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NORMS TO THEIR ORIGIN COUNTRY?
SOME EVIDENCE FROM SOME ARAB COUNTRIES**

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Abstract

This paper explores some political and social consequences of international migration experience and remittance receipt in the case of Arab countries using Arab Barometer survey dataset. The main idea is to address whether persons who receive international remittances or have lived in the past in democratic host countries, namely U.S (or Canada) and Europe, can act as agents of changes. Three forms of political participation are considered comprising interest in politics, electoral participation and protest demonstration. Other indicators are taken into account including the perception of economic inequality and cultural constructions of gender in Muslim societies. We find that migration and remittance receipt have a positive influence on the political participation and interest of migrants and families who remain in the country of origin and receive remittances. Moreover, our estimates show that migration experience of male migrants strengthens their likelihood to vote, to be more interested in politics, to perceive the economic inequality as well as to encourage the veiling in their home countries. However, they seem less engaged in a protest demonstration.

JEL Classifications: A12, D72, F24, O15, O57

Keywords: Return migration, Remittances, Political participation, Arab countries

ملخص

تستكشف هذه الورقة بعض العواقب السياسية والاجتماعية المترتبة على تجربة الهجرة الدولية واستلام التحويلات في حالة البلدان العربية باستخدام مجموعة بيانات مسح البارومتر العربي. والفكرة الرئيسية هي معالجة ما إذا كان الأشخاص الذين يتلقون تحويلات دولية أو عاشوا في الماضي في البلدان المضيفة الديمقراطية، أي الولايات المتحدة (أو كندا) وأوروبا، يمكن أن يكونوا بمثابة عوامل للتغيير. وينظر إلى ثلاثة أشكال من المشاركة السياسية تشمل الاهتمام بالسياسة والمشاركة الانتخابية والتظاهرة الاحتجاجية. وتؤخذ مؤشرات أخرى في الاعتبار بما في ذلك تصور عدم المساواة الاقتصادية والإنشاءات الثقافية للجنسانية في المجتمعات الإسلامية. ونرى أن إيصال الهجرة والتحويلات لهما تأثير إيجابي على المشاركة السياسية والمصالح للمهاجرين والأسر الذين لا يزالون في بلد المنشأ ويتلقون تحويلات مالية. وعلاوة على ذلك، تشير تقديراتنا إلى أن تجربة الهجرة لدى المهاجرين الذكور تعزز احتمالية التصويت، وأن تكون أكثر اهتماما بالسياسة، لإدراك عدم المساواة الاقتصادية وتشجيع الحجاب في بلدانهم الأصلية. ومع ذلك، يبدو أنهم أقل انخراطا في مظاهرة احتجاجية.

1. Introduction

The harmful consequences of international migration on countries of origin have long been the main concern of migration studies. However, in recent decades, with the continuous increase of the amount of remittances sent by migrants - surpassing even, in some cases, official development assistance and foreign direct investment (FDI) - a number of researchers “migration optimists” have argued that international migration could have beneficial effects on the country of origin. In this sense, migrants’ remittances can compensate for the detrimental impacts of migration due to the loss of highly skilled and best educated human resources of developing economies (the so-called brain drain phenomenon) that deprives these countries of one of their scarce resources - human capital -. The existing data on remittances indicate that their shares to GDP tend to be quite high in many emigration countries such as Egypt or Haiti. In the case of Egypt for example, which is the top remittance receiver among the Arab countries, it was estimated that migrants’ remittances have ranged in the last decade between 2.85 and 15.58 percent of its GDP. It is also worth noting that remittances are more stable than other forms of external finance as FDI and tend to be countercyclical, rising during economic downturns (Chami et al., 2005; World Bank, 2012). Another fundamental aspect of remittances is their potential impact on economic growth (Benmamoun and Lehnert, 2013; Driffield and Jones, 2013; Bouoiyour et al., 2016). The evidence of the effect of migration and remittances on origin country also points at a complex relationship. Such effect is not often positive and is very likely to be context-dependent.¹

It is clear that financial flows generated by migrant remittances are one of the major gains from international migration, but the return migrants - whether temporary or permanent – can likewise generate benefits in their home countries, given their social, human and economic capital. In the academic literature, little attention has been paid to the phenomenon of return migration, its consequences and implications. Yet, according to OECD estimates, between 20 and 50 percent of migrants leave their home countries during the first five years of migration, because they would have to return to their country of origin or to settle in a third country. It is very likely that return migration will increase in the coming decades. Several factors may be part of reinforcing trend, for instance, the migrant unemployment exacerbated by the current economic crisis in most developed countries, the low level of integration into the host countries, and some favorable opportunities created by globalization available in many home countries. Existing evidence suggested that return migration can have positive effects on behind family members and migrant-sending community. It can, for example, spur investment in some developing countries like Egypt (McCormick and Wahba, 2003) and Tunisia (Mesnard, 2004). These studies, among others, have pointed out the propensity of returnees to become self-employed upon return (Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; McCormick and Wahba, 2003; Mesnard, 2004; Wahba and Zenou, 2009; Piracha and Vadean, 2010). In fact, with an experience outside their home countries, return migrants would bring back accumulated financial capital that can allow them to undertake their own business upon return and benefit their countries of origin. Even if many migrants are unlikely to return, they often still advance national development from abroad, through the activities of the diaspora as forging trade and investment links between countries. Transnational approaches suggest that contemporary migrants are best understood as “transmigrants”, persons who regularly oscillate across sending and receiving countries (Faist, 2000; Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004). Social remittances, a term coined by sociologist Peggy Levitt, or the ideas, practices, identities and social capital that migrants remit home, alter the behavior of those who remain behind and transform notions about democracy, norms of marriage, fertility, etc. In addition to their potential economic

¹ In parallel literature, remittances and return migration are not automatically converted into accelerated development in receiving countries (problem of remittance dependency or the “Dutch disease” for example).

contributions, international migrants can play a fundamental role in social, political and cultural changes in home countries if some contextual conditions in these countries are satisfied.

The present paper seeks to broaden the scope of this discussion while focusing on the social and political dimensions of migrants' remittances. We look at the "social remittances", representing the changes in political attitudes and practices nurtured by new political ideas and values that migrants bring back home with their temporary or permanent return. In some cases, the ties between migrants and non-migrants can influence the lives of those individuals who are still at home. The aim of the study is twofold. Firstly, it puts particular emphasis on the social and political effects of migration on some countries of origin, with specific reference to Arab countries. With the political uncertainty surrounding the "Arab spring", it seems fundamental to address whether and through what channels migration may affect the Arab societies. The paper also examines the major changes in Arab societies that had taken place in the last half century. In many Arab countries, difficult life conditions – particularly socio-economic and political conditions have helped drive regime change. Secondly, it closes a gap in the literature by foregrounding the potential role of migration to Western countries (European countries, Canada, and the United States, particularly) and thus the direct contact with democratic contexts in accelerating some interesting behavior change. It is evident that these host countries benefit from a good socio-political climate which makes possible the democratic diffusion and the transfer of new social and political norms from host to home countries. In fact, there is a considerable gap in the level of democracy between host and origin countries that is required for democratic diffusion (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006).

It is important to note the limited empirical evidence on the fundamental role that may play international migration as a vehicle for changes in the social structures and cultural practices in the Arab region. Yet, temporary migrants are difficult to capture in surveys, and therefore the weakness of suitable data in the region. Our study attempts to address, at least in part, this void using contemporary individual-level data. We exploit unique data collected among Arab people as part of the ArabBarometer project. Using ArabBarometer round 3 data sets, this study assesses the consequences of migration with respect to the behaviors and political attitudes, and gender political perception, among others. Moreover, the gender differences are accounted for in our analysis. The impact of remittance incomes as generators and pathways of local-level change and social transformations in Arab societies is also explored in this study because the interaction among migrants and their families often manifest through the sending of remittances but also migration fuels remittance flows once it occurs. In addition, the paper discusses some policy-level responses essentially from a migration perspective.

The study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an advanced literature review on the impact of return migration and remittances on the development of the origin country. Section 3 outlines a description of the Arab context. Section 4 describes data used and presents our methodological approach. Section 5 reports and details our results, while Section 6 concludes and offers some policy implications.

2. Literature Review

Over the past five decades, the international migration has been the focus of an abundant literature. The researchers have pointed out several channels through which the migration may positively affect the sending economy, by looking at the development impact of transfers of money, knowledge, skills, and social norms and values by migrants back to home countries. However, most analyses have first focused on financial remittances which are certainly the most visible migration' consequences. Beyond the fact that they are spent primarily on current consumption, these incomes seem to be associated with improvement in human development outcomes and poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, in the literature, as this review shows, there has been disagreement about the interactions between migration, remittances, and

development. The range of international migration effects and how remittances are spent are bracketed by two extremes. The first was that remittances tend to get spent on consumption rather than on productive investment which can reduce the effect on recipient countries. Accordingly, Chami et al. (2003) claimed that remittances are not used for investment and therefore they cannot be viewed as a potential source of capital for the economic development of recipient countries. Furthermore, one of the most harmful influences of migration is the increase in the likelihood that family members migrate in the future, hurting then the desired schooling and the educational attainment (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011; Beine, et al, 2001). The second extreme argued that because remittances are a transitory income for households, they are more likely to be spent on investment goods especially on housing, education and health, which may be beneficial for long-term growth prospects of developing countries (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010). In fact, several studies have investigated the household investment in children's human capital development in some developing countries. They documented a statistically significant correlation between remittances and child education (Cox and Ureta, 2003; Lopez-Cordova, 2006; Mansuri, 2006; Yang, 2008; Calero, et al. 2008, Bouoiyour and Miftah, 2015) and labour (Acosta, 2006; Calero et al., 2008; Gang, et al., 2011). Other channels through which migration may benefit sending countries were identified such as migrants' activities and networks, and return migration. For example, the latter can bring valuable entrepreneurial skills and attitude to developing home countries (McCormick and Wahba, 2003; Mesnard, 2004).

Migrants have become increasingly not only a source of remittances and investment but also a driving force of political and social change. Along with the individual and household level effects described above, migration and remittances can also help changing the social and cultural face of migrant-sending countries². Most of the research in the field has looked at the effects of migration on gender relations, fertility, democracy and institutional quality in the migrant's country of origin (Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Kunioka and Woller, 1999; Romana and Emmenegger, 2012; Spilimbergo, 2009; Lindstrom and Saucedo, 2002; Beine et al., 2012; Bertoli and Marchetta, 2012). For instance, Beine et al. (2012) found that international migration results in a transfer of fertility norms from host to home countries. Using Egyptian household-level data, Bertoli and Marchetta (2012) tested whether the couples characterised by the return of the husbands from a high-fertility destination country (Arab countries) have a larger number of children than couples of stayers. The authors suggested that, in such circumstance, return migration had a positive influence on the total number of children. Furthermore, even if migrants stayed in host countries, they could simultaneously be engaged in countries of origin and destination via activities and transnational networks. The idea is that through transnational connections or during their visit to the community of origin, migrants send home more than money, i.e., "social remittances". Levitt (1998) was the first to define this concept, and provided evidence indicative of how migration drives forms of cultural diffusion and social change. The author underscored that remittances play a major role in promoting immigrants' entrepreneurship, community and family formation as well as political integration.

The idea of "social remittances" has gained some acceptance in the literature. Various papers have especially investigated the political remittances, representing the changes in political attitudes and practices nurtured by new political ideas and values that migrants bring back home with their return. As noted Rother (2009), migrants had the potential to be agents of democratization. Also, Perez-Amendariz and Crow (2009) supported the proposition that Mexicans migrants impel the diffusion of democratic attitudes and the behaviors across international borders by way of having lived abroad and returned. This made respondents more

² In the Moroccan case, some studies have highlighted the paramount importance of migration in the acquisition of human capital (Bouoiyour and Miftah, 2015) and the transmission of values as well as the rise of individual aspirations (Arab, 2011).

tolerant of different religions beliefs, political preferences, and sexual orientations. In a recent study, Diabate and Mesplé-Somps (2015) showed that in Mali female circumcision practices are changing in households involved in migration. The authors argued that girls who live in villages -where return migrants are currently residing- are less likely to be circumcised (compared to girls who live in villages without migrants or returnees). This result is driven by the fact that this practice is not widespread in Côte-D'Ivoire, a country where these migrants have stayed.

However, the transfer of norms by migrants to origin countries is certainly related to their host countries features (regarding, for example, the quality of the institutions), as well as to individual characteristics (for example, the level of education). Arguably, Beine and Sekkat (2013) documented that international emigration had a wider impact on institutional indicators in the sending country when skilled emigration is considered. In other words, the migration effects on institutional quality are stronger with skilled rather than with total migrants. In this context, Spilimbergo (2009) spotlighted the pivotal role of foreign educated individuals in fostering democracy in their home countries. The author found that foreign-educated individuals tend to promote democracy in their origin country if foreign education is acquired in democratic countries. Note that few empirical studies have examined the impact of migration on the transfer of norms using micro data.

Last but not least, social remittances often occur between individuals who are connected by mutual social ties. From this perspective, cultural cross-overs are most likely to prosper in transnational clusters, such as village and regional communities (Faist, 2000). Previous studies on democracy and policy diffusion identified agents of change and emphasized the interpersonal nature of ideas transmission among elites. A particularly relevant question in our context is whether and how can a small minority be so influential? The answer is part of the more general historical debate on the role of single leaders or restricted elites and the adoption of policies practiced outside of their own country (Dominguez, 1997; Spilimbergo, 2009).

3. Arab Context

For a long time the Arab world had been viewed as a politically stagnant region because political leadership has not changed very much. However, the massive protests called the “Arab Spring” or “the Democracy Spring” manifested in Tunisia and Egypt at the beginning of 2011 have repeatedly witnessed the influence of newly empowered publics “Arab street” on political life. The hopes raised by the Arab Spring refer to more inclusive politics, more responsive government and more jobs. In many Arab countries, dissatisfaction with economic conditions coupled with political repression, lack of political freedoms, and corruption have helped drive regime change. One way to begin is to ask whether there are long-term structural factors (corruption issues, State repression, socio-economic inequalities, unemployment, etc.) leading to the Arab spring and continue operating for about 30 years. Historically, in the 1990s, the demands for change in the Arab world have prompted many leaders to some political liberalization (in particular, the creation of a parliament and the holding of elections). In fact, as noted Huntington (1991), the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe have certainly encouraged democratic opposition groups and worried authoritarian leaders elsewhere. Conversely, in the case of Arab countries, movements that act openly for democratic politics have been relatively weak; rather they come often from Islamic political groups³. On the other hand, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have made, under the “Structural Adjustment Program”, political democratization as well as economic liberalization a precondition for economic assistance. In practice, nevertheless, this liberalization has not been accompanied by democratization. The obstacles to democratization in these countries can be common like the

³ We can note the Islamic opposite in Egypt for example. In the case of Jordan, as Robinson (1997) pointed out, the Islamist movement has been a force in democratic expansion since liberalization began there in 1989.

political, cultural, and economic ones. It is entirely conceivable to have a good economic situation without democracy. This is the case in some parts of the Arab world (i.e., some oil exporters such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia⁴ and Libya), where their societies are too wealthy, so in this region, the democratization (and economic development⁵) might be primarily affected by cultural (and religious values) and political factors. The key question then is to what extent the political systems (the dominant-party model, the absolute monarchy or the constitutional monarchy with parliamentary-government system) and the culture are the chief obstacles to democracy in such countries. These systems, with the exception of a few, seem to involve competition for power but not alternation in power.

Certainly, these political factors have yielded social unrest throughout the Arab region, but if these problems are the salient manifestation of the Arab Spring, they have also been exacerbated by the region's underlying demographic features and pressures. First, the lack of opportunities in the Arab region has been exacerbated by a demographic boom. In fact, the Arab societies are now characterized by a dominance of young age classes and the low fertility rates (for example, according to the United Nations report (2013), young people under 25 years comprise 48 percent of total Maghreb population). This demographic shift implies a significant increase in the proportion of people of working age. The International Labor Organization data show that youth unemployment in the Arab region has ranged between 25 and 30 percent of total labor force ages 15-24 over the last two decades, more than double the global average. Second, the better educated are more affected by unemployment just as much as those with lower education level, which underlines the critical role of the region's education systems. However, the Arab countries differ in this respect since, for example, Tunisia's youth has received a much better education than young individuals in Egypt, but, in general, in many Arab countries, the demographic transition was accompanied by an acceleration of education investment. One must also consider that unemployment disproportionately affects women and those living in some parts of the country, arising gender and regional inequality. Third, the economic growth in several Arab nations has spurred the emergence of middle classes⁶ that have distinct life styles and social aspirations from traditional social classes. The World Bank concluded that rising shared dissatisfaction of ordinary people and especially of the middle class with the quality of life (evident in perception data from value surveys) was the main reason for Arab uprisings. As assessed by the World Bank⁷, by the end of the 2000s, MENA was the only region in the world with steep declines in subjective wellbeing. Finally, other demographic trends might have a negative influence on Arab countries, which have witnessed in the past two decades a rise in the population movements from rural to urban areas, followed by a rapid urbanization that raised demand for public services (water, sanitation, and electricity in particular), housing, and education and healthcare. Estimates showed that in 2010, 357 million people (56 percent) lived in Arab cities (Mirkin, 2013). The growth in urban population is expected to be rapid in Arab countries, which will average 68 percent of global urban population in 2050. Inequalities between rural and urban areas and within urban areas have been persistent features in many Arab countries. Even though the Arab region is facing demographic transition, growing inequality and wealth disparities occur even if they are not likely to be much larger than in the rest of developing countries. For instance, women's economic and political participation remains weaker.

⁴ Saudi Arabia, for example, has faced minor political protests.

⁵ Some Gulf countries like the Saudi Arabia are an interesting case, because despite their oil wealth, they are beset by income inequality and unemployment.

⁶ Social networking has made a growing middle class increasingly aware of how ordinary people live in other parts of the world.

⁷ See <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/10/21/middle-class-frustration-that-fueled-the-arab-spring>

4. Conceptual Framework, Data and Empirical Methodology

Recent popular uprising of 2011 has drawn attention to the potential role that international migration and migrants' remittances may play in Arab societies. Although there exists a critical extra-economic dimension of migration, a little understanding of its impact on the social and political outcomes of Arab countries is currently available. This suggests that researchers who set out to contribute to this line of research have a number of challenges to face as the mobilization of statistical data. Given the literature widely discussed in the previous section, it seems crucial to address the sensitive and complex link between migration and socio-political changes in the home country. Perez-Amendariz and Crow (2009) identified three effective channels underlying the transfer of new political ideas and values to individuals in home countries: (1) migration return, (2) information transmitted by migrants who remain abroad to people in the origin country, and (3) information that migrants channel to high-volume migration communities having an aggregate-level effect that alters attitudes and beliefs of members of those communities. In the present study, we consider (1) those who had a migration experience and (2) those who received new ideas and information across borders via migrants' remittances. For this purpose, we make use of an advantageous feature of the ArabBarometer Survey (AB survey), namely the identification of respondents who have emigrated in the past five years. Data from three waves of the AB survey, respectively 2006-2009, 2010-2011 and 2012-2014 are publicly available. These extensive opinion surveys can track changes in the perceptions of the Arab population of pluralism, freedom, governance, democracy, inequality, civil and political participation, and religious and social values. The first wave of the surveys was carried out amongst representative sample of populations (1,000 to 2,000 respondents from each country) of five Arab countries namely: Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Palestine. In 2010, in partnership with the Arab Reform Initiative, other Arab countries have been integrated. It is the case of Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Surveys and data for these countries were conducted through nationally representative samples. Samples were designed according to a stratified, clustering, and random procedure.

As we are interested in measuring the outcomes of migration and remittance receipt, we have restricted the sample by considering only the latest wave of ArabBarometer data because, i) the first wave of AB survey data did not contain variable relevant to our analysis (in particular information on whether family receive remittances from someone living abroad), ii) we have chosen to eliminate the second wave data that did not include all countries (Morocco, for example). In order to guarantee some degree of representative sample, we have excluded countries with less than 60 return migrants or people who receive remittances. This is the case of Egypt (26 migrants), Iraq (45 families receive remittances) and Libya (28 families receive remittances)⁸. Consequently, the last wave of surveys provides data collected from 11,151 respondents from all ten Arab countries, 1,354 surveyed individuals reported having lived at least one month in a Western country and 1,436 families reported receiving remittances from abroad (see Tables 1a and 1b).

Fortunately, the data at hand allowed for the identification of our indicators of international migration and remittance receipt. As noted above, the questionnaires identify migrants by the fact that some individuals surveyed have stayed abroad (for at least one month) in a Western country. It is known that contrary to permanent migrants, temporary migrants (including circular and return migration) may maintain more solid links with their country of origin given their intention to go back. The fact that migrants accumulate knowledge and financial capital in developed countries before spending the rest of their lives in their home country represents

⁸ The dataset also includes Kuwait that is not considered in our analysis since the percentage of Kuwaiti nationals generally does not exceed 40 % of the population. Also, migrants are mainly coming from non-democratic countries i.e., Asian and Arab countries. Recently, Asian presence in Kuwait has increased markedly, comprising almost 59 % of the non-Kuwaiti population in 2007.

an advantageous effect of return migration (Beine and Sekkat, 2013). Our indicator of migration is a dummy variable equals to 1 if an individual aged over 18 has spent a minimum period of time in a Western country (European country, Canada, the United States) during the past five years prior to the survey. Moreover, despite remaining living abroad, the relation between migrants and their families can manifest via the sending of remittances. In this respect, remittances can be perceived as a sign of continued interest and involvement in the community (Fitzgerald, 2000). The dichotomous variable takes the value of one if respondents at the time of the survey are receiving international remittances and 0 otherwise. The migration and remittance variables are included as explanatory variables in our models for each of the dependent variables taken into account. We consider two set of indicators based on various questions in the ArabBarometer survey (see the Appendix for variables definitions). The first one refers to the perception of economic inequality and cultural constructions of gender in Muslim societies. We first focus on the perception of the gap between rich and poor, which relates to the extent to which respondents evaluate the current government's performance on narrowing the gap between rich and poor. On the other hand, the more obvious cultural symbol and gender difference of Muslim societies is captured by the fact that the dress of women should be modest without needing to wear a Hijab (the headscarf worn by Muslim women). These aspects are measured by dichotomous variables reflecting whether respondents prefer women wearing normal clothes (coded one and zero otherwise) or think that there is a growing gap between rich and poor (coded one and zero otherwise). Note that veiling has a large and complex meaning than covering the head and the body because in many cases social requirements determine such way of dressing rather than religious beliefs. That is to say, the situation of women in the Arab world can be understood from the social and cultural structure of their milieu. Some Muslim women consider the veiling a symbol of their faith, other find it liberating. In fact, as suggested the anthropological and sociological literatures (e.g., Read and Bartkowski, 2000), there are many reasons of the practice of the veil such as religious conviction, reducing the risk of violence in public spaces or entry into the labor market. By contrast, to the Western eye, the women who wear the veil are often submissive and marginalized.

The second set of indicators refers to different forms of political participation, comprising interest in politics, electoral participation and protest demonstration. First, the question measured individual political attitude is in general, to what extent are you interested in politics? Second, we examine two political behaviors: electoral and protest ones. The questionnaire asks whether during the past three years, the interviewer has participated in an organized protest/march, which corresponds to the variable *Protest*. The variable *Vote* captures whether individual has voted in the last parliamentary elections. Respondents who voted or participated in civic organizations and protest were coded one and zero otherwise. It must be stressed that the massive protests and social mobilization have explanatory power in the collapse of many regimes in the Arab world since 2011.

The baseline specification for investigating the impact of migration and remittance receipt on outcomes at the individual level is as follows:

$$Outcome_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 X_i + \gamma_1 M_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where *Outcome* corresponds to one of our binary outcomes. *Mi* is the binary variable for individual accessing migration or remittances. We use as control variables (*Xi*) a set of individual characteristics, including gender, age, age2, marital status, education, area of residence (rural/urban), Internet use (almost daily or at least once a week), religiosity (Islam, Christianity, and other religions) and country dummy variables. By facilitating both the migrant's activities and transnational networks and the diffusion of ideas and norms, the *Internet* variable makes it possible to involve network analysis. The income is proxied by the

individual level of education⁹. This was captured by a dummy variable reflecting whether respondents have a secondary level or MA and above.

Since our outcomes are dichotomous, the use of a probit model is preferred for estimating a separate model for each of the different outcomes influenced by migration or remittances. However, the results could be biased because of the endogeneity in the relationship between migration or remittances and our dependent variables, one that intertwines with measurement error¹⁰ and omitted variable bias. Moreover, there are unobserved individual-specific factors that may simultaneously influence our outcomes and individual migration decision or individual's receipt of remittances, in such case the IV strategy is called for. The longest established Instrumental Variable estimator for binary outcomes and treatment variable is Bivariate probit. The first probit equation of the recursive base model gives the probability of the access to migration. It can be written as

$$M_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 X_i + \gamma_2 Z_i + \mu_i \quad (2)$$

Equation (1) is the second equation of our biprobit system. This system allows accounting for the problem of endogeneity of migration and remittance receipt, where the exclusion restriction (Z) on the exogenous variables is required. Such variables or instruments are supposed to affect the migration variable (or remittance receipt) equation but not that of the main equation. We use as instrument of migration the question about the family' feeling of security (*“Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family’s safety and security are ensured or not?”*). We include this variable -noted *Instrument 1-* in the migration model since a lack of family’s safety and security can encourage migration. Further, the decision to migrate is often highly motivated by economic reasons. In the short-run, empirical studies demonstrated that a bad economic situation leads to increased migration, especially when disparities in wages and incomes are high. This is why we consider as second migration instrument -noted *Instrument 2-* the response to the question: *“What do you think will be the economic situation in your country during the next few years (3-5 years) compared to the current situation?”* To the extent that the nature and level of remittances can vary depending on the employment opportunities and other economic conditions in recipient country (and vice-versa in some cases), we employ the perception of economic situation by interviewers as an instrument to predict the probability of receiving remittances -noted *Instrument 3-*, using the question: *how would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?* We have collapsed it into a dichotomous variable where one means a good situation and zero otherwise. We also considered as instrument of remittances an indicator of the economic challenge of poverty, unemployment, and price increases –noted *Instrument 4-* using the question: *What are the two most important challenges your country is facing today?* Note that only one good instrumental variable is included in the migration or remittances equation. It is a good instrument when it is sufficiently correlated with migration or remittances and does not affect the variables of interest by any means other than through its correlation with remittances receipt or migration.

5. Results

5.1 Overall results

In this section, we explore one possible explanation for variation in political and cultural attitudes across countries, namely international migration or remittances receipt. Table 2 reports the results of biprobit models that included as explanatory variables individual and a set of potential control variables embedding country dummy variables (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,

⁹ We have not considered income or expenditure since remittances/migration can increase receiving households’ purchasing power and expenditures.

¹⁰ However, this problem is likely to be less serious in our case since people are simply asked whether they send or receive remittances, without reporting the amount of the remittances.

Morocco and Sudan¹¹). The migration (or remittances receipt) equation is not reported here, but migration and remittance receipt were estimated from age, gender, marital status, education, area of residence, the use of Internet, religiosity and country of residence. Rho (ρ) can be significant in these models, pointing to the presumed correlation between the error terms of our equations. If we have no endogeneity problem, we report the outcomes of the simple probit.

Our results reveal whether and how migration or remittance receipt can affect a person's probability to be "unsatisfied" with income equality in the country -noted "Equality"-, and the fact that women should wear modest clothing without wearing a Hijab -noted "NoHijab"-. We find a significant effect of migration or receiving remittances on the outcomes, indicating that first, migration is associated with an increase in the perception of a widening gap between the richest and poorest people in the country. Specifically, migration increases the tendency to consider that the gap between rich and poor is widening. Regarding women's dress, while the migration effect appears statistically insignificant, remittance receipt exerts a positive effect, indicating that recipient families are more likely to prefer women wearing western clothes. They thus seem to not adhere to traditional cultures. It is relevant to mention in this respect that today veiling has become globally a symbol of cultural separateness between modernity and traditional interpretation of Islam. Also, the use of the headscarf is interpreted in different ways and depended on political, social, and economic factors, with a number of questions enveloping the practice of human rights in this respect. Recently, we also observe a phenomenon of returning to the veil, seen as a mean to broaden women participation in the activities of the society (economical, political, social and cultural activities).

Quite interesting findings about the effects of socioeconomic determinants on the perception of income inequality were drawn. Singles are more likely to perceive income inequalities. In addition, the use of the Internet has a positive effect on such perception and on the tendency to consider western clothing more appropriate dress. As expected, the Christians, living in a Muslim majority country, are more likely to judge western clothing to be more appropriate, which confirms that the gender conditions norms would be most consistent in predominantly Muslim countries. In addition, a narrowing of the gap between rich and poor is seen in the investigated countries as well as the need to wear a veil by women. Surprisingly, we note that the variable *Education* is not significantly related to the perception of equality or the wearing of Hijab.

Concerning political attitudes and behaviors variables, our main findings are played in Table 2. Three variables are considered: (1) Interest in politics (noted PInterest), 2) Participation in an organized protest (coded Protest), and 3) Vote in parliamentary elections (noted Vote)¹². We first find that migrants who have lived in the past in the United States, Canada or Europe are much more interested in politics and more likely to vote in parliamentary elections than those who stayed in their home country. However, the odds of engaging in some form of political participation (such as march/protests) are lower for this group than for those who remained in their home country. This may be partly explained by the limited opportunities for protest that return migrants face in their host country (Crow and Pérez-Armendariz, 2010). Further, we have hypothesized that families who remain in the country of origin and receive remittances from abroad would have more democratic beliefs and behaviors than families without such ties. Our findings confirm also that remittance receipt tends to exert a positive influence on political interest and electoral behavior but a negative effect on individual protest participation. As noted by Crow and Pérez-Armendariz (2010), remittances can influence the

¹¹ The *Lebanon* variable is the omitted category that becomes the reference category.

¹² Other indicators of political attitudes and behaviors like being a member of a political party and even the respondent approves a system governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties were tested. However, we find that remittance receipt and migration have no significant effect on these attitudes.

political beliefs or opinions of those who receive them if they reproduce the effects of modernization on a small scale by increasing receiving households' purchasing power, expenditures on education and health, and the general standard of living. This might help explain the result related to *Equality* variable highlighting that recipient households are less likely to point to the sheer magnitude of inequality in their country.

As noted earlier, other relevant factors influencing political attitudes and behaviors are gender, age, marital status, education, and religiosity. Our result indicate that persons aged under 48/49 years and more educated respondents are more likely to be interested in politics. In fact, age is positively associated with all forms of political participation under study; however, a negative effect of age squared indicates that the older the individual the less likely he or she to participate in politics in his or her country. For instance, younger survey respondents had a high tendency to vote in national elections. This is surprising because the literature explains the political participation gap among younger and older people by the fact that there is some sense of hopelessness or disengagement from conventional political participation such as voting in elections by young people who prefer new social movements and activities, protest politics, etc. (Quintelier, 2007).

In addition, we find that the odds of being interested in politics are lower for women than for men, as do those who are single. Males are also typically more likely to participate in civic organizations and protests. More changes are needed to ensure that women educational and political participation have the same importance as that of men, a measure of the sharp changes in women's role in society that have occurred over the past two decades in the Arab world. Yet, it is well known that women's educational achievements are an essential means of empowering and a tool for reaching the equality goal¹³. Education facilitates access to employment and strengthens opportunities to participate in economic and social activities. Interestingly, in line with a large body of research, our results indicate that educated individuals are more likely to be interested in politics and to participate in protest activities¹⁴. One possible explanation for this positive relationship is that educated people are more likely to have the resources needed and the sense of the deficiencies of the authoritarian regime, which therefore could increase their level of civic and political participation (Feinstein et al., 2003¹⁵). Also, educated people are particularly informed about politics. This would be the case of people who can communicate their concerns to politicians and have access to information via Internet. Our findings confirm that Internet has a positive impact on the interest in politics and the participation in an organized protest/march. This is something that we would expect given that people who have easier access to information about the political system receive the most update news and expose them to various viewpoints; they may be thus more motivated than others to participate in politics through protest behavior.

Furthermore, our study indicates that those who live in Algeria and Morocco are less interested in politics and protest participation. In the case of Jordan, we can draw similar conclusion in relation to the last outcome; those who live in this country are less likely to protest. With respect to voting, there is a significant negative relationship, only for Morocco, implying that voting in Moroccan elections is lower.

¹³ So far, a number of studies have found that migrants' remittances may serve as a channel for investing in human capital in recipient countries and sometimes the gains are much greater for girls, yielding a decrease in gender inequalities in access to education in rural areas. Mansuri (2006) study on rural Pakistan suggested that the potential positive effects of economic migration on human capital accumulation were much greater for girls, as enrollment increased by 54 percent for girls and by only 7 percent for boys.

¹⁴ It is important to note in this respect the Brody's puzzle or the question of the true causal effect of education on political participation. In American case for example, political participation levels have not kept pace with education gains.

¹⁵ The authors find that the participation in adult learning has a significant effect on the change in social and political attitudes and on civic and political participation.

5.2 Results by gender

To ascertain the consistency of our results, we have considered some subsamples. Based on the literature review, we propose the hypothesis that can summarize the links between migration and cultural and political practices in the Arab countries by using in particular the subsample of male respondents. It is also, and even more, to advance our understanding of how male Arab citizens participate in political life. The results reported in Table 3 reveal that the migration experience of male migrants strengthens their odds of perceiving the economic inequality as well as their odds of encouraging the veiling. In this respect, we find any variety across countries studied (except Sudan) despite the fact that variation in the attitude of these countries towards women's issues exists¹⁶. In a traditionally male-dominated society, males – and thus society- like to keep many of their cultural values, morals and religion and there is often confusion between what is dictated by religion and what is required by local cultural traditions.

Concerning the political behaviors and attitudes of male migrants, they are compared to those who have stayed in their home countries, more likely to participate in an organized protest/march (Table 3). We show that migration experience of male raises their odds of electoral political participation and makes them much more interested in politics of their home countries. Another key finding is the importance of some individual characteristics like male education in democratic process. Our analysis suggests that in Arab societies the process of education can have a direct impact of increasing political interest and protest behavior.

Regarding the countries considered in our study, there is evidence that return migration in the case of Algeria and Morocco has a negative effect on the wide range of outcomes considered here and in a lesser measure in the case Jordan and Sudan.

6. Conclusions and Policy Implications

This study provides, for the first time to our best knowledge in the migration literature, an analysis of the social and political consequences of migration in the Arab countries using the ArabBarometer survey dataset. It interests in the case of these countries where the Arab Spring has let to political changes and assesses the role of international migration in transferring new social and political norms. Specifically, our study explores whether persons who moved to democratic host countries (European countries, Canada and United States) can contribute to changing and improving social and political practices. Such Western countries benefit from favorable socio-political conditions, facilitating the transfer of norms to the Arab world. The economic well-being and the efficiency of most migrants' host countries constitute potential incentives for migrants to emulate what they observe there (Crow and Pérez-Armendáriz, 2010). Non - migrants can also embrace new ideas and information across borders via migrants' remittances. Our findings suggest that migration is associated with an increase in the perception of economic inequality in the country and remittance receipt is associated with less preference of wearing the veil. One distinguishing gender differences, we find that, for males, migration seems strengthen their odds of perceiving the economic inequality as well as their odds of encouraging the veiling. The last empirical evidence corroborates the importance of considering the known resistance of traditionalism to changes in a traditionally male-dominated society, even with a migration experience. These results complement those derived from models which assess political behaviors and attitudes effects of migration. They indicate that migration experience and remittance receipt exert a significant influence on the political interest and participation of migrants and families who remain in the country of origin and receive remittances from abroad. Furthermore, compared to those staying in their home

¹⁶ In the case of Tunisia for example, women enjoy relatively less inequality when compared to other Arab countries like Jordan and Morocco. Head covering was certainly less frequent in the past than it is today in Tunisia because it was officially banned in public spaces before the Arab revolution (since 1981).

countries, male Arab return migrants are more likely to participate in an organized protest/march, to vote and to be interested in home country politics. This implies that male returning migrants expressed positive political attitudes and behaviors, which can be viewed as influencing the political context of the Arab countries. At the same time, they like to keep many of their cultural and morals values. In this respect, such cultural practices and norms that they choose to adhere form their identity and their place in a society where veiling is as a marker of that identity. These results cannot be understood apart from the broader context of Arab culture and Muslim societies that consider women as key to the preservation of the family and cultural values including that of male superiority. Considering the resistance of traditionalism to change, evolution of Muslim women's position is occurring most likely not in the near future, but on a longer term.

This study also controls for other relevant factors influencing political behaviors, and gender conditions and economic inequality perceptions. For instance, education determinant substantially protest participation in the political setting that exists in the Arab world. Accurately, we find that educated people are more likely to participate in an organized protest/march. Also, having a higher educational level increases the interest in politics. Further, people who used the Internet are more politically engaged.

Relevant policy implications arise as a result of this research. One is that through reinforcement of educational attainment programs, the Arab people may be more conscious of the importance of democracy and politics that must accompany the national development. Policy makers should work to reduce economic inequalities, building up citizen satisfaction with democracy. Moreover, because return may not necessarily be promoted by migrant sending governments who may have a more direct interest in receiving remittances than in incorporating returnees in the local labor market, public policies may encourage return migration. However, if it is assumed that migration can have a positive political effect, it alone cannot remove more structural development constraints. Its effects can depend on a complex set of factors such as institutional quality, social policies (welfare, health, redistribution of wealth) and investment environment. The relative importance of these effects will also depend on the country situation.

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Table 1a: During the Past Five Years, Did You Spend Time in A Western Country?

| Migration | Algeria | Egypt | Iraq | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | Libya | Morocco | Palestine | Sudan | Tunisia | Yemen |
|-----------------------|---------|-------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|---------|-----------|-------|---------|-------|
| Missing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Less than a month | 84 | 9 | 19 | 44 | 282 | 81 | 88 | 31 | 45 | 20 | 42 | 36 |
| Between one and three | 97 | 3 | 28 | 24 | 302 | 53 | 37 | 28 | 54 | 22 | 34 | 29 |
| Between three and six | 46 | 2 | 22 | 27 | 118 | 50 | 12 | 17 | 16 | 33 | 10 | 35 |
| Six months or more | 45 | 12 | 27 | 58 | 32 | 67 | 42 | 32 | 21 | 38 | 21 | 45 |
| I did not visit any W | 941 | 1,132 | 1,093 | 1,605 | 279 | 944 | 1,053 | 990 | 1,060 | 1,042 | 1,062 | 1,036 |
| Don't know | 6 | 34 | 17 | 36 | 3 | 5 | 12 | 12 | 2 | 43 | 27 | 8 |
| Refuse | 1 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 11 |
| Total | 1,220 | 1,196 | 1,215 | 1,795 | 1,021 | 1,200 | 1,247 | 1,116 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,199 | 1,200 |

Source: ArabBarometer survey Wave III.

Table 1b: Does Your Family Receive Remittances from Someone Living Abroad?

| Remittances | Algeria | Egypt | Iraq | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | Libya | Morocco | Palestine | Sudan | Tunisia | Yemen |
|-------------------------|---------|-------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|---------|-----------|-------|---------|-------|
| Missing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Yes, monthly | 13 | 19 | 3 | 56 | 11 | 39 | 3 | 23 | 34 | 65 | 31 | 181 |
| Yes, a few times a year | 39 | 14 | 17 | 33 | 21 | 61 | 9 | 55 | 47 | 100 | 27 | 152 |
| Yes, once a year | 98 | 8 | 25 | 15 | 16 | 23 | 16 | 47 | 44 | 62 | 21 | 122 |
| We do not receive any | 1,018 | 1,132 | 1,145 | 1,68 | 922 | 1,038 | 1,199 | 973 | 1,07 | 900 | 1,113 | 714 |
| Don't know | 24 | 15 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 19 | 15 | 11 | 2 | 36 | 6 | 23 |
| Refuse | 28 | 8 | 22 | 3 | 25 | 20 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 36 | 1 | 6 |
| Total | 1,220 | 1,196 | 1,215 | 1,795 | 1,004 | 1,200 | 1,247 | 1,116 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,199 | 1,200 |

Source: ArabBarometer survey Wave III.

Table 2: Effects of Migration and Remittance Receipt on Both the Economic and Gender Perception of Inequality and Each form of Political Participation

| | Equality | Equality | NoHijab | NoHijab | PInterest | PInterest | Protest | Protest | Vote | Vote |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Migration | 1.466*** (0.064) | | -0.435 (0.287) | | 0.278*** (0.058) | | -1.014*** (0.189) | | 1.189*** (0.148) | |
| Remittance receipt | | -1.274*** (0.239) | | 0.620* (0.339) | | 0.850*** (0.312) | | -1.169*** (0.180) | | 1.272*** (0.151) |
| Age | 0.0100 (0.007) | 0.023*** (0.007) | -0.011 (0.007) | -0.013* (0.007) | 0.022*** (0.007) | 0.022*** (0.007) | 0.022** (0.008) | 0.016* (0.008) | 0.093*** (0.007) | 0.093*** (0.007) |
| Age 2 | -0.00** (0.000) | -0.00*** (0.000) | 0.00* (0.000) | 0.00* (0.000) | -0.00** (0.000) | -0.00** (0.000) | -0.00** (0.000) | -0.00** (0.000) | -0.00*** (0.000) | -0.00*** (0.000) |
| Male | -0.035 (0.034) | 0.058* (0.035) | 0.003 (0.037) | -0.007 (0.034) | 0.162*** (0.036) | 0.184*** (0.035) | 0.340*** (0.039) | 0.207*** (0.051) | -0.022 (0.033) | 0.061* (0.032) |
| Single | 0.097** (0.046) | 0.148*** (0.049) | 0.0067 (0.046) | -0.0205 (0.048) | -0.082* (0.049) | -0.120** (0.050) | 0.050 (0.052) | 0.165*** (0.055) | -0.107** (0.043) | -0.187*** (0.043) |
| Divorced | -0.076 (0.092) | -0.0140 (0.094) | 0.0550 (0.101) | 0.0272 (0.099) | -0.113 (0.112) | -0.133 (0.108) | -0.080 (0.144) | 0.0277 (0.134) | -0.051 (0.091) | -0.110 (0.095) |
| Widowed | -0.261* (0.134) | -0.065 (0.161) | 0.275** (0.140) | 0.181 (0.144) | 0.000 (0.154) | -0.062 (0.151) | -0.252 (0.235) | -0.176 (0.247) | 0.097 (0.139) | 0.007 (0.141) |
| Urban area | -0.009 (0.036) | 0.0343 (0.038) | -0.001 (0.037) | -0.025 (0.039) | 0.039 (0.040) | 0.0076 (0.041) | 0.001 (0.043) | 0.0824* (0.049) | -0.022 (0.035) | -0.075** (0.043) |
| Education | -0.054 (0.037) | 0.0608 (0.038) | -0.0025 (0.039) | -0.0332 (0.037) | 0.200*** (0.039) | 0.189*** (0.039) | 0.228*** (0.044) | 0.201*** (0.042) | -0.023 (0.036) | -0.006 (0.035) |
| Christian | -0.030 (0.094) | 0.117 (0.110) | 0.793*** (0.076) | 0.787*** (0.077) | -0.169** (0.080) | -0.127 (0.079) | -0.279*** (0.103) | -0.428*** (0.089) | 0.059 (0.075) | 0.166** (0.073) |
| Other religions | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Internet | -0.047 (0.039) | 0.079** (0.040) | 0.106** (0.041) | 0.072* (0.039) | 0.230*** (0.041) | 0.224*** (0.041) | 0.426*** (0.045) | 0.362*** (0.052) | -0.091** (0.038) | -0.055 (0.036) |
| Algeria | -0.969*** (0.077) | -1.046*** (0.081) | -0.786*** (0.071) | -0.823*** (0.064) | -0.483*** (0.068) | -0.465*** (0.067) | -0.420*** (0.110) | -0.477*** (0.101) | -0.109* (0.059) | -0.073 (0.059) |
| Morocco | -0.341*** (0.078) | -0.509*** (0.081) | -0.440*** (0.063) | -0.441*** (0.062) | -0.323*** (0.068) | -0.337*** (0.067) | -0.260*** (0.067) | -0.170** (0.074) | -0.118* (0.062) | -0.174*** (0.061) |
| Jordan | -0.674*** (0.079) | -1.014*** (0.075) | -0.413*** (0.057) | -0.366*** (0.059) | -0.051 (0.060) | -0.037 (0.060) | -0.931*** (0.082) | -0.913*** (0.090) | 0.097* (0.056) | 0.080 (0.056) |
| Sudan | -0.479*** (0.079) | -0.547*** (0.086) | -0.175*** (0.062) | -0.236*** (0.070) | 0.038 (0.067) | -0.055 (0.072) | -0.078 (0.066) | 0.148* (0.085) | 0.114* (0.061) | -0.063 (0.065) |
| Instrument1 | -0.327*** (0.044) | | | | | | | | | |
| Instrument2 | | 0.161*** (0.047) | 0.080* (0.048) | | | 0.066* (1) (0.044) | 0.109** (0.043) | 0.088** (0.040) | 0.173*** (0.049) | |
| Instrument3 | | | | | | | | | | 0.128** (0.050) |
| Instrument4 | | | | -0.082* (1) (0.053) | | | | | | |
| Wald test of rho=0: | chi2(1)= 38.92 | chi2(1)= 16.99 | chi2(1)= 2.59 | chi2(1)= 3.269 | | chi2(1)= 6.104 | chi2(1)= 12.05 | chi2(1)= 9.686 | chi2(1)= 33.29 | chi2(1)= 29.51 |
| Constant | 0.949*** (0.172) | 0.847*** (0.182) | 0.026 (0.169) | 0.060 (0.168) | -1.38*** (0.184) | -1.36*** (0.184) | -1.52*** (0.198) | -1.39*** (0.198) | -2.10*** (0.163) | -2.06*** (0.167) |
| Observations | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 | 6,530 |

Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. The Robust standard errors are parentheses. Palestine, Yemen and Tunisia are omitted because of collinearity. Lebanon is the reference category. In 2009, remittances to Lebanon represented 21.7% of GDP, the highest such ratio among MENA countries. (1) Coefficients are significant at 12/14 percent.

Table 3: The Effects of Migration Experience, All Indicators, Subsample of Males

| | Equality | NoHijab | PoInterest | Protest | Vote |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------|---|-----------------------|----------------------|--|
| Migration | 1.454*** (0.071) | -0.756** (0.378) | 0.260*** (0.072) | 0.393*** (0.082) | 0.997*** (0.251) |
| Age | -0.0024 (0.011) | 0.0015 (0.010) | 0.0381*** (0.010) | 0.0129 (0.012) | 0.0768*** (0.010) |
| Age 2 | -0.0000 (0.000) | 0.0000 (0.000) | -0.0003*** (0.000) | -0.0002* (0.000) | -0.0006*** (0.000) |
| Single | 0.0996 (0.067) | -0.0197 (0.068) | -0.0806 (0.070) | 0.0433 (0.077) | -0.224*** (0.067) |
| Divorced | -0.331* (0.174) | -0.0882 (0.199) | -0.0942 (0.213) | 0.0266 (0.244) | 0.0747 (0.181) |
| Widowed | -0.392 (0.273) | 0.426* (0.253) | -0.184 (0.333) | - (0.270) | -0.387 (0.270) |
| Urban area | 0.0539 (0.050) | 0.0260 (0.053) | -0.0174 (0.055) | -0.0453 (0.062) | -0.0329 (0.051) |
| Education | -0.105** (0.050) | 0.0339 (0.052) | 0.214*** (0.053) | 0.102* (0.060) | 0.0711 (0.050) |
| Christian | -0.0449 (0.125) | 0.670*** (0.108) | -0.101 (0.111) | -0.359*** (0.128) | 0.174* (0.105) |
| Internet | -0.0448 (0.055) | 0.179*** (0.057) | 0.157*** (0.055) | 0.363*** (0.064) | -0.170*** (0.053) |
| Algeria | -0.958*** (0.134) | -0.676*** (0.109) | -0.336*** (0.092) | -0.620*** (0.104) | -0.145* (0.084) |
| Morocco | -0.256* (0.133) | -0.397*** (0.087) | -0.290*** (0.094) | -0.165* (0.097) | -0.0853 (0.088) |
| Jordan | -0.556*** (0.138) | -0.425*** (0.079) | -0.073 (0.083) | -0.770*** (0.097) | -0.0092 (0.080) |
| Sudan | -0.365*** (0.137) | -0.077 (0.087) | -0.020 (0.093) | -0.047 (0.097) | 0.065 (0.086) |
| Instrument 1 | -0.324*** (0.053) | -0.0825 (0.067) | | | |
| Instrument 2 | | | | | 0.143** (0.068) |
| Wald test of rho=0: | chi2(1) = 6.486 Prob>chi2 = 0.010 | chi2(1) = 2.9330 Prob > chi2 = 0.086 | - | - | chi2(1) = 10.24 Prob > chi2 = 0.001 |
| Constant | 1.079*** (0.245) | -0.342 (0.250) | -1.505*** (0.259) | -1.035*** (0.290) | -1.693*** (0.247) |
| Observations | 3,266 | 3,266 | 3,266 | 3,245 | 3,266 |

Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. The Robust standard errors are parentheses. The variables other religion, Palestine, Yemen and Tunisia are omitted because of collinearity. Lebanon is the reference category.

Appendix

Table A. Definition of Variables Considered (Dependent and Instrumental Variables)

| Variables/Description | Questions |
|--|---|
| Economic inequality | How would you evaluate the current government's performance on narrowing the gap between rich and poor? |
| The status of women in our society | To what extent you agree or disagree with this issue: Women should wear modest clothes without needing to wear a Hijab |
| Electoral activity | Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections? |
| Participation in civic organizations and protest | During the past three years, did you participate in an organized protest/march? |
| Interest in politics | In general, to what extent are you interested in politics? |
| Instrument 1 | Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family's safety and security are ensured or not? |
| Instrument 2 | What do you think will be the economic situation in your country during the next few years (3-5 years) compared to the current situation? |
| Instrument 3 | How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country? |
| Instrument 4 (an indicator of the economic challenge of poverty, unemployment, and price increases) | What are the two most important challenges your country is facing today? |