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GENDERING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT USING THE GALLUP SURVEYS

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Abstract

The literature on gender and the Arab "Spring" has documented the role of female activists in the uprisings and analyzed the implications of Islamists' electoral successes for women. However, little is known about how ordinary women have experienced the changes that accompanied the uprisings and how this compares with men's experiences. The removal of authoritarian rulers may have improved satisfaction with public institutions or decreased perceived corruption, but for some the uprisings may have resulted in higher perceived or reported crime and deeper material hardship. This paper analyzes gender differences between Tunisians' and Egyptians' perceptions of prevailing economic and political circumstances using nationally-representative samples surveyed before, during, and after the uprisings of the Arab "Spring." Descriptive results indicate that Egyptians' ratings of three indices of economic conditions are lower overall, although Tunisians perceive a steeper deterioration in economic circumstances in the post-uprising period. In both countries, these economic losses have not been compensated for by political gains, as measured by four indices. While women and men's economic and political attitudes follow a similar trajectory in each country, there are clear differences per the gender of the respondent, particularly when it comes to political attitudes. This gender difference is largely confirmed by multivariate analysis. Women are more likely than men to report favorable economic conditions in both countries. In the realm of politics, Egyptian and Tunisian women express greater dissatisfaction with law and order and with national institutions. At the same time, men perceive higher levels of corruption than do women in both countries.

JEL Classifications: J1, P1

Keywords: gender, women, Arab Spring, Arab uprisings, public opinion, political attitudes, economic attitudes, Tunisia, Egypt

ملخص

وثق الأدب عن النوع و"الربيع" العربي دور الناشطات في الانتفاضات وتحليل الآثار المترتبة على النجاحات الانتخابية للإسلاميين على النساء. ومع ذلك، لا يعرف الكثير عن كيف شهدت المرأة العادية التغييرات التي رافقت الانتفاضات وكيف يقارن هذا مع تجارب الرجال. تغيير الحكم المستبد أدى الى الارتياح للمؤسسات العامة والى تغيير وجهه النظر عن فسادها، ولكن بعض الانتفاضات قد أدت إلى ارتفاع معدل الجريمة أو زيادة الشعور بوجودها. وتحلل هذه الورقة الاختلافات بين الجنسين بين تصورات التونسيين والمصريين للظروف الاقتصادية السائدة والسياسية باستخدام عينات تمثيلية على الصعيد الوطني التي شملتها الدراسة قبل وأثناء وبعد الانتفاضات من"الربيع" العربى. تشير النتائج الوصفية أن أوضاع المصريين الاقتصادية هي أقل عموما على ثلاثة محاور، على الرغم من أن التونسيين يرون تدهور حاد في الظروف الاقتصادية في فترة ما بعد الانتفاضة. في كلا البلدين، لم يتم تعويض هذه الخسائر الاقتصادية لمكاسب سياسية، بقياس أربعة مؤشرات. في حين تتبع مواقف النساء الاقتصادية والسياسية مسار مماثل للرجال في كل بلد، ولكن هناك اختلافات واضحة بين النوعين، لا سيما عندما يتعلق الأمر بالمواقف السياسية. ويؤكد هذا الفرق بين الجنسين إلى حد كبير عن طريق التحليل متعدد المتغيرات. فالنساء أكثر عرضة من الرجال للإبلاغ عن الظروف الاقتصادية المواتية في كلا البلدين. في عالم السياسة، تعبر كل من المرأة المصرية والتونسية عن قدر أكبر من عدم الرضا عن القانون والنظام والمؤسسات الوطنية. أما الرجال فيدركون المستويات الأعلى من الفساد أكثر من النساء في كلا البلدين.

1. Background

Existing treatments of gender and the Arab uprisings have predominantly focused on three questions. *First,* they have described the involvement of female activists and women's civil society organizations in the uprisings. Scholars and journalists have sought to bring into the spotlight the role played by Arab women and women's organizations in attempts to topple authoritarian regimes and their continued struggles in the pursuit of "bread, freedom, and social justice."(Abu-Lughod and El-Mahdi 2011; Khamis 2011; Giacomo 2012) *Second,* they have asked what the electoral success of Islamist political parties in several Arab countries means for women's status and women's rights. This has involved the analysis of women's formal political status, in terms of the share of parliamentary representatives, ministerial posts, and party leadership positions going to women. It has also involved the analysis of the implications of new constitutions and other legislative changes for women's rights (Economist 2011). In many cases, these treatments of the issue of gender and the Arab uprisings have assumed or asserted that Islamist political agendas will exclude or disadvantage women (Economist 2011; Moghadam 2014; Washington Post 2012; Sadiki 2012). *Third,* these treatments have expressed concern for the legitimacy and efficacy of women's political claims-making in the post-uprising era, given the patronage women's organizations received from the deposed authoritarian regimes in some countries (Al-Ali 2012). The close association many women's organizations and the feminist cause had with the former regimes will likely discredit these groups and their demands in the eyes of the public, and may cause new political forces to distance themselves from issues of gender equality (Economist 2011; Kandiyoti 2012;Johansson-Nogues 2013).

The academic literature on religious conservatism, authoritarianism and women's status in Muslim-majority countries contains important insights for debates on gender and the Arab uprisings. Using cross-national analyses, this literature has argued that Islam leads to authoritarianism and women's disempowerment (Fish 2002; Donno and Russet 2004, however, contend that authoritarian rule does not consistently result in women's repression, nor does female empowerment consistently result in democratic government). Thus, it seems that the involvement of 'empowered' Arab women in mass movements for political change will not necessarily produce democracy. More importantly, this research suggests that greater democracy in Arab countries that have experienced uprisings will not necessarily improve women's conditions. This echoes the findings of feminist scholars of regime change, who point out that women's participation in social and political uprisings does not guarantee that they will reap the rewards of the resulting change (Johansson-Nogues 2013; Al-Ali 2012). Similarly, feminists argue that it is only under certain conditions that states and institutions that purport to be democratic actually enact changes that advance gender equality (Johansson-Nogues 2013; Moghadam 2013; Moghadam 2014).

Returning once more to the Arab setting, little is known about ordinary women's perceptions of and responses to the broad social, political, and economic transformations witnessed since the Arab Spring. As noted above, female activists and women's organizations' involvement in the uprisings have been widely accounted for, a focus which has come at the expense of describing how ordinary women have experienced the changes that accompanied the uprisings. It is not obvious whether women's (or men's) net perception of these changes should be positive or negative. It is altogether possible that the uprisings and the transition to more democracy have improved satisfaction with public institutions or decreased perceived corruption. However, for some, the uprisings have also resulted in greater physical and economic insecurity - higher perceived or reported crime and deeper material hardship.

People's experiences and perceptions of the costs and benefits of the uprisings will likely be shaped by gender to the extent that gender affects individuals' roles, vulnerabilities, and priorities. For instance, sexual violence has received extensive media attention in some Arab

countries where political unrest continues (Marcus 2012; Zaltsman 2012). Given the importance placed on female sexual purity in Arab societies, are Arab women more likely than men to identify personal safety as a pressing problem after the uprisings? Another example concerns the economic upheaval that has characterized the post-uprising period in several countries (Noueihed and Guerdane 2012; Springborg 2012). Given the emphasis placed on male breadwinning in Arab culture, are Arab men more likely than women to express dissatisfaction with the job climate after the uprisings? This analytic approach brings questions of masculinity as well as femininity into the debate on gender and the Arab uprisings. At the same time, it sidesteps the issue of the nature and effects of visible actors' (women's and Islamists') participation in unfolding political processes. Instead, it focuses on ordinary women's and men's assessments of the status of the key demands articulated by the uprisings: bread, freedom, and social justice.

This study seeks to understand how gender affects ordinary individuals' perceptions of the changed conditions that have resulted from the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in two Arab countries. I analyze several waves of the Gallup Worldwide Research opinion poll survey data in order to compare women and men's perceptions of the economic and political environment before and after the onset of popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.

2. Literature Review

Having given an overview of the literature on gender and the Arab Spring in the previous section, here I focus specifically on scholarship addressing this topic in Tunisia and Egypt.

Starting with Tunisia, many accounts have documented the active participation and leadership of women and women's organizations in the events of 2010-2011(Tchaicha and Arfaoui 2012; Khalil 2014; Daniele 2014). However, little is known about the characteristics differentiating women who contributed to the struggle from those who did not. Some have pointed to the emergence of new forms of activism among those seeking gender equality in Tunisia. Specifically, formalized and state-sponsored gender activism has been displaced and replaced by decentralized and de-institutionalized forms of activism that make greater use of the street and social networks (Khalil 2014).

Others acknowledge the limits of decades of state feminism before the Jasmine Revolution. In particular, rural and working class women were denied the fruits of the women-friendly policies enjoyed by their elite urban sisters under the leadership of Bourghiba and Ben Ali (Tchaicha and Arfaoui 2012; Khalil 2014). Belying Tunisia's reputation as a leader in the realm of gender equality in the Arab region is the fact that Tunisian women are more likely to live in poverty than men, even when educational attainment is held constant (Tchaicha and Arfaoui 2012). Despite the frailty of gender equality in Tunisia, most research on gender and the Jasmine Revolution expresses alarm at the rise of popular expressions of conservative Muslim practice, as well as at the rise of Islamist political parties, questioning whether these religious forces will endanger secular guarantees of women's rights such as the 1956 Tunisian Code of Personal Status (Tchaicha and Arfaoui 2012; Gray 2012; Daniele 2014; Charrad and Zarrugh 2014).

Finally, the literature has traced the continued dominance of men and marginalization of women in formal politics in Tunisia after the uprising. This is apparent not only in women's share of National Constituent Assembly seats, but in their absence from several influential commissions and underrepresentation in party leadership positions (Khalil 2014). The gendered implications of the terminology used by the Tunisian constitution to describe women's role in society was another site of contention within the realm of formal politics. Although the final constitution passed dropped the mention of women's complementarity, the constitution-drafting process was one largely orchestrated by men (Charrad and Zarrugh 2014).

Moving on to a review of the literature on Egypt, we see many of the themes that characterize the literature on Tunisia. Here again, many accounts assert that women were equal partners in the protests that led to the ouster of the Mubarak regime, though little empirical evidence is offered to buttress this surprising claim or to describe the female participants (Hafez 2014; Fahmy 2013; Morsy 2014). Several authors express disappointment and pessimism regarding women's status in the post-uprising period, pointing to the misogynist discourse and legislative initiatives of some Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi members of the People's Assembly, as well as to some secular forces' (including the army) efforts to reverse woman-friendly laws and to dissolve feminist institutions that were associated with the former first lady (Dawoud 2012; El Baradei and Wafa 2013; Fahmy 2013; Morsy 2014).

Scholars have meticulously documented the exclusion of Egyptian women from formal politics. Since the uprising, they have been underrepresented in parliamentary candidate lists, in the short-lived People's Assembly, and in the many bodies formed to undertake critical tasks, such as the drafting of an interim constitution (El Baradei and Wafa 2013; Morsy 2014). Women's political marginalization intensified after the uprising as a result of the abolition of the parliamentary quota that guaranteed that the People's Assembly would reserve at least 64 seats (out of 444) for women (Fahmy 2013).

In one of the few accounts that addresses masculinity and femininity in the context of the Egyptian uprising, Hafez has identified young men as targets of arbitrary violence at the hands of a paternalistic state. In fact, she traces sexual violence directed at female protesters to young men's emasculation as a result of political repression and economic deprivation (Hafez 2012). Others remind us that sexual violence against women is a tool of control and intimidation used not only by Egyptian citizens, but also by the (male-only) police and military (Fahmy 2013).

3. Research Questions

Using indices developed and validated by the Gallup surveys, I address the following seven research questions in Tunisia and Egypt pertaining to gendered assessment of the economic (bread) and political (freedom and social justice) situations in these countries:

1. *Bread:* Has ordinary people's ability to afford *food and shelter* increased or decreased as a result of the uprisings? Are women more likely than men to report deprivation in the area of food and shelter?
2. *Bread:* Has ordinary people's assessment of the *job climate* improved or deteriorated as a result of the uprisings? Are men more likely than women to report an unfavorable job climate after the uprisings?
3. *Bread:* Has ordinary people's sense of personal, household, and community *financial wellbeing* increased or decreased as a result of the uprisings? Are men more likely than women to report financial stress after the uprisings?
4. *Freedom and Social Justice:* Have ordinary people's perceptions of *law and order* changed as a result of the uprisings, and how? Are women more likely than men to express dissatisfaction with law and order after the uprisings?
5. *Freedom and Social Justice*: Has ordinary people's evaluation of environment, housing, and infrastructure in their communities (*community basics*) improved or deteriorated as a result of the uprisings? Do women and men differ in terms of their evaluation of community basics?
6. *Freedom and Social Justice:* Has ordinary people's confidence in *national institutions* improved or deteriorated as a result of the uprisings? How do women and men compare in terms of their confidence in these institutions?

7. *Freedom and Social Justice:* Has ordinary people's perception of the level of *corruption* in business and government increased or decreased as a result of the uprisings? Are men more likely than women to report high levels of corruption?

4. Data and Methods

4.1 Data

Seven waves of the Gallup Worldwide Research opinion poll data are available for the countries Tunisia and Egypt. The earliest wave was fielded in March 2009 and the most recent wave was fielded in March 2012. The Tunisian uprising is commonly held to have begun in December 2010, with President Zein Elabidine Ben Ali fleeing the country in January 2011. Events in Egypt trailed those in Tunisia by one month. The Egyptian uprising was launched in January 2011, and President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in February 2011. The Gallup surveys therefore provide opinion poll data for roughly 2 years preceding the uprisings, and one year following the uprisings.

4.2 Sample

The respondents interviewed for the Tunisian and Egyptian Gallup surveys constitute a probability sample that is nationally representative of "the entire civilian, non-institutionalized, aged 15 and older population of the entire country" (Gallup 2011: 5). Face-to-face interviews were conducted by local field staff in Arabic, and interviews lasted approximately one hour. In each wave and for every country, the Gallup opinion poll collected responses from a target sample of approximately 1,000 respondents. The analysis sample for this study consists of all respondents with non-missing values on the variables of interest in each country-wave. Therefore, the analysis sample may be slightly greater or less than 1,000 depending on the country, wave, and variables included.

4.3 Variables

Each of the research questions listed above pertains to an outcome variable representing a composite measure, or index, of current economic or political circumstances. These indices consist of the summed scores of several dichotomous survey items. Generally, a single point was assigned for positive answers to the questions detailed below, with negative answers as well as the responses "don't know" and "refused" assigned zero points. The summed score for all items in a given index was then multiplied by 100. An individual respondent generally had an index score calculated if she/he had valid scores for at least two of the items comprising an index.

Gallup Worldwide Research validates each index by correlating the index score with external measures (such as national GDP) as well as internal measures (such as other index scores). The reliability of each index is assessed using Cronbach's alpha, which exceeds .69 for all indices (Gallup 2011: 14). Due to government restrictions imposed on some questions that were deemed sensitive in some country-waves, not all indices are available at every data point (Gallup 2011: 14).

The economic indices selected as outcome variables for this study include the following variables. The values of each index range from 0 to 100.

Food and shelter. This index is based on two survey items: 1) Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to buy food that you or your family needed? (WP40); and 2) Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to provide adequate shelter or housing for you and your family? (WP43). "Lower scores on this index indicate that more respondents reported struggling to afford food and shelter in the past year, while higher scores indicate fewer respondents reported such struggles." (Gallup 2011: 18)

Job climate. This index is based on three survey items: 1) Right now, do you think that economic conditions in the city or area where you live, as a whole, are getting better or getting worse? (WP88); 2) Thinking about the job situation in the city or area where you live today, would you say that it is now a good time or a bad time to find a job? (WP89); and 3) In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the availability of good job opportunities? (WP10249). Lower scores indicate worse perceptions of current economic opportunities, and higher scores indicate better perceptions of current economic opportunities (Gallup 2011: 32).

Financial wellbeing. This index is based on five survey questions: 1) Which one of these phrases comes closest to your own feelings about your household's income these days: living comfortably on present income, getting by on present income, finding it difficult on present income, or finding it very difficult on present income? (WP2319); 2) Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your standard of living, all the things you can buy and do? (WP30); 3) Right now, do you feel your standard of living is getting better or getting worse? (WP31); 4) Do you believe the current economic conditions in your city or areas where you live are good or not? (WP87); and 5) Right now, do you think that economic conditions in the city or area where you live, as a whole, are getting better or getting worse? (WP88). Index scores are higher for those who report greater financial wellbeing, and lower for those who report worse financial wellbeing (Gallup 2011: 34).

The political indices selected as outcome variables for this study include the following variables. The values of each index range from 0 to 100.

Law and order. This index is comprised of three questionnaire items: 1) In the city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police force? (WP112); 2) Do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live? (WP113); and 3) Within the last 12 months, have you had money or property stolen from you or another household member? (WP117)(Gallup 2011: 16). "Higher scores on this index indicate that more citizens report feeling secure"(Gallup 2011: 16).

Community basics. This index is based on responses to six questions: 1) In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the public transportation systems? (WP91); 2) In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the roads and highways? (WP92); 3) In your city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of air? (WP94); 4) In your city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of water? (WP95); 5) In your city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the availability of good affordable housing? (WP98); and 6) In your city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the beauty or physical setting? (WP99). The community basics index score is higher for greater satisfaction with everyday community basics, and lower for lesser satisfaction with everyday community basics (Gallup 2011: 20).

National institutions. This index is composed of responses to four questions: 1) Do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about the military? (WP137); 2) How about the judicial system and courts? (WP138); 3) How about the national government? (WP139); and 4) How about honesty of elections? (WP144). Higher scores on this index indicate greater confidence in national institutions, and lower scores indicate lesser confidence in national institutions (Gallup 2011: 24).

Corruption. This index is based on two questionnaire items: 1) Is corruption widespread within businesses located in (country), or not? (WP145); and 2) Is corruption widespread throughout the government in (country), or not? (WP146). "Higher scores on the corruption index indicate more residents perceive corruption as widespread" (Gallup 2011: 30).

The main explanatory variable of interest in this analysis is *gender*. In the multivariate analyses (described in the following section), additional covariates are included in the models to test the robustness of the association between gender and the outcome indices. As with the economic and political indices, these covariates are not necessarily available in every country-wave. The control variables include the following:

Age. The respondent's current age was reported in full years and was measured continuously in the Gallup surveys.

Education. Educational attainment is measured categorically in terms of whether the respondent has: 1) completed elementary school or less; 2) completed secondary school; and 3) completed 4 years beyond secondary.

Urban residence. Urban versus rural residence is indicated by a dummy variable for urban residence. In some country-waves, this variable was available in the data. In others, it was created by aggregating the categories: 1) a large city; and 2) a suburb of a large city (as opposed to a rural area or farm; or a small town or village).

Marital status. This categorical variable includes the responses: 1) never married; 2) currently married; 3) separated or divorced; and 4) widowed.

Employment status. This variable is comprised of the response categories: 1) out of the labor force; 2) unemployed; and 3) employed.

Income quintile. This categorical variable is based on the respondent's reported household income in the local currency. Household incomes for the full country-wave sample are then divided into quintiles, yielding five categories of household income ranging from the poorest 20% of all households to the richest 20% of all households (Gallup 2011: 9).

4.4 Methods

Descriptive analyses are used to trace the trajectory of women's and men's responses to each of the indices listed above from March 2009 to March 2012 in Tunisia and Egypt. This allows me to address the question of whether men and women differ before and after the uprisings in terms of their satisfaction with economic and political circumstances. Multivariate regression analyses are necessary in order to determine whether gender bears a statistically significant association with economic and political satisfaction. Since the index scores are discrete rather than continuous, but contain more than three categories of responses, Poisson regression is used to model the data. Poisson regression techniques are therefore used to test the statistical effect of gender on the outcome indices, net of other important factors including age, education, urban/rural residence, marital status, employment status, and household income quintile.

5. Results

5.1 Economic costs and benefits of the uprisings

As noted earlier, it is likely that ordinary people in Tunisia and Egypt have experienced both gains and losses as a result of the uprisings that occurred in these two countries in 2010-2011. In this section, I assess whether people's perceptions of economic circumstances have improved or deteriorated in the three years of data according to the three indices available to us, and I describe how this differs by gender.

I begin by discussing descriptive results for Tunisia. Ordinary Tunisians' ability to afford *food and shelter* improved slightly between March 2009 and April 2010, but then deteriorated thereafter. Perhaps because they are more likely to live in poverty, by the final wave available in the data, women in Tunisia reported greater deprivation in the area of food and shelter than did men.

Perceptions of the state of the local *job climate* actually improved immediately after the Tunisian uprising, as indicated by the spike in the data (particularly among women) for the April 2011 survey wave. This may reflect optimism about the transitional government's ability to deliver better job opportunities after Ben Ali's ouster. However, after April 2011 respondents reported a perceived deterioration in the local job climate. For both men and women, the job climate index scores were at least 50% lower in October 2011, compared to previous time points.

According to the *financial wellbeing* index, perceptions of household income, standard of living, and community economic conditions have also worsened in Tunisia since the uprising. For men and women combined, financial wellbeing peaked immediately before the uprising (at 54 points), then dropped precipitously (to 23 points). The financial wellbeing index appears to be the measure on which Tunisian men and women agree the most, perhaps because it gauges household conditions rather than personal circumstances.

In sum, it appears that ordinary Tunisians' assessment of their economic situation has become more negative in the wake of the Tunisian uprising. However, it is important to note that the ability to afford food and shelter, but particularly financial wellbeing, were on a downward trajectory months before the uprising broke out (perhaps suggesting that economic hardship motivated the uprising in Tunisia). Respondents' poor assessment of economic conditions cannot therefore be causally attributed to the uprising definitively.

I next consider the results for Egypt. Higher scores on the *food and shelter* index prevailed in Egypt up until October 2010, four months prior to the Egyptian uprising. From October 2010 onwards, ordinary people's ability to afford food and shelter has been relatively low and flat for both men and women. Unlike Tunisian women, Egyptian women do not report considerably more deprivation when it comes to food and shelter after the uprising.

With regards to the local *job climate*, ordinary Egyptians' assessment of job opportunities followed a slight downward trajectory for both men and women between August 2009 and April 2011, four months after the uprising began. The job climate index then drops further for the August 2011 data point, and does not recover much by March 2012. Egyptian men and women are about equal in terms of their poor evaluation of the local job climate.

In contrast, Egyptian women's reported *financial wellbeing* is equivalent to or higher than men's for all points of time save for March 2012. Again, this index's scores follow a shallow downward slope from March 2009 to October 2010, but declining financial wellbeing steepens after the Egyptian uprising.

To summarize, ordinary Egyptians' perception of economic conditions deteriorated over the period from 2009 to 2012. The job climate and financial wellbeing indices seem to have declined visibly after the Egyptian uprising, but, generally, the worsening of economic conditions is less stark than that reported by Tunisians.

5.2 Political costs and benefits of the uprisings

Next I assess whether the economic losses reported in the previous section are balanced out or exceeded by gains in the realm of political conditions in Tunisia and Egypt. Four indices provide indications of ordinary citizens' assessment of the political situation, as illustrated by the figures below.

Ordinary Tunisians' feelings of personal security and experiences of property crime worsened precipitously after the uprising in that country. In the seven months between October 2010 and April 2011, the *law and order* index score for Tunisian men and women combined dropped by a factor of about 20% (from 84 to 61 points). This is somewhat surprising given the relatively safe conditions prevailing in post-uprising Tunisia compared to

other countries of the region involved in the Arab Spring. Perceptions of law and order further declined after April 2011, with Tunisian women reporting more negative assessments of law and order compared to Tunisian men throughout the entire considered period.

Satisfaction with *community basics*, such as the environment, housing, and infrastructure available in their communities, also declined in Tunisia in the period under consideration. Data for this index is only available for four time points. Ordinary Tunisians' perception of community basics deteriorated between March 2009 and April 2010, it plateaued between April 2010 and April 2011 (in other words, remained steady immediately before and after the uprising's start), then dropped between April 2011 and October 2011. Tunisian women's assessment of community basics is generally equal to or more positive than Tunisian men's.

Like law and order, Tunisians' confidence in *national institutions*, including the military, courts, government and elections, plummeted after the uprising there. Between October 2010 and April 2011, scores for the national institutions index dropped from 86 to 58 points for all Tunisians. Confidence in national institutions recovered after that, but only moderately. This finding is interesting because it indicates disillusionment with these institutions relative to the time of Ben Ali's reign. Generally, Tunisian women reported greater confidence in national institutions than men, save for the final time point.

Perceived *corruption* is widely reported to have been a central complaint of the young revolutionaries that spurred the uprising in Tunisia. Indeed, perceptions of corruption were on the rise in the years leading up to the uprising. Surprisingly, however, Tunisians appear to have reported even more pessimistic views regarding the prevalence of corruption in their country's businesses and government after the uprising there. Corruption index scores peaked in April 2011, after Ben Ali's ouster, and only returned to their immediately pre-uprising levels 11 months later. Generally, Tunisian men reported higher corruption than did their female compatriots.

To summarize, the economic costs of the uprisings have not been compensated for by political benefits, in the eyes of ordinary Tunisians, at least in the domains considered here. Political losses after the uprising have included greater feelings of personal insecurity, deterioration in community basics, less confidence in national institutions, and higher levels of corruption. Only community basics and corruption were perceived to have been getting worse before the uprising, suggesting that if these factors drove ordinary Tunisian citizens to revolt, they were perhaps less dominant motivations than economic motivations.

Description of the trajectory of political attitudes in Egypt is constrained by the relatively sparse data points available for the four indices of interest. However, some general patterns can be discerned. Perceptions of *law and order*, which had actually improved in the pre-uprising period, have dropped dramatically in the wake of the Egyptian uprising. For men and women combined, the law and order index score saw a 20% reduction between October 2010 and April 2011. Egyptian women's feelings of personal insecurity are considerably worse than their male counterparts'.

Community basics were increasingly viewed negatively in the period leading up to the Egyptian uprising. Between March 2010 and April 2011, the community basics index score dropped from 58 to 46 points overall, a steeper decline than had been witnessed in the previous period. Since April 2011, satisfaction with community basics has remained fairly steady in Egypt. Generally, Egyptian women express greater satisfaction with community basics than do men.

Only three data points are available for the *national institutions* index, rendering the description of this measure's trajectory especially difficult. Apparently, the Egyptian authorities only allowed data for this measure to be collected after the uprising, starting April

2011. From April 2011 to March 2012, the index displays a U-shaped trajectory, with men's confidence in national institutions exceeding women's. Without data from the pre-uprising period, it is hard to make sense of this pattern.

Finally, with regards to the *corruption index*, we again have data for only three time points, although they are spread out over a longer time period. Between March 2009 and August 2011, perceived corruption in business and government in Egypt increased by 12 points. It declined slightly thereafter. As in Tunisia, men perceive corruption to be higher than do women in Egypt.

To summarize, based on the three indices for which we have a sufficiently long time trend for Egypt, attitudes towards prevailing political conditions appear to have also deteriorated. Whereas perceptions regarding community basics and corruption were already worsening before the Egyptian uprising, law and order were reported to have been gradually improving until the uprising. As is the case with Tunisia, greater gender gaps are apparent in political attitudes, compared to economic attitudes. Next, I test whether these gender gaps are statistically significant due to gender or features that distinguish men and women in Egypt and Tunisia.

5.3 The effect of gender on economic satisfaction before and after the uprisings

We have seen in the descriptive statistics above that women and men sometimes differ in their attitudes towards the prevailing economic situations and, especially, the prevailing political situations in Tunisia and Egypt. Are these discrepancies due to gender, or due to the fact that men are more likely than women to be employed or highly educated, or to other similar characteristics that vary systematically by gender? In this section, I ask whether gender predicts significant differences in economic index scores, and if so, in what direction. I assess the statistical effect of gender at the earliest time point for which we have data on a given index (pre-uprising), as well as the latest time point for which we have data (post-uprising). I focus my comments on the latter.

According to Table 1, Tunisian women report significantly lower scores on the *food and shelter* index after the uprising, net of controls. This suggests that they experience greater deprivation in this area compared to men, a finding which is consistent with women's generally higher poverty levels in low- and middle-income countries. There are no differences according to gender in the *job climate index* in the latest wave of the Tunisian data. This is surprising, since one might assume that this measure should reflect men's preoccupation with their culturally-sanctioned breadwinning role relative to women. In light of the results for the food and shelter index, it is also curious that women report significantly higher scores on the *financial wellbeing* index relative to men (again, this holds after the Tunisian uprising). As noted above, this may be because this measure captures household rather than personal circumstances.

The findings for the post-uprising Egyptian data do not echo the results reported for Tunisia. On the *food and shelter* index, Egyptian men and women appear to be identical in the latest wave, net of controls. Egyptian women have a significantly more favorable perception of the *job climate*, compared to men, when all other covariates are accounted for. Like Tunisian women, Egyptian women report greater *financial wellbeing* relative to their male counterparts.

5.4 The effect of gender on political satisfaction before and after the uprisings

Next, I consider the effect of gender on political satisfaction in the post-uprising period. I begin with the multivariate regression results for Tunisia.

Table 3 shows that in the latest wave of the Tunisian data, women's perceptions of political circumstances are worse than men's, with the exception of corruption. Tunisian women

report significantly worse feelings regarding *law and order*, less satisfaction with *community basics*, and lower confidence in *national institutions*. While it is clear why Tunisian women's gender identity might explain greater feelings of insecurity, given the social vulnerability and reputational losses experienced by women who are victimized in public, it is not apparent why gender predicts differences in the community basics and national institutions measures. In addition, Tunisian women are statistically less likely to report high levels of corruption. This measure gauges corruption in business and government, and if men are more likely to engage with these institutions when the need arises, they may be more sensitive to corruption.

Table 4 shows that in Egypt's final wave of data, women's political attitudes are more negative than men's only with regards to *law and order* and *national institutions*, net of controls. Egyptian women and men do not differ in their *community basics* scores, and women perceive there to be less *corruption* in the country than do men.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

Some accounts have debated whether women's activism in the Arab region has focused or should focus on demands that are specific to women. Al-Ali (2012) contends that in the long term, it is strategically unwise for women in the countries of the Arab Spring to sideline their gendered needs in favor of broader demands. Abu-Lughod and El-Mahdi (2011) state that general economic and political grievances trump the gender-specific problems of Egyptian women. Similarly, Sika (2012) claims that women participated in the Arab uprisings "not as representatives of their gender, but as valuable and integral members of Arab society."

While this paper cannot speak to the motivations underlying women's participation in the protests that culminated in regime change in Tunisia and Egypt, it does demonstrate that men and women have markedly different needs and concerns. While trends over time in women's and men's economic and political attitudes follow a similar trajectory in each country, there are visible gaps in the line graphs per the gender of the respondent. This gender difference is largely confirmed by multivariate analysis. Table 5 summarizes the findings that emerge from the post-uprising data from Tunisia and Egypt. In the realm of economics, gender is not associated with economic satisfaction in two out of six measures. However, Table 5 shows that women are more likely than men to report more favorable economic conditions in three out of six measures. In the realm of politics, Egyptian and Tunisian women differ from men in seven out of eight measures. Women consistently express greater dissatisfaction with law and order and with national institutions in both countries. At the same time, men perceive there to be higher levels of corruption than do women.

This study sheds light on the diversity of experiences that fall under the rubric of the Arab Spring with its cross-national comparison of Tunisia and Egypt. Initial conditions differed quite dramatically in the two countries under consideration, as have the trajectories taken by the uprisings. Generally, ordinary citizens' perceptions of the economic situation before the uprisings were more positive in Tunisia compared to Egypt. In Tunisia, respondents reported deteriorating economic conditions after the uprising. In Egypt, economic perceptions were relatively flat, albeit poor. Perceptions of the political situation in Tunisia declined rapidly after the Jasmine Revolution, whereas Egypt presents a mixed picture. In the Tunisian case, the Gallup data suggest that the removal of Ben Ali's regime has translated into net losses for ordinary people in the short-term. In the Egyptian case, the verdict as of the latest data point, February 2012, is unclear. No doubt, the specificities of each national context must be used to inform and interpret ordinary people's responses to pre- and post-uprising circumstances.

In both Tunisia and Egypt, gender gaps were generally wider in political attitudes compared to economic attitudes. Women had more negative assessments of the political situation than did men, a finding which was borne out by multivariate analyses. What does this mean in terms of the gendered nature of the uprisings' gains and losses, and what does it tell us about

femininity, masculinity, and gender inequality in the Arab region? It is not surprising that women express greater concern over law and order in Tunisia and Egypt, given that in Arab culture threats to women's physical security also endanger their reputations and honor. It is also not surprising that men report greater perceived corruption, given that they customarily deal with the kind of 'public' institutions mentioned in the questions capturing this attitude. Because Arab men have higher rates of labor force participation and are often the family members designated to deal with government agencies and civil servants, they may observe more corruption than do women. However, it is difficult to interpret the finding that women have more negative assessments of national institutions and more positive assessments of financial wellbeing. These findings call for further research to unpack the causal forces underlying such gender differences.

This study addresses, albeit indirectly, the broader question of women's tolerance and support for the social, political, and economic upheaval that often accompanies regime change and democratic transition. Indeed, Tunisian women's involvement in the uprisings has not yielded tangible gains for ordinary women, and if Egyptian women's participation in the January 25th uprising has produced any benefits for ordinary women, they are not to be found in the Gallup data. Nor has women's activism equalized observed differences in ordinary women's and men's economic and political experiences and attitudes. The findings reported here reinforce previous research indicating that the downfall of authoritarian regimes and the (ostensible) transition to greater democracy do not necessarily improve women's conditions or close the gender gap.

Finally, these findings also highlight the need for policy and programs that seek to alleviate the negative consequences of the political and economic upheaval the Arab region has witnessed. Clearly, women are the group most affected by the problems of physical insecurity, and urgent action is needed to address real or perceived susceptibility to crime and harassment among women. Men are also the group in greatest need of policy and program interventions addressing their economic vulnerability and their susceptibility to corrupt practices such as bribery and nepotism.

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Figure 1: Trajectory of Economic Indices in Tunisia, 2009-2012



Figure 2: Trajectory of Economic Indices in Tunisia by Gender, 2009-2012



Figure 3: Trajectory of Economic Indices in Egypt, 2009-2012



Figure 4: Trajectory of Economic Indices in Egypt by Gender, 2009-2012



Figure 5: Trajectory of Political Indices in Tunisia, 2009-2012



Figure 6: Trajectory of Political Indices in Tunisia by Gender, 2009-2012



Figure 7: Trajectory of Political Indices in Egypt, 2009-2012



Figure 8: Trajectory of Political Indices in Egypt by Gender, 2009-2012



Table 1: Poisson Regression Coefficients for the Association between Gender and Economic Indices in Tunisia, 2009-2012

	Earliest Wave			Latest Wave		
	Mar-09 Food & Shelter β	Aug-09 Job Climate β	Mar-09 Fin. Wellbeing β	Mar-12 Food & Shelter β	Mar-12 Job Climate β	Mar-12 Fin. Wellbeing β
Female	0.014*	-0.021*	0.080***	-0.034***	0.001	0.110***
N	995	982	995	1,020	1,020	1,020

Notes: In the earliest wave, models control for the covariates age, education, urban residence, marital status, and income quintile (coefficients not shown). In the latest wave, models control for the same covariates, plus employment status (coefficients not shown).

Table 2: Poisson Regression Coefficients for the Association between Gender and Economic Indices in Egypt, 2009-2012

	Earliest Wave			Latest Wave		
	Mar-09 Food & Shelter B	Aug-09 Job Climate β	Mar-09 Fin. Wellbeing β	Mar-12 Food & Shelter β	Mar-12 Job Climate β	Mar-12 Fin. Wellbeing β
Female	-0.070***	0.139***	0.103***	0.000	0.187***	0.077***
N	1,072	1,026	1,072	1,006	1,006	1,006

Notes: In the earliest wave, models control for the covariates age, education, marital status, and income quintile (coefficients not shown). In the latest wave, models control for the same covariates, plus urban residence and employment status (coefficients not shown).

Table 3: Poisson Regression Coefficients for the Association between Gender and Political Indices in Tunisia, 2009-2012

	Earliest Wave				Latest Wave			
	Mar-09 Law & Order B	Mar-09 Comm. Basics β	Mar-09 Nat'l Instit'ns B	Mar-09 Corruption β	Oct-11 Law & Order β	Oct-11 Comm. Basics β	Mar-12 Nat'l Instit'ns β	Mar-12 Corruption β
Female	-0.047***	0.054***	.024***	-0.063***	-0.094***	-0.058***	-0.021***	-0.039***
N	995	995	995	995	996	996	1,020	1,020

Notes: In the earliest wave, models control for the covariates age, education, urban residence, marital status, and income quintile (coefficients not shown). In the latest wave, models control for the same covariates, plus employment status (coefficients not shown).

Table 4: Poisson Regression Coefficients for the Association between Gender and Political Indices in Egypt, 2009-2012

	Earliest Wave				Latest Wave			
	Mar-09 Law & Order B	Mar-09 Comm. Basics β	Mar-09 Nat'l Instit'ns β	Mar-09 Corruption β	Aug-11 Law & Order β	Aug-11 Comm. Basics β	Mar-12 Nat'l Instit'ns β	Mar-12 Corruption β
Female	-0.083***	0.051***	N/A	-0.031***	-0.115***	0.006	-0.067***	-0.032**
N	1,072	1,072	N/A	1,072	1,121	1,121	1,006	1,006

Notes: In the earliest wave, models control for the covariates age, education, marital status, and income quintile (coefficients not shown). In the latest wave, models control for the same covariates, plus urban residence and employment status (coefficients not shown).

Table 5: Summary of the Association between Gender and Economic and Political Indices in Tunisia and Egypt, Net of Controls, Latest Wave

	Economic Indices			Political Indices			
	Food & Shelter	**Job Climate**	**Fin. Wellbeing**	**Law & Order**	**Comm. Basics**	**Nat'l Instit'ns**	**Corruption**
Tunisia	Significantly *lower* scores among women	No significant gender difference	Significantly *higher* scores among women	Significantly *lower* scores among women	Significantly *lower* scores among women	Significantly *lower* scores among women	Significantly *lower* scores among women
Egypt	No significant gender difference	Significantly *higher* scores among women	Significantly *higher* scores among women	Significantly *lower* scores among women	No significant gender difference	Significantly *lower* scores among women	Significantly *lower* scores among women