working paper series

MAPPING AND EXPLAINING ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL ISLAM AMONG ORDINARY CITIZENS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Mark Tessler

MAPPING AND EXPLAINING ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL ISLAM AMONG ORDINARY CITIZENS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Mark Tessler

Working Paper 902

January 2015

Send correspondence to:
Mark Tessler
University of Michigan
tessler@umich.edu

First published in 2015 by
The Economic Research Forum (ERF)
21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly Street
Dokki, Giza
Egypt
www.erf.org.eg

Abstract

This paper provides partial summaries of two interrelated works that use survey data to map and explain the views held by Middle Eastern publics about the role Islam should play in government and political affairs. The first part introduces and presents recent data from the Arab Barometer. It examines trends across the region, as well as in individual countries, and it both offers and invites reflection about some of the regional and country-specific dynamics that may account for observed patterns. The second part uses a more inclusive dataset and presents some of the results of regression analyses that test hypotheses in which support for political Islam is the dependent variable. Findings are mapped across both demographic categories and county-level characteristics and, again, reflection is invited about the mechanisms and pathways to which the findings may call attention. In both cases, only selected findings will be presented, the goal being not only to introduce the projects and solicit feedback and interpretative insights but also to indicate the availability of two datasets that are now in the public domain.

ملخص

تقدم هذه الورقة ملخصــات جزئية من عملين مترابطين يسـتخدما بيانات مسح لرسم خريطة وشرح الآراء التي أعرب عنها الجماهير في الشـرق الأوسـط حول الدور الذي ينبغي أن يقوم به الإسـلام في الشـؤون الحكومية والسـياسـية. الجزء الأول يقدم ويعرض بيانات حديثة من البارومتر العربي. ويدرس الاتجاهات في جميع أنحاء المنطقة، وكذلك في كل بلد على حدة، وعرض ذلك على حد ســـواء ويدعو إلى التفكير حول بعض الديناميات الإقليمية والقطرية التي قد تكون مســـؤولة عن الأنماط المرصـــودة. الجزء الثاني يســـتخدم مجموعة بيانات أكثر شـمولا، ويقدم بعض من نتائج تحليلات الانحدار لاختبار الفرضـيات التي تدعم الإسـلام السـياسـي وهي المتغير التابع. يتم تعيين النتائج عبر كلتا الفئتين الديموغرافية والخصائص على مستوى المحافظة، ومرة أخرى، هو انعكاس حول آليات وسبل الوصول إلى النتائج التي قد تستدعي الاهتمام. في كلتا الحالتين، سيتم تقديم نتائج محددة فقط، والهدف ليس فقط لتقديم مشاريع والتماس ردود الفعل والرؤى التفسيرية ولكن أيضا للإشارة إلى توافر مجموعتين من البيانات التي هي الآن متوفرة في المجال العام.

Part One: Selected Findings from the Arab Barometer
This section, extracted from a larger and for the most part descriptive work, uses public opinion data collected as part of the Arab Barometer Survey Project to report on the conceptions and preferences pertaining to political Islam held by ordinary citizens in the Arab world. It begins by providing background information about the Arab Barometer, a unique multi-country project that conducts nationally representative surveys of attitudes, values and behavior patterns and then makes these data available for use by others.

1. The Arab Barometer
The Arab Barometer Survey Project (hereafter AB) strives to create a resource of public opinion data that will serve both the scholarly and policy-making communities and be useful to these communities both inside and outside the Arab world. AB data are of value to academics and policy makers who are interested in measuring, mapping and explaining within countries, cross-nationally and over time, the normative and behavioral orientations of ordinary men and women in the Arab world. AB surveys devote particular attention to views about politics and governance, about religion and its political role, about other countries and international affairs, and about the status of women and gender relations. AB surveys also ask respondents about the extent and nature of their personal engagement in the political and civic life.

To date, all of these issues and concerns have been explored in depth in three waves of AB surveys, making this project the most comprehensive and timely public opinion dataset on the Arab region. The first wave, conducted in 2006-2007, with one survey added in 2009, was carried out in seven countries. The second wave, initiated in late 2010 and completed in fall 2011, was carried out in ten countries. The third wave of surveys, carried out primarily in 2013, with a few surveys conducted in late 2012 or early 2014, was carried out in 12 countries. All in all, as shown in Table 1, the AB has carried out 29 surveys in fourteen different countries and interviewed more than 35,000 respondents. Table 1 lists the countries included in each of the three waves and gives the sample size and time of each survey. The number of participating countries, which has expanded with each wave and will hopefully expand further when the fourth wave is carried out, is determined by the availability of funding and by local conditions, including the need for government approval in some instances, which make it possible to conduct a nationally representative survey.

The AB is governed by a Steering Committee composed of Arab and American scholars, with important aspects of administration and methodological oversight located at the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. A team that provides supplementary methodological support has been established in the U.S. The AB works closely with the Arab Reform Initiative and to a significant extent operates under its region-wide umbrella. The AB is also a member of the Global Barometer, a loose confederation of five independent but cooperating regional barometer survey projects. In addition to the AB, the Global Barometer is composed of barometers in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South and East Asia. Thus, although focused on Arab countries, the AB is also part of a broad international network that facilitates the sharing of information and insight and makes possible cross-regional comparisons.

The AB works closely with local scholars or others with experience in public opinion research in each country it surveys. Many of these individuals are university professors in a social science discipline, although commercial firms have been engaged when appropriate local social scientists are not available. Before initiating each wave of surveys, representatives of many of the in-country teams meet for the purpose of designing or updating the survey instrument to be used in that wave. Thus, although some questions that have proved to be useful in past surveys in the Arab world or elsewhere have been "borrowed" for inclusion in AB surveys, the AB instrument itself is the product of deliberations involving participants from many Arab

countries. Once drafted, the instrument is pre-tested in many of the countries before being finalized, and in some instances a few questions are added to base the module for use in particular countries. In the third wave, the base instrument contained items, including items with multiple parts, which solicit responses to more than 200 questions.

AB surveys are conducted through face-to-face interviews with probability-based and nationally representative samples of ordinary citizens aged 18 and older. In most instances, multi-stage area-probability sampling has been used to select respondents. In a smaller number of instances, samples or sampling frames have been provided by national statistical bureaus. Each local team submits a sampling plan that is reviewed and, if necessary, modified by specialists in the Arab world and the U.S., with the lead role in this assessment played by a team at CSS in Jordan. CSS also frequently sends specialists to work with the in-country team both on implementation of the sample design and on the training of interviewers. Finally, upon completion of each survey, the resulting dataset is subjected to quality control measures that assess the representativeness of the sample, undertake weighting if necessary, and check (and if necessary correct) for interviewer falsification. Thus, despite the inevitability of some imperfections, as in all survey research, it is fair to say that the AB is characterized by very rigorous quality control procedures and has produced public opinion data of very high quality. In recognition of the quality and value of the Arab Barometer, the first wave of the AB was awarded the American Political Science Association's prize for the best publicly available dataset in comparative politics in 2009.

Further information about the AB is available on the Barometer's website: **arabbarometer.org**. The website has sections in both English and Arabic and not only contains additional information about methodology, in-country partners and other background material; it also contains a number of country reports and articles. Most important, perhaps, the data collected through AB surveys are available for downloading in SPSS format. Individuals who are interested in acquiring the data for scholarly, public policy, or perhaps teaching purposes are invited to visit the website and download the data – which are also available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research based at the University of Michigan in the U.S. Although the website contains a substantial amount of information in both Arabic and English, it is still in development and there are plans at the time of this writing for significant expansion.

Finally, the AB's outreach and dissemination activities should be mentioned. Vehicles through which findings from AB surveys are disseminated include public presentations, press releases, and reports made available through the AB website. A particularly important part of this effort is the Barometer's cooperation with the Arab Reform Initiative and the use of AB data in construction of ARI's Arab Democracy Index, which is designed to monitor democratic developments across the region.

Dissemination and outreach efforts also include major conferences to which both opinion leaders and a broader public are invited. Recent examples include a 2012 conference in Cairo organized in cooperation with ARI; a 2013 conference in Doha hosted by Qatar University; and a 2014 symposium in Washington hosted by the United States Institute of Peace. Planned for 2015 are a panel at the regional meeting of the World Association of Public Opinion Research, to be held in Doha, and a conference to be held in Tunis. Yet additional efforts, especially since completion of the second wave of AB surveys in 2012, have involved the use of social media to share findings and insights with audiences in the Middle East, the U.S., and Europe. Press articles based on AB findings have appeared during the last year in Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon and elsewhere.

2. Arab Attitudes toward Governance

Many of the questions in AB surveys ask respondents for their views about the way countries like theirs should be governed. Prominent among the topics investigated are perceptions and preferences related to democracy and to the role that Islam should play in political affairs, what is sometimes called "political Islam." Table 2 lists several, although not all, of the items about these two topics contained in the Arab Barometer interview schedule. In reporting the findings about responses to these questions, this paper will for the most part present distributions based on pooled analyses of the nine countries included in the second and third waves of AB surveys. These countries, as shown in Table 1, are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. A focus on these countries will make it possible to assess aggregate changes over the critical two-year period that begins at the end of 2010 and encompasses regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and important developments in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere that, at least potentially, have influenced the region in ways not seen for many decades, perhaps since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 or even the war of June 1967. At the same time, in instances where it is instructive to do so, findings from individual countries as well as the pooled analyses will be presented.

2.1 Islam and Politics

Table 3 presents findings from pooled analyses of responses to three of the questions listed in Table 2 that ask about the role Islam should play in political affairs. As noted above, the pooled analyses are based on data from Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. Table 3 shows the proportions in Wave 2 and Wave 3 who agree or agree strongly and who disagree or disagree strongly that: (1) The country would be better off if more religious people held public positions in the state; (2) Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government decisions; and (3) Religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life. Although the percentage distributions are not identical for the three items, the table shows that each item reveals a substantial division of opinion about the political role to be played by Islam; that in each case a majority, often a slight majority, prefers that Islam *not* play a significant role in political life; and that the distributions of views are broadly similar in Wave 2 and Wave 3. Thus, for example, in Wave 2 and Wave 3, respectively, only 40% and 36% of all respondents agree or agree strongly that religious leaders should have influence over government decisions.

Tables 4 and 5 supplement the pooled analyses and compare views about political Islam in two particular countries, Egypt and Tunisia, over the 15-20 months between Waves 2 and 3. These countries merit a closer look because, in each case, a government led by an Islamist political party came to power in free elections shortly after the conduct of the Wave 2 survey and was still in power when the Wave 3 survey was conducted. The analyses thus shed light on whether and how the experience of more than a year of life under an Islamist-led government modified the way people think about the role that Islam should play in government and political affairs.

In Egypt, the Wave 2 survey was conducted in June and July 2011 and the Wave 3 survey was conducted in March and April 2013. The parliamentary election won by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party was completed in January 2012 and the final round of the presidential election won by the Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi took place in June 2012. Table 4 shows the distributions of Egyptian responses from the two AB waves to the questions about whether the country would be better off if religious people hold public positions and the question about whether religious leaders should have influence over government decisions. It shows that on both items there was a marked decrease in support for political Islam. Fewer people either agreed or agreed strongly with either proposition; and many more respondents, by margins of 11 percentage points on the first question and 16 percentage points on the second question *strongly* disagreed. Overall, the percentage strongly agreeing or

agreeing that it would be better if religious people hold public office declined from 47% to 26%, and the percentage strongly agreeing or agreeing that religious leaders should exercise political influence declined from 37% to 19%.

In Tunisia, the Wave 2 survey was conducted in September and October 2011 and the Wave 3 survey was conducted in February 2013. The parliamentary election won by the Islamist al-Nahda party took place in in late October 2011 and the government it led came to power before the end of the year. Table 5 shows the distributions of Tunisian responses from the two AB waves to the questions about whether religious leaders should have influence over government decisions and about whether religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life. In contrast to Egypt, responses do not show an overall decline in support for political Islam, but rather increasingly polarized views on the subject. On both items, the proportion of respondents who either strongly agree or agree with the position supportive of political Islam was almost identical in 2011 and 2013, ranging from 21% to 26%. By contrast, the proportion that *strongly* agrees and the proportion that *strongly* disagrees with the position supportive of political Islam increased, while the proportion that merely agrees and the proportion that merely disagrees with the position supportive of political Islam decreased.

Tables 4 and 5 strongly suggest that life under an Islamist government had an impact on the way that Egyptians and Tunisians think about the place that Islam should occupy in the political life of their country. The experience with Islamist governance was not the same in Egypt and Tunisia, and the character and structure of the two governments differed as well. Nevertheless, both fell from power in 2013 as a result of intensifying public discontent and pressures coming from forces associated with the pre-Arab Spring regime. During 2012 and a good part of 2013, however, citizens in both countries did get a taste of life under a government run or led by Islamists and this experience did, in the ways shown in Tables 4 and 5, have an impact on their judgments about the role that Islam should play in political affairs.

A question that emerges about those who favor political Islam is whether this predisposition makes them less likely to support democracy. Table 6 shows that this is not the case. Based on a pooled analysis of data from the nine countries in the second and third wave of AB surveys, and presenting findings separately for each wave, the table compares the extent of support for democracy among respondents who do and respondents who do not support political Islam. The question that asks whether religious leaders should have influence over government decisions is used in this instance to categorize respondents with respect to support for political Islam; and a question shown in Table 2 that asks whether democracy, while it may have problems, is better than any other political system is used to categorize respondents with respect to support for democracy. In Table 6, responses to both questions have been dichotomized by combining "agree" and "strongly agree" and by combining "disagree" and "strongly disagree."

The table shows that those who have a positive attitude toward political Islam, meaning that they agree or agree strongly that religious leaders should have influence over government decisions, are just as likely to agree or agree strongly that democracy is the best political system as are those who disagree or disagree strongly that religious leaders should have influence over the decisions of government. Based on these dichotomized measures, 82% of Wave 2 respondents who favor political Islam support democracy, which is only 2 points less than the percent of Wave 2 respondents who do not favor political Islam. The difference is slightly larger among Wave 3 respondents, but even among those who favor political Islam the proportion who say that democracy is the best political system is 76%. Thus, there is support for democracy among the overwhelming majority of men and women who believe Islam should play a role in political life, and this differs only slightly from the degree of support for democracy among those who do not favor political Islam.

As shown in Table 6, the juxtaposition of these dichotomized measures of attitudes toward political Islam and attitudes toward democracy yields four political system preference categories. These categories and the proportion of Wave 2 and Wave 3 respondents in each are as follows, with the first figure representing the Wave 2 proportion: Favorable attitude toward both political Islam and democracy, 33% and 27%; Unfavorable attitude toward political Islam and favorable attitude toward democracy, 51% and 53%; Favorable attitude toward political Islam and unfavorable attitude toward democracy, 7% and 9%; Unfavorable attitude toward both political Islam and democracy, 9% and 11%. As expected given the findings reported in Table 6, approximately half of all respondents in both waves favor a democratic system in which Islam does not play an important political role. A substantial majority of the remaining respondents favors a democratic system in which Islam does play an important political role. The distribution across these four political system preference categories is not the same among the nine countries included in the pooled analyses, however, and the distribution for each individual country is shown in Table 7.

Although a detailed discussion of political system preferences in specific countries is beyond the scope of the present report, it may be noted that in no country was there a meaningful increase in support for a political system that is democratic and in which Islam plays a political role; and that in three countries, Egypt, Yemen and Iraq, there was a significant *decline* between Wave 2 and Wave 3 in support for a political system that is democratic and assigns an influential place to Islam. In Egypt, this was accompanied by a shift toward support for a democratic system that does not assign a place to Islam. This was the political system preference of 70% of the respondents at the time of the Wave 3 survey, when the Muslim Brotherhood had been in power for more than a year, whereas at the time of the Wave 2 survey, prior to the elections that brought the Brotherhood to power, this was the political system preference of only 52% of the Egyptian respondents. In Iraq, the shift in political system preferences is reflected in increased support for a political system that is not democratic.

A final comparison of the views held by those who do support and those who do not support a political system in which Islam plays an important role considers attitudes toward gender equality and toward the interpretation of Islamic prescriptions. Findings are shown in Table 8. The table uses two items from a larger battery in the AB interview schedule to assess attitudes toward gender equality. Respondents were asked whether they agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly that: (1) A university education is more important for a boy than a girl; and (2) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women. The battery pertaining to interpretations of Islam began with the following introductory statement: Islamic jurists and religious scholars often differ in their interpretations of certain issues in Islam. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each interpretation given below. The two statements from this battery that are used in Table 10 are: (1) In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights than Muslims; and (2) In Islam, women should wear modest clothes but do not need to wear the hijab.

Table 8 shows that most respondents do not agree or agree strongly that a university education is more important for a boy than a girl. In Wave 2, 73% of all respondents held this view, as did 78% of the Wave 3 respondents. By contrast, only 26% in Wave 2 and 34% in Wave 3 consider men and women to be equally qualified for political leadership. These item-specific differences are similar to those found in responses to other questions in the AB gender equality battery, items that are not included in the table. In general, there is broad support in both AB waves for equality between men and women in the social and economic arenas and limited support in the political arena. Table 10 also shows, in response to both questions, that individuals with a positive attitude toward political Islam are somewhat less likely to support gender quality. The difference between these individuals and those who do not support political

Islam is 10 percentage points on both of the items in Wave 2. In Wave 3, the difference is 11 percentage points on one of the two items and 14 percentage points on the other.

Turning to interpretations of Islam, Table 8 shows that most respondents agree or agree strongly with an interpretation of Islam that may be termed "progressive," or perhaps "modern," as opposed to "literal" or "restrictive." In the case of the two items included in Table 8, a "progressive" interpretation is one that finds in Islam greater acceptance of diversity, equality, freedom and personal choice. In Wave 2, 74% of all respondents reject the proposition that non-Muslims in a Muslim country should have political rights inferior to those of Muslims, and 64% reject an interpretation of Islam that requires women to wear the hijab. In Wave 3, 70% and 62% of all respondents, respectively, embrace these "progressive" interpretations.

There are differences in the interpretation of Islam associated with support for political Islam in the case of both items, although the difference is much larger and more significant in one instance. By substantial margins – 17% in Wave 2 and 19% in Wave 3 – respondents with a favorable attitude toward political Islam are less likely to endorse a progressive interpretation of the religion in relation to the rights of non-Muslims citizens of a Muslim country. By contrast, by margins of only 4% in Wave 2 and 9% in Wave 3, respondents with a favorable attitude toward political Islam are less likely to agree or agree strongly that Islam does not require a woman to wear the hijab.

In sum, so far as broader worldviews are concerned, the political and social orientations of individuals who do and of individuals who do not support political Islam sometimes differ significantly and sometimes differ relatively little. These differences are not of sufficient magnitude and consistency to justify the conclusion that the two categories of respondents inhabit entirely different normative domains. At the same time, differences are not entirely absent and at least some are substantial. Thus, it is the case that supporters and opponents of political Islam are united by shared perceptions and preferences in some areas but are divided by conflicting views about the character of the society in which they would prefer to live in others.

Part Two: Mapping and Explaining Support for Political Islam

This section, which is less descriptive and more analytical, uses a larger two-level dataset and presents partial and selected findings from a project aimed at testing hypotheses that may account for individual-level variance in attitudes toward the role Islam should play in government and political affairs. Toward this end, and emphasizing that this section seeks to provide only a limited and introductory overview, the discussion does the following:

▪ briefly introduces a new two-level dataset, which has been placed in the public domain for use by others;

▪ presents without extensive discussion three individual-level hypotheses that have been tested with OLS regression analysis;

▪ describes the basic methodology of the analysis;

▪ presents findings based on pooled analyses both for all respondents and for subsets of respondents based on sex and age; and

▪ inquires in one instance, by way of example, whether country-level attributes condition the explanatory power of hypothesized individual-level relationships.

As shown in Table 9, the dataset is based on and merges responses from 44 surveys carried out on one or more occasions in 15 Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa. These include surveys conducted in the first two waves of the Arab Barometer; in the 4th and 5th waves, and in one case the 6th wave, of the World Values Survey; surveys directed by the author with support for the National Science Foundation and other granting agencies; and a small number of other relevant surveys acquired by the author. Most of the surveys were

conducted between 2001 and 2011, although six were conducted earlier. All involved face-to-face interviews and a total of 67,680 respondents were interviewed, 95% of whom are Muslim. The preparation of this merged dataset was supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Called the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset, it has been deposited for acquisition and use by others with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

The dataset includes responses to a wide range of questions about governance, Islam and its political role, the status and rights of women, assessments of the governing regime, civic and political engagement, and a range of other politically-relevant topics and issues. Although not every question was asked in every survey included in the dataset, many questions, including those pertaining to political Islam, were asked in a large number of the surveys. In other instances, attitudes toward the same concept were measured using different but equally reliable and valid questions. Table 10 lists the questions pertaining to political Islam that are included in the dataset and indicates the number and percentage of surveys containing each item.

In addition to individual-level responses, the dataset includes time-adjusted measures of 34 political, economic and demographic characteristics of the country of which the respondent is a citizen. Among the political measures are indices of civil liberties, political rights and corruption; among the economic measures are per capita GDP, GINI coefficients and level of unemployment; and among the demographic measures are level of urbanization, percent of the population under the age of 15, and percentage of female secondary school enrollment. The presence in the dataset of these and other country-level attributes makes it possible to assess the degree to which the strength and explanatory power of individual-level variable relationships vary as a function of aggregate political, economic or social circumstances. Table 11 lists the country-level variables included in the dataset. The dataset also contains 5-year or 10-year lags of many of these measures.

In the summary analysis presented here, support for political Islam is the dependent variable and three sets of individual-level hypotheses are considered. These propositions are listed below. The rationale that makes each plausible and worthy of consideration, although very important, is mentioned only briefly in the present truncated discussion.

H1. **Gender Equality.** Individuals who hold more conservative views on social and cultural issues and are thus less supportive of gender equality are more likely to believe that Islam should play an important role in political affairs than individuals who hold more progressive views on social and cultural issues and are thus more supportive of gender equality.

Both perceived value congruence and policy expectations offer a rationale for this hypothesis and suggest mechanisms that are probably operating if the proposition is confirmed.

H2a. **Regime Evaluation.** Individuals who are more dissatisfied with the character and performance of their political institutions and officials are more likely to *favor* a political formula that gives Islam an important role *if they are citizens of a country governed by a secular regime* than are individuals with higher levels of political satisfaction.

H2b. Individuals who are more dissatisfied with the character and performance of their political institutions and officials are more likely to *oppose* a political formula that gives Islam an important role *if they are citizens of a country governed by a regime with a strong Islamic connection* than are individuals with higher levels of political satisfaction.

The dynamic assumed to be operating in this case is that those who are unhappy with the regime by which they are governed are significantly more likely to favor a system of government that differs consequentially from the one in power with respect to the political role played by Islam than those with a positive evaluation of that regime.

H3a. **Economic Situation.** Individuals with lower levels of economic satisfaction are more likely to *favor* a political formula that gives Islam an important role *if they are citizens of a country governed by a secular regime* than are individuals with higher levels of economic satisfaction.

H3b. Individuals with lower levels of economic satisfaction are more likely to *oppose* a political formula that gives Islam an important role *if they are citizens of a country governed by a regime with a strong Islamic connection* than are individuals with higher levels of economic satisfaction.

The dynamic that is assumed to be operating and that makes these hypotheses plausible parallels that associated with H2a and H2b, with the presumed driver of attitudes toward political Islam in this case being judgments about the individual's economic circumstances rather than the country's political situation.

To test these hypotheses, all of the surveys containing questions about political Islam are included in a pooled analysis using OLS regression. Only Muslim respondents are included and weights are used to correct both for variations in sample size and for population overlap when multiple surveys close in time have been conducted in the same country. Personal religiosity, education, sex and age are included as controls, although the hypotheses are also tested separately among respondents classified by sex and age. In these instances, sex and age are no longer present as control variables.

To measure attitudes toward political Islam, as well as other orientations that are based on multi-item indices, the relevant items included in each individual survey were factor analyzed and factor scores were generated to capture the variance among the respondents in that survey. High loadings on a common factor offered evidence of unidimensionality, and hence reliability and validity; and conceptual equivalence, as explained below, was established by the presence of "bridging" items as well as common items across the multiple surveys.

The logic and method offering evidence of conceptual equivalence through bridging is illustrated in Table 12, which presents the factor analyses carried out with data from five of the surveys: Palestine 2003, Algeria 2004, Iraq 2006, Yemen 2006 and Morocco 2007. For each survey, the table shows the items that have strong loadings on an underlying concept, which in this case is a continuum of views about whether or not Islam should have an important place in political affairs. Although the battery of items with high factor loadings is not the same in every survey, in each case those items that are *not* present in one or more of the other survey batteries load highly on the same factor as do one or more items that *are* present in other survey batteries. For example, although the items used to measure attitudes toward political Islam in the 2003 Palestinian survey and the 2004 Algerian survey are different for the most part, conceptual equivalence between the dimensions they measure is indicated by the fact that one item, which in this case asks whether religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-political life, is strongly associated with the underlying dimension measured in *both* surveys. This item serves as a "bridge" and offers evidence that the same underlying dimension is being measured by the two different batteries of items. Indices measuring support for gender equality, regime evaluation and personal religiosity were generated in the same way, and the items employed in each case are listed in an appendix.

Only findings about H1, in which attitudes about gender equality is the independent variable, are considered in the present summary report, the primary goal of which is to introduce the Carnegie dataset and illustrate with a few findings the structure of the analysis that has been undertaken and which the dataset permits. A fuller analysis appears in the author's forthcoming

book, *Islam and Politics in the Middle East: Explaining the Views of Ordinary Citizens*. The book will be published in 2015 by Indiana University Press.

Findings about H1 are reported in Table 13. The table presents the results of a pooled analysis that includes the various independent and control variables with, first, all of the respondents included in the analysis and then, respectively, with only younger men, only older men, only younger women and only older women included in the analysis. The table shows, as hypothesized, that there is a strong and statistically very significant inverse relationship between support for gender equality and support for political Islam in the five sets of regressions. Findings about the other hypotheses are instructive, potentially even more so since the independent variables have explanatory power among some demographic categories but not others, but these analyses are incomplete since in the present paper they have not been tested separately among respondents from countries governed by a secular regime and respondents from countries governed by a regime with an Islamic connection.

Although the findings strongly support H1 among all four of the demographic categories – younger men, older men, younger women and older women, the inverse relationship between support for gender equality and support for political Islam is not statistically significant in every individual survey. This is shown in Table 14. Moreover, the number of surveys in which it is significant at any particular level of statistical confidence is not the same for all four demographic groups. The table indicates, for example, that H1 is significant at or below the .05 level much more frequently among men than among women.

More generally, however, since the findings about H1 based on the pooled analysis apply to only some of the surveys in the pool, Table 14 indicates that efforts to explain and predict attitudes to political Islam will be incomplete if they do not seek to identify the conditioning country-level characteristics of those surveys in which the hypothesized relationship is most likely to be strong and significant. Findings about these conditionalities are shown in the case of younger women in Tables 15a and 15b. The tables show that for individuals in this demographic category, a statistically significant inverse relationship between support for gender equality and support for political Islam is disproportionately likely to be found in countries with higher levels of secondary school enrollment and a smaller percentage of the population under the age of 15 ten years prior to the survey – the latter indicating a smaller youth bulge.

There is an additional way that the conditioning impact of country-level attributes on the hypothesized individual-level relationship can be explored. The strength of the individual-level relationship is expressed not only by its level of statistical significance but also, and to an extent more precisely, by the coefficients resulting from regression analyses. These survey-specific coefficients are the dependent variables in a cross-survey analysis in which attributes of the country at the time it was surveyed are independent variables. This is illustrated by the findings shown in Table 16, which again is based on the responses of younger women. The table shows that the coefficient decreases to a statistically significant degree – thus having a higher negative value and indicating a stronger inverse relationship – as a function of an increase in female secondary school enrollment, a decrease in the percentage of the population under the age of 15 ten years prior to the survey, and an increase in life expectancy.

These findings, presented primarily for illustrative purposes, invite reflection about the underlying pathways and mechanisms that determine not only whether but also when and under what conditions support for political Islam increases as support for gender equality decreases. Why this is more likely to be the case among some segments of the population than others -- among men in this instance; and why for any subset of individuals is this more likely to be the case among individuals who are citizens of countries with particular characteristics? These are questions that the findings presented in Tables 14-16 place on the agenda for reflection and

further research. Speculating about these pathways and mechanisms is beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, the findings shown, despite their limitations with respect to hypotheses, demographic categories and country-level attributes, go a considerable distance toward mapping the individual-level and country-level factors, and the interaction between factors at each level of analysis, that play a role in accounting for variance in the attitudes toward political Islam. Recalling that the dataset on which these analyses are based is in the public domain, the approach and findings presented here will hopefully encourage further reflection and additional research and, in this way, make an incremental but nonetheless valuable contribution to discerning the determinants of the attitudes toward political Islam held by ordinary citizens in the Middle East and North Africa.

References[1]

Robbins, Michael, and Mark Tessler (2012). The Effect of Elections on Public Opinion toward Democracy: Evidence from Longitudinal Survey Research in Algeria. *Comparative Political Studies* 45: 1255-76.

Tessler, Mark (2015). *Islam and Politics in the Middle East: Explaining the Views of Ordinary Citizens.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

___. "L'Islam dans les sociétés arabes, hier et aujourd'hui." In Frédéric Charillon and Alain Dieckhoff (eds.), *Afrique du Nord-Moyen Orient*. Paris: La documentation française, 2011.

___. *Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.

___. "Religion, Religiosity and the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights from the Arab Barometer Surveys." *Middle East Law and Governance* 2 (2010): 221-252.

Tessler, Mark, and Amaney Jamal (2012). The Arab Barometer: Taking Stock after Five Years. *APSA- CD Newsletter* 10 .

Tessler, Mark, Amaney Jamal and Michael Robbins (2012). Arab Attitudes toward Democracy and Governance: Findings from the 2010-2011 Arab Barometer. *Journal of Democracy* 23, 4: 89-103.

---

[1] Sources for Additional Information about Findings and Methodology

Table 1: Three Waves of Arab Barometer Surveys

Country	Wave One		Wave Two		Wave Three	
Algeria	N=1300	5-6/2006	N=1216	4-5/2011	N=1220	3-4/2013
Bahrain	N=500	1-2/2009				
Egypt			N=1219	6-7/2011	N=1196	3-4/2013
Iraq			N=1234	2-3/2011	N=1215	6/2013
Jordan	N=1143	6/2006	N=1188	12/2010	N=1795	12/2012
Kuwait					N=1000	2-3/2014
Lebanon	N=1195	10/2007	N=1387	1 1-12/2010	N=1200	6/2013
Libya					N=1247	4-5/2014
Morocco	N=1277	11-12/2006			N=1196	5-6/2013
Palestine	N=1270	5/2006	N=1200	12/2010	N=1200	12/2012
Saudi Arabia			N=1404	1-3/2011		
Sudan			N=1538	12/2010	N=1200	4-5/2013
Tunisia			N=1196	9-10/2011	N=1196	2/2013
Yemen	N=717	10/2007	N=1200	2/2011	N=1200	11-12/2013
14 countries	7 surveys,	N=7,402	10 surveys,	N=12,782	12 surveys,	N=14,868

Table 2: Some of the Survey Items Pertaining to Democracy and to Political Islam

To what extent do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements

Democracy

1. Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak.
2. Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.
3. A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other political systems.

Political Islam

1. Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should not interfere in voters' decisions in elections.
2. [Your country] would be better off if religious people hold public positions in the state.
3. Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government decisions.
4. Religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life.

Table 3: Arab Attitudes toward Political Islam in Wave Two and Wave Three Surveys*

Notes: *Pooled analysis: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen

13

Table 4: Egyptian Attitudes toward Political Islam in Wave Two and Wave Three Surveys

Table 5: Tunisian Attitudes toward Political Islam in Wave Two and Wave Three Surveys

Table 6: Support for Democracy by Support for Political Islam in Wave Two and Wave Three Surveys*

| A democratic system may have problems, yet it is stronger than other political systems	Religious leaders should have influence over government decisions			
	Strongly Agree/ Agree		Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	
Strongly Agree/ Agree	Supports democracy and Political Islam		Supports democracy but Not Political Islam	
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3
Column percent	82	76	84	83
Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	Not Support democracy but Supports Political Islam		Not Support democracy and Not Support Political Islam	
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3
Column percent	18	24	16	17

Notes: *Pooled analysis: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen

Table 7: Political System Preference by Country by Wave

	Supports democracy and Political Islam		Supports democracy but Not Political Islam		Not Support democracy but Supports Political Islam		Not Support democracy and Not Support Political Islam	
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3
All	33	27	51	53	7	9	9	11
Algeria	20	20	65	60	7	14	8	6
Egypt	27	15	52	70	10	3	11	12
Iraq	44	30	43	46	4	10	9	14
Jordan	36	38	45	43	9	9	10	10
Lebanon	12	7	70	78	2	2	16	13
Palestine	35	31	50	50	6	9	9	10
Sudan	46	37	36	42	11	11	7	10
Tunisia	22	23	67	60	3	4	8	13
Yemen	52	36	31	37	10	14	7	13

Table 8: Attitudes toward Gender Equality and Interpretations of Islam in Wave Two and Wave Three*

	Religious leaders should have influence over government decisions					
	All Respondents		Strongly Agree/ Agree (Favors Political Islam)		Disagree/ Strongly Disagree (Not Favor Political Islam)	
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3
Gender Equality						
A university education is more important for a boy than a girl (% disagree/strongly disagree)	73	78	67	71	77	82
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women (% disagree/strongly disagree)	26	34	20	25	30	39
Interpretation of Islam						
In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy less political rights than Muslims (% disagree/strongly disagree)	74	70	64	58	81	77
In Islam, women should wear modest clothes but do not need to wear the hijab (% agree/strongly agree)	64	62	62	57	66	66

Notes: *Pooled analysis: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen

Table 9: Surveys and Sample Sizes Organized by Country and Date

Country Year	N	Country Year	N	Country Year	N
Jordan 2001	1223	Algeria 2011	1216	Egypt 1988[b]	292
Jordan 2003	1000	Morocco 2001	2264	Egypt 2000	3000
Jordan 2006	1143	Morocco 2005	1083	Egypt 2008[c]	3051
Jordan 2007	1200	Morocco 2006	1277	Egypt 2011	1220
Jordan 2008	967	Morocco 2007	1200	S. Arabia 2003	1502
Jordan 2010	1188	Kuwait 1988	300	S. Arabia 2011	1405
Palestine 1995	2368	Kuwait 2005	750	Iran 2000[c]	2532
Palestine 1999	1200	Lebanon 2007	1195	Iran 2005	2667
Palestine 2003	1320	Lebanon 2010	1387	Turkey 2001	4607
Palestine 2006	1270	Yemen 2006	1440	Turkey 2007	1346
Palestine 2008	3430	Yemen 2007[a]	717	Bahrain 2009	436
Palestine 2010	1200	Yemen 2011	1200	Qatar 2010	1060
Algeria 2002	1282	Iraq 2004	2325	Sudan 2011	1538
Algeria 2004	1446	Iraq 2006	2701	Tunisia 2011	1196
Algeria 2006	1300	Iraq 2011	1236		
				Total Observations	67,680
				Total Surveys	44
				Total Countries	15

Notes: [a] The 2007 Yemen survey was found to have a number of respondent duplicates. Only one respondent in the set of duplicates was retained, thereby reducing the size and representativeness of the sample. [b] The 1988 Egypt survey was only carried out in Cairo. [c] 2000 Iran survey and the 2008 Egypt survey do not contain items pertaining to political Islam. They are included in the integrated multi-survey dataset for purposes unrelated to the present study but do not provide data for the present investigation of attitudes relating to Islam's political role. Without these two countries, the number of observations is 62,097 and the number of surveys is 42. The number of countries remains 15.

Table 10: Items Used to Measure Attitudes toward Islam's Role in Government and Political Affairs

Item	Number of Surveys Containing Item	Percent of Surveys Containing Item[a]
Government should implement only the laws of the Shari'a	36	85.7
Men of religion should not influence how people vote in elections	36	85.7
It would be better for our country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office	35	83.3
Men of religion should have no influence over the decisions of government	35	83.3
Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-political life	30	71.4
Our country should be governed by Islamic law and a political system in which there are no political parties or elections	28	66.6
A candidate's religiosity would be an important consideration in my attitude toward for a person running for political office	25	59.5
Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office	15	35.7

Notes: [a] Percent is based on the 42 surveys that included at least one item pertaining to political Islam.

Table 11: Country-Level Variables included in the Dataset

Political Characteristics
Year of Independence
Colonial Heritage
Years under Colonialism
Civil Liberties Index (Freedom House, 1-7 scale)
Political Rights Index (Freedom House, 1-7 scale)
Status of Freedom (Freedom House, 1-3 scale)
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 0-10 scale)
Percentage of Women in the Lower House of Parliament
Legal Protection of Religion Index (Association of Religion Data Archives, 0-3 scale)
Freedom of Religion in Practice Index (Association of Religion Data Archives, 0-2 scale)
Government Funding of Religion Index (Association of Religion Data Archives, 0-12 scale)
Government Regulation of Religion Index (Association of Religion Data Archives, 0-10 scale)

Economic Characteristics
GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars)
GDP Per Capita (in current U.S. dollars)
Per Capita National Income (in current US dollars)
GINI Coefficient
Percent Unemployed (age 15 and older)
Percent of Women in Labor force
Percentage of GDP from Natural Resource Rents (Oil, Natural Gas, and Minerals)
Per Capita Natural Resource Rents (Oil, Natural Gas, and Minerals)

Social and Demographic Characteristics
Population (in millions)
Area (in square kilometers)
Percentage of Urban Population
Percent of Population under Age 14
Percent of Non-Muslim Population
United Nations Human Development Index
Life Expectancy (in years)
Adult Literacy Rate (age 15 and older)
Female Literacy Rate (age 15 and older)
Gross Secondary School Enrollment Rate
Female Secondary School Enrollment Rate
Linguistic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization
Ethnic Fractionlization

Table 12: Factor Loadings of Items Measuring Attitudes toward Political Islam in Five Surveys

	Palestine 2003	Algeria 2004	Iraq 2006	Yemen 2006	Morocco 2007
Government should implement only the laws of the sharia		.747	.791	.555	
Men of religion should not influence how people vote in elections	-.628				-.843
Men of religion should have no influence over the decisions of government	-.719			-.468	-.880
Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-political life	-.683	-.623			
It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office	.463		.829	.684	
Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office		.610		.528	.505
Religious leaders should not interfere in politics			-.705		
A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections would be good for [country]				.609	

Table 13: OLS Regressions Coefficients Showing the Influence on Support for Political Islam of Attitudes toward Gender Equality, Regime Evaluation, and Economic Satisfaction

	All Respondents	Men 34 and Under	Men 35 and Older	Women 34 and Under	Women 35 and Older
Higher Support for Gender Equality	-.119***	-.133***	-.128***	-.112***	-.087***
	(.007)	(.013)	(.013)	(.014)	(.016)
More Positive	.040***	.031*	.030*	.049***	.062***
Regime Evaluation	(.007)	(.013)	(.007)	(.014)	(.016)
Higher Level of Economic Satisfaction	-.011*	.006	-.006	-.026**	-.020
	(.005)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.012)
Controls					
Greater Personal Religiosity	.186***	.169***	.201***	.180***	.197***
	(.007)	(.011)	(.013)	(.015)	(.018)
Higher Level of Education	-.045***	-.014	-.045***	-.041***	-.081***
	(.006)	(.014)	(.012)	(.014)	(.014)
Female Sex	.027*				
	(.014)				
Older Age	-.026**				
	(.009)				
Constant	.190***	.027	.109**	.223***	.289***
	(.040)	(.051)	(.043)	(.051)	(.048)
Number of Observations	59,689	14,910	14,836	15,740	13,817

Notes: Higher values on dependent variable indicate higher support for political Islam; the table presents unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at .05 level. **significant at .01 level. ***significant at .001 level.

Table 14: Number of Surveys in which the Inverse Relationship between Support for Gender Equality and Support for Political Islam is Statistically Significant and Range of Coefficients Expressing an Inverse Relationship

	All Respondents	Younger Men	Older Men	Younger Women	Older Women
p < .001	27	1	2	3	-
	67.5%	2.5%	5.0%	7.5%	
p < .01	2	7	7	3	1
	5.0%	17.5%	17.5%	7.5%	2.5%
p < .05	1	11	10	2	8
	2.5%	27.5%	25.0%	5.0%	20.0%
p < .1	-	2	1	1	7
		5.0%	2.5%	2.5%	17.5%
Not Sig.	10	19	20	31	24
	25.0%	47.5%	50.0%	77.5%	60.0%
Total N (weighted)	40	40	40	40	40
	(35)	(35)	(35)	(35)	(35)
Coefficient/to from	-.232/	-.311/	-.339/	-.491/	-.405/
	-.018	-.022	-.002	-.034	-.015

Table 15a: Conditioning Impact of Country's Level of Secondary School Enrollment and Prior Proportion of the Population under the Age of 15 on the Inverse Individual-Level Relationship between Support for Gender Equality and Support for Political Islam among Younger Women

		Relationship Not Statistically Significant (p > .05)	Relationship Statistically Significant (p < .05)
Level of Secondary School Enrollment	Lower	19 61.3%	1 12.5%
	Higher	12 38.7%	7 87.5
		N = 39, p = .015	
Percentage of Population under 15 Ten Years Prior to Survey	Lower	15 46.9%	7 87.5%
	Higher	17 53.1%	1 12.5%
		N = 40, p = .048	

Note: Probabilities are based on X^2 values that were computed with weighting, whereas actual rather than weighted frequencies are shown. The number of surveys included in the analysis is less than 42 because the interview schedule in several surveys did not include all relevant questions. Level of secondary school enrollment is cut 81 percent; proportion of the population under the age of 15 years ten years prior to the survey is cut at 41 percent.

Table 15b. Binary Logistic Regression Showing the Conditioning Impact of Country's Level of Secondary School Enrollment and Prior Proportion of the Population under the Age of 15 on the Inverse Individual-Level Relationship between Support for Gender Equality and Support for Political Islam among Younger Women

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Higher Level of Secondary School Enrollment	2.395** (1.147)		2.170* (1.186)
Higher Percentage of Population under 15 Lagged by 10 Years		-.165** (.075)	-.137* (.078)
Constant	-2.785*** (1,030)	4.947* (2.782)	2.551 (3.110)

Note: The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure indicating whether or not the individual-level relationship is significant at or below the .05 level.   This is the case in 8 of the 39 surveys included in the analysis.   The analysis includes weights to adjust for population overlap, as discussed in the text. Given the small N, which is 35 after weighting, p < .1 may be considered statistically significant. The table presents logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p <.1, ** p <.05, *** p <.01

Table 16:   Conditioning Impact of Country's Level of Female Secondary School Enrollment, Prior Proportion of the Population under the Age of 15, and Life Expectancy on the Inverse Individual-Level Relationship between Support for Gender Equality and Support for Political Islam among Younger Women

	Model 1
Higher Proportion of Female Secondary School Enrollment	-.162*** (.033)
Higher Percentage of Population under 15 Ten Years Prior to Survey	.102*** (.030)
Higher Life Expectancy	.009*** (.004)
Constant	-.768*** (.252)

Appendix: Wording and Response Options of Items Used to Measure Attitudes toward Gender Equality, Evaluation of the Governing Regime, and Personal Religiosity

Attitudes toward Gender Equality

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree

A university education is more important for a boy than a girl. Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree

Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages. Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree

Men make better business executives than women do. Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree

Regime/Government Evaluation

I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in it. Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?
-The prime minister
-The courts/judicial system
-Parliament
-The police
-Military
-The civil service

How satisfied you are with the performance of the current [country] government? Very Satisfied, Somewhat satisfied, Not very satisfied, Not at all satisfied

Our political leaders care about ordinary citizens. Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree

Public officials pursue their own interests. Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree

Personal Religiosity

How often do you read the Quran? Every day or almost every day, Several times a week, Sometimes, Rarely or Never

How often do you pray? Very often (several times a day), Often (everyday), Sometimes (once or twice a week), Rarely (one or two times a month or only on religious holidays), Never

Independently of whether you go to religious services or not, would you say you are: Religious

Somewhat religious, Not religious

When you consider what would make a suitable spouse for your son or daughter, would you say that each of the following is Very important, Somewhat important, A little important, or Not important at all: S/he doesn't pray

Which of the following best describes you? Above all I am [nationality of country], Above all I am a Muslim, Above all I am an Arab

How often do you pray/perform in the mosque? Very often (several times a day), Often (everyday), Sometimes (once or twice a week), Rarely (one or two times a month or only on religious holidays), Never

Do you refer to religious teachings when taking decisions about your life? Always, Sometimes, Rarely, Never

Are you member of a religious organization? Not a member. Inactive member, Active member, Leader

When you need advice about a personal problem, how often do you consult each of the following? An imam or fakih: Often, Sometimes, Rarely, Never