable. Households with migrants in the West, but not to in GCC, are more positive than households with no migrant – there is a significant gain of 12 percentage points among household with a migrant in the West compared to households without migrants. The second question about preferences probes whether relations are perceived as important – here too, households with migrants in the West, but not to in GCC, are more positive than households with no migrant – with a significant gain of 7 percentage points. In both of these cases, one can imagine that the mechanism at play relates to preference

⁶ All the questions but the first are yes/no questions and can be easily coded in a binary way. Question 1 allowed 3 answers, “better”, “worse”, and “same”. We constructed our dummy to take the value of 0 if the answer was “worse” or “same” and 1 if “better”.

⁷ The West category includes countries of Europe and North America, whilst the Gulf Cooperation Council – GCC – includes the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.

shifting, with migrants in the West (but not in the GCC) developing a taste for Western culture, and transmitting to their parents back home an increased attachment to these relations, and to the importance of conflict avoidance. As a counterpoint, there is no effect of living in the West, or in the GCC, on the appreciation of the role of the US leadership, as this is likely to involve political calculations about the effect of US actions on the interest of their countries, rather than civilizational preferences. It is interesting to observe that for both of the first two questions, the values of MENA households with migrants in the West are (marginally) higher than average preferences in the West, as if migrants are not just catching up with the values of the West, as happens for values related to gender or civic action found in the literature reviewed above, but rather, chose, given their position, to become champions for building up civilizational bridges.

The other two questions relate more clearly to possible informational effects. There is in particular signs of clear misunderstanding between East and West, with 63 percent of the population of the West believing that the West is committed to a better relation with the Muslim world, but only 41 percent of MENA residents (without migrants abroad) believing this. Here, one can ask whether migrants in the West learn from the citizens they encounter, and convey this new knowledge to their families back home. Table 1 shows that this is indeed the case, with a 11 percentage points gain on this question among households with migrants in the West, compared to households with no migrants. There is a similar, albeit smaller effect on the question of whether interactions are improving. In contrast, the perspective of migrants to the GCC is different. For both questions, the effect is negative – what migrants seem to learn when they live in the GCC, and which they convey back home, is that the West is not committed to the relation, and that interactions are not getting better. In both of these cases, the negative effect is significant and rather large (-10 and -9 percentage points respectively compared to households with no migrants). Moreover, for both questions, responses are more unfavorable than among GCC nationals, suggesting that here too, migrants are not just espousing the home values, but rather, using information from their country of residence to develop their own estimates of the situation.

On the whole then, straight averages of values suggest that families with migrants in the West have more positive opinions about the Muslim/West relationship than non-migrant households and households of migrants in the Gulf, supporting the hypothesis that migration to the West bridges the gap between civilizations. In the next section we examine whether these findings hold once we control for the characteristics of the respondents, whether we account for possible selectivity biases, and whether we vary the samples and enlarge the set of questions to look at.

4. Empirical Analysis

In order to examine the relationship between migration and diaspora on the opinions of the left behind we first adopt simple OLS regression. Our benchmark specification is the following:

$$Y_{ic} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 M_{ic} + \alpha_2 X_{ic} + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ic} is one of the 5 aforementioned proxies of opinion on the Muslim-West relationship or the three composite indices (PCA, MCA, Equal) as constructed in the previous section; M_{ic} is a dummy for whether individual i in country of origin c has a family member currently living abroad; X_{ic} is a set of control variables that may affect social beliefs, such as gender, age, marital and employment status, educational attainment, urban dummy, and household income. Finally, we include country of interview fixed effects (δ_c) in order to take into account specificities of each one of the 7 Arab origin countries at the core of our analysis. ε_{ic} is a zero-mean error term.

We first start by looking at the OLS estimation of Equation (1), where the dependent variable is, alternatively, one of the five proxies of opinions described in Section 3. Throughout all five specifications in Table 2, families with a member abroad are more likely to champion better relations between the Muslim and Western worlds.

In order to better understand what drives such results, in Table 3 we replace the dummy for having a migrant abroad (M_{ic}) in Equation (1) with three dummies specifying the destination of migration: West, GCC, and the rest of the world.⁸ Regardless of whether focusing on conflict avoidance, co-existence or cooperation opinions, migrants in Europe and North America appear to be the main drivers of our findings, whilst households with a migrant in GCC countries do not show different views than non-migrant families. This is robust to the use of the composite indices constructed by aggregating together the five former variables through Equal Weights, Principal Component Analysis, or Multiple Correspondence Analysis (Table 4).

Among personal characteristics, the one with most influence on values is the level of education of the respondent, with educated individuals more likely to support pro-West values. It is noteworthy that the effect of having a migrant in the West has about the same magnitude as having a higher education.

5. Migration Selectivity

The evidence presented so far largely draws a simple correlation. However, there may be unobservable characteristics that differentiate movers and stayers, and that can simultaneously affect preferences and beliefs, leading to biased estimations. Also, emigrants are not randomly distributed in the population, hence estimating this regression with simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator would provide biased results of the relationship between having a migrant abroad and views of the left-behind.

In order to be able to identify emigration, we need an exclusion restriction that has an impact on the probability to have a family member abroad but not on opinions of the left behind. It has to be noted here that we don't observe any information about the migrant abroad but only observe the left behind household in the country of origin. Thus, we assume that observed and unobserved characteristics are correlated across family members. To construct our exclusion restriction we exploit a question on migration intentions included in the Gallup survey: "Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently or temporarily to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?" Specifically, the exclusion restriction is measured by the share of people willing to emigrate in a given region in each country in the previous wave (Wave 3).⁹ Indeed, as argued by Docquier et al. (2014) and Dao et al. (2016), potential migration rates are good estimates of actual migration rates. It is worth noting that we exploit information on migration intentions from a previous wave in order to get a lagged effect and ensure that there is no overlap or contamination of the left-behind opinions and potential migration rates.

We hence estimate the following selection equation:

$$M_{ic} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_{irc(t-1)} + \beta_2 X_{ic} + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (2)$$

⁸ The reference category is the group of households with no international migrants.

⁹ For Yemen there is no variable on migration intentions in Wave 3 or previous ones, hence we adopt the value for Wave 4.2.

where P_{irc} is the potential migration rate by region r in country c measured in $t-1$, and the other variables are the same as in Equation (1).¹⁰

However there may be an additional threat to identification. Among those who decide to migrate, individuals going to the West or to the Gulf may have different characteristics, selecting their destination on the basis of some unobservable variables, such as open-mindedness. If this was the case, there might be a positive bias in our estimates of the effects of migrants to the West on their families' values. This type of destination selectivity has been overlooked by the previous migration-related literature, although it is likely to imply an important bias in the estimates of the effects of migration. The difficulty in correcting for such a bias lies in the need to find an exclusion restriction that affects the destination, but not the propensity to migrate, nor the social values.

We construct a measure of diaspora by origin and destination distinguishing by educational level. We construct such an instrument as follows. We first look at all the destinations where respondents said to currently have a household member. Second, using the data of the 2009 Gallup World Poll Survey for each of the GCC countries, we identify all migrant workers born in each of our Arab countries of origin.¹¹ We then sum the number of immigrants in the Gulf region born in each of these 7 origin countries. In order to have heterogeneity among countries, we distinguish between high-skilled (secondary or higher educated) and low-skilled (primary or lower educated) immigrants. Finally, we match these diaspora levels with our original households from the Gallup-Silatech Survey such that high-skilled (low-skilled) individuals in country c are matched with the number of high-skilled (low-skilled) immigrants from that same country c in the Gulf. The rationale is that a larger educated diaspora in the West increases the likelihood of a surveyed educated household to have a household member in the West rather than elsewhere. Similarly, a larger uneducated diaspora in the GCC increases the likelihood of a surveyed uneducated household to have a household member in the GCC rather than elsewhere. In other words, if the West (GCC) attracted previous migrants from the same origin with the same educational level as the household, the probability of a member of the household choosing that destination, over another, is higher. Note that this IV relies on a sort of assortative matching based on educational level (that is, a high-skilled family is likely to be influenced by the size of the high-skilled diaspora, rather than low-skilled, provided that there exists a sort of homogeneity in educational attainment at household level). We expect this variable to affect the destination of the migrant, but it does not have any direct impact on social and political norms of the respondent.

The equation of the selection into destination to be estimated is:

$$G_{ic} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 D_{ic} + \gamma_2 X_{ic} + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (3)$$

where G_{ic} is the probability of having a family member in the Gulf (conditional on currently having a migrant in the household), and D_{ic} is the diaspora exclusion restriction.

Such a system of equations cannot be estimated using traditional 2SLS or 3SLS models, because of the inter-linkages between the various decisions that have to be addressed simultaneously. For

¹⁰ As a robustness check, we have also used the number of children less than 15 years of age currently living in the household to identify emigration (not shown here). Having kids of young age to take care of had been found to reduce the propensity to migrate abroad (Epstein and Gang, 2006; Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008). Results available from the authors.

¹¹ Bertoli and Ruysen (2016) find that "The origin-specific distribution of distance-one connections from Gallup closely mirrors the actual distribution of migrant stocks across countries, and bilateral migration intentions appear to be significantly correlated with actual flows".

this reason, we exploit the Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) estimator by Roodman (2011). CMP is indeed a suitable method of estimation of simultaneous multi-equation systems where appropriate exclusion restrictions allow the construction of a recursive set of linear equations. It fits a limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator in which regressors appear unrelated (such as in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework), but there is correlation between errors. We focus on our composite indexes, though our results are robust to also using a single variable opinion.

As Table 5 shows, both the exclusion restrictions used to correctly identify our full structural model are statistically significant and with the expected sign. The sizes of the opinion coefficients are larger than the OLS estimates suggesting that the simple OLS underestimates the impact of the diaspora on opinions. Our Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) estimates in Table 5 confirm our previous findings, albeit providing additional information on the nexus between international migration and the norms of the left behind. First, when we control for the emigration choice, we find that that having a migrant is associated with more favourable views of Western civilization. Secondly, once we control for emigration and the destination choice at household level, we find that that those favourable views are due to migrants in the West. And not due to migrants in the Gulf who do not transmit back home values on the Muslim/West relation that are particularly different from the values held at home.

Thus, the conclusion from both our OLS and CMP results suggest that diaspora networks act as a bridge between civilizations, providing more tolerance and better understanding of Western nations.

6. Robustness Checks

In order to check the robustness of our findings we extend the measures of opinions above to include more questions related to Muslim-West relations, and by broadening our dataset to all labor sending Arab countries in the Gallup/Silatech data Wave 4.2.

The five additional questions we look at are:

6.1 Conflict avoidance

- Do you think that the Muslim world and the West are getting along with each other today?

6.2 Co-existence

- 2. Do you think that the Muslim world is committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds?
- 3. Do you believe that the Muslim world respects the Western world?
- 4. Do you believe that the Western world respects the Muslim world?

6.3 Cooperation

- Is greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds a benefit?

In the previous section, we used information from 7 countries (Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Palestinian territories, Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Yemen). We now consider two slightly enlarged samples. Sample A includes these 7 countries plus Morocco and Iraq. The cost of including these extra 2 countries is that information on income and employment is not available for these countries. Sample B is even larger and includes, in addition to the 9 countries above, four additional Muslim countries namely: Mauritania, Djibouti, Comoros, and Somaliland.

Table 6 shows the full set of opinions for these 2 groups of countries (Samples A and B). Broadly speaking, the larger samples fare similarly to the 7 countries we had examined earlier on

the five questions that we had look at in the previous section. The new questions complete the picture on the relation between the Muslim and Western worlds. In particular, there are majorities in all the groups of countries (including in the West) that believe that the relation is beneficial (a preference question). Moreover, the misunderstanding we had noted above is widespread: not only do citizens of MENA and GCC groups consider that the West is not committed to the relation, while the West believes to the contrary that it is, but by the same token, this extends to the question about whether the West respects the Muslim world. Large majorities in MENA and in the GCC believes that the Muslim world is committed to a better relation with the West, and that it respects the West, while at the same time, majorities in the West believe that the opposite holds.

Beyond the information about the preferences of each group, the results about the values of MENA households with migrants in the West and in the GCC retain the same structure. Households with migrants in the West tend to be more positive about the beneficial effect of the relation, suggesting that they either develop a better understanding of the West, or that they get attached to the Western culture, and as a result, value more closer relations. Migrants to the GCC do not however develop preferences different from those of their home country citizens.

Controlling for country fixed effects and individual characteristics in Table 7 yields similar patterns as those observed in Tables 2 and 3. However, those estimates are only used as suggestive additional results since we don't have the full set of controls (mainly employment and income used above in Table 3) and we do not control here for selectivity. As previously found, overall migrants tend to have more favorable opinions of the West across the three dimensions of conflict avoidance, co-existence, and cooperation. In addition, migrants in the West appear to be the main drivers of this finding, whilst households with a migrant in GCC countries do not show different views than non-migrant families. Those results also hold for different samples of Muslim countries of origin (Sample A and Sample B). The larger sample B provides some extra significant results, and in particular, in relation to the important question about the beneficial aspects of the Muslim/West interaction.

7. The Case of Tunisia

In order to shed additional light on the relationship between migration and the clash of civilizations, we focus on the case of Tunisia given its prominent role in the Arab Spring and its large diaspora which is predominantly located in the West. We start by replicating the previous analysis focusing only on Tunisia. Using Gallup/Silatech data for 2009, we examine the 5 variables capturing cooperation, conflict avoidance and co-existence, and estimate the following simple OLS:

$$V_i = \tau_0 + \tau_1 M_i + \tau_2 X_i + \mu_i \quad (4)$$

where V_i is one of the 5 aforementioned proxies of opinion on the Muslim/West relationship; M_i is a dummy for whether individual i in Tunisia has a family member currently living abroad; X_i is a set of control variables that may affect social beliefs, such as gender, age, marital and employment status, educational attainment, urban dummy, and household income. Overall we are left with over 700 observations, out of which almost a quarter currently has a family member abroad.

Even restricting the analysis to Tunisia only, our previous findings are confirmed (Table 8). Indeed, migration is associated with more positive attitude towards Muslim/Western relationships.

7.1 The diaspora during transition: data and methodology

Given the potential relationship between international migration and the diaspora network on the attitudes of the left behind, we investigate further the role of the diaspora network. We use longitude data to identify the role of the diaspora before and after the Arab Spring to identify whether diaspora networks help families back home traverse turbulent times psychologically, beyond possible income effects.

Albeit a sustained growth rate of about 5 percent, Tunisia faced structurally high unemployment over the last decade, at approximately 15 percent (David and Marouani, 2015). The persistent lack of prospects for the youth, especially for the higher educated graduates, together with high corruption and the quick spread of social media triggered growing social discontent. On December 17, 2010 in the small town of Sidi Bouzid a street vendor immolated himself to protest against the government, sparking mass protests and demonstrations all over the country. The Tunisian revolution culminated in the ousting of President Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, after 23 years in power.

The Gallup World Poll Survey contains a set of composite indicators referring to the life evaluation of the respondent. Such indices are carefully constructed by Gallup scientists by aggregating together several core questions included in the GWPS, and they are then double-checked by comparing them with similar external measures (such as the World Bank and United Nations indicators).¹² In particular, we exploit 4 of these indices: (i) Optimism Index, measuring respondents' positive attitudes about the future; (ii) Life Evaluation Index, measuring respondents' perceptions of where they stand now and in the future; (iii) Job Climate Index, measuring respondents' attitudes about the economic opportunities in the community; (iv) Youth Development Index, measuring a community's focus on the welfare of its children.

To make sure our results are not driven by the way Gallup constructed its composite indices, we also look at 4 single variables included in the GWPS: (i) "Are you satisfied with your standard of living?"; (ii) "On which step of a 1 to 10 ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?"; (iii) "Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say about five years from now?"; (iv) "Do you think the economic conditions of your country are getting better?". Overall, these 4 composite indices and 4 single variables give a clear picture of the self-perceived wellbeing and optimism of respondents.

In order to exploit the time dimension of the survey, we adopt a different proxy for having a social tie in a foreign country. In fact, the variable of whether the interviewee has a family member currently living abroad has been asked only in 2009. On the contrary, we now rely on a question asked in each year on whether the respondent has someone outside the country to rely on. This allows us to make use of 7 GWPS waves from 2008 to 2013. However, that there is no information of the country where the migrant lives, making impossible to differentiate between the effect of having a migrant in the West and in the Gulf (such as in the analysis of the previous section). Nonetheless, we know from the 2009 data that almost 9 out of 10 Tunisian emigrants were reported to be residing in Europe and North America, suggesting that the West is by far the major hub for international migration from Tunisia. This is also confirmed by secondary data

¹² In order to further corroborate indices' reliability, Gallup uses Cronbach's alpha on country-level data. For the composite indicators at the core of this paper, the Cronbach's alpha is 0.92, 0.91, 0.85, and 0.83 for the Optimism Index, Life Evaluation Index, Job Climate Index, and Youth Development Index, respectively. See Gallup (2012) for more details about the methodology of the GWPS.

(Migration Policy Centre, 2013). In particular, France attracted over 54 percent of Tunisians in 2009, followed by Italy (14 percent) and Germany (8 percent).

Our aim is to test whether families with international migration tend to be more optimistic during transition. Our hypothesis is that since they hold a more favorable opinion about the ultimate destination of the country, this should smoothens the negative aspect of their current experiences. To test this hypothesis, we can exploit the time series of our data in order to compare the impact of having a social tie abroad *before and after* the 2011 Tunisian revolution. Such a difference-in-differences approach requires the estimation of the following specification:

$$O_{jt} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 N_j + \theta_2 P_t + \theta_3 N_j * P_t + \theta_4 Z_j + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad (5)$$

In Equation (5), O_{jt} is one of the above 8 proxies of optimism and life evaluation for individual j at time t ; N_j is a dummy being one if individual j has a social network abroad which she can rely on; P_t is a dummy for observations after the Tunisian revolution of 2011; control variables Z_j include gender, age, marital status, household size, education attainment, wave dummies, urban and regional dummies. Our coefficient of interest is θ_3 , which represents the effect of having a social tie abroad during periods of negative experiences. If our hypothesis that diaspora networks help smoothing negative experiences is true, we expect θ_3 to be positive throughout all specifications.

7.2 Empirical findings

Before looking at the econometric results, let us compare the raw average in Figure 2. The key assumption behind the difference-in-differences strategy is that the optimism of both individuals with and without a social tie abroad should have followed the same time trend in the absence of the shock. In our case, the validity of the common trend assumption is confirmed by Figure 2, which shows that the average the Optimism Index in Tunisia has followed the same time trend for both treatment and control groups from 2008 to 2011. After 2011 however, the life index for individuals with no migrant abroad worsened dramatically, whilst people with social ties in foreign countries coped better with the shock.

Column 1 of Table 9 shows our main specification, where the dependent variable is the composite indicator of optimism as constructed by Gallup and normalized between 0 and 1. Confirming the graphical evidence of Figure 2, results point at an overall positive impact of social ties abroad on the self-perception of life. Clearly, the aftermath of the revolution has in general left Tunisians more pessimistic about their lives and future prospects. However, the coefficient of the interaction term $N_j * P_t$ suggests that during the negative experience of the revolution, Tunisian households with a social network abroad have coped better and have managed to remain a more optimistic outlook about the future.

These findings are robust to the use of different composite indices, such as the Life Evaluation Index in column 2 of Table 9, the Job Climate Index in column 3, and the Youth Development Index in column 4. Similarly, using single variables in Table 10 confirms that having a migrant network is a powerful way to cope with negative shocks.

Importantly, we control for household income in order to isolate the income from the value effect of having migrants abroad. Our results remain similar with and without the inclusion of this variable, suggesting the existence of a pure values effect. Indeed, this finding clearly indicates that the extra optimism experienced by households with migrants abroad is driven by psychological rather than pecuniary effects, which have supported the development of a more

positive outlook on the future. A probable candidate that explains this effect is a greater belief in the positive aspects of a more democratic order in the future.

8. Conclusion

The current relation between the Middle East and the West seems to be at a historical low, buffeted by intractable conflicts and violence in the Middle East, large migration to Europe, principally from the war zones of Syria and Iraq, and terrorist acts in Europe by Islamic extremist groups. In such a turbulent environment, there are fears that the “clash of civilization” hypothesized by Huntington in the early 1990s is building up in front of our eyes, possibly leading to greater conflicts and calamities in the future.

There are also fears in Europe that this conflict will be further exacerbated by the arrival of millions of migrants from the Middle East in the past few years. This paper suggests that the effect of migration is likely to be at the opposite, reducing the risks of a widening clash of civilization, and that international migration and the diaspora networks it generate are conversely an instrument of closer East/West comprehension and improved inter-relations.

We focused on Arab countries and examined the attitudes of the left behind regarding Arab/Western relationships and conflict avoidance. Using the Gallup data, we compared attitudes and preferences of households with no migrant to the values of families with migrants in the West and in the Gulf. Overall our findings point at a positive association between migrant networks in the West and a more optimistic perspective of the Arab/West relations. This result suggest that international migration builds bridges between civilizations by transferring more understanding of the West, and by shifting preferences towards Western values. We also showed that such a transfer of values provided a positive psychological cushion that during the turbulent transition to democracy in Tunisia, probably by boosting the importance of the goal of arriving at a more democratic destination.


The policy implications of this line of research are important. To the extent that current migrants to countries with more emancipated social and political values can be considered as an investment in the future of their countries of origin, this should shape the policies of accommodation in their destination countries. So far, the EU response to the inflow of refugees has been largely focused on security issues. As the focus shifts to policies that stress social integration, the influence of the migrants on the values of the families and communities that they left behind should be kept in mind, both in terms of speeding up the absorption of more modern values, and when thinking about means of fostering more communication between migrants and their country of origin.

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
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Figure 1: Characteristics of Respondents in the West and the GCC



Notes. (1) Countries in the GCC sample include: Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates. Countries in the West sample include: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. (2) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2.

Figure 2: Average Optimism Index for Households with and Without a Migrant Network Abroad, 2008-2013



Data source: Gallup World Poll Survey, 2008-2013.

Table 1: Characteristics of Respondents from Households with No Migrant, Migrant in the West and Migrant in the GCC, Compared With those in the GCC and in the West

	MENA without migrant	MENA with migrant in West	MENA with migrant in GCC	Average West	Average GCC
<i>(i) Conflict avoidance</i>					
Interaction better	0.36	0.40**	0.27***	0.27	0.38
Avoidable conflict	0.63	0.75***	0.60	0.72	0.61
<i>(ii) Co-existence</i>					
Relations important	0.69	0.76***	0.72	0.74	0.69
West committed	0.41	0.52***	0.31***	0.63	0.48
<i>(iii) Cooperation</i>					
US leadership	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.49	0.32
<i>Composite Indicators</i>					
Index (Equal)	0.51	0.58***	0.44***		
Index (PCA)	0.51	0.59***	0.44***		
Index (MCA)	0.52	0.59***	0.44***		

Notes: (1) T-test for different means, where the control group is always individuals with no migrant in the household. (2) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (3) Number of observations changes for each outcomes, but in the most restrictive cases (that are Index PCA and Index MCA) the sample size is 3,373 for "without migrant", 734 for "migrant in West", and 296 for "migrant in GCC". (4) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2.

Table 2: Migration and Opinions (Single Variables)

	(1) Interaction better	(2) Relations important	(3) West committed	(4) Avoidable conflict	(5) US leadership
Having a migrant abroad	0.047* (0.021)	0.058*** (0.014)	0.043** (0.018)	0.060*** (0.017)	0.068*** (0.009)
Female	0.010 (0.028)	0.012 (0.024)	0.048** (0.016)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.057** (0.022)
Age	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Squared age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Urban	0.006 (0.018)	0.018 (0.021)	0.004 (0.019)	0.001 (0.013)	0.024 (0.021)
Married	0.016 (0.016)	0.021 (0.028)	0.019 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.019)
Secondary education	-0.012 (0.024)	0.071*** (0.020)	-0.017 (0.021)	0.035* (0.017)	0.095** (0.033)
Tertiary education	0.023 (0.041)	0.151*** (0.023)	-0.033 (0.052)	0.071*** (0.018)	0.136*** (0.033)
Employed	-0.003 (0.026)	0.008 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.033)	-0.006 (0.025)
Household income	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.499*** (0.080)	0.664*** (0.039)	0.468*** (0.076)	0.539*** (0.035)	0.511*** (0.051)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,839	6,029	5,788	5,824	4,281
R-squared	0.060	0.037	0.038	0.072	0.092

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. (3) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2.

Table 3: Migration by Destination and Opinions (Single Variables)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Interaction better	Relations important	West committed	Avoidable conflict	US leadership
Having a migrant in West	0.069** (0.021)	0.054*** (0.015)	0.073*** (0.021)	0.080*** (0.012)	0.081*** (0.017)
Having a migrant in GCC	0.034 (0.041)	0.058* (0.025)	0.016 (0.018)	0.019 (0.022)	0.051 (0.036)
Having a migrant in others	0.016 (0.032)	0.070 (0.046)	0.019 (0.037)	0.081* (0.040)	0.057 (0.077)
Female	0.010 (0.027)	0.012 (0.024)	0.048** (0.016)	0.033* (0.017)	-0.057** (0.022)
Age	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
Squared age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Urban	0.006 (0.018)	0.018 (0.021)	0.004 (0.019)	0.001 (0.013)	0.024 (0.020)
Married	0.016 (0.016)	0.021 (0.028)	0.018 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.019)
Secondary education	-0.012 (0.024)	0.071*** (0.020)	-0.017 (0.021)	0.036* (0.017)	0.095** (0.033)
Tertiary education	0.023 (0.041)	0.151*** (0.023)	-0.033 (0.053)	0.071*** (0.018)	0.135*** (0.033)
Employed	-0.004 (0.026)	0.008 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.010 (0.033)	-0.006 (0.025)
Household income	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.497*** (0.080)	0.664*** (0.039)	0.466*** (0.075)	0.538*** (0.035)	0.509*** (0.052)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,839	6,029	5,788	5,824	4,281
R-squared	0.060	0.037	0.038	0.073	0.092

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. (3) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2.

Table 4: Migration by Destination and Opinions (Composite Index)

	(1) Index Equal	(2) Index Equal	(3) Index PCA	(4) Index PCA	(5) Index MCA	(6) Index MCA
Having a migrant abroad	0.047*** (0.011)		0.045** (0.012)		0.045** (0.012)	
Having a migrant in West		0.056*** (0.014)		0.055** (0.016)		0.055** (0.016)
Having a migrant in GCC		0.039 (0.036)		0.039 (0.036)		0.039 (0.036)
Having a migrant in others		0.030 (0.032)		0.024 (0.025)		0.025 (0.026)
Female	0.010 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)	0.015 (0.021)	0.016 (0.021)	0.015 (0.022)	0.016 (0.022)
Age	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Squared age	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Urban	0.001 (0.010)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.011)
Married	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
Secondary education	0.036** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.009)	0.028** (0.010)	0.028** (0.009)	0.030** (0.010)	0.030** (0.009)
Tertiary education	0.069* (0.031)	0.069* (0.032)	0.059 (0.034)	0.058 (0.034)	0.061 (0.033)	0.061 (0.033)
Employed	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.023)
Household income	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.538*** (0.021)	0.537*** (0.020)	0.538*** (0.031)	0.537*** (0.030)	0.540*** (0.030)	0.538*** (0.029)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,671	3,671	3,671	3,671	3,671	3,671
R-squared	0.098	0.098	0.102	0.102	0.101	0.101

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. (3) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2.

Table 5: Controlling for the Double Selectivity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Westernization</i>	<i>Index Equal</i>	<i>Index Equal</i>	<i>Index PCA</i>	<i>Index PCA</i>	<i>Index MCA</i>	<i>Index MCA</i>
Having a migrant abroad	0.107*** (0.033)		0.123*** (0.035)		0.122*** (0.034)	
Having a migrant in West		0.110*** (0.034)		0.125*** (0.036)		0.125*** (0.035)
Having a migrant in GCC		0.082 (0.084)		0.100 (0.089)		0.102 (0.089)
Having a migrant in others		0.083* (0.050)		0.095* (0.052)		0.098* (0.052)
Female	0.024** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)	0.030** (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)	0.030** (0.012)
Age	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Squared age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Urban	0.005 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)
Married	0.002 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	0.006 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)
Secondary education	0.034** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.013)	0.024* (0.014)	0.025* (0.014)	0.026* (0.014)	0.026* (0.014)
Tertiary education	0.046** (0.020)	0.047** (0.020)	0.033 (0.020)	0.034* (0.020)	0.036* (0.020)	0.037* (0.020)
Employed	0.016 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)
Household income	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Probability of having a migrant</i>						
Intention to migrate	0.312*** (0.087)	0.309*** (0.089)	0.315*** (0.087)	0.312*** (0.088)	0.315*** (0.087)	0.313*** (0.088)
<i>Probability of migrant in GCC</i>						
Diaspora in GCC	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)
sigma_1	-1.312*** (0.013)	-1.313*** (0.013)	-1.276*** (0.013)	-1.278*** (0.013)	-1.277*** (0.013)	-1.278*** (0.013)
sigma_2	-0.904*** (0.010)	-0.904*** (0.010)	-0.904*** (0.010)	-0.904*** (0.010)	-0.904*** (0.010)	-0.904*** (0.010)
rho_12	-0.108* (0.056)	-0.090 (0.071)	-0.134** (0.056)	-0.117 (0.073)	-0.133** (0.056)	-0.118 (0.072)
rho_13	0.004 (0.052)	0.050 (0.153)	0.012 (0.052)	0.051 (0.156)	0.013 (0.052)	0.049 (0.157)
rho_23	-0.076*** (0.028)	-0.077*** (0.028)	-0.076*** (0.028)	-0.077*** (0.028)	-0.076*** (0.028)	-0.077*** (0.028)
Observations	3,671	3,671	3,671	3,671	3,671	3,671

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors in parentheses. (3) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2.

Table 6: Characteristics of Respondents from Households with No Migrant, Migrant in the West and Migrant in the GCC: Different Samples

	GCC	WEST	Sample A				Sample B			
			Without migrant	Migrant in West	Migrant in GCC	Migrant in Others	Without migrant	Migrant in West	Migrant in GCC	Migrant in Others
<i>(i) Conflict avoidance</i>										
Interaction better	0.382 (0.486)	0.271 (0.444)	0.360 (0.480)	0.388 (0.488)	0.275 (0.447)	0.287 (0.453)	0.349 (0.477)	0.382 (0.486)	0.295 (0.456)	0.290 (0.454)
Avoidable conflict	0.613 (0.487)	0.719 (0.450)	0.638 (0.481)	0.758 (0.429)	0.619 (0.486)	0.661 (0.474)	0.638 (0.481)	0.758 (0.429)	0.619 (0.486)	0.661 (0.474)
Getting along	0.375 (0.484)	0.167 (0.373)	0.359 (0.480)	0.372 (0.484)	0.232 (0.423)	0.233 (0.424)	0.343 (0.475)	0.356 (0.479)	0.261 (0.440)	0.250 (0.433)
<i>(ii) Co-existence</i>										
Relations important	0.693 (0.461)	0.744 (0.437)	0.688 (0.464)	0.778 (0.416)	0.739 (0.440)	0.768 (0.423)	0.679 (0.467)	0.737 (0.441)	0.752 (0.433)	0.720 (0.449)
West committed	0.476 (0.499)	0.631 (0.483)	0.405 (0.491)	0.530 (0.499)	0.325 (0.469)	0.378 (0.486)	0.402 (0.490)	0.488 (0.500)	0.350 (0.477)	0.362 (0.481)
Muslim committed	0.794 (0.404)	0.377 (0.485)	0.684 (0.465)	0.685 (0.465)	0.665 (0.473)	0.653 (0.477)	0.648 (0.478)	0.628 (0.484)	0.679 (0.467)	0.590 (0.492)
West respect	0.823 (0.382)	0.264 (0.441)	0.797 (0.402)	0.776 (0.417)	0.720 (0.450)	0.716 (0.452)	0.760 (0.427)	0.715 (0.451)	0.733 (0.443)	0.672 (0.470)
Muslim respect	0.317 (0.465)	0.493 (0.500)	0.289 (0.454)	0.325 (0.469)	0.269 (0.444)	0.271 (0.445)	0.294 (0.456)	0.339 (0.474)	0.276 (0.448)	0.268 (0.444)
<i>(iii) Cooperation</i>										
US leadership	0.320 (0.467)	0.493 (0.500)	0.322 (0.467)	0.366 (0.482)	0.343 (0.476)	0.316 (0.466)	0.515 (0.500)	0.581 (0.494)	0.436 (0.497)	0.530 (0.500)
Interaction benefit	0.689 (0.463)	0.782 (0.413)	0.692 (0.462)	0.769 (0.422)	0.703 (0.457)	0.754 (0.431)	0.671 (0.470)	0.754 (0.431)	0.729 (0.445)	0.691 (0.463)

Notes: (1) Sample A: Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Palestinian territories, Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Yemen. (2) Sample B: Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Palestinian territories, Mauritania, Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Comoros, Tunisia, Yemen, and Somaliland. (3) Means and Standard Deviations in parentheses

Table 7: Robustness: Migration by Destination and Opinions: Different Samples

	(1) Interaction better	(2) Relations important	(3) West committed	(4) Muslim committed	(5) West respect	(6) Muslim respect	(7) avoidable conflict	(8) US leadership	(9) Getting along	(10) Interaction benefit
<i>Sample A</i>										
Having a migrant abroad	0.087 (0.116)	0.285*** (0.053)	0.199*** (0.039)	0.106 (0.110)	0.159 (0.102)	0.012 (0.114)	0.228*** (0.069)	0.141 (0.148)	-0.052 (0.147)	0.120 (0.082)
Having a migrant in West	0.092 (0.179)	0.292*** (0.064)	0.309*** (0.025)	0.058 (0.153)	0.161 (0.136)	-0.036 (0.162)	0.350*** (0.066)	0.112 (0.206)	-0.041 (0.221)	0.193 (0.137)
Having a migrant in GCC	0.100 (0.158)	0.212** (0.088)	0.125 (0.102)	0.151 (0.151)	0.197 (0.156)	0.086 (0.113)	0.025 (0.105)	0.245** (0.116)	-0.009 (0.144)	0.012 (0.084)
Having a migrant in others	0.045 (0.142)	0.400*** (0.142)	-0.041 (0.094)	0.168* (0.094)	0.100 (0.306)	0.023 (0.082)	0.309** (0.156)	0.098 (0.385)	-0.173 (0.310)	0.153*** (0.047)
Observations	6,165	6,411	6,124	6,204	5,597	5,676	6,163	4,728	6,206	5,334
<i>Sample B</i>										
Having a migrant abroad	0.084 (0.078)	0.182*** (0.052)	0.122* (0.071)	-0.016 (0.110)	0.124 (0.081)	-0.133 (0.104)	0.238*** (0.061)	0.193* (0.105)	-0.061 (0.096)	0.152** (0.067)
Having a migrant in West	0.123 (0.110)	0.155** (0.061)	0.192** (0.096)	-0.038 (0.145)	0.164* (0.099)	-0.183 (0.138)	0.331*** (0.099)	0.227 (0.151)	-0.036 (0.140)	0.244*** (0.089)
Having a migrant in GCC	0.107 (0.139)	0.213** (0.104)	0.102 (0.101)	0.143 (0.127)	0.110 (0.162)	0.043 (0.114)	0.086 (0.112)	0.236 (0.149)	0.011 (0.122)	0.102 (0.120)
Having a migrant in others	-0.049 (0.135)	0.229** (0.097)	-0.058 (0.080)	-0.092 (0.134)	0.011 (0.161)	-0.172 (0.132)	0.153 (0.103)	0.063 (0.192)	-0.239 (0.171)	-0.010 (0.089)
Observations	10,245	10,492	10,089	10,223	9,669	9,769	10,196	8,716	10,279	9,339

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors. (3) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2. (4) Sample A: Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Palestinian territories, Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Yemen. (5) Sample B: Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Palestinian territories, Mauritania, Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Comoros, Tunisia, Yemen, and Somaliland.

Table 8: Migration by Destination and Opinions in Tunisia

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Interaction better		Relations important		West committed		Avoidable conflict		US leadership	
Having a migrant abroad	0.109** (0.048)		0.054 (0.035)		0.091* (0.047)		0.083*** (0.028)		0.058 (0.038)	
Having a migrant in West		0.133*** (0.049)		0.041 (0.038)		0.093* (0.049)		0.090*** (0.029)		0.065 (0.040)
Having a migrant in GCC		-0.069 (0.215)		0.227*** (0.038)		0.114 (0.181)		0.162*** (0.023)		-0.050 (0.103)
Having a migrant in others		-0.057 (0.158)		0.079 (0.077)		0.049 (0.151)		-0.073 (0.129)		0.063 (0.183)
Female	-0.002 (0.042)	-0.000 (0.042)	-0.042 (0.036)	-0.042 (0.036)	0.022 (0.042)	0.023 (0.043)	0.050* (0.030)	0.052* (0.030)	-0.017 (0.031)	-0.018 (0.031)
Age	-0.000 (0.009)	0.000 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)
Squared age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Urban	0.004 (0.042)	0.005 (0.041)	0.046 (0.033)	0.046 (0.033)	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.042)	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.027)	0.037 (0.030)	0.038 (0.030)
Married	-0.011 (0.054)	-0.014 (0.054)	-0.063 (0.043)	-0.060 (0.043)	0.038 (0.053)	0.038 (0.053)	-0.017 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.035)	0.007 (0.040)	0.006 (0.040)
Secondary education	0.019 (0.049)	0.025 (0.049)	0.051 (0.039)	0.049 (0.039)	0.035 (0.048)	0.036 (0.049)	0.072** (0.030)	0.077** (0.031)	0.078** (0.035)	0.078** (0.035)
Tertiary education	-0.125 (0.080)	-0.121 (0.080)	-0.022 (0.069)	-0.023 (0.069)	-0.198*** (0.075)	-0.197*** (0.075)	0.024 (0.052)	0.028 (0.051)	0.082 (0.066)	0.081 (0.066)
Employed	-0.025 (0.043)	-0.025 (0.043)	-0.093** (0.037)	-0.094** (0.037)	0.030 (0.044)	0.030 (0.044)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.030 (0.031)	0.081*** (0.030)	0.082*** (0.030)
Household income	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Constant	0.566*** (0.166)	0.551*** (0.167)	0.773*** (0.137)	0.785*** (0.138)	0.619*** (0.173)	0.620*** (0.174)	0.764*** (0.106)	0.768*** (0.106)	0.269** (0.127)	0.261** (0.127)
Observations	735	735	753	753	731	731	726	726	764	764
R-squared	0.029	0.033	0.050	0.053	0.021	0.022	0.029	0.034	0.042	0.043

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors. (3) Data source: Gallup-Silatech Wave 4.2.

Table 9: The Impact of Having A Network Abroad on Optimism in Tunisia (Composite Indices) – Difference-in-Difference Estimation

	(1) Optimism	(2) Life Evaluation	(3) Job Climate	(4) Youth Dev.
Post * Network	0.037** (0.018)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.059** (0.028)	0.068*** (0.017)
Network abroad	0.039*** (0.014)	0.021 (0.013)	0.006 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.012)
Post revolution	-0.165*** (0.016)	-0.080*** (0.016)	-0.195*** (0.021)	-0.215*** (0.016)
Female	0.018** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.008)
Age	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Squared age	0.005*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
Married	0.034*** (0.011)	0.015 (0.010)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.013 (0.010)
Child	-0.002 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.006 (0.008)
Adult household size	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
Secondary education	0.049*** (0.010)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.022* (0.013)	-0.016* (0.009)
Tertiary education	0.099*** (0.016)	0.083*** (0.014)	0.034* (0.020)	-0.007 (0.014)
Urban	0.062*** (0.009)	0.046*** (0.008)	0.121*** (0.012)	0.067*** (0.009)
Household income	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.571*** (0.036)	0.555*** (0.034)	0.376*** (0.049)	0.840*** (0.033)
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,684	6,421	5,712	6,719
R-squared	0.142	0.078	0.077	0.083

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors in parentheses. (3) Data source: Gallup World Poll Survey, 2008-2013.

Table 10: The Impact of Having A Network Abroad on Optimism in Tunisia (Single Variables) – Difference-in-Difference estimation

	(1) Living Standard	(2) Life today	(3) Life 5 years	(4) National Economy
Post * Network	0.098*** (0.028)	0.027** (0.011)	0.003** (0.001)	0.059* (0.035)
Network abroad	0.013 (0.021)	0.019** (0.008)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002 (0.031)
Post revolution	-0.143*** (0.024)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.258*** (0.026)
Female	0.041*** (0.013)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.022 (0.014)
Age	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.003)
Squared age	0.009*** (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.003)
Married	0.058*** (0.018)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.059*** (0.019)
Child	-0.011 (0.014)	0.004 (0.005)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.017 (0.015)
Adult household size	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.004*** (0.002)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.004)
Secondary education	0.089*** (0.016)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.039** (0.017)
Tertiary education	0.107*** (0.024)	0.072*** (0.010)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.085*** (0.026)
Urban	0.095*** (0.015)	0.038*** (0.005)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.114*** (0.015)
Household income	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Constant	0.708*** (0.058)	0.539*** (0.024)	0.054*** (0.002)	0.517*** (0.062)
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,807	6,696	6,696	5,561
R-squared	0.075	0.098	0.098	0.077

Notes: (1) ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. (2) All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors in parentheses. (3) Data source: Gallup World Poll Survey, 2008-2013.