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ACTIVITIES: THE CASE OF
TURKEY**

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Working Paper 0103

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As of August 1998, financial support towards the ERF Working Papers Series from the Commission of the European Communities (through the FEMISE Program) is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in the Working Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.

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* This study heavily depends on Adaman & Carkoglu (2000). The authors are grateful to FEMISE (EGY/93/018) and TESEV (The Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey), as well as Boğaziçi University Research Fund (99C102) for their financial support. The authors are also thankful to the FREKANS Research Company (especially to Messrs Caglayan Isik and Gurkan Kizilarlan) for their meticulousness and competence in conducting our survey, and to Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu and -nal Zenginobuz for their stimulating comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

Abstract

In this paper we aim at providing a general assessment of public administrative systems in Turkey both at local and central governments. Our work is based on a survey conducted in urban settlements. Our findings indicate that local governments' services are perceived to be relatively more satisfying compared to those of central government. We also diagnose a certain degree of corrupt deals at both levels of government and attribute this to a serious degree of internalization of such activities by the citizens. In conclusion we offer some policies that can deal with these issues.

Introduction:

Theoretical and qualitative research regarding the central and local governments in Turkey has asserted the heavily corrupt nature of their operations, and that both government types are infested with patron-client networks and bribery. However, empirical work on this issue seems to have thus far concentrated on aggregate level considerations such as the effects of agricultural policies on political support, while neglecting the ‘micro’, inter-personal dimension. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in research by focusing on individuals’ perceptions and attitudes *vis-à-vis* corruptive activities, as observed in the results of a nation-wide representative survey of urban population that was conducted in Fall 1999.

The paper develops *a measure of the intensity of corruption* as perceived by the electorate and analyses its determinants in terms of (i) *demographic*, (ii) *geographic*, (iii) *political*, (iv) *socio-economic*, (v) *psychological*, (vi) *economic*, and (vii) *cultural* variables. The focus on the public dimension is divided into central and local governmental activities. As such, the paper hopes to shed light on whether people’s perception of the ongoing corruption differs between the local and central levels. The dual nature of the paper’s investigation will enable the addressing of the issue of the reform and the restructuring of the public authority, and will provide guidelines as to the suitable pace and nature of decentralization and devolution that are to be undertaken.

The paper is organized as follows. First, a theoretical background section that clarifies the concept of corruption as well as introduces the main theoretical and quantitative research conducted thus far in Turkey. Next, the survey methodology is discussed by portraying the sample, the dependent variable (*viz.* the intensity of corruption) and the independent variables (*viz.* personal characteristics). Further, the paper presents the results of the analysis conducted to explain the perceived intensity of corruptive elements, both at the central and the local levels, through a set of independent variables. Finally, the implications of the results are discussed putting forth further research questions.

Theoretical Background

It has been generally noted that both central and local governments may very well misuse the mandate that has been entrusted to them when creating funds and/or allocating resources over which they have control. They may favor third parties with whom they have personal and/or political ties at the expense of public benefit. In such an environment, it becomes rational for voters to vote for political parties or politicians whom they perceive to be providing them with special favors; and

politicians would provide such favors in return for re-election votes, and/or personal or political gains (see, *e.g.*, Krueger, 1994). Such actions are also known as ‘government failures’ and ‘rent-seeking.’ These *patronage* relationships will bring about a loss of economic efficiency. On the one hand, the efficiency criterion governing economic activities will not be fulfilled, and on the other hand some resources will be wasted due to people’s engagement in lobbying activities that produce no value-added (Bhagwati, 1987). In addition to such patronage networks, there may be cases where individual public agents will not perform what is required of them because of having accepted bribes from third parties in return for not performing their duties in an unbiased manner (see, *e.g.*, Rose-Ackerman, 1987). Needless to say, the existence of patron-client networks at top levels is usually conducive to widespread bribes at lower levels. Throughout this paper the term ‘corruption’ will be used so as to encompass these two different yet interrelated concepts of patronage and bribery.

With different accentuation and jargon, the literature on the political economy of Turkey points to the fact that the paternalistic mode of governance, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, turned itself into a patronage-based governance modality with the introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1950s. In a related way, the lack of civic engagement in Turkey is again commonly seen to have played a role in the mentioned transformation (see, for example, İnsel, 1996; Sunar, 1975, 1996)¹. In fact, as shown by Buğra (1994), the intervention of the state into the economic life in the Republican era has always been carried out via a set of ‘special’ networks between private entrepreneurs and the state itself. To put it in a nutshell, the pioneers in the new Republic were literally ‘created’ and protected by the central government. What was under metamorphosis after the 1950s, was not the nature of the relationship between the government and the business community, but *rather the modernization ideology loosening its impetus*. Both politicians cum technocrats and other groups started to put their personal and group interests on top of their agendas.

A digression to distinguish between the central and local governments is noteworthy here. The economic, political and social challenges to democracy caused by rapid urbanization are no doubt among the most prominent issues on the public agenda. As of the last population census year, 1990, an estimated 60 percent of the Turkish population live in urban areas. Although estimates differ, in Istanbul alone there are

¹ For related studies, see Kolars (1973), Tachau (1973), Akarlı & Ben-Dor (1975), Kudat (1975), Sayarı (1975, 1977), Sunar (1985, 1990, 1995) and Güneş-Ayata (1994). Most of these studies take the dichotomy of “center-periphery”, as first proposed by Mardin (1973), as the theoretical framework in analysing the patronage networks in Turkey.

approximately 400,000 new migrants yearly. Such a dramatic inflow of new inhabitants create a multitude of chronic problems, including insufficient housing, water shortages, environmental pollution, and traffic congestion almost insurmountable in Turkey's largest cities. However, these problems are not unique to Turkey's largest metropolitan areas. They are equally formidable in the country's other smaller urban areas. For a recent discussion of the problems that are present in local administrations and their proposed solutions, see Keleş (1994) and Yalçındağ (1995).

The adoption of a liberal economic policy framework on January 24, 1980 marks a turning point in modern Turkish history. Reflections of this framework on the public administrative system and Turkish politics have been revolutionary in many respects. Pressures of rapid urbanization helped bring the issue of local government to the forefront of Turkish politics first during the 1960s. In the 1970s, the municipal administrations of metropolitan centers were captured by the center-left CHP, while the central government was under the control of right-wing coalitions. As the central governments tightened their tutelage over the municipalities under the control of their rival CHP, the reactions of the municipalities grew and demands for a populist devolution of power took hold. The political importance of municipal administration had continued to increase over the last two decades. Nevertheless, despite the favorable atmosphere of the liberal policy framework of the 1980s, it is hard to claim that significant devolution of power to the local authorities had taken place. The Turkish national political agenda in much of the late 1990s was dominated by rising pro-Islamist electoral support and its political mandate that challenged the secularist principles of the Turkish Republic. The 1994 and 1998 local elections were partly responsible for this development, as they revealed some of the deep-rooted uneasiness about the political system in Turkey. The remarkable electoral success of the Refah and Fazilet parties in the 1994, and to a lesser extent, the 1998 local elections gave the pro-Islamist cadres the executive control over most of the large metropolitan as well as smaller size Anatolian municipalities.

It is this very reality that forces anyone who wishes to investigate the public sphere in Turkey to make a distinction between the central and the local governments. This of course equally applies to the issue of corruption. Hence, rather than dealing with the problematic issue of corruption within the public arena as a whole, a distinction between the local and the central should prove to be more appropriate, not only in diagnosing the severity of corruption in both layers, but also in proposing specifically designed reform programs to tackle corruption at the two layers.

The limited empirical research on the aggregate level seems to validate the above-presented assertion. State intervention on a patronage basis, especially in the agricultural sector, has been widely investigated. The existence of motives, on the part of politicians, to manipulate the pricing policies supportive to agricultural in return for political support have been uncovered (see, for example, Ergüder, 1981; Gürkan and Kasnakoğlu, 1991; Çarkoğlu, 1995). At a more aggregate level, Çarkoğlu (1995, 1997, 2000) has illustrated the existence of manipulative interventions in the monetary and financial policies so as to increase the political support of some groups in the elections.

The issue of bribery has also been touched upon in some public surveys, but certainly not in detail. The periodical research that has been conducted by Strateji|MORI since 1994, ranks at the aggregate level the issue of bribery as a social problem only after the issues of persistent inflation, unemployment, the Kurdish separatist conflict in the south-eastern provinces and education (see, for example, *Strateji|MORI*, 1997). The research conducted by the T-SES Foundation (The Social, Economic and Political Research Foundation of Turkey) in 1998 revealed that, faced with many social problems, only 1% of respondents claimed bribery as the most important problem in Turkey (*T-SES*, 1999:61). Another research in which the bribery issue is questioned is that of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in which, as of 1998, bribery has been assigned the top priority by only 6.5% of the respondents, which constitute the largest group after those who deem problems of unemployment, social unrest, education and income distribution as the most important (*Adenauer Vakfi*, ud:86). When people were asked whether they themselves bribed, the research conducted by IRI (*IRI*, 1995a,b) in 1995 as well as that by Adaman and Çarkoğlu (2000) in 1999, reveals that 12% and 11%, respectively, of the nation-wide urban population indicated that they did. Although these empirical studies provide important information regarding bribery, they all fall short of providing a detailed description of people's perceptions and positions *vis-à-vis* bribery. This is understandable, since none of these studies aimed at considering the bribery issue as their main research topic. The main and common problematic issue overarching all research is that of the ambiguity of the term "bribery." As a result, different people may attach different meanings to the concept of bribery, and therefore their answers may have been blurred according to these personal, subjective definitions. It is conceivable unless explicitly clarified that some might have considered as bribery only those cases where a favor is conducted in terms of monetary gains, while others might have taken into account non-monetary payments as well. The survey designed here considers this problem explicitly, and aims at clarifying the context within which the issue of corruption will be referred to.

This classification will of course be made with reference to central versus local governments.

Methodology

The aim of our survey was to portray the perceptions of urban adults regarding the intensity of corruption at the central and local government levels. The central government is defined as the government approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, while the local governments are defined as municipalities in general. In this survey, a distinction between different municipality levels (*e.g.* a greater city municipality versus a district municipality) has not been made². Our primary reason for not differentiating between these two layers of local government was practical. Such differentiation would have necessitated dividing our sample respondents and questionnaires into the greater and the regular city municipalities, and then contrasting them to the central government. Such a differentiation at statistically significant levels would have necessitated a significant and unaffordable rise in our costs. The second difficulty was on a conceptual level. The duties and responsibilities of greater city municipalities as opposed to district municipalities are not only legally ambiguous, but people do not clearly perceive the borders between these layers as well. Since our primary objective was to differentiate between the local and the central authorities, we opted to phrase our questions so as to differentiate between the central and local governments, but not between the different levels of local governments.

Sample

The questionnaire was administered, between 21st October and 9th November 1999, by using a 'random sampling' method with an objective to represent the nation-wide urban population, in which the 7 regions' urban population figures of the 1997 census data were taken as the basis. From each region two cities were chosen on an *a-priori* basis (therefore a grand total of fourteen cities), and the sample size for each region was distributed between these two pairs of cities in proportion of their population figures (for the resulting number of interviews, see Table 1).

Within each city, all neighborhoods were listed according to their population figures as given by the 1995 election, the choice of which was made on a 'random and proportionate to size' basis. We decided to conduct six interviews per neighborhood. As the total sample size was determined to be 1200, 200 neighborhoods were accordingly chosen. We further decided to conduct two interviews in each street.

² Of the 14 cities in which we conducted our survey, 5 are 'metropolitan cities', and while the rest of the 9 are 'standard cities'.

Accordingly, the total number of streets to be selected from the already chosen neighborhoods was set at 600. In choosing the streets, mean real estate values across all streets compiled by the Ministry of Finance were used, according to which streets in each neighborhood are classified as 'rich', 'medium' and 'poor'. Therefore, from each neighborhood three streets, one from each category, were randomly selected. Interviewers were asked to randomly choose the houses to be questioned (to go to those houses that have the number 5 and its multiplications, and to select the second floor). A respondent over the age of 18 within each household was chosen for the interview. At the end, a total of 1206 interviews were conducted (a figure slightly higher than the original one due to targeting a higher number of interviews for contingencies)³. In order to correct for deviations in the sample from known population characteristics we weighted our data according to people's political preferences. The results of the 1999 election were used to correct the bias of our sample⁴. The basic demographic characteristics of our sample, under the categories of age, gender and education, are provided in Table 2.

Two prefatory remarks are necessary in evaluating our results. The first point is that women, on average, have a lower level of education than men. Hence, while only 4% of all men have no degree, this number climbs to 12% for women, and the ratio of those who have a university degree is 16 for men to 7.4 for women. The second point is that it proved more difficult to interview young and old women than it was to interview men. To be noted, of our sample, 30.8% of the men fall within 18-24 age group, while this percentage goes down to 25.8 for women. Furthermore, in the sample 20.7% of the men are 49 years and more, while the corresponding percentage drops to 14.7 for women.

Dependent Variable: The Intensity of Corruptive Activities

Two sets of questions were put forth to measure the intensity of corruption, both at the central and local levels. The first set identifies six areas in which corruptive elements may be observed, and respondents were asked to make an assessment, on a scale of 0-10, regarding their perceived intensity of corruption for each area. The aim here was to clarify as much as possible the specific context in which corruptive activities are or are not observed by respondents. The second set aims at classifying respondents'

³ Under the restrictive assumption of simple random sampling, a sample size of 1206 is expected to have a confidence interval of 95% with an error margin of $\pm 2,5\%$.

⁴ In compiling our computations, the 1999 election results were only available at city level. A further fine-tuning could be possible if we have had the distinction between urban and rural categories.

evaluation of various strategies for obtaining a required service from the government as “most effective” and “least effective.” These two sets of questions are given below.

Question 1. We would like you to consider, in general, the services that the central governments have been providing in the last five years. I am now going to list some of the service areas and ask you to give me an evaluation of the extent to which the central governments have been engaged in corruptive activities so as to gain economic or political benefits. A score of 0 would mean full corruption and a score of 10 would mean no corruption at all.

- a. How equitable does the central government treat the companies while implementing its economic policies?
- b. Does the government favor some districts and cities while inaugurating or investing in the already existing elementary/high schools/universities in order to get votes, or determine the investments on the basis of needs?
- c. How equitably are people treated in receiving the security services supplied by the police forces?
- d. How equally are those people who burn down forests in order to open up land for cultivation or construction punished by the government?
- e. How equitably does the government sanction people who evade taxation?
- f. Does the government favor some companies while subcontracting some major projects like motorway or dam building? Or does it assign the project to the best bidder?

Question 2. We would like you to consider, in general, the services that the local governments have been providing in the last five years. I am now going to list some of the service areas and ask you to give me an evaluation of the extent to which the local governments have been engaged in corruptive activities so as to gain economic or political benefits. A score of 0 would mean full corruption and a score of 10 would mean no corruption at all.

- a. How equitable do the municipalities treat people in implementing construction plants?
- b. How equally do the municipalities serve all areas of the city while collecting garbage?
- c. How equal do the municipalities treat the businesses while they check for prices or hygienic conditions?
- d. How equally do the municipalities treat different quarters of the city while supplying the fire brigade service?

- e. How equally do the municipalities treat different areas of the city while providing or maintaining parks and recreational services?
- f. Do the municipalities favor some companies while subcontracting some major projects like pavement construction? Or does it assign the project to the best bidder?

Questions 3. Of the following different ways I am now going to list down, which one is the most and which other is the least likely to work in obtaining the required service from the central government?

Questions 4. Of the following different ways I am now going to list down, which one is the most and which other is the least likely to work in obtaining the required service from the local government?

- a. To provide all necessary documents to the department that is in charge;
- b. To try to establish parochial ties with the person in charge;
- c. To put pressure by using media or television;
- d. To put pressure by organizing a mass demonstration or protestation;
- e. To give a gift and ask whether you could do something for them.

In questions 3 and 4, the answers (b) and (e) obviously correspond to corruptive solutions, whereas the answer (a) denotes the neutral bureaucratic way of acting. The answers (c) and (d) indicate a complaining attitude with the underlying expectation that public pressure will bring about the desired outcomes. Therefore, depending on whether the answers (b) and (e) were chosen as the most effective or as the least effective means, the public sphere, be it central or local, will be perceived as either loaded with corruptive activities or free of such activities.

From these two sets of questions, a corruption index is computed by a simple factor analysis for both the local and central governments. Putting it explicitly, for the central level, the questions *Q1a-Q1f* are used in conjunction with whether the answers *Q3b* and *Q3e* were chosen as the most valid or as the most invalid means toward providing a service. Similarly, for the local level, the questions *Q2a-Q2f* are used in conjunction with whether the answers *Q4b* and *Q4e* were chosen as the most effective or as the least effective means toward providing a service. Our factor analyses are presented below in Tables 3 and 4.

The factor analysis results are all in the expected direction. Since all increasing values of evaluations in our questions indicate that corruption decreases and that the lower values mean increasing corruptive activities, the positive loadings indicate satisfactory

evaluations⁵. The total explained variances for both cases are quite satisfactory (45.02% and 43.57%, respectively, for the central and the local governments). From these factor loadings two variables were then constructed as “the intensity of corruption”, one for the central government, and one for the local governments for each respondent. Accordingly, the two factors derived give us the evaluations of the extent of corruptive activities for each individual. The higher the factor scores for a given individual, the lower the corruptive activity evaluation of that individual for the local or central government, and *vice versa*. For both local and central governments, we are also in a position to evaluate the relative importance of different kinds of corruptive activities behind our general evaluation of these activities. For the case of local governments, the most important corruptive activity seems to concern the equal treatment in controlling for prices or hygienic conditions, whereas equal treatment of fire brigade services loads as the least important factor in determining the total corruptive activity score for a given individual. In determining the corruptive activity evaluation of the central governments, the equal treatment of tax evaders ranks as the most important item, whereas the equal treatment of the police appears as the lowest important factor. As expected, for both local and central governments seeing bribery as the most valid means to obtain service loads negatively, whereas seeing bribery as the least valid means to obtain service loads positively.

Independent Variables

The independent variables used to explain the variation in individual evaluations of the intensity of corruptive activities at both local and central governments and their descriptions are given below.

Age

This variable denotes the age of the respondent, and can take an integer above 18 (Question 5)⁶.

Gender

This parameter denotes the gender of the respondent, and takes the value of 0 for females and 1 for males (Question 6)⁷.

⁵ Recall that for *Q1&2a-Q1&2f* the value 0 means a total corruption and the value 10 a corruption-free application.

⁶ See Table 2.

⁷ See Table 2.

The Geographical Position of the City in which Respondent Lives

To create this variable, the 14 cities in which the survey was conducted are categorized as (i) metropolitan cities (Ankara, Istanbul and İzmir), (ii) Western cities (Adana, Antalya, Bursa, Denizli and Samsun) and (iii) Eastern cities (Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Konya, Trabzon and Van) (Question 7)⁸.

Party Preference

This parameter indicates the party with which one finds him/herself associated. For that aim, the respondent was asked to answer to *Which party would you vote for if there were an election today?* (Question 8a); and if the respondent reveals that s/he is indecisive or indifferent, then the question is rephrased as *Which party do you feel closer to when it comes to voting for a political party?* (Question 8b). As such, respondents are categorized as supporters of ANAP, CHP, DSP, DYP, Fazilet, HADEP, MHP, and all other small parties. Note that those respondents who continued to reveal their indecisiveness in Question 8b are equally distributed among eight options. Figure 1 below depicts the share the political parties have received.

Socio-economic Status

The socio-economic status parameter is an index that is composed of the respondent's belongings (car, dishwasher, cellular phone, credit card, personal computer), the nature of his/her accommodation (whether the respondent lives in his/her home or pays rent or stays in a housing provided by the employer or stays in an acquaintance's house without paying rent), monthly income, education, occupation (unemployed, housewife, small/medium trader, big trader, worker/officer in the private or public service, medium-high level manager/self-employed), family size, and the number of working family members (Questions 9a-k). The socio-economic status parameter is then created for each individual through a factor analysis (see Table 5, below), whose distribution reveals that in our sample those with a negative factor value (indicating a low status) account for approximately 54% of the total sample.

General Life Satisfaction Level

This dummy variable aims at capturing the respondent's general life satisfaction level on the basis of satisfaction, taking the value [1], and no-satisfaction, taking the value of [0]. To that end, the question: *To what extent are you satisfied from what you have been living through?* is put forth (Question 10). For computational reasons, the answers “very much” and “to some extent” satisfied are classified as “satisfied”, and

⁸ As such, in western cities a total of 287, in eastern cities a total of 245 and in metropolitan cities a total of 674 interviews were conducted.

the answers “not much” and “not at all” satisfied are classified as “not-satisfied” (see Figure 3, below).

Evaluations of Economic Conditions

The perceived effects, prospectively and retrospectively, of economic activities on the welfare of one’s family and the country as a whole are also questioned. Retrospectively, the question as to *How would you evaluate the impact of last year’s economic policies taken by the government on your family’s well-being and on the country’s well-being?* is put forth (Questions 11a-b). The answers “positive” (taking the value of [0]) and “negative” (taking the value of [1]) are recorded. Prospectively, the question as to *How would you evaluate the prospect of your family’s well being in the next year and the prospect of the country’s well-being over the next year?* is put forth (Questions 12a-b). The answers “very bad” and “bad” are categorized as “negative” (taking the value of [1]) and “very good” and “good” are categorized as “positive” taking the value of [0]. (See Figure 4a and 4b, below.)

Materialist/Post-Materialist Values

Here, Inglehart’s (1977, 1990) “materialist/post-materialist value dimensions scale” was replicated as a proxy to determine respondents’ cultural positioning. Inglehart developed a 12-item battery of questions to measure individuals’ value priorities, where this battery of questions was divided into three groups (A, B and C). The following question of the three sets of battery of questions was put forth.

Question 13. Of what I am now going to read, which one do you consider as the most important and which one do you consider as the second important one?

- A1- Maintaining a high growth rate
- A2- Ensuring people’s participation on issues related to the country and their surroundings
- A3- Maintaining strong defense forces
- A4- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful
- B1- Maintaining order in the nation
- B2- Giving people more say in important government decisions
- B3- Fighting rising prices
- B4- Protecting freedom of speech
- C1- Maintaining a stable economy
- C2- Progress toward a less impersonal more human society
- C3- Fighting against crime

C4- Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money

In each set the 1st and 3rd arguments denote materialist values, whereas the second and fourth arguments correspond to post-materialist values. Thus, the responses should tend to polarize along materialist/post-materialist dimensions, with some individuals consistently emphasizing materialist goals, while others giving priority to post-materialist values. Dummy variables were created for these arguments, and a factor analysis was then conducted. The factor loadings, confirming Inglehart’s (1990) findings, are presented below in Table 6⁹.

Analysis and Results

We start with an analysis concerning the answers given to the question sets 1 and 2 above. In that regard, the first result to be presented is the mean value of the answers given to each question; these are displayed in Table 7 below. As can be seen from the table, the mean values are between 2.2 and 3.7 for the central government, and 3.5 and 6.7 for the local governments. Recalling that the scale takes on the value of 0 to denote the most corruptive activity and the value of 10 to express the corruption-free activity, one can observe that the perceived corruption intensity at the central level is very high, centered around 3. The perceived corruption intensity at the local level is centered around the mid-value of 5, and as such local governments’ involvement in corruptive activities is perceived as less severe than that of the central one.

The answers to the question sets 1 and 2 are then further examined by the factor analysis, the result of which is given again in Table 7. The factor analysis clearly shows that the two sets of answers are distinct from each other. It is therefore possible to form two dimensions from these answers, which account for the 59.49% of the total variance. A detailed investigation of Table 7 would reveal that the three areas of (treatment of companies, treatment of tax evaders, and treatment of subcontractors) at the central level that account for the highest factor loadings (0.781, 0.780 and 0.772) also have the highest corruption scores (2.2, 2.6 and 2.6), but the same correlation does not seem to occur at the local level.

The distributions of the factor values that were computed as weighted averages from the factor loadings, for both the central and local governments, are presented in Figures 6 and 7. As can be observed from these figures, the values associated with the central government are concentrated on negative values, whereas those associated

⁹ Further econometric research reveal that supporters of HADEP, CHP, Fazilet and other small parties do have a tendency towards post-materialist values, whereas those of MHP and DSP towards materialist values; that the younger and more educated one shows a tendency towards post-materialist; that the more satisfied from life one is the possibility of his/her having materialist values goes up.

with the local government are concentrated around the value of zero, which means not an equitable treatment but not close to full-corruption either. A T-STATISTICS WILL BE GIVEN HERE.

Next, in Table 8, the percentages given to the most effective and to the least effective means when one is in need of a service from either the central or the local governments are presented. The table as well as these values also shows the so-called 'net' values that are simply computed as the difference between the most effective percentages and the least effective ones. The corruptive solutions, answers (b) and (e), get the two highest net values for both local and central cases. Three additional observations are noteworthy. The first is that while the answer of "provision of all the necessary documents" gets a positive net value (4%) for the case of local governments, it gets a clearly negative net value (-9%) for the case of the central government. A bureaucratic solution at the local level of letting the system work out a resolution (or settlement) of the problem at hand by simply providing the necessary information has more believers in it than non-believers. This may be taken as an indicator of a healthy administrative system at the local level. The second point is that while the answer of "putting pressure by using media or television" gets a positive net value (3%) for the central government, it gets clearly a negative net value (-8%) for the local government. The effectiveness of media pressure is obviously higher for the central government, whereas at the local government the media pressure is yet to develop as an effective means to obtain a response from the administration. Finally, the organization of a mass demonstration or protest is clearly found to be an unwanted solution for both cases. For both central and local government levels, unorthodox participation emphasizing conflict pressure does not attract much support from the people. If this observation were to be made hand in hand with a high commitment to peaceful participation methods, one could take it as a sign of healthy political participation thus solving the problems that exist between administrations and people at large. However, since no commitment is observed in orthodox participation methods of providing necessary information, and since there is a low level of belief in conflicting participation, this may be taken as a sign of apolitisation, or simply alienation from the system. This is due to the fact that people's satisfaction with service levels have been found to be quite low at both levels of government (Adaman and Çarkoğlu, 2000).

Analysis

This part presents the results of an econometric analysis that aims at explaining the intensity of corruption by a set of independent variables, both for the cases of the central and local governments. The following regression model was used:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \sum \beta_i X_i + \sum \lambda_i DV_i + u_i,$$

where Y_i is our dependent variable, which is the intensity of corruption as explained above. X_i stands for the variables of age, socio-economic status and materialism/post-materialism values, DV_i denotes the dummy variables of gender, geography, satisfaction level, and economic evaluation. The coefficient α in this model represents a reference group consisting of all dummy variables that are not covered by DV_i . The regression technique that is used is the "stepwise" linear one, and as such, only the significant variables are kept in the regression¹⁰.

Variables Affecting the Intensity of Corruption: The Case of Central Government

Table 9 below presents the results for the case of the central government. As can be seen from the table, the positive effect on the intensity of corruption comes from, with the order of magnitude (as seen from the standardized coefficient values), the dummy variable of general satisfaction, the dummy variable of Fazilet Party supporters, the materialism/post-materialism values and the dummy variable of gender; and the negative effect is due to socio-economic status values. The coefficient α corresponds to those women who are not satisfied and who support ANAP/MHP/CHP/DSP/DYP/HADEP and other small parties.

Variables Affecting the Intensity of Corruption: The Case of Local Government

Table 10 below presents the results for the case of the local government. As can be seen from the table, the positive effect on the intensity of corruption comes from, again in the order of magnitude, the materialism/post-materialism values, the dummy variable of general satisfaction, the dummy variable of MHP supporters, the dummy variable of DSP supporters, the dummy variable of East cities. Furthermore, the negative effect again in the order of the magnitude is due to the dummy variable of the retrospective effect of policies on the country's welfare, the socio-economic status values, the prospective effect of policies on the family's welfare and the retrospective effect of policies on the family's welfare. The coefficient α corresponds to those who are not generally satisfied, who think that the policies positively affected both the country's and the family's welfare, who think that the policies will positively affect the family's welfare, who live in metropolitan or Western cities and who support ANAP/CHP/DYP/HADEP/FP and other small parties.

A summary of the results is given in Table 11. The factors affecting the perceived intensity level of corruption at the central and local levels are presented in a

¹⁰ All regressions are performed by SPSS 9.0.

taxonomical (taxonomial, taxonomic) way. Some suggestions as to the existence of a relationship between the dependent and independent variables are also added.

Geography: The results obtained indicate that the citizens living in the Eastern cities, when compared to those living in the metropolitan and Western ones, have a relatively low perceived intensity of corruption at the central level. No effect of the geography has been detected at the local level. Acknowledging that there seems to be a wide consensus on the fact that the regional differences in Turkey count very much for the political and economic discrepancies (see, for example, *UNDP-TESEV*, 1996, 1997, 1998; Çarkoğlu, 2000; Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2000), one would have guessed quite the opposite result at first hand (viz. citizens of the Eastern cities perceiving a higher intensity of corruption). Two speculations, to some extent complementary perhaps, can be given for this. First, those living in the eastern cities, suspicious of the anonymity of their answers, might have underreported their perceived intensity levels especially with reference to the Ankara government. Second, those living in the eastern cities might be concerned with much more important issues with regard to the central government than the patronage issue, so that this item did not command much of their attention in absolute terms.

Political position: Political position emerged as a factor affecting the perceived intensity level of corruption. At the central level, the supporters of DSP and MHP parties perceived a relatively lower intensity of corruption compared to other parties' supporters. This tendency might partially be explained by the fact that these two parties have been in power at the time of the survey—thus their supporters either do not think that their parties have a corruptive nature or do not want to discredit their parties. In addition, a possible explanation to the fact why the supporters of ANAP - the third member of the coalition at the time of our survey - did not also differentiate themselves could be that their parties in the last years have been very much accused of being engaged in corruptive activities. At the local level, the Fazilet party supporters turned out to be revealing that the corruption intensity at the local level is lower compared to what the supporters of other parties revealed. The same logic that has been used to explain the perceptions regarding the central government will apply here, that is, that a very clear majority of people were living in the cities whose mayors were from the Refah party. Finally, regarding the non-appearance of the HADEP party as playing a role in the intensification of corruption perception - a plausible conjecture given the party's radical position towards the status quo - one may speculate that the party supporters' agenda may consist of such items that overrule the patronage problem.

Economic evaluation: Those who think that the government's economic policies have had and will have a negative impact on the welfare of their families and that of the country as a whole, are likely to perceive a higher intensity of corruption at the central level. One may argue here that those who criticize the government's policies may be establishing a link between the existence of corruption and poor economic performance.

Socio-economic status: The fact that the socio-economic status index is positively correlated with the perceived intensity of corruption, both at local and central levels, can be partly explained by the fact that a high index would mean a higher integration with society (due to, *inter alia*, a higher education and income level). Such people would on the one hand be very sensitive to corruption, and on the other hand be in a better position to be able to observe the economic and political life of the country and their cities.

General satisfaction: As being 'generally satisfied' implies to a certain extent a conformity with the economic and political environment one lives in, those satisfied are likely to perceive a low intensity of corruption. Although those profiting from corruptive activities are at the same time very likely to be generally satisfied, their percentage in the society, and hence in our sample, can easily be assumed to be small—thus their likely high intensity level could not have much impact.

Materialism/post-materialism: When the ideological doctrine of a person turns out to be more materialist, it is likely that that person would reveal a lower intensity of corruption perception compared to the average both at local and central levels.

Age: The age parameter has been found to have no effect on the perception of the intensity of corruption at both central and local levels.

Gender: Women, on average, turn out to have a higher perceived intensity of corruption at the local level when compared to men. A speculative explanation to this fact could be given in that women, being engaged in daily life struggles (as shopping, escorting children to and from schools, cleaning houses and surrounding areas, etc.) more heavily than men, are likely to be in a better position to observe and consequently judge municipality activities.

Concluding Remarks

Several important points are worthy of emphasis in our findings. First, the observation that, while both levels of governments in Turkey are perceived to be seriously infected with corruptive activities, the perception of the central government is significantly worse than that of the local government. Second, the clear partisan lines

that shape both levels of government in such a manner that the performance of governments at both levels is affected in a positive way through a partisan attachment of the respondents to the parties in power. This in a sense reflects a clear politicization and polarization of performance evaluations at both levels of government. Third, the observation that the urban population in Turkey has very conveniently internalized the corruptive nature of government activity at both levels of government. Given the dominant view of the existence of largely corruptive activities, individuals see that the best way of getting any service from both levels of government is by simply being part of the corrupt system. Taking the risk of some exaggeration, people seem to answer our questions by saying: "Find a friend in the government and/or try to form a parochial tie with the people who run the government. Ask if you could do anything for them and/or buy presents for them. However, if you want to get your service, don't bother to protest or apply pressure on governments because that is not the way they will respond to you." All in all, people in Turkey on the one hand seem to perceive a high intensity of corruptive activities in both central and local governments, and on the other hand seem to be so clearly internalized into corruptive functioning.

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Figure 1: Political Position




Figure 2. Distribution of the Socio-economic Status




Figure 3: General Life Satisfaction Level




Figure 4a: Retrospective Economic Evaluation




Figure 4b: Prospective Economic Evaluation




Figure 5: The Distribution of the Sample on the Materialism / Postmaterialism Scale




Figure 6: Corruption: Central Government




Figure 7: Corruption: Local Government




Table 1: Distribution of the Sample

	Number of Interviews	% Of Interviews
Adana	85	7.0
Ankara	168	13.9
Antalya	51	4.2
Bursa	61	5.1
Denizli	16	1.3
Diyarbakir	33	2.7
Erzurum	38	3.2
Gaziantep	35	2.9
İstanbul	379	31.4
İzmir	127	10.5
Konya	58	4.8
Samsun	74	6.1
Trabzon	51	4.2
Van	30	2.5
Total	1206	100

Table 2: Age, Education and Gender Characteristics of the Sample

	Gender			Gender		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
Degree holder						
None	11.6	4.1	7.9	75.0	25.0	100
Primary school	40.3	28.9	34.8	59.9	40.1	100
Secondary or high school	39.6	50.0	44.7	45.9	54.1	100
University	7.4	16.2	11.6	32.9	67.1	100
Graduate studies	1.1	0.9	1.0	58.3	41.7	100
	100	100	100			
	Significance level: 3.7E-12			Significance level: 3.7E-12		
	Pearson Chi-square: 59.50			Cramer's V: 0.22		
Age groups						
18-24	25.8	30.8	28.2	47.4	52.6	100
25-34	29.6	26.3	28.1	54.7	45.3	100
35-48	29.8	22.2	26.1	59.0	41.0	100
49 +	14.7	20.7	17.5	43.4	56.6	100
	100	100				
	Significance level: 0.001			Significance level: 0.001		
	Pearson Chi-square: 16.48			Cramer's V: 0.117		

Table 3: Factor Analysis Results: The Central Government

Equal treatment of those who evade taxation	0.79
Equal treatment of bidders in government tenders.	0.78
Equal treatment of companies	0.77
Equal treatment of those who burn down forests	0.76
Equal treatment of cities in terms of educational facilities	0.74
Equal service from the police forces	0.71
Bribery (in the central government) as the most invalid means	0.27
Bribery (in the central government) as the most valid means	-0.26
Total explained variance (%)	45.02

Notes: Factor extraction method: Principle components method. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation

Table 4: Factor Analysis Results: Local Governments

Equal treatment in controlling for prices or hygienic conditions	0.80
Equal provision of garbage collecting service	0.78
Equal treatment in providing or maintaining parks and recreational services	0.78
Equal treatment of bidders in municipal tenders	0.74
Equal treatment in controlling for construction permits	0.72
Equal provision of fire brigade service	0.67
Bribery (in local governments) as the most valid means	-0.30
Bribery (in local governments) as the most invalid means	0.19
Total explained variance (%)	43.57

Notes: Factor extraction method: Principle components method. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation

Table 5: Factor Analysis: Socio-Economic Status

Ownership (Credit card)	0.63
Ownership (Cellular phone)	0.61
Ownership (Dishwasher)	0.60
Ownership (Personal computer)	0.57
Monthly family income	0.56
University degree holder	0.48
Employment status-Managers	0.39
Ownership (Car)	0.36
Highschool degree holder	0.35
Number of family members working	0.24
Graduate degree holder (MA, PhD and the like)	0.18
Wage earner	0.14
Employment status -Self-employed-(small)	0.10
Employment status -Self employed-(large)	0.10
Rent payer	0.03
Employment status-Unemployed	0.01
Family size	-0.24
No formal education	-0.30
Housewife	-0.49
Primary school degree holder	-0.56
Total explained variance (%)	16.07

Notes: Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Factor extraction method: Principle components method

Table 6: Factor Analysis: Materialist/Post-Materialist Values

Law and order	0.63
Strong defence forces	0.54
Fight against crime	0.43
Fight against price increases	0.43
Stable economy	0.35
High growth rate	0.10
Environmental concern	-0.08
Humanly relationship	-0.24
Participation	-0.41
Ideas more important than money	-0.54
More say in important government decisions	-0.55
Freedom of speech	-0.65
Total explained variance (%)	20.24

Notes: Factor extraction method: Principle components method. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation

Table 7: Factor Analysis and the Means of Corruptive Activities in Different Service Areas, at the Central and Local Levels

	Means	Central	Local
Equal treatment of companies (<i>Q1b</i>)	2.6	0.78	0.10
Equal treatment of those who evade taxation (<i>Q1e</i>)	2.2	0.78	0.18
Equal treatment of subcontractors (central) (<i>Q1c</i>)	2.6	0.77	0.18
Equal treatment of those who burn down forests (<i>Q1d</i>)	2.9	0.73	0.19
Equal treatment of cities in terms of education facilities (<i>Q1f</i>)	3.0	0.72	0.17
Equal service from the police forces (<i>Q1a</i>)	3.7	0.65	0.26
Equal provision of garbage collecting service (<i>Q2a</i>)	5.8	0.12	0.81
Equal treatment in providing or maintaining parks and recreational services (<i>Q2e</i>)	4.8	0.17	0.76
Equal treatment in controlling for prices or hygienic conditions (<i>Q2f</i>)	4.4	0.26	0.76
Equal provision of fire brigade (<i>Q2d</i>)	6.7	0.03	0.73
Equal treatment of subcontractors (locals) (<i>Q2b</i>)	3.7	0.37	0.64
Equal treatment in implementing construction plans (<i>Q2c</i>)	3.5	0.40	0.61
Explained variance (%)	30.76	27.73	

Notes: Factor extraction method: Principle components method. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation

Table 8: The Most Valid and the Most Invalid Means: Central and Local Governments

	Valid %		Invalid %		Net %	
	Central	Local	Central	Local	Central	Local
Provide all the necessary documents (Q3&4a)	27	36	35	32	-9	4
Establish friendship with the person in charge (Q3&4b)	26	31	7	7	19	24
Put pressure by using media or television (Q3&4c)	14	6	11	14	3	-8
Organize a mass demonstration or protestation (Q3&4d)	6	4	25	26	-19	-22
Give a gift and be ready to give a service (Q3&4e)	26	21	17	16	9	6
No answer	2	1	5	4		

Table 9: Factors Affecting the Perceived Intensity of Corruption: The Central Level

	Coefficients	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficients	t-Values	Significance Level
Alfa	-0.27	0.05		-5.03	0.00
General satisfaction (DV)	0.32	0.06	0.16	5.26	0.00
Fazilet Partisi supporters (DV)	0.44	0.10	0.14	4.48	0.00
Materialism/post-materialism	0.09	0.03	0.09	2.95	0.00
Socio-economic status	-0.11	0.03	-0.11	-3.46	0.00
Gender (DV)	0.16	0.06	0.08	2.55	0.01
R ² : 0.072					
Adjusted R ² : 0.067					
Standard error: 0.973					

Notes: The Alfa coefficient corresponds to those women who are not satisfied with their lives and who support ANAP/MHP/CHP/DSP/DYP/HADEP and other small parties.

Table 10: Factors Affecting the Perceived Intensity of Corruption: The Local Level

	Coefficients	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficients	t-values	Significance Level
Alfa	0.31	0.07		4.17	0.00
Country welfare deteriorated (DV)	-0.42	0.08	-0.19	-5.55	0.00
Materialism/post-materialism	0.11	0.03	0.11	3.96	0.00
General satisfaction (DV)	0.23	0.06	0.11	3.95	0.00
Socio-economic status	-0.11	0.03	-0.10	-3.64	0.00
Family welfare will deteriorate (DV)	-0.17	0.06	-0.09	-2.85	0.00
MHP supporters (DV)	0.30	0.09	0.09	3.29	0.00
DSP supporters (DV)	0.33	0.10	0.09	3.16	0.00
Family welfare deteriorated (DV)	-0.17	0.07	-0.08	-2.33	0.02
East cities (DV)	0.15	0.07	0.06	2.24	0.03
R ² : 0.177					
Adjusted R ² : 0.17					
Standard error: 0.911					

Notes: The Alfa coefficient here corresponds to non-MHP and DSP supporters who are not generally satisfied, who think that the policies positively affected both the country's and family's welfare, who think that the policies will positively affect the family's welfare, who live in metropolitan or Western cities.

Table 11: Factors Determining the Perceived Intensity of Corruption

	Central	Local
Geography	East: –	
Political preference	DSP: – MHP: –	FP: –
Economic evaluation	Family welfare deteriorated: + Country welfare deteriorated: + Family welfare will deteriorate: +	
Socio-economic status	+	+
General satisfaction	Satisfied: –	Satisfied: –
Materialism/ post-materialism	–	–
Age		
Gender		Male: –