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INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FOR DEMOCRACY
IN THE ARAB WORLD EXPLAINING THE GAP

Mohammed Al-Ississ and Ishac Diwan

Working Paper No. 981

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Send correspondence to:

Ishac Diwan

Harvard University

Ishac_Diwan@hks.harvard.edu

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Abstract

We take a new look at the question of the Arab democratic exception. We use the new sixth wave of the World Value Survey, which was collected between 2012 and 2013, and which included for the first time 12 Arab countries, up from only four in wave 5. We innovate empirically, by measuring the demand for democracy in a more robust way than past studies, and conceptually, by looking at how the forces of modernist aspirations, economic grievances, social preferences, and attachment to the status-quo interact for particular socio-economic groups to determine their preference for a democratic order over an autocratic one, and how these are affected in the Arab region by specificities related to self-interest, culture, and policy. Our statistical analysis reveals a democratic gap in the Arab region, which is correlated, and thus possibly explained in parts, by lower emancipative effects of education among the educated, compared to global experience. We argue that these effects must have been shaped in parts by the policies of power preservation pursued by the autocratic regimes of the past, rather than by local culture lone.

JEL Classification: P1, P2

Keywords: Arab Democracy; Demand for Democracy

ملخص

نلقي نظرة جديدة على مسألة الاستثناء الديمقراطي العربي. نستخدم الموجة السادسة الجديدة من مسح القيم العالمية، حيث شملت 12 دولة عربية للمرة الأولى، ارتفاعاً من أربعة فقط في الموجة الخامسة. نقوم بالابتكار تجريبياً، عن طريق قياس الطلب على الديمقراطية بوسيلة أكثر قوة من الدراسات السابقة، والمفاهيمية، والتي تبحث في كيفية قوة تطلعات الحداثه، المظالم الاقتصادية، والأفضليات الاجتماعية، وفي الوضع الراهن تتفاعل مجموعات اجتماعية واقتصادية خاصة لتحديد تفضيلها للنظام الديمقراطي والأطروحة في المنطقة العربية والخصوصيات المتعلقة بالفائدة والثقافة والسياسة. التحليل الإحصائي لدينا يكشف عن وجود فجوة للديمقراطية في المنطقة العربية، مما يفسر ربما جزئياً، الآثار التحريرية الأقل من التعليم بين المتعلمين. وعليه فقد تكون تشكلت الأطروحة بسبب سياسات الحفاظ على السلطة المستغلة من الأنظمة الاستبدادية في الماضي، بدلاً من السلطة المحلية وحدها.

1. Introduction

In this paper, we re-open the debate about a possible cultural bias against democracy in Arab countries, a subject pushed to the front page of newspapers by the popular uprisings of 2011. Our goal is to assess whether citizens in Arab countries desire democracy as much as otherwise similar individuals in the rest of the world, and to try to evaluate if the reasons behind a possible discrepancy can be attributed to self-interest, culture, or the effects of policy.

We take advantage of new data released by the World Value Survey (WVS) as its 6th wave, which was collected during 2011/2013, and which included 12 Arab countries, and 75 non-Arab countries.¹ This is in contrast the WVS's 4th and 5th waves, collected around 2000 and 2008, which only included 5 and 4 Arab countries respectively. The new dataset allows for the first time to compare values in a sizable share of the Arab world to values around the world. The WVS covers a broad range of variables that measure political and social values, thus allowing for an analysis of both democratic values and some of their key correlates, and thus for testing various hypotheses about the formation of democratic values.²

The literature focusing on the individual support for democracy in the Arab world is thin. Most existing work concerns the relationship between support for democracy and Islam. While some researchers such as Fish (2002), have found that there is a Muslim democratic deficit, other researchers concludes that at the level of individual preferences, there is no particular democratic deficit connected to being Muslim, whether Muslims are compared to individuals of other religions in heterogeneous societies (Hoffman 2011), whether individuals of various levels of piety are compared in Arab countries (Tessler 2002, 2005), or whether one compares individuals in Muslim societies to individuals in other societies, (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This literature however does not look at an Arab specificity in a comparative context, because micro-data on values covering a large set of Arab countries and international comparators were, until recently, not available.

Besides using a richer dataset, the paper innovates methodologically in several respects. First, it looks at the Arab values in comparison to global values, asking for example if education is as “emancipative” in the Arab world as in the rest of the world. Second, we go beyond measuring a possible “Arab exception” on democratic preferences and look at some of its key correlates. We focus on four possible correlates of the preference for democracy -- modernist aspirations, economic grievances, social references, and attachment to the status quo. Third, as a central identification strategy, we explore whether Arab biases in these values can be related to culture or to policy by taking advantage on the differential impacts of socio-economic group characteristics on values. Finally, we use a new measure of the “preference for democracy” which we argue is superior relative to measures used by other researchers such as Tessler (2010), Norris (2011), or Inglehart and Welzel (2005).

Our empirical work reveals that in the WVS, and using our definition of preferences for democracy, individuals living in Arab countries do have a lower preference for democracy compared to otherwise similar individuals living in other countries at similar levels of development, i.e, they do experience a democratic deficit.

What to make of this finding? The empirical literature concerned with democratization has largely compared democratic performance *across countries*. As a group, Arab countries have the lowest rating in the world on democracy indexes such as the Polity index (Freund and Jaud

¹ These are: Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Qatar, Yemen, Kuwait, and Libya. Bahrain, is left out as the WVS has considered its data not to be reliable.

² Other databases have not allowed for a proper evaluation of the democratic values of individuals in the Arab region. In particular, Gallup data does not include good measure of democratic aspirations, PEW does not have a detailed list of the respondents' characteristics, and the Arab Barometer, which has a deeper coverage of issues surrounding democracy and political Islam, does allow for comparisons with the rest of the world.

2014). Until 2011, all Arab countries (save Lebanon) were governed by kings or presidents for life (Owen, 2013). While this political specificity puts the Arab world group quite apart from the rest of the world, the prevalence of autocratic regimes may be however totally unrelated to individual preferences. Indeed, most political scientists do not believe that individual preferences have a great effect on whether a country ends up democratic or not, and instead, democracy is believed to arise as an agreement among elites (Prezeworski, 2002). Empirically, researchers have found many country-specific reasons why Arab countries have a democratic deficit. One set of results which applies to many Arab countries is related to a democratic deficit that is connected to oil rents, which favor patronage and strengthen autocracy (for eg. Ross 2001). Other explanations focus on the effect of wars, which were prevalent in the Arab region and led to oversized armies with an incentive to grab power, and of external interventions (Elbadawi and Makdissi, 2013). But there is also an active debate on whether this “democratic exception” is due to a cultural bias present in Arab and/or in Muslim countries (Barro 1999 vs Stepan and Robertson 2003, 2004).

We are agnostic about the impact of individual preferences on regime type. We also do not dispute that local culture can, to some extent, affect individual preferences for a democratic order. Instead, our main contribution in this paper is to argue that causality could be also running the other way around, from regime type to individual preferences, with autocratic regimes able to influence the values held by their subjects. By looking simultaneously at the preference for democracy and other values, we find that there are three main differences between the region and the rest of the world. First, young age is not as emancipative politically in the Arab region than in the rest of the world, and in particular, Arab youth tend to be less individualistic, which is associated with lower demand for democracy. Second, Arabs are much more religious than elsewhere, and religiosity is associated with low preferences for democracy worldwide. Third, we find that education is not as politically emancipative in the Arab region as in the rest of the world, as it tends to foster economic, social and political conservatism, and fear of moving away from the status quo much more than elsewhere, all of which are values that are associated with low preferences for democracy. Moreover, this third effect is large and swamps the first two effects.

Our results do not *prove* that causality runs from regime type to individual preferences, but they strongly suggest that an important culprit to explain the Arab democratic gap is political rather than cultural or structural. Local culture can explain the age and the religiosity differences with the rest of the world, but it is unlikely to explain the differences in values among the educated. And while the more educated individuals have an interest in the preservation of strong rule in the Arab region to defend their economic position or their social preferences, this is unlikely to also explain their support for conservative ideals such as the values of authority or patriarchy. We argue that a part of the reasons behind the existence of the large education gaps must be that autocratic regimes were able to manipulate educational institutions in ways that bias individual values in ways that favor their rule, such as by promoting the respect of authority and political quietism -- for example by supporting rote learning and by exacerbating popular fears of a chaotic future outside the political status quo.³

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how to measure the preference for democracy, evaluates empirically the existence of an Arab exception, and asks whether this exception is particularly connected with different socio-economic groups. Section 3 goes over the theoretical and empirical foundations of three possible drivers that determine the preference and interests of individuals for a democratic order: their political aspirations, economic

³ It should be noted that this explanation contradicts the empirical regularity according to which richer and more educated countries tend to be more democratic -- political scientists often interpret this relation as a reflection of the fact that reversion to autocracy is harder in such countries (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). There is however a growing set of countries that are becoming richer and more educated, but not more democratic, such as China, Russia and the FSU, and most Arab countries.

grievances, and fear of change schools, before considering how local culture and state policies may bias these preferences. Section 4 looks at the distribution of preferences of individual values to discriminate between the culture versus policy factors behind the observed divergences. Section 5 concludes and offers suggestions for future research.

2. Measuring the Preference for Democracy, and Comparing Arab Citizens With the Rest of the World

In this section, we discuss first how to measure the individual preference for democracy, and then look at how popular support for democracy in the Arab region compares with the rest of the world.

Measuring individual preferences for democracy in ways that make international comparisons meaningful is no easy matter. When simply asked to rate their preference for a democratic order, Arabs, like most citizens of the world, express a high demand for democracy (Tessler, 2002, 2005, 2012). When the questions become more qualified however (for example, would respondents favor a quick or gradual shift to democracy), responses become more ambiguous in the Arab Barometer data (Tessler 2012). Thus, to capture a clearer preference that is relevant operationally in particular circumstances, the measurement of a preference for democracy must compare two alternatives: a democratic system one can aspire to, and an alternative system, which could be the current one, or an imagined autocratic one. Several measurements are possible using the WVS questionnaire, depending on how one defines precisely these two alternatives, and these turn out to yield widely different results when measuring Arab values.

Two particular measurements have been used in the past in the WVS literature. In the first, one measures the difference between the answers to a question about the strength of democratic aspirations (“how important is it for you to live in a country that is democratically governed?”), to an assessment of the current situation (“how democratically is your country being governed today?”). The so-called democratic gap variable is used extensively by Pippa Norris (Norris 2011). The other prevalent measure, which was introduced by Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart 2005), is to compare democratic aspirations with preferences for autocracy (“as a way of governing your country, what do you think of having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”).⁴ Below, we refer to these measures Demo1 and Demo2 respectively.

We have a problem with both definitions, in regard to the circumstances and history of the Arab region. The first variable measures unconstrained aspirations. Some people may like the idea of democracy, and they may think that their country is particularly not democratic (so Norris’s Demo1 will be large), and yet, when asked to *rank* democracy and autocracy, they may still prefer the latter. Inglehart’s Demo2 measure is closer to what we are interested in as it compares democratic aspirations with autocracy, but it is too blunt in its characterization of autocrats as rulers “who do not bother with elections”. It may well be that many Arabs would instead associate with the notion of what Mark Tessler (Tessler 2004) calls “security democrats”, individuals looking for strong rule and (relatively managed) elections.⁵ We prefer to measure the (relative) preference for democracy with a variable that allows respondents to rank their preference for democracy relative to “strong rule”, and not to an extreme form of autocracy. Ideally, such a measure would allow respondents to directly rank alternatives (rather than subtract two ordinal values), and it would rely on more than one question in order to reduce noise.

⁴ Answers to each of these questions are a number that represent the respondent preference between two extreme possible answers, typically over a (1-10) range. This allows developing various measures of gap by subtracting two variables.

⁵ Moreover, both measures treat two ordinal variables as cardinal by subtracting them and expecting the difference to be ordered. While the use of ordinal values cannot be avoided in statistical analysis of opinions, it should be minimized, especially for dependent variables.

In this paper, we have developed what we argue is a more adapted measure to the circumstances where both a full democracy and a repressive autocracy are likely to be viewed by many as undesirable. We develop our measure, which we call “preference for democracy” (PfD), by using 3 questions in the WVS that ask respondents to rank the values provided in 3 separate menus, where each menu includes at least one value connected to democratic environments (“people have more say in how things are done”, “giving people more say in important government decisions”, “protecting freedom of speech, progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society”) and one to authoritarian (but not openly tyrannical) environments (“making sure the country has strong defense forces”, “maintaining order in the nation”, “the fight against crime”). Our measure is also ordered: we rate higher individuals who rank values connected with democracy above those associated with security more frequently.⁶

Table 1 shows the basic statistics for Demo1, Demo2, and PfD, as well as their constituent variables, in the Arab countries and the rest of the world (ROW) WVS samples. Importantly, it turns out that while the PfD average is lower in the Arab sample (3.0 versus 3.75 average score on a scale of 10), the average of Demo1 and Demo2 are larger in the Arab world. Moreover, this is not the result of focusing on a particular time period. We have also plotted the national averages of the PfD variable over the last 3 waves of the WVS in Figure 1, against GDP per capita. It is apparent that the PfD values in Arab countries tend to be below the global regression line in all periods. Before discussing the probable reasons for this regularity, let us examine this result in more depth by looking at how these 3 values are distributed along various socio-economic groups in the Arab and global samples.

2.1 A simple model

We develop below several sets of multi-level regressions to explain variations in democratic values PfD, following the form:

$$\text{PfD} = aA + bB + cC + \text{error},$$

where the matrix A describes individual characteristics, B is a set of independent variables that describe countries (GDPc, level of democracy as measured by the Polity score, time dummies); and C describes the population under study in various ways (dummies for all Arab countries, or for individual Arab countries, for oil dependent countries, and/or for Muslim-majority countries). We use simple OLS techniques for ease of interpretation (while recognizing that logistical models would be more adapted to the task), and all variables have been standardized.⁷

We use as controls a set of individual characteristics, including age (15-90), education (classified at four levels), religiosity, gender, and income. We measure income with dummies variables (relative to the richest group) to allow for non-linearities of the income effect – for example, the middle class may be more democratic than both the richer and poorer part of the population. Religiosity is measured relative to the values people want to inculcate in their children, in order to avoid gender biases that would arise if we used instead of the frequency of attending religious services (since women are not bound to participate in the five daily prayers in Islam). Precise definitions are in the annex.

It is usually believed that values reflect culture and change slowly. A key weakness of opinion polls is that they measure opinions at a particular moment in time, and that these measurements can be influenced by particular events, and end up as non-representative of the true underlying values. In order to both measure the recent state of values, but attempt to neutralize short-term fluctuations, we pool data from the 5th and 6th waves, which span the period 2000-2013. As a result, our data covers about 194,000 individuals in 88 countries, of which about 25,000

⁶ For a precise description of how the PfD variable, and other variables used in the paper, are constructed, see the appendix.

⁷ Standard errors are clustered at the country level.

individuals in 12 Arab countries. The WVS sample size in each country/wave tends to be reasonable and representative (1000 to 3000 respondents). Answers to questions are typically over a range (1-10), allowing us to measure the intensity of particular values. Most of the questions we use span the two last waves. When constructing indexes using the responses to several questions to capture a particular value, we check that they are properly constructed by using factor analysis (see annex).

2.2 Fixed Arab effects

We start by investigating the differences between the three measures of preferences for democracy in the global sample of individuals – Demo 1 (Norris), Demo2 (Inglehart), and our own measure (PfD). In the base regression, A include individual characteristics (age, education, gender, income, religiosity), B includes only GDP per capita and a time dummy, and C includes an Arab region dummy and its interaction with time.⁸

The results (in Table 2, columns 1 to 3) of the estimation of A accord with the main findings of Inglehart that education, as a core emancipative value, drives the preference for democracy – indeed, the three measures of democratic values rise with education. The effect of age and income however vary according to the definition used. Demo1 and Demo2 rise with age, while PfD is higher among the youth. This is an important difference, as the first two variables do not accord well with Inglehart’s notion that younger generations should be more emancipated. In addition, Demo1 decreases with income and Demo2 has no relation to income, while PfD is highest among the lower middle class, another desirable feature in light of the literature on the role of the middle class in consolidating democracy. The PfD measure differs from Demo1 and Demo2 in two other ways – it decreases with religiosity, and it is higher among females, relative to males (but both effects are small). Finally, the effect of development, as measured by lnGDPc is positive and significant for PfD (again, as suggested by modernization theory) but not significant for the other two measures. Thus, our PfD variable behaves in more intuitively appealing ways than Demo 1 and Demo 2 on two important accounts: the relation between preference for democracy and age and with national income.

What of the Arab exception? The results in Table 2 show again important divergences among the three measures. Demo1 and Demo2 show the Arab region as having a *premium* for democracy, of +14% and +10% respectively, as suggested by the simple averages discussed above, while our variable PfD shows a *deficit* of 8%. Since we are using standardized forms for our variables, with a mean of 0 and an SD of 1, this should be interpreted as a gap of 8% below to the global average (which is 3.75 – see Table 1), expressed in terms of units of standard deviation of the global distribution of PfD (which is 2.58). Note that this estimated democratic deficit is smaller than that suggested by the raw averages in Table 1. This must be due to net composition effects, the Arab region being much more religious and a bit less educated than the global average, two factors that reduce PfD (but it is also younger, which creates an offsetting positive effect on PfD).

The Arab premium connected to Demo1 is explained by the fact that Arab citizens have slightly higher aspirations (column 5), and that they rate their regimes as much less democratic than in the ROW, as they are (column 6). Demo2 shows a premium largely because Arab demand for a hard autocratic rule is below that of the ROW (see column 4) – most likely, this is connected with the catastrophic history of dictators in the region. In effect, these results indicate that Arabs aspire for more democracy and less autocratic rule, as they have too little of the first and too much of the second. But when asked to rank democracy and *strong rule* (and not hard autocracy), our result in Table 1 indicates that many Arabs tend to prefer the latter, even when

⁸ The time effect in the Arab region is given by the Arb1 dummy, which refers to the 4 countries with data in waves 5 and 6 (which are Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq), multiplied by a wave 6 dummy. It thus shows the trend among these 4 countries between waves 5 and 6.

they dislike hard dictators. As a result, they end up below the global averages on PfD, even though they register a premium on the measure of unconstrained aspirations (Demo1), and of hard autocracy (Demo2), as if these end up choosing among the lesser of evils. This tension between aspirations and a hard reality may well be at the heart of the Arab autocratic specificity. In the rest of the analysis, we will focus on the PfD variable to measure the preference for democracy, as we believe that, based on the results above, this variable characterizes in a meaningful manner Arab preferences when it comes to the type of regime they aspire to.

It can be noted that while we have weak evidence for the movement of Arab opinions over time, since they are restricted to four countries, PfD took a small hit after the 2011-12 uprisings in the 4 countries in the sample, dropping by 3% on average (but not significant), but at a time when the global trend was also negative. If this trend was applied to the sample of 12 countries, in wave 5, just before the “Arab Uprisings”, the gap must have been of a similar magnitude.⁹

2.3 The effect of individual Arab characteristics on PfD

The level differences we have observed above between citizens of Arab countries and the rest of the world may reflect differences among all citizens, or they may be due to particular differences among particular socio-economic groups. Identifying such group differences would help in understanding more clearly the underlying factors of the Arab specificity, and in particular, can allow us to “test” if these are more likely to be due to differences in interest, culture, or to have been created by policies. We thus extend the results of Tables 2 by looking more in depth at the effect of individual characteristics on PfD by adding an Arab dummy variable interacted with individual characteristics in the regression model. To recall, the PfD is globally higher among the middle class (inc2), the youth, and the educated. Is the structure of individual preferences for PfD different in Arab countries? It is clear from Table 3 that the main ways in which the Arab world is different are, in order of importance, the effects of education, and then of age on PfD (as the variables have been normalized, the size of the effects can be directly compared in our regression results). As noted above, a third factor that stands out is religiosity, because of a large compositional effect, rather than because religiosity influences values in the Arab region differentially.

First, the effect of education on PfD is very much muted in the Arab region (+3% = +10% - 7%) relative to the rest of the world, (+10%). This means that as an individual moves from uneducated to being a university graduate, which is about 4 SDs on the education scale (see Table 1), her PfD rises by 40% globally, but only by 12% in the Arab world - a very large difference.¹⁰ Thus, as in the ROW, education emancipates, but it does so much less in the Arab world compared to the global experience, resulting in low national averages on PfD. The result that education emancipates politically in the Arab world is not new (Tessler 2002, Jamal 2006), but that it does so less than elsewhere is.

Second, the effect of young age on PfD is smaller in the Arab region than in the rest of the world – the net Arab slope relative to age is -3% (-6%+3%), compared to a global slope of -6%.¹¹ So for example when comparing a person in her 20s, with another in her 60s (about 3 SDs on the age scale), holding all other personal characteristics at their global means, the young would have an excess on PfD relative to the old of 18% in the ROW, and only of 9% in the

⁹ This is consistent with the findings of Tessler (2015) who shows, based on Arab barometer micro-data that cover eight Arab countries, that the uprisings of 2011 have not affected preferences for democracy in significant ways.

¹⁰ It is noteworthy that there is a similar, albeit smaller effect for Gap 2, the measure on preference for democracy relative to a hard autocracy.

¹¹ In contrast, the relation between age and Demo2, the measure on preference for democracy relative to a hard autocracy, goes the other way around, as if older individuals are more comfortable with hard autocracy.

Arab region. Here too, the novelty is not that youth are more emancipated in the region compared to the old, but that they are less so compared to global experience.

Third, the effect of religiosity is significant, negative, and similar in the Arab region and in the ROW, and this translates into a larger PfD gap in the region given that it is much more religious than the ROW (.76 versus .35 on a scale of 0-1, see Table 1). Here, the results is different from those in Hoffman 2004, Jamal 2006, Tessler 2002, and Hassan 2008, who all find that the effect of religiosity on the PfD is small and insignificant in Muslim-majority countries. Here, we find this effect to be negative (and small), but in ways similar to the ROW - these differences are likely to be due to differences in the sample and/or in our measurement of PfD.

The income effect, which is evident in the global sample, is neutralized in the Arab region, which has only a small upper middle class effect. In particular, the lower middle class group (Inc2) has a 2% premium on PfD in the global sample, but zero in the Arab region. This contradicts claims that it was the middle classes that mainly supported democratic ideals during the regional uprisings of 2011 (Diwan 2013). Finally, women are found to be more pro-democracy in the PfD sense than men in the Arab region, but not in the ROW, with a small differential of 1%.

What is the relative contribution then of age, education, and religiosity in explaining the Arab gap? Let us consider for simplicity that Arabs have the same distribution of age and education as in the ROW, but that religiosity is one SD above the global situation (which is close to reality – see Table 1). Let us then compare the attitudes to PfD of its main champion - a young, highly educated, lower middle class (LMC), with average religious beliefs. Let us pick then a LMC youth of about 25 years old (with about one SD below the global average age, i.e of age 43.3-16.8), that goes to university (this corresponds to a rating of 4 which is again close to an education level about one SD above the global average: 2.94+.78). The global educated youth is estimated to have a surplus on PfD, relative to an average global individual (i.e with all variables are at the mean of their global distribution, the normalized PfD measure is 0) by 18 points (+6+10+0+2). The Arab educated youth, with a religiosity level set at the Arab average, would have an excess of PfD relative to an average global citizen of 4 points (3+3-2+0).¹² The PfD difference between the Arab and global educated MC individuals is thus 14 points (18-4), which can be decomposed into the differential effect of education (7), age (3), religiosity (2), and LMC effect (2).

What does this say about our main question about the relative importance of various factors in shaping the democratic deficit in the Arab world? Clearly, the effect of education predominate – in the example above, it explains half of the democratic gap. On the other hand, to the extent that we can conflate Arab culture with its surplus of religiosity, it is apparent that culture's contribution to the Arab democratic gap is small. Moreover, more educated individuals are less likely to be influenced by local than by global cultures. The blunted effect of education on the demand for democracy in the Arab world could be related either to self-interest, with the educated against redistribution and democracy, or to the impact of state policy. We come back to this central issue in sections 3 and 4.

2.4 Civic action and protest

Are the lower levels of PfD in the Arab countries that we have uncovered above associated with lower level of political involvement? The question is worth asking given the seeming contradiction between our results on the existence of a democratic preference gap, and the scenes of demonstrations and protest witnesses in major Arab cities during 2011-12 (a period that falls between the WVS waves 5 and 6). To try to elucidate this contrast, there are several

¹² The last term related to the compositional effect of religiosity is computed as follows for the educated young Arab: $[0.76 - 0.35] / .48$ – see Table 1.

questions related to political involvement in the WVS that can be looked at here. We focus on three variables – interest in politics, participation in demonstrations in the past, and a broad index of civic action that we construct and that encompasses three questions related to the extend to which respondents have participated in a demonstration, signed a petition, or joined a boycott.¹³

It turns out that there are no level differences in the Arab world relative to the ROW – the level Arab dummy is not significantly from zero in Table 2 (columns 7 to 9).¹⁴ But are there differences in the participation of particular groups in political activities? To answer this, we look at the slope effects associated with our 3 variables (Table 3, columns 7 to 9). It turns out that there are important slope differences for education again, but not for the other individual characteristics. Although educated Arabs are *more* interested in politics than their global comparators, they are not as engaged politically (4% versus 17% on civic action). This large differential (13% on civic action) parallels the results above on the PfD gap being especially large among the educated and strengthens the notion that education is not as emancipatory politically in the Arab world as in the rest of the world. On the other hand, the results in Table 3 also show that youth participate more in demonstrations than in the rest of the world (relative to older individuals), which runs against their relative gap on PfD, pointing towards the existence of other countervailing influences, and requiring further investigation.¹⁵

2.5 Robustness

We conclude this section by conducting robustness checks to see if a few outliers in the Arab region drive the results or whether they apply broadly in the Arab sub-sample. First, the PfD regressions are broadly similar across countries and periods. The democratic gap measured above applies to every Arab country in the sample, albeit with different intensities. To evaluate the country effects, we rerun the PfD regression, replacing the Arab dummy by country dummies for each of the 12 Arab countries covered by the WVS, in order to measure how far from the regression line each Arab country lies, (see Table 8). We find that all the countries of the region are below the global “regression line” on PfD. The regressions yield in general effects with the same signs as those in Table 3, when they are significant, with only a few exceptions.¹⁶ We have also run Table 3 regressions for waves 5 and 6 separately (results not shown). For PfD, there is no Arab effect in wave 5 (where the sample is much smaller), and a stronger Arab effect in wave 6.

3. Theory – the Formation of Individual Preferences for Democracy

Before looking at deviations from the norm, and trying to explain these differences as being due to self-interest, culture, or policy, we need to start by understanding how preferences are formed. We thus describe here several theoretical models that can explain the formation of preferences for democracy. We then broaden the discussion to the possible impacts of local culture and state policies in shaping particular deviations from these predictions in the Arab world.

¹³ For all the indexes used in the paper, factor analysis was conducted to ensure that all the variables entered have one unique factor. See annex.

¹⁴ Table 2 also reveals that the variables “protest” and “civic engagement” (but not “interest in politics”) have fallen between waves 5 and 6 in the four countries for which data exists over the two waves. This suggests that political activism was slightly higher during the period covered by wave 5 (and was then higher than in the ROW).

¹⁵ These results confirm Robbins and Tessler (2014) results, based on Arab Barometer data, on the dominance of youth and the educated in protests in Egypt, but they go beyond these by *comparing* their participation rates with those of similar groups in the ROW.

¹⁶ Age is negatively correlated with PfD, except for Palestine w6; education has a positive sign, except in Qatar w6; religiosity has a negative sign, except in Iraq w5 and Yemen w6; income has a positive sign, except in Yemen w6; the gender effects however varies.

3.1 Theories of preference formation

Besides views that Arab culture, or Islam, are culturally anti-democratic, and our contention that policies too can influence values, there are three structural views in the literature on what drives the individual preference for a democratic order that seem particularly relevant for the Arab world. They are the “modernization thesis”, the distributionist view, and the high transition costs supporting the status quo view.

The “modernization” thesis has a long tradition steeped in the work of Weber, Durkheim, and Lipset (1959), and is has been operationalized statistically by the sociological work of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and their colleagues under the World Value umbrella. In “Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy”, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that individual preferences evolve, from traditional/religious to secular rational, and from survivalist to self-expressive values, as societies become more “modern”. The evidence collected to back the modernization thesis is remarkable, although it is also biased toward the specific Western experience with industrialization and post-modernism. Inglehart argues that rising levels of individualism and of self-expression are at the heart of the emancipation drive. In this view of the world, the yearning for democracy in the Arab world that found its highest expression during the Uprisings of 2011-12 could be related to the weakening of traditional authority and religion, driven by rising education, urbanization, and economic growth, which lead emancipated parts of the population to reject repression as a tool for governance. Inglehart and Welzel also argue that most of social change happens through generational replacement, with younger generations leading change (2005, 2010). We will check below the extent to which “individualism” gap can be correlated with a PFD gap, for the Arab region as a whole, and among particular socio-economic groups.

A second intellectual tradition relates to democratization as driven by self-interest. One key concern in this literature is over income inequality and redistribution. From an economic point of view, it is expected that the poorer segment of the population will favor taxation and redistribution, and that the rich would oppose this (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The empirical implications of these models is that one would expect poorer individuals to prefer redistribution more than the rich, and to prefer (on this account) democracy more also, as long as the median voter is poor enough. There are three important complicating factors discussed in the literature on the Middle East. First, it is often argued that the poor will not act in their class interests (because they do not have sufficient information to understand their economic interests, or because they are easily be swung by clientelistic forces to support autocracy), and that it is the middle class rather than the poor that will typically be the main supporter of democracy.¹⁷ Second, some authors have also argued that the middle class will not oppose autocracy when it benefits from various favors such as state jobs, and subsidies, especially in oil dominated economies (Bellin 2002, Kamrava 2005, Lust-Okar 2008, Ross 2001). Finally, another related claim is that the rich or the educated may also oppose democracy not just because they fear redistribution, but also because they dislike the type of social policies that Islamist governments would promote if they were elected to power (Lust-Okar 2008). We will check whether distributional preferences in Arab countries differ from the rest of the world in these respects.

Third, individuals’ preference for political change are also likely to depend on the perceived cost and benefit of this change. It is possible conceptually that the various reasons for change discussed above (modernization, redistribution) do not transfer into a greater demand for democracy when their political environments are unstable, generating fears of chaos associated with a political transition. From an economic perspective, one would expect that it would be the poor that would be most sensitive to risk, since poverty is likely to breed risk aversion. One

¹⁷ See for example Masoud for a careful examination of this thesis in Egypt

could also speculate that the less individuals trust their state, the more they would be willing to go through a painful transition in order to support the move towards a more effective state.

While the three theories described above have tended to be seen as competing to explain the underlying reality, it is more productive to see them as potentially operating in parallel (as in Cifti, 2010). These separate channels can interact at the level of the individual and can in theory produce varying levels of preference for democracy, depending on the socio-political environment.

If Arab individuals were governed with the same preferences (and global culture), circumstances, and policies as individuals in the ROW, they will not show particular variations relative the ROW on the way these theories apply in determining jointly their PfD and the key values of individualism, support for redistribution, and fear of chaos. On the other hand, to the extent that circumstances (i.e their interests) diverge, or their local culture diverges, or the policies that affect these preferences diverge, then we would expect divergences to appear in their PfD. Our central goal is to try to separate these influences, and particularly those related to local culture and to indoctrination by state-led policies. This is a tricky endeavor, and our identification strategy will rely on how one would expect these divergences to be distributed along the dimensions of age, education, and religiosity.

Let us start with the effects of local culture. A minimalist definition of culture in the Arab world is to think of it as embodied in the dominance of the Muslim religion in the region, and to take religiosity as the main marker of local culture. We have already found that religiosity does not affect the demand for democracy in the Arab world differently than in the ROW, but that its level is much higher in the region. In this minimal way then, culture does influence PfD negatively, but in relatively limited ways.

However, one could argue that a more expansive definition of local culture is needed since Islamic values cut across the three domains discussed above. Indeed, central tenets of Islam can be seen to affect preferences in these domains, such as the fear of “Fitna” (discord) exacerbating the fear of chaos, the deference to the communal goals (“Umma”) reducing the appeal of individualism, and the value of self-help reducing the appeal of redistributive policies (Bayat 1992).¹⁸ Local culture can affect individualism - Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) define culture as a preference map over individualism/collectivism, and they find that Arab culture is mid-way between the Anglo-Saxon individualism and Asia collectivism.¹⁹ The appeal of religious conservatism, sometimes embodied in political Islamist movements bent on applying religious laws (“Sharia”) to all the spheres of the laws, can also directly affect the PfD.²⁰

Thus, local culture may explain biases with respect to all the values central to the theories described above and can affect PfD indirectly through other channels than religiosity. But similarly, state-led policies can also affect these values. This type of effects which have studied in the political economy literature in the region were alluded to above and include the effect of security policies on the fear of chaos, the fear of the social policies advocated by political Islam, and a possible MC bias connected with state favors to this group. Another type of policies, more closely connected to education, concerns the possible *indoctrination* efforts by autocratic regimes to use education policies and institutions in order to change individual preferences in

¹⁸ On this last point, Al-Gamal has argued, at the opposite, that Islam favors redistribution (Al-Gamal 2013).

¹⁹ While Inglehart believes that local culture evolves with modernization, and Lipset believes that Muslim culture is intrinsically anti-democratic, Roland takes a middle view – that culture persists, but that they can change slowly with development.

²⁰ Mark Tessler (2002, 2006, 2012) has argued that Arabs are supportive of both political Islam and of democracy, but he both uses different definitions of democracy (in particular, unconstrained), and he does not compare Arab preferences to global preferences.

ways that favors their rule, in particular through efforts to inculcate values of political quietism. It is mainly sociologists that have made this case – such as Bourdieu (1998) who's defining work shows how institutions work to ensure the survival of the system by “reproducing” the values of the elites. The possibility of indoctrination is also consistent with the extensive progressive pedagogy literature, where education is viewed as the main mechanism to strengthen democratic values, at least since the groundbreaking work of Dewey in 1916 (see for example Dewey 2004) in western countries, and that of Freire (1998) for developing countries. Economists on the other hand do not seem as aware of the possibility that education and autocracy can coexist, and instead, there is a wildly held view that autocratic regimes would prefer not to educate their population, an intuition modeled formally in Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).²¹ But many countries have in the past two decades increased the level of education of their citizens without becoming more democratic (FSU, Russia, China, Arabs and GCC...). The existence of a relation running from political regime, to education systems, and to individual preferences has not been explored empirically, to our knowledge. Our “indoctrination hypothesis” then will be that democratic countries will tend to foster a preference for democracy among their citizens, while autocratic regimes will tend to foster a dislike for democracy, the respect for authority, and a fear of change. Indoctrination policies require that regimes have the capacity and the time horizons to engage in such deep social engineering. This has certainly been the case in the Arab world, which has been dominated by autocratic states for the past 50 years, and subjected to mass education movements since the 1960s. We will take it that policies can affect the values of the educated through the indoctrinating effect of education, but that they have no differential influence on age, given education (besides the possibility that older educated individuals, who have been educated previous to the age of mass education in the 1950s and 60s, may be more emancipated than younger educated persons).

Our main concern is to try to separate the effect of self-interest, culture, and policy in shaping gaps in Arab preferences. To do so, we will take advantage of different ways in which these factors are likely to affect preferences. We would expect local culture to affect mostly the uneducated (and also the old and the poor), which are least connected to global culture. We know that more educated Arabs have very high rates of connection to the internet, and thus to global culture (Diwan 2015). Moreover, we know that they also identify more with global than with local identities (Norris, 2000). Conversely, we would expect that indoctrination policies would mainly affect the educated since its effect works through education itself. Thus, we would see indoctrination at work if social values connected with a low PfD are not just higher in the Arab world relative to the ROW, but also higher among the educated Arab relative to the uneducated Arabs.

Our empirical results so far – that Arabs experience a democracy gap, which is especially marked among the educated, already suggests that indoctrination could be at play. But they can be consistent with several of the other theories listed above. For example, education may not confer as much individualism in the region compared to the rest of the world; or the educated may fear income redistribution, or conservative social policies, brought about by democratization. In order to discriminate between these competing hypotheses then, we need to look at additional evidence.

²¹ The empirical literature on the topic has so far been inconclusive. Most of the work in this field compares countries, not individuals. The focus has been on how countries compare over time and relative to each other in terms of the evolution of education achievements and democratic governance. Glaeser et al (2007) claim of causality from education to democracy has been disputed by Acemoglu et al (2005) who argue that the results are driven by comparisons between countries, and not time, and that there was no relation once country effects are taken into account. A recent discovery is that it is the distribution of education that matters, not its average (Castello-Climent, 2008),

4. Can We “Explain” the Democratic Deficit by Self-Interest, Culture, or Policies?

The theories described above about the formation of individual preferences for democracy turn around the evolution of values connected with individualism, the desirability of income redistribution, and the cost of political change. Our hope is that the examination of these values, which are, together with PfD, “caused” by culture, interests, and policies, will help identify the particular impact of each these forces. We will also find it useful to look at the support for (conservative) social values to try and discriminate more between culture and policies. Below, we then look at the level, distribution, and correlation with PfD, of individual values related to individualism, redistribution, fear of change, and social attitudes.

4.1 Measurement

We start by looking at four variables from the WVS data, including indexes that we construct, to test the validity of the theories described above. These variables are described below.

Individualism. Individualism (or self-expression, emancipation) is defined as the ability of individuals to make autonomous decisions and to innovate as needed without undue social constraints. Individualistic agency typically rises in parallel to rising education, urbanization, and access to knowledge and information, which widens people’s intellectual resources, leading them to become cognitively more autonomous (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). Such “modernizing tendencies” were recognized by sociologies early on, starting with Durkheim who identified a shift from “communities of necessity” to “elective affinities” as part of a liberating process that diminishes social constraints on human choice and nurture a sense of autonomy. The notion of individualism is also closely related to notions of “capabilities” as defined by Amartya Sen (1999). Several questions in the WVS address opinions about such values. We construct an index based on three questions, two related to preferences concerning the extent to which parents encourage imagination and self-expression among their children, and one relating to the extent respondents think of themselves as being creative and critical.²²

Economic preferences. We measure the preference for redistribution by building an index of two questions related to whether “incomes should be made more equal, vs. whether do we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort“, and “government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, vs. people should take responsibility for themselves”. We call this measure the preference for equality (PFE).

Fear of change and trust in the state. We also look at the variable “Fear of chaos”, which we capture as an index that measures the extent to which respondents are worried about a war involving their country, a civil war, or a terrorist attack. We also look here at the confidence in the state. We measure this with an index that measures how much confidence respondents have in the government of their country, its parliament and its civil service.

4.2 Correlation with PfD

It is useful to start by examining if in our data the correlations between these 4 new variables and the PfD variable reflect the theories discussed above. In this respect, it is possible to look at the correlation coefficients between PfD and each of these variables in two ways: at the country level (in the global sample), between national averages; and at the individual level, using the full information. It is well known that typically, correlation coefficients at the individual level are lower than correlations across countries (Inglehart at Welzel 2010), and can even have opposite signs. The correlation among countries cover many other possible

²² Note that we do not measure IND as Inglehart does -- he uses the first principal component of a very large set of variables. Our measure is closer to that of Welzel (2012), and has the benefit of being easier to interpret because it is more concretely connected to a small set of questions.

indirect relations besides the direct individual effects, are more akin “general equilibrium” effects.²³

It can be verified that the overall correlation between PfD and these variables, both in Arab countries, and across countries is negative, and in some cases quite large -- in particular, the country level correlation of PfD with individualism is 48%; and that with the fear of chaos is equally large at -56%. Only the correlation with PfE and with Trust the State are smaller at -18% to -15% (see Table 4). The individual level correlations are lower, as expected, with those among Arabs broadly of the same magnitudes and signs as in the ROW. The main difference here is that Arabs seem to translate the fear of chaos into low PfD at about three times the rate calculated in the ROW. (Also note the high levels of correlation between PfD and the various measures of civic engagement). These figures already suggest a potentially tight relation between PfD and individualism, conservatism, and fear of change, but a low connection with redistribution policies.

4.3 Level differences

We now examine if, beyond simple correlations, these values behave in a way that parallels the PfD gap. The results in Table 5 are from regressions of these variables in a manner similar to equation 1 on individual and country characteristics, allowing us to verify if there is an Arab level difference.²⁴

It is readily apparent that there is an Arab exception in all these variables, paralleling, and potentially explaining, the PfD gap: (i) Arab individuals have levels of individualism below those of otherwise similar individuals in countries at similar levels of development, with a gap of 11% (column 1);²⁵ (ii) the preference for equality is much lower than the rest of the world (by 17%); and (iii) the fear of chaos is 19% greater than in the rest of the world (but the dummy measuring the extra trust in the state is zero). Each of these “gaps” (and any combination) – low levels of individualism, low interest in redistribution, exacerbated fear of chaos - can explain the low levels of PfD in the Arab region. The question before us is whether they are distributed among individual characteristics in ways that allow us to identify the effects of self-interest, culture, and policy in the formation of these gaps. For this, we need to examine the composition of these gaps across social groups.

4.4 Slope differences

Table 6 shows regressions that compute the Arab specific slopes for these four values along the dimensions of age, education, gender, income, and religiosity.²⁶

Let us first focus on the individualism (IND) gap to try to understand if it can explain the PfD gap, and whether it is shaped by interest, culture, or policy (Table 3). It is apparent that the contributions of various socio-economic groups to the Arab individualism gap are highly unequal. Interestingly, the slopes effects explain all the regional effect (as the Arab dummy goes to zero). (i) First, religiosity – which as argued above can be seen as a marker for local culture, has an especially negative effect in the region on IND. This highlights the role of local culture. Since religiosity did not have a differential impact on PfD, this would suggest that

²³ Inglehart and Welzel (2010) analyze two such situations: in US states with a larger African American population, racism tends to be higher, even though African American tend to be anti-racist; In pre-war Germany, large unemployment made people more pro-war, even when they were not unemployed themselves.

²⁴ These regressions control for the Arab dummy, GDPc, individual characteristics, as well as time dummy and an ARB1’s interaction with time.

²⁵ The gap has been shrinking in all the four countries for which we have data in waves 5 and 6 (by 4% between the two waves).

²⁶ Some researchers would simply include the variables defined above in the PfD regression as additional explanatory variables. This however presents a grave problem of collinearity and of endogeneity, since these variables themselves can be determined by the same exogenous factors that determine the preference for democracy. We prefer to stick to truly exogenous explanatory variables.

there are other countervailing reasons favoring PfD among religious people. (ii) Second, young age does not generate as much IND in the region as in the rest of the world, i.e, youth does not “liberate” from national culture as much as elsewhere. We interpret this as due to Arab culture itself, with its emphasis on harmony within the large family. This effect can explain the PfD gap among the youth. (iii) More educated Arabs are found to be as individualistic as other educated individuals around the world. This attests to the preeminent impact of education in opening up individuals to global culture (at least to its self-expressive dimension). Since we know that educated Arabs have a PfD gap, we will have to look for other reasons than individualism in explaining this.²⁷ In sum, we can conclude that there is evidence that local culture reduces individualism by slowing down the emancipation of the youth (and the religious), but that education does foster emancipation from local culture. Thus, while the anti-democracy bias of youth can be explained by culture, that of the educated cannot.

Turning now to PfE, the goal is to understand why the region is less interested in redistribution relative to the ROW – is it its culture, or the interests of particular groups? Since we know that the region is less unequal than others (Bibi and Nabli, 2010), the low regional level of PfE can be logically related to interests. Here again, the slopes effects take the ARB dummy to zero and thus explain all the regional variation relative to global experience. (i) First, we find that more religious individuals are to the “right” (and by a lot), which must be due to culture (and thus contradicts claims that Muslims are on the “left”). This effect should reduce their PfD, and suggests that counter-veiling forces on PfD must be strong (to counteract both this effect and the effect of religiosity on IND). (ii) Second, we find that the Youth tend to be on the “left”, relative to global youth. This is most likely to be due to self-interest, expressing a rejection of the seniority premium imbedded in the autocratic bargain. Given that this should support a higher level of PfD, it would appear that the anti-PfD forces (such as culture) must be large. (iii) Finally, we find that educated Arabs are more to the “right” compared to educated individuals in the ROW. This can be due to either their self-interest, being to some extent important beneficiaries of the autocratic regimes, and can, by itself, explain the PfD deficit of the educated, or it can be due to the effects of indoctrination (with regimes being particularly anti-communist in the 1980s and 90s).²⁸ Thus, we are unable to separate self-interest and indoctrination effects among the educated on this account.

Finally, do the different socio-economic groups experience a fear of change differentially? As a regional specificity, fear of chaos could reflect local culture (fear of Fitna), or the special fragility of the region, which makes people more sensitive to this. Confidence in the state too can be partly cultural. The chaos dummy remains very strong when controlling for individual characteristics, but not trust in the state (as all other values). (i) First, religiosity is related to more fear of chaos, which strengthens the cultural (Fitna) interpretation. This is one more reason religious people should have low PfD. (ii) Second, the relation between age and the fear of chaos is similar to the global experience (but in addition to a fixed effect). On the other hand, young Arabs are less confident in the state than global youth do. Again, this runs against the youth having low PfD relative to the old. (iii) The educated are very much fearful of chaos, and are trusting of the state, relative to global experience, both of which make them unwilling to contemplate regime change. This effect cannot be interpreted as cultural, since we have argued that local culture should affect the uneducated most. It is also unlikely to be due to interest, since there are no good reasons why the educated should be more risk averse than the uneducated. We thus take this as a first evidence of the effect of indoctrination policies.²⁹

²⁷ In addition, income effects are neutralized compared to the ROW, with the MC effect observed in the global sample eliminated in the Arab world – as in the PfD case. And there is a small individualism surplus for women.

²⁸ There are no specific income or gender effects in the region.

²⁹ Here too, the global income effect, with the poor fearing chaos more, is neutralized in the region, as is the gender effect, suggesting again a flattening of opinions relative to characteristics other than education, age, and religiosity.

Let us recapitulate the main results, now organized by individual characteristic (see Table 7 for a summary of results). On religiosity, the 3 effects are negative, while its impact on PfD was found to be zero. This means that there is a large countervailing force that makes PfD attractive for religious people. One such factor is the stronger opposition to strong rule by more religious individuals (see Table 3). One can speculate that this is related to the history of repression in the region, as autocratic regimes were particularly fierce in their treatment of Islamic movements. Nevertheless, and beyond issues related to the intensive margin of religiosity, the high levels of religiosity in the region did result in low levels of support for democracy. Second, in trying to understand why the youth support PfD less relative compared to global experience (and also why they engage more in demonstrations), we found two reasons - their desire for redistribution, and their low trust in the state. The only negative element is their IND gap, which reduces their PfD, and which we have interpreted as the result of local culture. Finally, while the impact of education on PfD was found to be negative (and large), our results suggest that this is likely to be due in parts to self-interest (their gap on PfE), and in parts to indoctrination policies (their fear of chaos).

4.5 Social preferences

The results thus, so far, suggest an indoctrination effect at play among the educated, but this is not totally convincing as their gap can be also explained by self-interest. To see more clearly if indoctrination is at play, we look here at the effects of education on social values. The preference for particular social values must largely be influenced by culture or policies, rather than by interests. One useful value to look at is the “respect for authority”. If an excess on this value exists for cultural reasons, we would expect it to affect the uneducated more, while if it is larger among the educated, this would reflect the effect of indoctrination policies. We also look at the value of patriarchy. The sociological literature finds that Muslim countries have been lagging on gender emancipation (Esmer 2002, Alexander and Welzel 2011, Norris and Inglehart 2002). The value of patriarchy has been closely connected with that of autocracy, the autocrat playing the same role, in the large, as the head of a patriarchal family (Joseph 1996). We also look at religious conservatism (or political Islam), to check the possibility that it is the fear of conservative social policies that reduces the appeal of democracy among the educated (as hypothesized by Lust-Okar 2008).

The WVS is rich in questions that can measure social values. For respect for authority, we construct an index on the basis of two questions relating to whether “greater respect for authority is a good thing”, and “obeying rules” is an essential characteristic of a democracy. To look at the support for patriarchy, we built an index to measure how connected individuals are to patriarchal values, which combines answers to three questions: “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”; “on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do”; and “a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.” Finally, we find only one question that measures, imperfectly, the support for political Islam (PI) - whether “Religious authorities should ultimately interpret the laws.” (This question was asked in all countries covered by the WVS, with the nature of the religious authority being that of the religion of the respondent).

A quick look at the various statistics reveals that social conservatism is negatively correlated with PfD and is prevalent in the region. The cross-country correlation of PfD with respect for authority is -36%; that with patriarchy is a whopping -72%; and that with religious conservatism (which we interpret as support for political Islam in the Arab region) is 35%. The regional gaps, when measured as fixed effects, show a very large “excess” of support for conservative social values – the extra support for values of obedience, patriarchy, and political Islam are respectively +11%, +30%, and +18%, above the rest of the world (Table 2, columns 2 to 4).

Looking at slope effects reveals that education fosters social conservatism, unlike the experience in the rest of the world, in all these dimensions. On the other hand, religiosity and age do not affect social values in ways very different than in the ROW. The results are in Table 6. It is apparent by looking laterally at the table that the effect of education is higher than the effects of other characteristics (religious conservatism at +6%, patriarchy at +10%, and respect for authority at +14%). These are strong results which cannot be explained by the impact of local culture, and point out instead to the indoctrination thesis. Moreover, the educated group is unlikely to oppose democracy out of a fear of a takeover by religiously conservative groups, since these are values that it itself espouses.

Robustness. When controlling for individual countries, we find not only that all the countries of the region are below the global “regression line” on PfD (as reported above), but also that they tend to have broadly similar values on the other dimensions we have looked at, but with some interesting exception. In particular, it appears (see Table 7) that Lebanon, Palestine, and Tunisia rate on PI like the rest of the world; and all countries except Morocco, Egypt, and Qatar favor redistribution less than the rest of the world. On self-expression, the deficits are larger in Libya, Yemen, and Iraq. Finally, economic worries are higher than in the ROW everywhere save in Jordan, Lebanon, and Bahrain, and fear of chaos is high everywhere but in Jordan, Palestine, and Bahrain. All in all however, it does not seem that particular countries massively biased the results that characterize the region as a whole. Instead, Arab countries exhibit many similarities in the preferences of their citizen, a similarity we attribute to the similarity of their political regimes, all of which have tried to shape the minds of their citizens in similar quietist ways.

5. Conclusions

Our investigation found, using the WVS data, which covered 12 Arab countries and 88 non-Arab countries in its 5th and 6th wave, that the Arab region did experience a democratic demand deficit around 2008-2013. More specifically, when focusing on the Arab region in a comparative perspective, we found that the globally strong push for democracy by the educated and the youth was stunted by conservative, anti-distributional, and pro status quo biases among the educated, and by an individualism gap among the youth.

These results suggest that while Arab culture may to some limited extent promote collectivism at the expense of democracy values, educated Arab groups have been much less emancipated and supportive of democracy compared to their global peers. We have argued that the structure of preferences in the Arab world is consistent with the claim that these preferences are shaped at least in part by policies of manufacturing consent, in addition to self-interest, and local culture.

Areas of future research relate to a closer look at the mechanisms that reduce PfD of the educated, and to examine the experience of other autocratic countries. One area that can be investigated more is that of the impact of various grouping, such as oil producing countries, or Muslim majority countries. Across countries, one could discriminate more finely between states with the capacity and the longevity to put together indoctrinating education institutions, and the others. One should also be able to look more carefully at the differences in values among cohorts, including those that were educated before the development of mass nationalist education.

Importantly, our results suggest that education reform in Arab countries should focus not just on its quality from an economic productivity perspective, but also, from the social and political qualities it embodies as well.


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Figure 1: Preference for Democracy in the World and in Arab Countries, 2000-2013



Notes: The variables represent the average value of PfD at the country level for all the countries in the WVS samples of waves 4 to 6.

Table 1: Summary Statistics (Global and Arab Datasets, Individual Level, Waves 5 and 6)

	Arab countries			Obs.	ROW		All	
	Obs.	mean	SD		mean	SD	min	max
Preference for democracy (PFD)	23036	3.00	2.52	135591	3.75	2.58	1	10
Demo1	14027	3.27	3.37	125479	2.08	2.75	-9	9
Demo2	18660	3.76	4.24	120884	3.51	3.96	-9	9
Strong Leader	21348	4.54	3.36	125641	4.90	3.05	1	10
Preference for equality (PFE)	23183	4.94	3.06	134752	5.43	2.93	1	10
Religious conservatism (RC)	22467	5.98	3.11	121358	4.04	2.91	1	10
Demo aspire	21044	8.44	2.15	131341	8.40	2.03	1	10
Demo de-facto	14177	5.14	2.75	126447	6.31	2.44	1	10
Fear of chaos	16042	7.34	3.02	65777	6.26	3.15	1	10
Individualism	24574	2.50	2.70	138774	3.23	3.42	1	10
Protest	19725	2.89	3.13	122210	3.78	3.19	1	10
Trust the state	23859	5.34	2.84	158614	5.21	2.4	1	10
Respect authority	21348	7.78	3.04	156048	7.32	2.88	1	10
Civic engagement	23183	3.67	2.70	144948	3.60	2.64	1	10
Interest in politics	22467	5.13	2.67	161948	5.12	2.60	1	10
Patriarchy	21044	5.44	2.29	161883	5.15	2.39	1	10
Age	24507	38.27	14.21	138431	42.30	16.84	15	99
Education	24471	2.63	1.03	137600	2.94	.78	1	4
Religiosity	24574	.76	.42	138759	.35	.48	0	1
Inc1	23684	.18	.38	129599	.18	.38	0	1
Inc2	23684	.23	.42	129599	.20	.40	0	1
Inc3	23684	.24	.43	129599	.28	.45	0	1

Table 2: Global Determinants of Preference for Democracy (PFD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	PfD	[5-6] Demo1	[5-4] Demo2	Strong Leader	Demo aspire	Demo De facto	Interest in politics	Civic engagement	protest
age	-0.06***	0.05***	0.06***	-0.02	0.07***	0.00	0.09***	-0.02	-0.04**
education	0.06***	0.13***	0.08***	-0.04*	0.10***	-0.07***	0.13***	0.15***	0.13***
female	0.01	-0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.01*	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.08***
religiosity	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01
inc1	-0.00	0.08***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.11***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.03**
inc2	0.02**	0.04***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.07***	-0.04***	-0.02	-0.01
inc3	0.01	0.03***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.06***	-0.02***	-0.02	-0.01
lngdpc	0.11***	-0.05	0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.09*	-0.06*	0.21***	0.08**
ARB	-0.08**	0.14***	0.10**	-0.11***	0.05*	-0.13**	0.05	-0.08	-0.03
wave6	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.12***	0.09**	-0.10***	-0.05	-0.03	-0.13***	-0.08**
w6*ARB1	-0.03	0.02	-0.07	0.09	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05***	-0.06**
N	141914	126530	126217	132087	137278	127428	146730	131104	127652
adj. R ²	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.12	0.05

Notes: OLS, uses WVS waves 5 and 6. Standardized beta coefficients. ARB is a dummy for 12 Arab countries included in wave 6. ARB1 is a dummy for the four Arab countries included in wave 5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.

Table 3: Determinants of PfD in Arab Countries, With Slope Specific Effects

	(1) PfD	(2) Demo1	(3) Demo2	(4) stlead	(5) aspire	(6) defacto	(7) Protest	(8) Civic action	(9) Int. in politics
age	-0.06***	0.03***	0.05***	-0.02***	0.07***	0.03***	-0.01**	-0.01	0.09***
education	0.10***	0.10***	0.12***	-0.08***	0.11***	-0.02***	0.18***	0.17***	0.11***
female	0.00	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	0.01***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.10***
Religiosity	-0.02***	-0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02***	-0.01***	-0.03	-0.01
inc1	0.01***	0.07***	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.10***	-0.01***	-0.04**	-0.06***
inc2	0.02***	0.05***	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.07***	-0.01**	-0.02	-0.05***
inc3	0.01***	0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01	-0.03***	-0.06***	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.03***
lnGDPc	-0.33***	0.44***	0.16***	-0.29***	0.02	-0.39***	0.48***	0.19***	-0.07**
ARB	0.11*	-0.20***	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.15***	-0.11	0.14	-0.15**
Age*ARB	0.03***	0.01	-0.03***	0.02***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05**	0.01
Edu*ARB	-0.07***	0.01	-0.05***	0.05***	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.12***	-0.13***	0.16**
Fem*ARB	0.01***	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.01**	0.01**	-0.06***	-0.04**	-0.00
Relig*ARB	-0.00	0.02***	0.04***	-0.03***	0.03***	-0.01**	0.02**	-0.00	0.01
inc1*ARB	-0.01***	0.01**	0.01**	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02	0.02
inc2*ARB	-0.02***	-0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.03**
inc3*ARB	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.02	0.01
N	141914	126530	126217	132087	137278	127428	127761	132019	145178
adj. R ²	0.10	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.08	0.19	0.15	0.12	0.04

Notes: See notes from Table 2. Also include time dummies. Standardized beta coefficients. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients between PfD and Other Values (waves 5 and 6)

	Individual, MICs	Individual, Arab	Countries, global**
Preference for Equality (PfE)	.00	-.02	-.18*
Religious conservatism (RC)	.02*	-.04*	-.35*
Individualism (IND)	.10*	.12*	.48*
Respect for Authority	-.11*	-.09*	-.36*
Civic action index	.17*	.18*	-.12*
Support for patriarchy	-.10*	-.10*	-.72*
Interest in politics	.01	.01	-.09
Civic engagement	.12*	.07*	.50*
Protest	.09*	.04*	.47*
Trust for the state	-.12	0	-.15*
Fear of chaos	-.04*	-.12*	-.56*
Strong Leader	-.03*	-.02*	-.22*
Age	-.06*	-.04*	.32*
Education	.06*	.10*	.27*
Religiosity	.04*	-.15*	-.35*
Inc1	-.02*	.03*	-.17*
Inc2	.01	-.01	.02*
Inc3	.01*	-.00	.23*

Notes: * = significant at 5% level; ** correlation among country averages.

Table 5: Scale Effects for Social and Political Attitudes

	1 Individualism	2 Support of patriarchy	3 Respect of authority	4 Support Religious Conservatism	5 Fear of chaos	6 Trust the state	7 Preference for equality	(8) Religiosity
GDPc	0.01	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.17***	-0.22***	-0.05	0.12***	-0.17***
ARB	-0.11**	0.30***	0.11***	0.18***	0.19***	0.05	-0.17***	0.31***
wave6	-0.08**	-0.01	-0.13***	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03	-0.02
w6AR1	0.04**	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.08**	0.01	0.01	0.00

Notes: See notes of Table 2. Regressions also control for age, education, female, religiosity, inc1, inc2, inc3, lngdpc, wave6, wave6*group, as in Table 2 (effects not shown). Sample: Waves 5 and 6.

Table 6: Determinants of Values – Arab and Global

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Individualism	Support of patriarchy	Respect of authority	Support Religious conservatism	Fear of chaos	Trust the state	Preference for equality	Religiosity
age	-0.10***	0.01	-0.00	-0.02***	0.00	-0.01	0.02***	-0.01
education	0.08***	-0.14***	-0.07**	-0.10***	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.04***	-0.06**
female	-0.03***	-0.15***	0.00	0.02***	0.04***	0.01	0.02***	0.03***
religiosity	-0.07***	0.07***	0.08**	0.09***	0.02***	-0.02	-0.01***	
inc1	-0.06***	0.02*	0.01	-0.01	0.05***	-0.05***	0.08***	0.02
inc2	-0.06***	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.02***	-0.04*	0.08***	-0.01
inc3	-0.02**	-0.02	0.00	-0.01**	0.03***	-0.04**	0.05***	0.01
lngdpc	0.03	-0.18***	-0.13**	-0.08	-0.26***	-0.02	-0.12**	-0.17***
ARB	-0.07	0.19*	-0.09	-0.01	0.42***	-0.10	0.01	0.21***
Age*ARB	0.07**	0.03	0.04	0.03***	0.01	0.08**	-0.02**	0.03
Edu*ARB	0.01	0.10*	0.14***	0.06***	0.07***	0.14**	-0.02**	0.06
Fem*ARB	0.00	-0.04***	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.03***	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Relig.*ARB	-0.08**	0.04	0.04	-0.01*	0.03***	-0.01	-0.03***	
inc1*ARB	-0.01	0.03**	0.01	0.01*	-0.03***	0.02	0.00	0.01
inc2*ARB	-0.01	0.05***	0.01	-0.00	-0.01***	0.02	0.00	0.04***
inc3*ARB	-0.02	0.04***	0.01	-0.00	-0.02***	0.02*	0.00	0.02**
N	146601	145188	140703	130263	72955	123679	141603	147195
adj. R ²	0.05	0.20	0.08	0.23	0.27	0.01	0.11	0.14

Notes: See notes of Table 3. Standardized beta coefficients, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table 7: Effects of Individual Characteristics on Values in the Arab World and in the ROW

	Arab effect, unconstrained	Arab gap, with slope effects	Education gap	Youth gap	Religiosity gap
PfD	-	++	-	-	0
Strong rule	--	0	+	-	-
Civic action	0	0	--	+	
Individualism	-	0	0	-	--
PfE	--	0	-	+	-
Fear of chaos	++	++	+	0	+
Trust the state	0	0	++	-	0
Respects patriarchy	++	0	++	0	0
Religious conservatism	++	0	+	-	-
Respects authority	++	0	+	0	0
Religiosity	++	0	0	0	0

Notes: Double signs refer to effects that are larger than 10%. See Tables 3, 5, and 6.

Table 8: Country Specific Effects on Values (Waves 5 and 6)

	PfD	Demo1	Demo2	Preference for equality	Religious conservatism	Individualism
JOR	-0.03**	-0.03***	0.09***	-0.05***	0.10***	-0.00
MAR	0.00	0.10***	0.11***	0.03*	0.03***	0.02
EGY	-0.03**	0.08***	0.08***	-0.01	0.17***	-0.03*
LBN	-0.01***	0.01	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.00
PLN	-0.01***	0.03***	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
QAT	-0.04***	na	na	-0.06***	0.08***	-0.01
TUN	-0.05***	0.09***	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01	-0.00
LBY	-0.08***	0.08***	0.02***	-0.06***	0.06***	-0.02***
YEM	-0.03***	0.05***	0.04***	-0.01**	0.01**	-0.02***
IRQ	0.02	0.05***	0.08**	0.03**	0.09***	-0.13***
DZA	-0.02***	0.02***	0.04***	-0.03***	0.02***	-0.01
KWT	0.00	0.00	-0.02**	-0.04***	0.06***	0.01**
BHR	-0.03**	na	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.04***	-0.01**
N	133108	126530	127166	135083	123010	136266
R ²	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.14	0.06

Notes: Standardized beta coefficients. Also controls for all individual characteristics, GDPc, w6, w6*ARB1.

Annex. Definition of variables

Preference for democracy (PfD). This variable uses responses to the following six questions

V60. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):

V61. And which would be the next most important?

- A high level of economic growth
- Making sure this country has strong defense forces
- Seeing that people have more say about how things
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful

V62. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):

V63. And which would be the next most important?

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Giving people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

V64. Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):

V65. And what would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second choice”):

- A stable economy
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society
- Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money
- The fight against crime

The index combines 3 sub-indexes: demo6061, demo6263 and demo6364 (where the numbers indicate which variables are used for ordering, such as V60 and V61 for demo6061). All the sub-indexes are binary and take the value of 1 if democracy > order and zero otherwise. The combinations of responses that make each sub-index take the value of 1 are:

- demo6061: V60=3 or (V60=1&V61=3) or (V60=4&V61=3)
- demo6263: V62=2 or V62=4 or (V62=3 & V63=2) or (V62=3 & V63=4)
- demo6465: V64=2 or V64=3 or (V64=1 & V65=2) or (V64=1 & V65=3) To fit the variable in the (1,10) range, the 3 sub-indexes are summed up, added to 1, and then multiplied by (10/4).

Factor Analysis: Variables form one factor

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
demo6061	0.6830	0.5336
demo6263	0.7160	0.4873
demo6465	0.5390	0.7095

Democratic Aspirations (aspirations). V140: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?

Democratic satisfaction (de facto) V141: And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?

Democratic Deficit (Demo1): constructed as the difference between democratic aspirations and democratic satisfaction, V140-V141.

Strong Leadership (SL). Reversed 1-10 version of V127: I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”

Democratic Gap (Demo2): constructed as the difference between democratic aspirations and strong leadership, V140-V127.

Preference for Equality (PfE). Average of reversed V96 and V98.

V96: Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. "Incomes should be made more equal" vs. "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort".

V98: Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

"Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" vs. "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves".

Factor Analysis: Variables form only one factor

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
V96revs	-0.7832	0.3866
V98revs	0.7832	0.3866

Individualism (IND). Average value of V15, V22, V70revs).

V15: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five! (Code five mentions at the maximum): Imagination

V22: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five! (Code five mentions at the maximum): Self-expression

V70: Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? "It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one's own way."

Factor Analysis: Variables form one factor

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
V15ten	0.6937	0.5188
V22ten	0.6151	0.6217
V70revs	0.5118	0.7380

Gender Inequality (patriarchy). Average value (V45revs V51revs V52revs).

V45: Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements? "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women"

V51: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do"

V52: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl"

Factor Analysis: Perfect!

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
V45revs	0.9991	0.0018
V51revs	0.9998	0.0004
V52revs	0.9998	0.0004

Respect for authority: Average value (V69revs V138ten).

V69: Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? (Code one answer for each): "Greater respect for authority"

V138: Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy": "People obey their rulers"

Factor Analysis: Variables form only one factor.

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
V69revs	0.7783	0.3942
V138ten	0.7783	0.3942

Religious conservatism (RC): Raw form of V132

V132: Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy." Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.

Interest in Politics: Average of V7 reversed and V84 reversed.

V7: For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is (read out and code one answer for each): Politics

V84: How interested would you say you are in politics?

Factor Analysis: Variables form only one factor

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
V710	0.8828	0.2207
V8410	0.8828	0.2207

Civic Engagement (civic): Average value (v85, v86, v87)

V85: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: "Signing a petition"

V86: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: "Joining in boycotts"

V87: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: "Attending peaceful demonstrations"

Factor Analysis: Variables form one factor

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
signpeti10	0.8188	0.3296
joinboyy10	0.8325	0.3070
demonst10	0.8170	0.3324

Participation in Demonstrations (protest): Originally 1-3 scaled V87. Reversed and transformed into 1-10 scale.

V87: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: "Signing a petition" Attending peaceful demonstrations.

Trust state institutions: Average value (V115revs V117revs V118revs)

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?:

V115: The government

V117: Parliament

V118: The Civil service

Factor Analysis: Variables form only one factor

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
V115revs	0.8169	0.3326
V117revs	0.8592	0.2618
V118revs	0.8048	0.3523

Fear of Chaos (chaos): Average value (V183revs V184revs V185revs).

To what degree are you worried about the following situations?

V183: A war involving my country

V184: A terrorist attack

V185: A civil war

Factor Analysis: Uniqueness level is very low-good

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
V183revs	0.9277	0.1394
V184revs	0.9361	0.1238
V185revs	0.9257	0.1431

Independent variables

Age: the scope of this variables is restricted to 15-99.

Education: Originally V248 is a 1-9 scaled variable but the number of scale changes across waves, and so we aggregated into a 1-4 scale where 1 stands for people who no education, 2 for individuals with at most have a primary school diploma, 3 for people who have more than primary school and less than university education and 4 for people who have at least started a university program.

Female: V240, takes a value of 1 for female and 0 for male.

Income: Inc1, Inc2, and Inc3 are dummy variables related to the 3 first quartiles of the income distribution respectively, relative to the group in the richest fourth quintile.

Religiosity: V19, which asks whether religious faith is an important child quality. Unlike other questions that measure piety, this question was asked in all countries/waves.

The country averages are:

Lngdpc: Logarithmic value of GDP per capita for each of the countries (PPP, constant 2005 international \$), for the year in which the survey was done (World Bank Indicators).

Lnoilrent: Logarithmic value of oil rents over GDP, taken the year in which the survey was done (World Bank indicators).

Muslim: Share of self-declared Muslim in the total population, using V144, which asks religious denomination of the respondent.